How do marital status,work effort,and wage rates interact?

How marital status interacts with men's earnings is an important analytic and policy issue, especially in the context of debates in the United States over programs that encourage healthy marriage. This paper generates new findings about the earnings-marriage relationship by estimating the linkages among flows into and out of marriage, work effort, and wage rates. The estimates are based on National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel data, covering 23 years of marital and labor market outcomes, and control for unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate marriage effects on hours worked (our proxy for work effort) and on wage rates for all men and for black and low-skilled men separately. The estimates reveal that entering marriage raises hours worked quickly and substantially but that marriage's effect on wage rates takes place more slowly while men continue in marriage. Together; the stimulus to hours worked and wage rates generates an 18%-19% increase in earnings, with about one-third to one-half of the marriage earnings premium attributable to higher work effort. At the same time, higher wage rates and hours worked encourage men to marry and to stay married. Thus, being married and having high earnings reinforce each other over time.     

Is the male marriage premium due to selection? The effect of shotgun weddings on the return to marriage

In standard cross-sectional wage regressions, married men appear to earn 10 to 20% more than comparable never married men. One proposed explanation for this male marriage premium is that men may be selected into marriage on the basis of characteristics valued by employers as well as by spouses or because they earn high wages. This paper examines the selection hypothesis by focusing on shotgun weddings, which may make marital status uncorrelated with earnings ability. We compare the estimated marriage premium between white men whose first marriages are soon followed by a birth and other married white men in the United States. The return to marriage differs little for married men with a premarital conception and other married men, and the results suggest that at most 10% of the estimated marriage premium is due to selection. Received: 19 June 1998/Accepted: 10 July 2000     

Pathways to educational homogamy in marital and cohabiting unions

There is considerable disagreement about whether cohabitors are more or less likely to be educationally homogamous than married couples. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I reconcile many of the disparate findings of previous research by conducting a “stock and flow” analysis of assortative cohabitation and marriage. I find that cohabitors are less likely to be educationally homogamous than married couples overall, but these differences are not apparent when cohabiting and marital unions begin. Instead, the results suggest that differences in educational homogamy by union type are driven by selective exits from marriage and cohabitation rather than by differences in partner choice. Marriages that cross educational boundaries are particularly likely to end. The findings suggest that although cohabitors place greater emphasis on egalitarianism than married couples, this does not translate into greater educational homogamy. The findings are also consistent with a large body of research on cohabitation and divorce questioning the effectiveness of cohabitation as a trial marriage.     

Spousal Mobility and Earnings

An important finding in the literature on migration has been that the earnings of married women typically decrease with a move, while the earnings of married men often increase with a move, suggesting that married women are more likely to act as the “trailing spouse.” This article considers a related but largely unexplored question: what is the effect of having an occupation that is associated with frequent migration on the migration decisions of a household and on the earnings of the spouse? Further, how do these effects differ between men and women? The Public Use Microdata Sample from the 2000 U.S. decennial census is used to calculate migration rates by occupation and education. The analysis estimates the effects of these occupational mobility measures on the migration of couples and the earnings of married individuals. I find that migration rates in both the husband’s and wife’s occupations affect the household migration decision, but mobility in the husband’s occupation matters considerably more. For couples in which the husband has a college degree (regardless of the wife’s educational level), a husband’s mobility has a large, significant negative effect on his wife’s earnings, whereas a wife’s mobility has no effect on her husband’s earnings. This negative effect does not exist for college-educated wives married to non-college-educated husbands.In the substantial literature on the relationship between migration and earnings, an important finding has been that the earnings of married women typically decrease with a move, while the earnings of married men often increase with a move. This is consistent with the notion that married women are more likely to act as the “trailing spouse” or to be a “tied mover.” This article considers a related but largely unexplored question: what is the effect of having an occupation that is associated with frequent migration on the migration decisions of a household as well as on the earnings of the spouse? And how do these effects differ between men and women?There are three reasons to move beyond the previous analysis of household moves to studying the effect of occupational mobility on migration and earnings. First, the analysis of changes in employment and earnings of movers is only part of a broader discovery concerning the extent to which the earnings of husbands and wives are affected by the ability to move to or stay in optimal locations. Second, the existing literature relies on the comparison of movers to nonmovers. Even longitudinal comparisons will not completely eliminate the bias in this comparison because movers likely differ in their earnings growth, not just the level of premigration earnings. Third, the methods used in the literature often do not adequately adjust for occupational differences between men and women, so it is difficult to know whether the current findings in the literature are the result of differences in jobs held by men and women, or rather are the result of differences in influence on location decisions. The question pursued in this article is, controlling for an individual’s own occupation and the earnings potential in that occupation, how does the migration rate in a spouse’s occupation affect one’s own labor market outcomes?This article uses the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 2000 U.S. decennial census to calculate mobility measures by occupation and education class. Mobility is measured by the fraction of workers who, in the past five years, have either (a) changed metropolitan area or (b) if in a nonmetropolitan area, changed Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA).¹ Using the sample of white, non-Hispanic married couples between the ages of 25 and 55 in the 2000 census, I perform migration and earnings analyses separately for four groups of couples: both have college degrees (“power couples”), only the husband has a college degree, only the wife has a college degree; and neither has a college degree.Results indicate that the mobility rates in both the husband’s and wife’s occupation affect the household migration decision, but mobility in the husband’s occupation matters considerably more. Comparison analysis for never-married individuals indicates that among individuals with college degrees, never-married men and women are equally responsive to occupation mobility in their migration behavior.The earnings analysis uses occupation fixed-effects and average wage in occupation-education class to control for substantial heterogeneity in earnings potential. For couples in which the husband has a college degree, the wife’s mobility has no effect on the husband’s earnings, regardless of the wife’s education. However, the husband’s mobility has a large, significant negative effect on the wife’s earnings. This negative effect does not exist for couples in which only the wife has a college degree.     

农村留守妇女的婚姻稳定感及其影响因素——以湖南省为例

通过对“湖南省农村留守妇女调查”数据的分析,本研究探讨了农村留守妇女的婚姻稳定感及其影响因素。研究发现,农村留守妇女的婚姻稳定感处于较高的水平;就其影响因素而言,有无被欺凌的情况、与家里长辈的相处情况、家庭生活满意度、丈夫打工期间的联系频率、探亲频率、丈夫汇钱时是否直接汇给自己、是否担心婚姻感情会发生变化、丈夫外出打工后夫妻感情的变化等变量对农村留守妇女的婚姻稳定感都有显著的影响。     

Educational Homogamy and Gender-Specific Earnings: Sweden, 1990–2009

Several studies have shown strong educational homogamy in most Western societies, although the trends over time differ across countries. In this article, we study the connection between educational assortative mating and gender-specific earnings in a sample containing the entire Swedish population born 1960–1974; we follow this sample from 1990 to 2009. Our empirical strategy exploits a longitudinal design, using distributed fixed-effects models capturing the impact of partner education on postmarital earnings, relating it to the income development before union formation. We find that being partnered with someone with more education (hypergamy) is associated with higher earnings, while partnering someone with less education (hypogamy) is associated with lower earnings. However, most of these differences in earnings emerge prior to the time of marriage, implying that the effect is explained by marital selection processes rather than by partner education affecting earnings. The exception is hypogamy among the highly educated, for which there are strong indications that in comparison with homogamy and hypergamy, earnings grow slower after union formation.     

Why are cohabiting relationships more violent than marriages?

In response to increases in cohabitation in the United States, researchers have recently focused on differences between cohabiting and marital unions. One consistent finding is a higher rate of domestic violence among cohabiting couples as compared with married couples. A prominent explanation for this finding is that cohabitation is governed by a different set of institutionalized controls than marriage. This article explores an alternative explanation, namely, that differences in selection out of cohabitation and marriage, including selection of the least-violent cohabiting couples into marriage and the most-violent married couples into divorce, lead to higher observed rates of violence among cohabiting couples in cross-sectional samples. Our results suggest that researchers should be cautious when making comparisons between married and cohabiting couples in which the dependent variable of interest is related to selection into and out of relationship status.     

A marriage trichotomy and its applications

This paper promotes research methods specific to men, the new focus of fertility and family planning studies (especially in sub-Saharan Africa). I propose a novel marriage categorization based on married men’s intentions to take another wife. The three marriage groups are currently monogamous men who intend to remain so, currently monogamous men who intend to become polygynous, and currently polygynous men. The first analysis demonstrates that typical marriage analyses may misclassify men who intend to become polygynous. Applications of the marriage trichotomy illustrate that men with varying marital intentions have differing desires regarding fertility and family planning.     

The Educational Gradient in Marriage: A Comparison of 25 European Countries

Previous research has suggested that a new marriage gradient has emerged in the United States, with marriage becoming increasingly the privilege of the better-educated. This article examines whether this is true for Europe and explores differences in the marriage gradient among 25 European countries, using multilevel models. The focus is on the chances of living in a marital (or cohabiting) union during midlife (ages 40–49). Multilevel analyses show that the direction and strength of the gradient depend on the societal context. In countries where gender roles are traditional, better-educated women are less likely to be married than less-educated women; in gender-egalitarian countries, better-educated women are more likely to be married. For men, the educational effect on marriage is absent in traditional countries but becomes positive as gender roles become more equal. Inequality in a society also modifies the gradient: if the degree of economic inequality between educational groups in a society is strong, better-educated men are more likely to be married than less-educated men. In general, the results suggest that there may be an accumulation of social and economic disadvantages for the less well educated in more-developed countries.     

Indonesian survey looks at adolescent reproductive health

The Baseline Survey of Young Adult Reproductive Welfare in Indonesia, conducted from September to December 1998, provides information about young Indonesians on topics concerning work, education, marriage, family life, sexuality, fertility, and HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. The survey interviewed 4106 men and 3978 women aged 15-24 years in three provinces of Java. Survey findings showed that 42% of the women and 8% of the men are currently or have been married. There was a strong inverse relationship between marriage and schooling, which suggests that greater educational attainment and a higher average age at marriage are likely to go together. Although most young couples prefer to delay and space births, only half of currently married young women are using any type of contraception. These results indicate that there is a need for better reproductive health care as well as improved reproductive health education. Moreover, the current economic crisis has lead to a decline in the use of the private sector for health care. Instead, young people are using the less-expensive government services, and young women are turning to pharmacies and midwives rather than to private doctors to obtain contraceptives. These findings have several policy implications including the need for reproductive health programs that provide services needed by young people.     

Explaining the Gender Wealth Gap

To assess and explain the United States’ gender wealth gap, we use the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study to examine wealth accumulated by a single cohort over 50 years by gender, by marital status, and limited to the respondents who are their family’s best financial reporters. We find large gender wealth gaps between currently married men and women, and between never-married men and women. The never-married accumulate less wealth than the currently married, and there is a marital disruption cost to wealth accumulation. The status-attainment model shows the most power in explaining gender wealth gaps between these groups explaining about one-third to one-half of the gap, followed by the human-capital explanation. In other words, a lifetime of lower earnings for women translates into greatly reduced wealth accumulation. After controlling for the full model, we find that a gender wealth gap remains between married men and women that we speculate may be related to gender differences in investment strategies and selection effects.     

The conflicting effects of delayed marriage and declining divorce rates on cumulative fertility in Indonesia

The impact of nuptiality patterns on fertility in Indonesia is examined with multivariate analysis controlling for 8 socioeconomic variables. Data were obtained from the 1987 Indonesian Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Marriage is usually universal by age 35, and in this study all women 30 years had been married at least once. 20% were married at 15 years and 45% married at 18 years. For those married more than once, prevalence of 1st marriage was 7% for women 15-24 years, 15% for 25-34 years, and 29% for 35-49 years. In 1976 and 1987, the age at 1st marriage and number of times married were both strongly and negatively correlated. The % never marrying between 15-49 years rose from 21.5% to 26.4% between 1980-87. Cumulative fertility w as related to both age at 1st marriage and number of times married. Muslim women, women in Java and Bali, and rural women all marry at younger ages. 27% of the variance in age at 1st marriage is explained by women aged 25-34, current residence, region, religion, language, education, and work or not before marriage. The number of times married is also associated with socioeconomic characteristics without control, i.e., Muslim women 25-34 years were 3 times more likely to have been married more than once than in other faiths. With controls for socioeconomic factors, only 13% of the variance is explained and being Muslim has no statistically significant effect. The important net effects were being interviewed in Balinese, age, and age at 1st marriage. In the analysis of cumulative fertility, age at 1st marriage consistently is related to cumulative fertility in almost every socioeconomic group when age and number of times married is controlled for. Women married more than once have lower fertility. 36% of the variance is explained by all the variables. Being married more than once leads to having 2.1 fewer children. A 5-year delay in marriage leads to .75-1.1 fewer children. When other variables are controlled for, neither educational level nor prior work experience has a statistically significant effect on cumulative fertility. In the contraception analysis, women married more than once used contraception less. Among women 35-49, those marrying later had higher contraceptive use, but in general contraceptive use declined with age. More information is needed on why marriage patterns are changing.     

The Protective Effect of Marriage for Survival: A Review and Update

The theory that marriage has protective effects for survival has itself lived for more than 100 years since Durkheim’s groundbreaking study of suicide (Durkheim 1951 [1897]). Investigations of differences in this protective effect by gender, by age, and in contrast to different unmarried statuses, however, have yielded inconsistent conclusions. These investigations typically either use data in which marital status and other covariates are observed in cross-sectional surveys up to 10 years before mortality exposure, or use data from panel surveys with much smaller sample sizes. Their conclusions are usually not based on formal statistical tests of contrasts between men and women or between never-married, divorced/separated, and widowed statuses. Using large-scale pooled panel survey data linked to death registrations and earnings histories for U.S. men and women aged 25 and older, and with appropriate contrast tests, we find a consistent survival advantage for married over unmarried men and women, and an additional survival “premium” for married men. We find little evidence of mortality differences between never-married, divorced/separated, and widowed statuses.     

New evidence on the value of birth expectations

Past national surveys regarding birth expectations have usually been restricted to currently married women, a fact which has led demographers to question the usefulness of these data. Because the June 1976 Current Population Survey includes the expectations of all women in a cohort regardless of marital status, it provides the data needed to evaluate biases due to restricted survey universes. At older ages, where there are substantial differences in lifetime expectations between currently married and single women, there are relatively few single women; at younger ages, however, where the proportion of single women in a cohort is relatively large, the differences in expectations are small. This counterbalancing effect makes the lifetime birth expectations of currently married women a close approximation of all women in a cohort. The analysis also indicates that the observed intracohort declines in lifetime birth expectations since 1967 were due largely to the addition at subsequent survey dates of previously unmarried women; nevertheless, some “true” cohort declines also seem to have occurred.     

Socioeconomic Differences According to Family Arrangements in Chile

Family changes have accelerated in Chile in the last decades. Impressively, the proportion of children born outside of marriage has reached over 60%, at the same time that marriage has declined and cohabitation has increased. These changes are regularly considered indicators of a second demographic transition. This study describes the socioeconomic differences that currently exist in Chile between first-time mothers living in different family arrangements, and it asks to what extent these differences are the result of long term disadvantages passed on from the families the respondents grew up in. The data comes from a postpartum survey implemented in Santiago (N = 686 women). The results show large differences in the socioeconomic wellbeing of women in different family arrangements. Women in nuclear marriages stand far apart from any other group in terms of educational attainment, income and participation in the labor force. Cohabiters and married women in extended households enjoy a level of socioeconomic wellbeing that is similar, but not as high as that of married women in nuclear households. Cohabiters in extended households, visiting, and single mothers look alike, and are the most vulnerable women in the sample. The link between the current scenario and the family where the respondents grew up is strong. Under these circumstances, it is hard to interpret the recent demographic changes in Chilean families as a prototypical case of the SDT. The trend the country is following resembles closer the dichotomous trajectory the U.S. has followed.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Women’s Progress for Men’s Gain? Gender-Specific Changes in the Return to Education as Measured by Family Standard of Living, 1990 to 2009–2011</Emphasis>

This study investigates gender-specific changes in the total financial return to education among persons of prime working ages (35–44 years) using U.S. Census data from 1990 and 2000, and the 2009–2011 American Community Survey. We define the total financial return to education as the family standard of living as measured by family income adjusted for family size. Our results indicate that women experienced significant progress in educational attainment and labor market outcomes over this time period. Ironically, married women’s progress in education and personal earnings has led to greater improvement in the family standard of living for married men than for women themselves. Gender-specific changes in assortative mating are mostly responsible for this paradoxical trend. Because the number of highly educated women exceeds the number of highly educated men in the marriage market, the likelihood of educational marrying up has substantially increased for men over time while women’s likelihood has decreased. Sensitivity analyses show that the greater improvement in the family standard of living for men than for women is not limited to prime working-age persons but is also evident in the general population. Consequently, women’s return to education through marriage declined while men’s financial gain through marriage increased considerably.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Unobserved variables and marital status The schooling connection

Studies increasingly indicate that some of the characteristics of individuals are jointly determined with marital status, fertility, and labor supply. This study focuses on the effect of schooling on marital status. A Hausman-type test shows that schooling cannot be legitimately treated as an exogenous determinant of marriage and divorce. It is shown that if schooling is treated as an exogenous variable, the negative effect of schooling on the odds of marriage is underestimated. Further, the results indicate that schooling has a significant negative effect on divorce if it is treated as an exogenous variable; the coefficient for schooling is positive if it is treated as an endogenous variable.I wish to thank Gary Becker, T W. Schultz, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments. In addition, I am grateful for research support from DePaul's College of Commerce and Research Board.     

The effect of marital status at first birth on marital dissolution among adolescent mothers

The sequencing of marriage and first birth was expected to play an important role in the stability of marriage among adolescent mothers. We hypothesized that adolescent women who married prior to conception would have the lowest rates of marital disruption, followed by those who married between conception and birth. Adolescent women who gave birth prior to marriage were expected to suffer the highest rates of marital dissolution. The results provide partial support for our hypotheses. There is little difference in the probability of separation between adolescent mothers who had a postmarital conception and those who had a premarital conception but married before the birth. Having a premarital birth, however, significantly increases the probability of marital dissolution. We also hypothesized that marital status at first birth would have less effect on the probability of marital dissolution for blacks than for whites. This, too, is generally supported by our findings. Among black females, those with a premarital birth are the first to suffer a marital disruption, but by the end of ten years there is little difference in the probability of separation among the three marital status groups. In contrast, among white females, those with a premarital birth are the first to experience a disruption, and this differential persists over all subsequent marriage duration intervals. Thus, the sequencing of marriage relative to birth has similar short term effects for whites and blacks, but the effect for blacks is evident only in the short term. Ten years after the marriage, black adolescent mothers have similar rates of marital stability regardless of the sequencing of marriage. This is consistent with the findings of previous research and with our hypothesis; with the black family pattern of lower rates of marriage, higher rates of illegitimacy and higher divorce rates, the sequencing of marriage has no long lasting consequences on marital stability. Finally, our predicted decline in the effect of marital status at first birth over historical time also finds partial support. For white females there has been a change in the effect of marriage-first birth sequencing on separation over time. In the period encompassed by the women in our study, white adolescent mothers who married subsequent to the birth have been the most likely to experience a separation at all marriage duration intervals, but this differential narrows as age at interview declines. Among black females there has been no change in the effect of a premarital birth over time.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

The Compositional and Institutional Sources of Union Dissolution for Married and Unmarried Parents in the United States

Unmarried parents have less stable unions than married parents, but there is considerable debate over the sources of this instability. Unmarried parents may be more likely than married parents to end their unions because of compositional differences, such as more disadvantaged personal and relationship characteristics, or because they lack the normative and institutional supports of marriage, thus rendering their relationships more sensitive to disadvantage. In this article, we evaluate these two sources of union instability among married, cohabiting, and dating parents following the birth of a shared child, using five waves of longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. Using discrete-time event history models, we find that demographic, economic, and relationship differences explain more than two-thirds of the increased risk of dissolution for unmarried parents relative to married parents. We also find that differential responses to economic or relationship disadvantage do not explain why unmarried parents are more likely to end their unions than married parents.