Making people feel good: Workers' constructions of meaning in interactive service jobs

This paper analyses the experiences of women who work in residential real estate sales, to identify the factors that lead women to choose and keep this occupation. In-depth interviews provide the data for a case study of the importance of various job traits in determining job satisfaction for a specific category of workers. The more general question concerns workers' constructions of the emotional labor involved in interactive service work. Within a general queueing model, this paper focuses on job queues. Specifically, I examine workers' preferences for jobs and the factors that contribute to positive ranking of the job after workers' initial experiences with it. Findings show that although the women's experiences on the job have disappointed their expectations, most remain satisfied with their work and plan to stay in the field. The reasons for this high level of satisfaction are related to characteristics of the workers—the women's educational and skill levels, and the limited alternatives that they perceive for themselves, and characteristics of the job—its autonomous nature and the emotional labor it entails.     

The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Unionism and changing employee views toward work

Using data from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey and the 1984 Union Image Survey, this paper examines the changing importance of satisfaction with job elements that are not traditionally the focus of union activity (e.g., advancement, autonomy, interesting work) in the decision to unionize. The results provide modest evidence of an increase in the importance of satisfaction with these job elements as a determinant of union voting intent. Unions may achieve greater organizing success by giving more attention to such themes. We thank Charles McDonald of the AFL-CIO and James L. Medoff of Harvard University for making available the Union Image Survey data.     

WHY DO WORKERS JOIN UNIONS? THE IMPORTANCE OF RENT SEEKING

Union status models ignore the fact that rent-seeking prospective members have an incentive to bid up entry costs so that higher union wage gains make union jobs more costly to obtain. The standard presumption that higher union wages cause firms to substitute toward higher quality workers is shown to be incorrect under most plausible assumptions; the observed positive correlation between wage gains and the propensity to join a union underestimates the size of the true supply response. The union/nonunion wage differential reveals more about the social cost of unions than the gain to an individual worker from union membership.     

Participation in union activities: A multivariate analysis

Multivariate analysis is used to estimate a model of member participation in local union activities. A sample of 387 members of the UAW living in the Detroit area was drawn from the1961 Detroit Area Study: Work Group Influence and Political Participation. It was hypothesized that participation would be positively associated with level of schooling, current wages, seniority, skilled jobs, job dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction with the local union, desire for another job, commitment to the labor movement, and getting along with others. OLS and Logit estimation techniques were used and support was found for all hypotheses except those related to wage levels and seniority.     

Unions,incentive systems,and job design

I model the relationship between incentive systems and job design and how unions influence both. The basic idea is that it is easier to monitor worker effort for jobs designed to be routine and inflexible. Pay based on monitoring is used in this scenario rather than incentive pay based on production. Jobs with worker flexibility and autonomy call for incentives based more on output. Unions typically oppose output-based pay, thus inducing job design change. The empirical work supports this view and shows that incentive pay is much less likely for union workers and unions have a clear negative effect on job characteristics that lead to use of incentive pay. In particular, union jobs are more repetitive, have more measurable criteria, and involve less judgmental criteria and less data analysis.     

PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINT

Recent discussions of the professions agree on the centrality of autonomy to professionalism but disagree whether organizational employment is consistent with the maintenance of professionals' traditional autonomy. This article analyzes autonomy in the engineering profession with a view to discovering both whether engineers are able to maintain high levels of autonomy in an organizational context and whether autonomy is as central to job satisfaction among engineers as the literature suggests. The data used are drawn from a survey questionnaire mailed to a sample of 800 engineers in the Rochester, New York area in 1986. Two major findings are discussed. First, although engineers are subject to certain constraints, they do appear to maintain relatively high levels of professional autonomy, especially concerning how their jobs are actually carried out. Second, despite the high value engineers place on autonomy, its relationship to job satisfaction is not a simple one. The strong effect on job satisfaction of one type of autonomy (the ability to choose the projects on which one works) may be the result not of autonomy per se but whether engineers find their work interesting.     

Correlates of union membership and joining intentions in a unit of federal employees

Correlates of membership and joining intentions in the federal sector, where union representation is broadly available but membership is relatively low, are examined. Key independent variables — attitude toward joining, normative influence, perceived instrumentality of joining, union activism, and satisfaction with the union — are all positively correlated with both membership and joining intentions. In regression analyses, attitude toward joining predicted both membership and intentions. Union satisfaction and activism predicted membership, but normative influence and instrumentality did not; and normative influence and instrumentality predicted joining intentions, but union satisfaction and activism did not. Other important variables include: general attitude toward unions, which predicted both membership and intentions; membership in the previous union, which predicted intentions, but not membership; race, which predicted intentions, but not membership; satisfaction with pay, which predicted (negatively) joining intentions, but not membership; and satisfaction with fellow workers, which predicted membership, but not intentions. We attempt to explain why determinants of membership might differ from determinants of joining intentions. This research was supported by a grant from the John A. Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Paul D. Geyer on an earlier draft of the paper.     

Is Any Job Better than No Job? Life Satisfaction and Re-employment

Using data for West Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we analyse the impact of transitions from unemployment to full-time employment on life satisfaction, with special focus on the influence of job quality. We apply various indicators of job quality (self-reported job satisfaction, wages, type of contract, and indicators of the fit between the worker and job requirements). We control for the influence of income changes and other factors affecting life satisfaction, using a conditional logit estimator. Results suggest that job quality only matters to some extent, and often people in bad jobs are still better off than those who remain unemployed. This effect is statistically significant for most indicators of job quality, except for workers with low job satisfaction and for those whose new job is much worse than their pre-unemployment job.     

Perceptions of union power,service, and confidence in labor leaders: A study of member and nonmember differences

Attitudes toward specific aspects of unionization held by the subjects of large national samples of the U.S. work force (the1977 Quality of Employment Survey) and the general population (the1972–1978 General Social Surveys) are examined in two separate analyses. Comparisons of the attitudes held by union members and nonmembers are made on specific dimensions of union power and service and confidence in union leaders. Nonmembers are found to have stronger perceptions that unions are influential in running the country and that unions are stronger than employers. Conversely, union members have stronger perceptions that unions offer protection, job security, improve wages and conditions of work, are worth their dues, and have greater confidence in union leaders. Discriminant analysis of data over a five-year period also revealed that union members have a stable higher confidence level in union leaders than nonmembers. Explanations for such union member and nonmember differences are hypothesized. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Brent Schooley. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Western Academy of Management meetings at Monterey, California, 1981.     

Occupations,Human Capital and Skills

Economists have long recognized that occupations can be used as proxies for skills in wage regressions. Yet the potential existence of non-market factors such as discrimination and occupational choice (sorting) on the basis of job attributes that are separate from, but potentially correlated with, wages makes occupations an imperfect control for skills. In this paper, we consider whether inter-occupational wage differentials that are unexplained by measured human capital are indeed due to differences in unmeasured skill. Using the National Compensation Survey, a large, nationally-representative dataset on jobs and ten different components of job requirements, we compare the effects on residual wage variation of including occupation indicators and these skill requirements measures. We find that although these skill requirements vary across 3-digit occupations, occupation indicators decrease wage residuals by far more than can be explained by skill alone. This indicates that “controlling for occupation” does not equate to controlling for only these skill measures, but also for other factors. Additionally, we find that there is considerable within-occupation variation in skill requirements, and that the amount of variation is not constant across skill levels. As a result, including occupation indicators in a wage model introduces heteroskedasticity that must be accounted for. We suggest that caution be applied when using and interpreting occupation indicators as controls in wage regressions.     

Health conditions and job hazards: Union and nonunion jobs

Blue-collar union members are more likely than nonunion blue-collar workers to report health conditions caused by job accidents and by bad working conditions caused by noise, smoke, heat, and dust. This is consistent with blue-collar union members’ evaluation of hazardous job conditions and with their indemnity claims filing behavior for industrial injury or occupational disease. Union members are also more likely to be found in industries with higher injury rates. Age and marital status are positively associated and being female and education are negatively associated with a self-reported job related health condition. We thank Steve Zrebiec for research assistance and Bill Greene for the maximum likelihood routines. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Council on Compensation Insurance or Brigham Young University.     

Union membership,economic rents,and migration behavior

This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

Diana Gittins. The Child in Question. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. 231 Pages

Abstract

Does occupation-level information reflect what people actually do at work and thus influence individuals? I examine whether there is an effect of occupation-level complexity on individuals' sense of personal control, and if there is, whether the effect is a proxy for the actual work people do on their jobs. I analyze a national probability sample of 1,450 employed persons interviewed by telephone in 1995. Without adjustment for worker's reports of autonomy, creativity, authority, and social interaction in their daily work, an index of DOT occupational complexity of work with data and people correlates with the sense of personal control. Adjustment for job-level autonomy, creativity, authority, and social interaction renders the occupation-level measure insignificant and shows significant effects of autonomous work, creative work, and social interaction at work on the sense of personal control.     

The “Helper” controversy in the construction industry

Helpers, whose role is to assist craftsmen, have been a subject of controversy in the construction industry for nearly a century. The AFL-CIO construction unions have attempted in various ways to control the work of helpers so that helpers cannot “pick up” the trade and then compete with craftsmen for jobs. With the help of the U.S. Department of Labor’s administration of the Davis-Bacon Act, these unions succeeded in almost eliminating the use of helpers on government-financed construction and most union jobs. This has meant that much unskilled and semiskilled work has been done by journeymen at skilled labor wages. The result has hurt union members and unionized contractors by aiding open-shop contractors, who use helpers extensively, to underbid their competitors and win increasing market share. This article examines the ramifications of the helper issue and related training problems from the turn of the century to the present, discusses various union policies, court decisions, and legislation affecting the issues, and concludes that the economies of utilizing helpers are sufficient to cast doubt on the efficacy or future success of current union attempts to limit narrowly the training and use of helpers. Professor Emeritus of Management; formerly, Director, Industrial Research Unit, and Chairman, Labor Relations Counsel.     

Local union leaders’ satisfaction with grievance procedures

We develop a model of local union leaders’ satisfaction with their grievance proce-dures drawing from the job characteristics model and agency theory. The model is tested with OLS regression and LISREL estimates based on a survey of local union leaders in British Columbia. Results show that local union leaders are more satisfied with their grievance procedures when local officials have more autonomy in decision making; their local size is smaller; the grievance filing rate is low; grievance issues are perceived as important; the grievance resolution rate is high; a greater propor-tion of grievances are settled in the early steps; and the union success rate is high. In addition, grievance procedure satisfaction is multifaceted and each facet has its own unique variance and a different combination of significant predictors. This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We thank Dev Jennings for his helpful comments on an earlier version.     

Technology,international competitiveness,and union behavior

Union opposition to a free trade agreement with Mexico affirms the conventional wisdom that international trade damages the union movement. This study uses data from the March and May CPS for 1984 to 1987 to investigate this issue for production workers. The results indicate that union wages are not influenced by greater trade at medium union densities. However, at low union densities, greater imports (exports) reduce (increase) wages with the opposite pattern occurring at high union densities. The union wage pattern is consistent with product market considerations playing a strong role at low union densities and end game considerations playing a strong role at high union densities. In general, nonunion wages are not significantly impacted by greater trade. After controlling for imports and exports, nonunion wages are much greater in internationally competitive industries while union wages are not significantly greater in competitive industries. Nonunion wages appear to be more influenced by efficiency wage considerations. Thus, a Mexican free trade agreement will have little influence on union wages and should increase nonunion wages. I thank Wally Hendricks, Larry Kahn, Dan Rickman, and Doug Dalenberg for their very useful comments. All remaining errors are my own.     

AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non-infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.     

UNIONS, PLANTS, JOBS, AND WORKERS

The relationship between unions and their members is an important, yet neglected, subject in recent studies of the sociology of work. This study develops and tests a theory of union satisfaction and participation that combines recent research in the sociology of work with previous explanations of union satisfaction and participation provided by industrial relations researchers, in an attempt to understand the relationship between unions, plants, jobs, and workers in U.S. manufacturing industries. This theory predicts that union members will be satisfied with their unions and participate more in them if there are extensive ties between workers, employers, and unions. These ties stem from the focus of labor/management relations in particular, and class struggles in general, on market outcomes and the historical linkage of union membership with employment in the United States. The theory also predicts that unions them-selves act as ties to specific work settings and that union participation is a forum for voicing dissatisfaction with specific characteristics of workers' jobs. Testing these predictions is complicated by contradictory nature of the structure and organization of work in advanced industrial societies. The analysis provides qualified support for this theory, with data drawn from more unions, plants, and union members than have been used to date. In addition to discussing modifications to the theory and analysis presented here, the study includes a discussion of its implications for the future of unionization and the organization of work, in light of declines in union membership, increased efforts to decertify unions and resist union organizing efforts, and deindustrialization in the United States.