ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS

In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content. Even when information is costlessly available strategic considerations may lead firms to remain uninformed. These results are illustrated in a simple Stackelberg model with price-setting firms where the pricing game is preceded by an information acquisition game.     

A REEXAMINATION OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION RESPONSES TO THE 65-MPH SPEED LIMIT

In a recent issue of Economic Inquiry (35[3]: 614–20) Lave and Elias (1997) contend that the 1987 increase in speed limits to 65 mph on rural interstate roads caused a reduction in statewide fatality rates. They argue that increased fatality rates on rural interstates were counterbalanced by declines on other roads due to compensatory reallocations of drivers and state police. This article is unable to find any empirical evidence of these reallocations. This removes the empirical basis for their hypothesis and implies that the effect of the 65-mph speed limit can be inferred from an analysis of rural interstates only. On these roads, fatality rates increased dramatically.     

RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN PUBLIC POLICY: THE EFFECTS OF THE 65-MPH SPEED LIMIT

In 1987 the U.S. government allowed states to raise speed limits to 65-mph on some highways. We evaluate the consequences using a resource allocation perspective: the chance to drive faster reallocates traffic from side roads to the safer interstate highways, and a higher speed limit permits highway patrols to shift manpower from speed enforcement to other safety activities. This perspective implies that we should measure the effect of a speed limit by its systemwide rather than its local effects. We do so and find that the fatality rate dropped by 3.49%-5.1% following the speed limit increase. (JEL A10, R40)     

THE NEAR OPTIMALITY OF MARK-UP PRICING

Mark-up pricing policies result in a loss of profits compared to marginal pricing behavior. These losses, however, are often very small, even for large changes in the money supply. But by adopting a simple pricing rule the firm does not have to forecast the future, and avoids the informational and computational costs required to determine the profit maximizing price each period. Thus, even if these costs are small, mark-up pricing policies may be optimal, or approximately so, at least for some firms. In a macro model this is likely to imply large monetary non-neutralities.     

TEACHING TOOLS: INTERTEMPORAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION: DISTRIBUTIVE ISSUES SURROUNDING GASOLINE PRICE HIKES

This paper shows that many people misinterpreted the gasoline price increases that followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Consumers expressed outrage when prices increased immediately even though a production shortfall did not materialize for several weeks. But by withholding output in the invasion's aftermath arbitragers (including oil companies) reallocated output intertemporally to make more available when it was needed most. The welfare consequences in general depend upon demand elasticities and their rate of change, but in this instance consumer surplus would probably have been maximized with a full and immediate price adjustment and oil companies profited from their restraint.     

THE OPTIMALITY OF PARTIAL PRICE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES

This paper studies the optimal price adjustment policies of a monopolistically competitive firm whose profit-maximizing price is subject to a serially correlated random disturbance. The firm chooses its price by comparing the expected cost of present and future price changes with the expected losses occurring when price deviates from its instantaneous profit-maximizing value. Partial price adjustment often is the best way to minimize the sum of these losses. Prices tend to be more flexible both in response to large shocks to the firm's profit-maximizing price and when much uncertainty exists about the future.     

ALLOCATION OF GOODS BY LOTTERY

Many authors have argued that lotteries are used to allocate resources because of the fairness of the mechanism. However, a number of historical examples suggest otherwise. Participation fees are almost always charged and they are often discriminatory. In addition, goods (or bads) allocated by lotteries are usually not transferable. Both lottery participation fees and restrictions on transferability reduce rent-seeking from speculators. Each feature increases the rents to the primary user groups relative to the rents attainable from alternative mechanisms such as auctions, queues, or merit allocations.     

THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS

Tournaments are widely used in organizations, explicitly or implicitly, to reward the best‐performing employees, for example, by promotion or bonuses, and/or to penalize the worst‐performing employees, for example, by demotion, withholding bonuses, or unfavorable job assignments. These incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees' relative performance. While the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood, little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents. We show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability, the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity. Under a wide range of conditions, loser‐prize tournaments, that is, tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers, are optimal for the firm. The reason is that low‐ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments, as compared to winner‐prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers, and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints. (JEL M52, J33, J24)     

A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labor market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly nonlinear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence. (JEL E32, J41)     

COLLABORATE OR CONSOLIDATE: ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES

We analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger, though the effect on prices, quantities, and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries. We further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture (i.e., by delegation of input pricing). (JEL L13, L23, L42)     

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING THEORETICAL VARIATIONS

Although resource mobilization theory has brought a number of advances to the field of social movements, it does not constitute a unified body of theory. The principal divisions exist between McCarthy and Zald's "professional organizer" model and McAdam's "political process" model. Their disagreements are centered mainly around their conceptualizations of the role that elites play in the formation and development of social movements. It is believed that these differences can be reconciled by returning to the original precepts of resource mobilization theory.     

ASSET MANAGEMENT,ALLOCATION OF TIME,AND RETURNS TO SAVING*

The paper entertains the proposition that individuals' time performs a productive role in generating nonwage income through the management of nonhuman capital assets. The asset management hypothesis is used to develop a life cycle model of consumptive and productive decisions. The model allows for variations in gross rates of return both across persons at a point in time and for any one person over his life cycle. The behavioral implications developed show that differences across consumption units in their time allocations and in their borrowing, saving, and asset holding decisions may be the result of differences in opportunities rather than “tastes.”     

STRUCTURAL CHANGE, COMPETITIVE BALANCE, AND THE REST OF THE MAJOR LEAGUES

Analyzing North American major sports leagues other than baseball, we find no break points in competitive balance time series corresponding to rule changes, the draft, free agency, salary caps, or labor disputes except for the 1998 basketball lockout. Some expansion and team relocation correspond with break points. Mergers that do correspond with break points all enhance competitive balance. But not all expansions, moves, and mergers correspond with break points. Remaining explanatory challenges include a general negative trend in competitive balance in basketball and the occurrence of a break point in football, 1976–1977. ( JEL C32, L83)     

THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS

I model a competitive insurance market with both moral hazard and adverse selection, and analyze the effect on welfare when both problems are present simultaneously. An examination of the interaction between these two problems leads to two hypotheses. First, the nature of the equilibrium contracts is such that each problem partially offsets the welfare loss associated with the other. And second, the degree to which this occurs increases as agents become more heterogeneous. Simulation results overwhelmingly support both hypotheses.