Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of legislatures—most important, that legislators can change their vote after seeing how their fellow legislators have voted—then the only possible equilibrium is one where all legislators ignore their policy preferences. That is, each legislator votes as if he or she is not pivotal. The result, consistent with empirical studies of Congress, suggests that legislators should tend to vote sincerely, rather than sophisticatedly. In this paper we examine how outcomes change if we change the rules for voting. Namely, instead of a simultaneous game, we consider a game where legislators vote sequentially in a pre-determined order. We show that, opposite to the simultaneous game, an alternative wins if and only if a majority of legislators’ policy preferences favor that alternative. Our results suggest that if Congress adopted this change in rules, then sophisticated voting would become frequent instead of rare.     

Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game

Legislators sometimes pass unrelated issues in one bill with one vote (omnibus bills), but they often vote separately on different issues as well. In this article, a model is considered in which the first mover chooses whether to bargain over an omnibus bill or several separate bills. The main difference between the two types of bills is that trade-offs between issues are possible with omnibus bills, but not with separate bills. The underlying bargaining game is demand-bargaining (Morelli 1999). In this game, moderate legislators prefer to propose single-issue bills; extreme legislators prefer omnibus bills, if the asymmetry in policy ideal points in the legislature is large enough.     

What Drives the Voting on Abortion Policy? Investigating Partisanship and Religion in the State Legislative Arena

Abstract

Much of the public policy debate on abortion now centers in the nation's state capitals. This research assesses the impact of partisanship and religiosity on the voting behavior of state legislators. Recent research indicates that a legislator's religious affiliation and the religiosity of their home districts can be a powerful predictor of votes on abortion bills, but this research uses a unique data set developed to analyze voting in the Florida House of Representatives to re-test those ideas and test several new ones. This work challenges the notion that member religion or district religiosity is more influential than partisanship in predicting votes on abortion. Ordered probit techniques show partisanship, gender and legislator religion (for Catholic and Jewish members only), to be the most significant predictors of abortion voting behavior. A number of district characteristics are found to be less significant. Theoretically, this suggests that legislators fulfill their party obligations as trustee on the floor of the House, more so than following constituent interests in the classic delegate role, as originally noted by Burke.     

Analyzing Roll-Call Voting Tools for Content

Abstract

The roll-call voting tools most frequently used by legislative scholars are not equally useful for all. Roll-call votes selected for traditional measurement tools systematically exclude issues determined to be important to women legislators. Those who study women in politics are unable to employ roll-call voting tools with the assurance that they are using valid measures for their research. After analyzing the content of widely used voting tools and discovering that votes from controversial bills of interest to women were often excluded, I outline suggestions for employing alternative methodological approaches. Further, I add to a growing criticism of roll-call voting statistics by identifying another limitation to their use.     

The Effects of Modeling and Experience on Young Children's Persistence at a Gambling Game

Gambling is common among children and adolescents, but Hide is known about factors initiating or maintaining this behavior. Fifty-one male and 51 female kindergarten and first grade children were invited to play a game involving repeated opportunities to select colored chips from a cup while blindfolded. Children playing for tangible incentives elected to play longer than those who were not (p < .001). Seeing a videotaped model win or fail to win a large prize had no effect on persistence with the game. Playing again one week later, children playing for incentives exhibited a more successful strategy, quitting sooner (p < .04) and with more winnings (p < .03). The parameters of experiential versus observational learning are discussed, with implications for educating children about risk-taking.     

Losses Disguised as Wins Affect Game Selection on Multiline Slots

Multiline slots are exciting games that contain features which make them alluring. One such feature is a loss disguised as a win (LDW); wherein, players win less than they wager (e.g., bet 2 dollars, win back 50 cents), but this net loss is disguised by flashing graphics and winning sounds. Research to date concludes that LDWs are both rewarding and reinforcing. Here, we investigated whether LDWs affect players’ game selection. Thirty-two undergraduate students with experience playing slot machines played 100 spins on four games—two had positive payback percentages (115%) and two had negative payback percentages (85%) after 100 spins. For each payback percentage condition, there was a game with no LDWs and a game with a moderate number of LDWs. For the 100 spins, players could choose to play whichever game they wished. They then rated their preference for each game following the 100-spins and chose a game to continue playing. The majority of players preferred playing the positive payback percentage game with LDWs and chose to continue playing this game over the three other games. We conclude that in addition to LDWs being reinforcing and rewarding, LDWs do in fact influence game selection. We conclude that responsible gambling initiatives should educate players about LDWs.     

Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study

Theoretical analysis suggests that enlargement of a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the existing voters may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We test for this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting power across voting bodies of varying size, we find empirical support for the paradox of new members.     

Losses disguised as wins in multiline slots: using an educational animation to reduce erroneous win overestimates

Slot machines are available in several countries, with multiline games growing in popularity. Interestingly, many audiovisually reinforced small ‘wins’ in multiline games are in fact monetary losses – outcomes referred to as losses disguised as wins (LDWs). Research suggests that LDWs cause players to overestimate how many times they remember actually winning during a playing session. The study sought to replicate this finding and see if a short educational animation about LDWs could significantly reduce this LDW-triggered win overestimation effect. It employed a mixed design, with animation viewed (LDW, control) as the between-subjects factor, and game played (200 spins on a few LDW or many LDW game; game order counterbalanced) as the within-subjects factor. Fifty-four novice participants estimated how many times they won more than they wagered in each game. In the control animation group, the study replicated the LDW-triggered win overestimation effect for participants playing the many LDW game. Crucially, win overestimates were significantly reduced in this many LDW game for players exposed to the LDW animation. The study concludes that LDWs can lead novice gamblers to remember winning more often than they actually do during a playing session, but educating participants about LDWs can reduce these erroneous win overestimates.     

The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences

The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses two strong versions of this paradox in the context of Condorcet voting correspondences. The first says that there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes honestly, but gets elected if she abstains. The second says that there is a voter whose least preferred candidate gets elected if she votes honestly, but loses the election if she abstains. All Condorcet correspondences satisfying some weak domination properties are shown to be affected by these strong forms of the paradox. On the other hand, with the exception of the Simpson-Cramer Minmax and the Young rule, all the Condorcet correspondences that (to the best of our knowledge) are proposed in the literature suffer from these two paradoxes. Received: 30 November 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2000     

On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members

Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.     

PARLIAMENT SHAPES AND SIZES

This paper proposes a model of Parliamentary institutions in which a society makes three decisions behind the veil of ignorance: whether a Parliament should comprise one or two chambers, what the relative bargaining power of each chamber should be if the Parliament is bicameral, and how many legislators should sit in each chamber. We document empirical regularities across countries that are consistent with the predictions of our model. (JEL D71, D72)     

A purely non-cooperative model of divided government

In this paper I describe an institutional structure in which there are two branches of the government: the executive one, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative one elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between these two branches. Given the presidential result, legislative elections are characterized by essentially an unique Nash equilibrium such that any voter on the left of the corresponding policy outcome votes for the leftist party and any voter on the right votes for the rightist party. Moreover, this equilibrium can be obtained by a process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. The whole game is then solved by backward induction and dominance arguments.I thank Francesco De Sinopoli, Jean-Francois Mertens, Howard Rosenthal and Jacques Thisse for very helpful discussions.     

Reports of Wins and Risk Taking: An Investigation of the Mediating Effect of the Illusion of Control

Two experiments examined the relationships between the knowledge that another person has won in a gamble, the illusion of control and risk taking. Participants played a computer-simulated French roulette game individually. Before playing, some participants learnt that another person won a large amount of money. Results from a first experiment (n = 24) validated a causal model where the knowledge of another person’s win increased the illusion of control, measured with betting times, expectancy and self-reports on scales, which in turn encourages risk taking. In the second experiment (n = 36), some participants were told the previous player acknowledged the win to be fortuitous. The suppression of the belief that the previous winner had himself exerted control over the outcome resulted in lower rates of risk-taking behaviors. This suggests that it was not the knowledge of another person’s win in itself that increased risk taking, but rather, the belief that the other person had some control over the gamble’s outcome. Theoretical implications for the study of social mechanisms involved in gambling behavior are discussed.     

Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee

Same parliaments, to form a committee of size $q$ , use a voting process like the following: every parliamentary member votes for one out of a fixed set of candidates, and those $q$ candidates receiving more votes are elected for the committee. Assuming total discipline of vote, this is a game form in which players are the parliamentary groups. We investigate, according to some natural hypotheses about preferences, the likely distribution of the members of this committee. The main results are: (a) when fractional votes are allowed, there is a complete agreement between the distribution among the groups of the elected candidates that are outcomes of a Nash equilibrium and the distribution that, according to the size of the groups, would compute the Jefferson-d’Hondt allocation rule, and (b) when fractional votes are not allowed, there is a near agreement for a majority of situations.     

Justifiable preferences over opportunity sets

In this paper we say that a preference over opportunity sets is justifiable if there exists a reflexive and complete binary relation on the set of alternatives, such that one opportunity set is at least as good as a second, if and only if the there is at least one alternative from the first set which is no worse than any alternative of the two sets combined together, with respect to the binary relation on the alternatives. In keeping with the revered tradition set by von Neumann and Morgenstern we call a reflexive and complete binary relation, an abstract game (note: strictly speaking von Neumann and Morgenstern refer to the asymmetric part of a reflexive and complete binary relation as an abstract game; hence our terminology though analytically equivalent, leads to a harmless corruption of the original meaning). In this paper we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the justifiability of transitive and quasi transitive preferences over opportunity sets. I would like to thank Prasanta Pattanaik for motivation in this research. I would also like to thank Maurice Salles and an anonymous referee of this journal for useful suggestions leading to considerable improvement in the presentation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Annual Conference on Econometric Modeling for Africa, held at Pretoria from July 4–6, 2001. I would like to thank all the conference participants for their observations on my paper. However, the sole responsibility for errors that do remain is my own.     

Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees

A tenure committee first votes on whether to hire a candidate; if it does, it receives an informative performance signal, and then votes on whether to tenure the candidate; rejection at either stage returns the committee to a candidate pool, endogenising the value of the outside option. A candidate’s fate depends only on the behaviour of two ‘weather-vane’ committee members. Committee members may vote against favoured candidates if the weather-vane is opposed; enthusiastic assessments by one of these weather-vanes may harm a candidate’s chances by increasing others’ thresholds for hiring him; sunk time costs may lead voters who voted against hiring to vote for tenuring him, even after a poor probationary performance. For two member committees that are patient and perceptive, the optimal voting rule is a (weak) majority at the hiring stage and unanimity at the tenure stage; when such committees are impatient or imperceptive, the double (weak) majority rule is optimal. Perversely, the performance of a patient, imperceptive committee improves as its perceptiveness further declines. Consistent with practice, falling threshold rules are not optimal. Results on optimal voting rules are also presented in limit cases as committee members’ beliefs become more correlated. Finally, we compare the model to a discrete-time European options model.     

A law of large numbers for weighted plurality

Consider an election between $k$ candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) for a single candidate, and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for this special candidate than any other candidate). Suppose we have a voting rule that takes all of the votes and produces a single outcome and suppose that each individual voter has little effect on the outcome of the voting rule. If the voting rule is a weighted plurality, then we show that with high probability, the preferred candidate will win the election. Conversely, we show that this statement fails for all other reasonable voting rules. This result is an extension of one by Häggström, Kalai and Mossel, who proved the above in the case $k=2$ .     

Do Differences Matter?

Abstract

Have women members of Congress made a difference? A handful of studies have answered this “so what” question by looking for differences between male and female legislators. We build on previous research and propose an additional way of answering this question. If women members are making a difference, then they should be changing how men behave in Congress. Specifically, if women members are making a difference, then they should be changing how their male colleagues debate the issues. We content-analyze each House floor debate on the Hyde Amendment to see if women are changing how men debate the abortion issue. We find that men and women frame the abortion debate differently, and we find some evidence that women members of Congress have shifted the debate over time to focus less on the morality of abortion and more on the health of the pregnant women. We hope our research stimulates further work that not only looks for differences between men and women legislators, but also looks to see if the differences cause legislatures to change the way they do business.     

First and second best voting rules in committees

A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters’ identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote non-informatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases.

“Wasn’t he sweet?” said Yossarian. “Maybe they should give him three votes.” Joseph Heller, Catch-22

     

Introduction

Abstract

This article examines how surges of female representation have produced gender patterns in standing committees and affected the financial support for “women's policy” in the Norwegian and Swedish national legislatures. The argument is two-fold. The more women there were in the Riksdag and the Storting, the more likely they were initially to end up on a “female” standing committee. Second, as the ratio of women legislators grew, spending on “families and children” in the national budget plummeted in both countries, only to acquire more prominence as the proportion of women legislators reached more than one fourth. The article begins with an extensive critical analysis of the gender-theoretical assumptions of the women and legislatures literature, suggesting that contemporary feminist scholarship that assumes gender to be malleable and contextual is more fruitful.