Migration,development and remittances in rural Mexico

The argument is that remittances to Mexico from migrants in the US contribute to household prosperity and lessen the balance of payments problem. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the incentives and constraints to development and individual economic well-being in rural Mexico. Examination is made of the financial amount of remittances, the use of remittances, the impact on development of remittances, models of migration, and migration historically. The viewpoint is that migration satisfies labor needs in developed countries to the detriment of underdeveloped countries. $2 billion a year are sent by illegal migrants from the US to Mexico. This sum is 4 times the net earning of Mexico's tourist trade. 21.1% of the Mexican population depend in part on money sent from the US. 79% of illegal migrants remitted money to relatives in Jalisco state. 70% of migrant families receive $170/month. In Guadalupe, 73% of families depended on migrant income. In Villa Guerrero, 50% of households depended on migrant income. Migrant income supported 1 out of 5 households in Mexico. Money is usually spent of household subsistence items. Sometimes money is also spent on community religious festivals, marriage ceremonies, and education of children or improved living conditions. Examples are given of money being used for investment in land and livestock. Migration affects community solidarity, and comparative ethic, and the influence on others to migrate. Employment opportunities are not expanded and cottage and community industries are threatened. Land purchases did not result in land improvements. Migration models are deficient. There is a macro/micro dichotomy. The push-and-pull system is not controllable by individual migrants. The migration remittance model is a product of unequal development and a mechanism feeding migration. Mexican migration has occurred since the 1880's; seasonal migration was encouraged. There was coercion to return to Mexico after the economic recession of World War I; the door was firmly closely during the Great Depression of 1929-35. The 1980 estimates of illegal Mexican migrants totaled 2-9 million, which is the largest flow in the world. US industrial presence and Mexican development have reinforced migration flows. Regional and international capitalist requirements govern migration.     

Overseas workers' remittances in Asian development

In recent years, overseas workers from Asia have been sending remittances of about $8 billion annually to their home countries. These remittances are an important source of precious foreign exchange for the major labor-exporting countries. The overall development impact of remittances, however, has not been well established. Remittances are spent primarily on day-to-day consumption expenditures, housing, land purchase, and debt repayment. Although only a small proportion of remittances are directed into productive investments, this does not warrant the conclusion that the developmental value of remittances is negligible. In fact, remittances spent on domestic goods and services Asia provide an important stimulus to indigenous industries and to the economies of the labor supplying countries. It is these broader macroeconomic benefits of remittances which seem to have been largely ignored in the literature, and this perhaps explains the pessimistic view of the developmental value of remittances. Reservations concerning the effects of remittance on the sending countries include the fears that 1) expenditure patterns of remittance receiving households may create a demonstration effect whereby nonmigrant households may increase consumption, 2) remittance inflow will increase income and wealth inequalities, 3) remittance expenditures may result in inflation, 4) remittances may produce only short-term fluctuations in long-term economic development, and 5) remittances may adversely affect agricultural development.     

State and regional policy implications of elderly migration

This paper uses the 1980 Census data to estimate the size of the economic transfers associated with the 1985 to 1990 interregional migration of older persons. Total economic transfers are estimated by multiplying interregional migration flows of older persons by the average income of older persons in each migration stream. Assuming an average life expectancy of 15 years for elderly migrants and an expenditure multiplier of 2, the total redistribution of income as a result of 1985 to 1990 elderly migration is estimated to be over $600 billion. The South Atlantic and Mountain regions are the recipients of the largest positive net transfers; the East North Central and West North Central regions have the largest negative net transfers.     

International migration in a changing world

This paper eulogizes the life and work of Gunther Beijer (1904-1983), an international migration research supporter, who was himself a refugee from Nazi Germany. The brain drain of professional workers of other nations into such traditional receiving countries as the US, Canada, and Australia particularly interested Beijer. The creation of many independent nations after World War II changed migration trends greatly. By the 1970s the immigration policies of receiving countries had changed to favor non-Caucasian professional workers and relatives of current residents. This new migration may be classified as 1) permanent settler, 2) guest worker, 3) professional transient, 4) clandestine, and 5) refugee. Non-Caucasian immigrants increasingly find that they may not be wanted when perceived as an economic or social threat. Beijer understood guest worker migration within Europe in the early 1960s, but he could not foresee the demands that guest workers and their families would place on receiving countries. Guest worker migration gives sending countries relief from unemployment and provides remittances; it also provides needed labor to economically health countries. Guest workers such as those currently employed in the Persian Gulf may not be accepted socially or politically by the host community and may be considered undesirable employees on their return home. Nations often tolerate illegal or clandestine migration when the labor need is high, but illegals may be expelled when economic or political conditions turn against them. The problems of the estimated 10 million refugees fall increasingly on developing countries, but must be shared by all nations since their increasing numbers affect domestic and international politics.     

Remittances from labor migration: evaluations,performance and implications

2 evaluative views of worker remittances draw opposite conclusions. The negative one posits that remittances increase dependency, contribute to economic and political stability and development distortion, and lead to economic decline that overshadows a temporary advantage for a fortunate few. The positive view sees remittances as an effective response to market forces, providing a transition to an otherwise unsustainable development. They improve income distribution and quality of life beyond what other available development resources could deliver. The implications are tested for labor supply countries to Europe and the Middle East. The implications of the negative are not supported. Although the dire predictions of the pessimistic view have not materialized, the converse - contributions of remittances to economic performance - should not be overstated due to a lack of data.     

Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Instruments

This paper reviews economic policies and instruments available to the developed countries to reduce unwanted migration from developing countries, not all of which is irregular migration. Countries generally welcome legal immigrants and visitors, try to make it unnecessary for people to become refugees and asylum seekers, and try to discourage, detect, and remove irregular foreigners. There are three major themes: 1. There are as many reasons for migration as there are migrants, and the distinction between migrants motivated by economic and non–economic considerations is often blurred. Perhaps the best analogy is to a river – what begins as one channel that can be managed with a dam can become a series of rivulets forming a delta, making migration far more difficult to manage. 2. The keys to reducing unwanted migration lie mostly in emigration countries, but trade and investment fostered by immigration countries can accelerate economic and job growth in both emigration and immigration countries, and make trading in goods a substitute for economically motivated migration. Trade and economic integration had the effect of slowing emigration from Europe to the Americas, between southern Europe and northern Europe, and in Asian Tiger countries such as South Korea and Malaysia. However, the process of moving toward freer trade and economic integration can also increase migration in the short term, producing a migration hump, and requiring cooperation between emigration and immigration destinations so that the threat of more migration does not slow economic integration and growth. 3. Aid, intervention, and remittances can help reduce unwanted migration, but experience shows that there are no assurances that such aid, intervention, and remittances would, in fact, lead migrants to stay at home. The better use of remittances to promote development, which at US$65 billion in 1999 exceeded the US$56 billion in official development assistance (ODA), is a promising area for cooperation between migrants and their areas of origin, as well as emigration and immigration countries. There are two ways that differences between countries can be narrowed: migration alone in a world without free trade, or migration and trade in an open economy. Migration will eventually diminish in both cases, but there is an important difference between reducing migration pressures in a closed or open world economy. In a closed economy, economic differences can narrow as wages fall in the immigration country, a sure recipe for an anti–immigrant backlash. By contrast, in an open economy, economic differences can be narrowed as wages rise faster in the emigration country. Areas for additional research and exploration of policy options include: (1) how to phase in freer trade, investment, and economic integration to minimize unwanted migration; (2) strategies to increase the job–creating impacts of remittances, perhaps by using aid to match remittances that are invested in job–creating ways.     

Worker Remittances and Capital Flows to Developing Countries

Worker remittances constitute an increasingly important channel for the transfer of resources to developing countries. Behind foreign direct investment, remittances are the second‐largest source of external funding for developing countries. Yet, literature on worker remittances has traditionally focused on the impact of remittances on income distribution within countries, on the determinants of remittances at a micro‐level, or on the effects of migration and remittances for specific countries or regions. Macroeconomic determinants and effects of remittances have received more attention only recently. Hence, the focus of this paper is on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances and on differences in these determinants between remittances and other capital flows. We find that remittances respond more to demographic variables while private capital flows respond more to macroeconomic conditions.     

Best Practice Options: Albania

The Cooperative Efforts to Manage Emigration (CEME) site visit to Italy and Albania – organized in cooperation with the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), an Italian independent research institute – took place in June 2002. Albania is a country of 3.1 million people with a GDP of $4.1 billion that switched in the early 1990s, after 45 years of communism, from economic autarky to a peculiar form of market economy, and experienced some of the world’s highest emigration rates in the 1990s. Some 600,000 to 700,000 Albanians, or almost one–fourth of Albanians, and half of Albanian professionals, emigrated. As a result, the labour force is only 38 per cent of the population, versus 50 per cent in most industrial countries (UNDP, 1996, 2000). The major destinations of Albanian migrants in the 1990s were Greece, which had 400,000 to 600,000 Albanians in 2002, and Italy, which had 144,000 legal residents and probably some tens of thousands illegals at the end of 2001. 1 The Albanian Government estimates that about half of the Albanians in Greece are legal residents. There are also about 100,000 Albanians in Switzerland, the UK, Germany, and other Western European countries.
Many Albanians have become legal residents of Greece and Italy as a result of regularization–legalization programmes. Albania is also a transit point for third country nationals attempting to reach the rest of Europe via Albania. Of particular interest to the CEME members were efforts by the Italian and Albanian governments to cooperate in managing the flows of Albanian and transit migrants. When the CEME visit was made, Albania was experiencing rapid, yet unbalanced economic growth as a result of $615 million in remittances from Albanians abroad (estimates: Bank of Albania annual report, 2001), and aid from the European Union (EU) and other sources. The spending of remittances and aid has fuelled a building boom, but there was no clear sense of how Albania would use the window of opportunity opened by remittances and aid to develop a viable economy. The optimistic scenario is that remittances and investments from Albanians abroad will produce an economic take off based on value–added food production and tourism in the “Switzerland of the Balkans”. The pessimistic scenario is that corruption and divided government will prevent the development of a successful economic strategy, and that low wages, high unemployment, and inadequate services such as health care and education will prompt the continued emigration of young and educated Albanians. Potential best practices include: joint Italian–Albanian marine patrols to discourage smuggling and trafficking in small “fast boats”; Italy granting Albania at least 6,000 work visas a year to publicize that there is a legal way to work in Italy, helping to discourage illegal migration; and bilateral and international assistance to enable Albania to develop laws and institutions to deal with foreigners transiting Albania, and foreigners requesting asylum in Albania. Albania does not, on the other hand, appear to be a best practice in managing the use of remittances to aid economic development. Although remittances play an important role in basic subsistence and construction of housing, there have been fewer efforts to encourage investment of these funds in infrastructure or productive activities. The banking system needs substantial reform to become a venue for transfer of remittances and source of credit for enterprise development. Albania would benefit from a more systematic examination of the lessons learned in other countries about the investment of remittances for economic development.     

The Effect of Remittances on Economic Growth in Kyrgyzstan and Macedonia: Accounting for Financial Development

Kyrgyzstan and Macedonia have experienced a reasonable increase in remittances over the last twenty‐five years. Subsequently, the extent to which remittances can be instrumental for economic development of the two countries has gained serious attention in recent development dialogues. The aim of this study is to examine the impact of remittances versus financial development on the economic growth of the two counties, complementing the burgeoning interest and focus on remittances for policy. The short‐run and the long‐run effects and the causality dynamics of remittances and financial development, are explored. The results show a long‐run positive impact of remittances on the economic growth of these countries. The impact of financial development is negative, significant only for Kyrgyzstan and not statistically significant for Macedonia. The causality results show that remittances support economic growth for Kyrgyzstan, whereas economic growth appears to propel remittances for Macedonia.     

The social costs of child abuse in Japan

The present study calculates the social costs of child abuse in Japan. The items calculated included the direct costs of dealing with abuse and the indirect costs related to long-term damage from abuse during the fiscal year 2012 (April 1, 2012, to March 31, 2013). Based on previous studies on the social costs of child abuse and peripheral matters conducted in other countries, the present study created items for the estimable direct costs and indirect costs of child abuse, and calculated the cost of each item. Among indirect costs, future losses owing to child abuse were calculated using extra costs with a discount rate of 3%. The social cost of child abuse in Japan in the fiscal year 2012 was at least ¥1.6 trillion ($16 billion). The direct costs totaled ¥99 billion ($1 billion), and the indirect costs totaled ¥1.5 trillion ($15 billion). This sum of ¥1.6 trillion for only the year 2012 is almost equal to the total amount of damages of ¥1.9 trillion caused by the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in Fukushima Prefecture. Moreover, abuse is a serious problem that occurs every year and has recurring costs, unlike a natural calamity. However, Japan has no system for calculating the long-term effects of abuse. Therefore, owing to the scarcity of data, the calculations in the present study may underestimate the true costs.     

State and Regional Policy Implications of Elderly Migration

This paper uses the 1980 Census data to estimate the size of the economic transfers associated with the 1985 to 1990 interregional migration of older persons. Total economic transfers are estimated by multiplying interregional migration flows of older persons by the average income of older persons in each migration stream. Assuming an average life expectancy of 15 years for elderly migrants and an expenditure multiplier of 2, the total redistribution of income as a result of 1985 to 1990 elderly migration is estimated to be over $600 billion. The South Atlantic and Mountain regions are the recipients of the largest positive net transfers; the East North Central and West North Central regions have the largest negative net transfers.     

The impact of the Gulf war on migration and remittances in Asia and the Middle East

The author discusses the impact of the 1990 Gulf war on the migrant worker populations in the region, with a focus on migration and remittances in Asia and the Middle East. Both immediate and long-term effects are considered. "From the perspective of foreign migrant communities living in the Gulf...the war...was much more of a disaster for Arabs than for Asians....Arab migrant populations...were dramatically affected by the Gulf crisis. In contrast, the Asian migrant community was largely concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the [United Arab Emirates] and remained relatively less affected by the crisis. Subsequent polarization in the Arab world gives Asian labor-exporting countries an unexpected opportunity to increase their share of Gulf labor markets still further in the coming years." (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA)     

Migrant remittances and development

Income remittances from migrant workers to countries of origin are central to the links between migration and development. Multiple, complex, and diverse forces, however, affect the flow of remittances. Factors may include the number and characteristics of workers abroad; levels and types of economic activity in sending and host countries; differential wage, exchange, and interest rates; political risk; and the facility for transferring funds. These factors then shape personal decisions made by migrants and their families regarding remittances, after which any longer-range development consequences of remittances may result. Debate rages over the effects of remittances on development. This paper therefore reviews papers on the measurement of remittances and gives recent findings on the volume and direction of flows. It continues by considering evidence on the uses of remittances and their consequences for development, and closes with a discussion of policy options for increasing and channeling remittance flows.     

Migration Plans and Received Remittances: Evidence from Fiji and Tonga1

This paper investigates the relationship between remittances and migration intentions in the source country using data from households in the Pacific island countries of Tonga and Fiji. Unlike previous research it accounts for potential endogeneity in the relationship between remittances and intentions and also includes households that receive remittances but do not have current migrants. We find a positive impact of remittances on intentions. The impact of remittances on intentions is stronger in a country with a longer history of migration and stronger in households with current migrants than those without migrants. These results provide new evidence on the role of remittances in the development of migration chains.     

A note on the status of women as a factor in population growth in less developed countries

The 1978 U.S. Bureau of the Census reported 4.3 billion as the world's population. 3.1 billion were living in the less developed areas where life is characterized by poverty and low levels of material well-being. In the develop countries the per capita income averaged $490, compared to $5,210 in developed areas. Little attention has been paid to the status of women in developing countries, where the impact of development often has a negative effect. As a measure of women's status, rates are given for male/female infant mortality. If the ratio is less than 1.14 the status of women is low. If the is 1.15-1.24 the status is medium. If the ratio is 1.25 and over, women enjoy high status. In countries where women have low status the population growth ra averages 3%. Where the status of women is medium, the growth rate is 2.5%. I countries of high status the population growth rate is 2.2. Further research is needed on correlations between population and economic growth, with particula emphasis on subtle factors behind population/economic development.     

Best Practice Options: Mali

Mali, a poor country that embraced democracy in 1991, is considered a democratic role model for francophone Africa. It is grappling with several migration issues, including well–established networks that move thousands of Malians abroad, often with false documents, for $2,000 to $3,000; the dependence of the Kayes region, with 1.5 million residents, on emigration, particularly the remittances sent by its workers abroad; and the migration of Mali and Burkina Faso children to work on cocoa and coffee plantations in Côte d'Ivoire and other neighbouring countries.
Mali is generally considered among the poorest five countries around the world, but is also considered one of the most promising democracies in West Africa (Helderman, 2002). The site visit revealed that the Kayes region of Mali is extraordinarily dependent on remittances, which have improved the lives of residents, and added schools and clinics, but do not seem to have led to the establishment of large numbers of businesses that promise stay–at–home development; that the Mali government seems open to co–development, cooperates with assisted return programmes for unauthorized Malians in France, and works with international organizations to attract educated Malians back to Mali; and that Mali is open to donor suggestions for economic development so that most residents will not have to depend agriculture and cattle raising in a water–scarce region. However, there was little evidence that Mali and its donors have found the country's comparative advantage for sustained economic growth.     

Can Migration Foster Development in Mexico? The Case of Poverty and Inequality

The impact of migration on development can be analysed from a number of perspectives. This article focuses on poverty and inequality. It assesses the relative contribution of migrants to Mexico′s economy through remittances, compared to other Latin American countries; analyses the distributional impact of remittances (with an emphasis on the poor), and compares this impact to the counterfactual impact of migrants’ stay‐at‐home income. It explains the processes leading to scant economic success rates among poor international migrants. Finally, it describes the nature and impact of current Mexican migrant‐oriented policies, and recommends a shift in focus, to lessen emigration, increase the income of migrants, promote returns, and bolster the economic impact of returning migrants.     

Transnational Twist: Pecuniary Remittances and the Socioeconomic Integration of Authorized and Unauthorized Mexican Immigrants in Los Angeles County1

Annual U.S.‐Mexico pecuniary remittances are estimated to have more than doubled recently to at least $10 billion ‐ augmenting interest among policymakers, financial institutions, and transnational migrant communities concerning how relatively poor expatriate Mexicans sustain such large transfers and the impact on immigrant integration in the United States. We employ the 2001 Los Angeles County Mexican Immigrant Residency Status Survey (LAC‐MIRSS) to investigate how individual characteristics and social capital traditionally associated with integration, neighborhood context, and various investments in the United States influenced remitting in 2000. Remitting is estimated to have been inversely related to conventional integration metrics and influenced by community context in both sending and receiving areas. Contrary to straight‐line assimilation theories and more consistent with a transnational or nonlinear perspective, however, remittances are also estimated to have been positively related to immigrant homeownership in Los Angeles County and negatively associated with having had public health insurance such as Medicaid.     

Migrant transnationalism and the choice of transfer channels for remittances: the case of Moldova

Migrant remittances, particularly when transferred through the banking system, may contribute to financial development in migrants' home countries. We analyse the determinants of the choice of transfer channel (formal services versus informal operators or personal transfers) by Moldovan migrants in 2006. We estimate a multinomial logit model from household survey data. Our explanatory variables include socio‐economic characteristics of the migrant and other household members, the pattern of migration (destination country, legal status, duration), and financial information (average amount and frequency of payments). Key reasons not to use a formal transfer channel are a migrant's emphasis on low transfer cost (rather than speed, convenience or security), irregular legal status in the host country, and short migration spells. Our findings demonstrate that migrants' transnational capacities and activities in their entirety bear upon the choice of transfer channel; any policy interventions to promote the use of formal channels should reflect this.     

The world economic system and international migration in less developed countries: an ecological approach

This study examines net migration in less developed countries (LDCs) within the context of a world economic system and an urban ecological framework. Data are obtained from the "1987 World Development Report," the "1983 and 1987 World Bank Tables," and the 1984 UN Demographic Yearbook. It is posited that international migration is a direct response to the changes in the ecological subsystems in LDCs. The framework of this analysis relies on analyses by Sly and Tayman that found in multi-equation models that migration was a demographic response to environmental conditions created by organization and technology. The maximum likelihood estimates derived from the proposed structural model indicate that net capital flows positively influence net migration rate directly. Large transfers of capital were associated with net migration. It is suggested that a reduced percentage in the labor force in agriculture may have a greater impact on emigration than wages or social disadvantages. Gross national product had a smaller impact on migration than net capital outflows. Exports had a positive impact on net migration. There was a direct negative effect of value added to manufacturing on net migration, and the direct negative effect was greater than the positive indirect effect. The percentage of persons economically active had a positive impact on net migration. Increased economic activity was related to increased emigration. The evidence suggests that world economic systems did have an impact on emigration, when profits were not invested in domestic economies of LDCs. Findings suggest that the value added to manufacturing, the percentage engaged in agriculture, and the economically active population mediated the impact of trade on net migration.