Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects – to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation. Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000     

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme. Received: 28 April 1997/Accepted: 30 January 1998     

Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle

For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet principle. Received: 8 July 1996 / Accepted: 9 June 1997     

On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules

In this paper we prove that the plurality rule and the run-off procedure are asymptotically strategy-proof for any number of alternatives and that the proportion of profiles, at which a successful attempt to manipulate might take place, is in both cases bounded from above by , where n is the number of participating agents and K does not depend on n. We also prove that for the plurality rule the proportion of manipulable profiles is asymptotically bounded from below by , where k also does not depend on n. Received: 10 February 2000/Accepted: 19 October 2000     

On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result

In a general model of indivisible good allocation, S?nmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of `richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory. Received: 22 February 2000/Accepted: 22 January 2002 I am grateful to Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Shinji Ohseto, Hiroshi Ono, Tomoichi Shinotsuka and Shigehiro Serizawa for valuable comments. And I am indebted to two anonymous referees for useful suggestions. Especially, I owe the present proof of Lemma 2 to one referee. I also thank Yukihiko Funaki, Atsushi Kajii, Mamoru Kaneko, Eiichi Miyagawa, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Manimay Sengupta, Yves Sprumont, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, Manabu Toda, Takashi Ui, Takehiko Yamato, Naoki Yoshihara and the participants of the seminars in Hokkaido University, Kansai University, ISER (Osaka University), Otaru University of Commerce and Tsukuba University. All errors are my own responsiblity.     

On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties

In this paper, we introduce a sufficient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a fixed budget has to be allocated among several pure public goods. We would like to express our deepest gratitude to our referee for an extremely careful and detailed report. His/her challenging questions did force us to be more acute on the scope of validity and the limits of our result. We would like also to thank Bernardo Moreno for pointing out a mistake in the statement of Theorem 1 as it was formulated in an earlier version and for sending a copy of his joint work with Barbera et al. (2008). This is the only one paper we know of, offering an alternative systematic analysis of the question explored in our paper.     

Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents

 This paper studies the topological approach to social choice theory initiated by G. Chichilnisky (1980), extending it to the case of a continuum of agents. The social choice rules are continuous anonymous maps defined on preference spaces which respect unanimity. We establish that a social choice rule exists for a continuum of agents if and only if the space of preferences is contractible. We provide also a topological characterization of such rules as generalized means or mathematical expectations of individual preferences. Received: 30 November 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996     

Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes

We identify, in a continuous multidimensional framework, a maximal domain of preferences compatible with strategy-proofness for a given generalized median voter scheme. It turns out that these domains are a variation of single-peakedness. A similar but stronger result for the discrete case and single-peakedness has been already obtained by Barberà et al. (1999). However, both results are independent and their proofs involve different arguments. Received: 27 July 1998/Accepted: 11 September 2000     

Public hearings and public preferences: the case of the White House Conference on Families

To provide input into Arizona's participation in the White House Conference on Families, the Arizona Governor's Council on Children, Youth, and Families commissioned a random statewide survey to assess the relative priority given to 41 selected family-related needs and preferences for institutional responses to those needs. A similar survey was administered to participants at each of six regional public hearings held throughout the state prior to the 1980 White House Conference on Families. A comparison of the two surveys provides an opportunity to test the representativeness of public hearings participants with respect to the population from which they were drawn. Fundamental differences in the priorities of these two samples cast considerable doubt on the assumption that public hearings are an effective means of gauging public sentiment.     

Iconicity,diagrammatics, and aesthetic preferences

I begin with a semiotic view on the evolution of the significatieon process, in order to initiate a discussion about the notion of iconicity as related to the notion of likeness. I then compare the paradigm of iconic representation to the paradigm of diagrammatic representation in the context of aesthetic preferences to analyze the structure of diagrammatic model as related to perception and the modes of learning. I refer to the results of the research on children's drawings from other cultures to support the discussion about the relationship between exposure, familiarity with a given representational convention, and the aesthetic expectations. Since familiarity with visual conventions plays a vital role in shifting boundaries of visual literacy, I argue that information design professionals are responsible for shifting the boundaries of visual literacy.     

Utilities,preferences, and substantive goods

 People’s utility levels are meant to be measures of their well-being. Early utilitarians defined them in terms of people’s happiness. Modern economics defines them in terms of people’s actual preferences. But in ethics they have to be defined in terms of people’s informed preferences. I shall discuss the relationship between people’s desires and preferences, and that between their reasoned and unreasoned preferences. I shall argue that people’s basic desires are much the same, whereas their preferences are often very different. Finally, I shall argue, contrary to Scanlon’s theory, that the things that are good for us are beneficial to us ultimately because they satisfy our biological and psychological needs and our personal interests. Received: 8 July 1996     

Religious Involvement and Participation in Volunteering: Types,Domains and Aggregate

Prior research on investigating the religion–volunteering relationship has tended to commonly treat religious involvement as single-item measures, e.g., frequency of church attendance, and has defined volunteering as a simple dummy variable (1 = volunteers, 0 = otherwise). The present study attempted to look at the above relationship by measuring religious involvement as a multifaceted and multi-item measure and volunteering as engaging in different types of voluntary activity, and specific domains and overall aggregate of volunteering. The results based on a statewide representative sample from the Survey of Texas Adults 2004 showed that religious involvement was generally and significantly related to higher volunteering across voluntary types, domains, and aggregate count of volunteering, but varied in magnitude contingent on the types and domains being examined. In addition, the religious effects were held even adjusting for a variety of pertinent socio-demographic and denominational characteristics, in which these background characteristics are more dynamic in relation to volunteering than we knew. Implications of the findings related to social services and policy making are discussed.     

Welfare, labor supply and heterogeneous preferences: evidence for Europe and the US

Following the report of the Stiglitz Commission, measuring and comparing well-being across countries has gained renewed interest. Yet, analyses that go beyond income and incorporate non-market dimensions of welfare most often rely on the assumption of identical preferences to avoid the difficulties related to interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, we suggest an international comparison based on individual welfare rankings that fully retain preference heterogeneity. Focusing on the consumption-leisure trade-off, we estimate discrete choice labor supply models using harmonized microdata for 11 European countries and the US. We retrieve preference heterogeneity within and across countries and analyze several welfare criteria which take into account that differences in income are partly due to differences in tastes. The resulting welfare rankings clearly depend on the normative treatment of preference heterogeneity with alternative metrics. We show that these differences can indeed be explained by estimated preference heterogeneity across countries—rather than demographic composition.     

Income distribution, happiness and satisfaction: A direct test of the interdependent preferences model

This study utilizes social-psychological measures of happiness and satisfaction in order to test the interdependent preferences model. According to this class of models, in addition to individual characteristics, utility also depends on the well-being of other members of society. Happiness and satisfaction should therefore depend on the average income of society and its distribution among rich and poor. Canadian survey data are used to test this hypothesis. Results differ across alternative measures of subjective well-being. Holding personal characteristics constant, self-reported satisfaction is lower the larger the share of income going to the poorest 40% of the community. A 3-point scale of happiness yields similar results, but not an 11-point scale. The determinants of satisfaction and happiness differ systematically between men and women. Overall, the empirical results support the interdependent preferences model, but defy any simple characterization in terms of inequality aversion and relative economic status.     

Public preferences for landscape features: A case study of two Scottish environmentally sensitive areas

This paper examines the extent to which the menu of environmental features supported by public policy in two Scottish environmentally sensitive areas (ESAs) and the range of environmental products supported by farmers who have participated in the scheme are congruent with public preferences. The examination of public preferences was based on a sample survey of residents and visitors to the Loch Lomond and Stewartry ESAs and the Scottish general public. This sample was split, with one group being asked questions relating to their valuation of a range of environmental features, and the second group being asked about their preferred level of future provision of the same set of features. The results indicate that the features most widely adopted by farmers and which have been very costly to support are amongst those least desired by the visitors to the areas and the general public. Consequently, it might be asserted that a changed menu of supported environmental actions in ESAs would be likely to deliver higher levels of social benefits.     

Public expenditure: Perceptions and preferences

Public preferences for government expenditure form an important part of the literature in public sector economics. However, in the academic literature these preferences have been largely considered as “given”. Exceptions to this are where public preferences expressed referenda (e.g. in California) can directly influence tax revenue and public expenditure levels. The present study follows an earlier one in using a questionnaire to ask individuals directly about their perceptions of and preferences for public spending. Replies from 50 respondents were analysed using multiple regression and analysis of variance techniques in order to ascertain whether public expenditure perceptions and preferences showed consistent and predictable patterns among young individuals with little or no experience of paying tax. The results showed that both perceptions and preferences for a series of seven macro-expenditure items were significantly different from one another and broadly predictable from individuals' self reported positions on ‘left/right’ scales. It is concluded that views about public expenditure may often form part of integrated attitudes with both perceptual and preferential components.     

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous,convex, and ordered preferences

This paper consideres the problem of designing better mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations for non-neoclassical economies under the minimal possible assumptions. We show that no assumprions on preferences are needed for feasible and continuous implementation of the constrained Walraisan correspondence. Further, under the monotonicity assumption, we present a mechanism that is completely feasible and continuous. Hence, no continuity and convexity assumptions on preferences are required, and preferences may be nontotal or nontransitive. Thus, this paper gives a somewhat positive answer to the question raised in the literature by showing that, even for non-neoclassical economies, there are incentive-compatible, privacy preserving, and well-behaved mechanisms which yield Pareto-efficient and individually rational allocations at Nash equilibria.I wish to thank J. S. Chipman, J. Jordan, M. Richter, H. Weinberger, the editor, and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. I am particularly thankful to L. Hurwicz who stimulated my interest in this problem and provided detailed comments and suggestions.