Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided.     

Rationalizability of choice functions on general domains without full transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. Such weakenings are particularly relevant in the context of social choice. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.     

Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity.     

Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.     

On the relative strengths of consistency conditions on choice functions

The paper compares a variety of well known set theoretic consistency conditions on choice functions with the two that have been introduced by the author in an earlier paper. The two conditions are non-trivial generalisations of choice functional transitivity and quasi-transitivity respectively. The paper shows if the two conditions are individually stronger than or weaker than or logically independent of 14 other conditions including the rationalisability by an ordering, path independence, the conditions and , idemmorphism, absorbance and superset. The relative strengths of all the 16 conditions have been summed up at the end by an implication diagram.I am indebted to Prof. Satish Jain for the guidence he gave me to write the Ph. D. dissertation in which the results of this paper appear and to the referee for his comments on the earlier version of this paper.     

Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences

It is well known that many aggregation rules are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the aggregation rules considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper the aggregation rules of interest are social welfare functions (SWFs). We investigate the problem of constructing a SWF that is non-manipulable. In this context, individuals attempt to manipulate a social ordering as opposed to a social choice. Using techniques from an ordinal version of fuzzy set theory, we introduce a class of ordinally fuzzy binary relations of which exact binary relations are a special case. Operating within this family enables us to prove an impossibility theorem. This theorem states that all non-manipulable SWFs are dictatorial, provided that they are not constant. This theorem uses a weaker transitivity condition than the one in Perote-Peña and Piggins (J Math Econ 43:564–580, 2007), and the ordinal framework we employ is more general than the cardinal setting used there. We conclude by considering several ways of circumventing this impossibility theorem.     

Special majority rules necessary and sufficient condition for quasi-transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences

A condition on preferences called strict Latin Square partial agreement is introduced and is shown to be necessary and sufficient for quasi-transitivity of the social weak preference relation generated by any special majority rule, under the assumption that individual preferences themselves are quasi-transitive.     

Multi-profile intergenerational social choice

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that this impossibility survives under a domain restriction and without completeness. We propose an alternative stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version and some standard social choice axioms if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship.     

Public information and social choice

We examine the value of public information when a society uses a social choice rule to decide among a set of outcomes. We require that a social choice function satisfies unrestricted domain, non-decisiveness and the Pareto principle. We show that there exist payoff structures for every social choice function, such that an arbitrary subset of voters is worse off by public information. We apply the proposition to collective information acquisition and to irreversible investments. Received: 2 June 1997/Accepted: 30 September 1998     

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

An extension of McGarvey’s theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism

In 1953, David McGarvey showed that if the number of voters is unrestricted, then the set of outputs obtained from majority rule is a very general class of binary relations. We will present an extension of McGarvey’s Theorem based on the plurality collective choice mechanism.     

Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules

A binary relation is indifference-transitive if its symmetric part satisfies the transitivity axiom. We investigated the properties of Arrovian aggregation rules that generate acyclic and indifference-transitive social preferences. We proved that there exists unique vetoer in the rule if the number of alternatives is greater than or equal to four. We provided a classification of decisive structures in aggregation rules where the number of alternatives is equal to three. Furthermore, we showed that the coexistence of a vetoer and a tie-making group, which generates social indifference, is inevitable if the rule satisfies the indifference unanimity. The relationship between the vetoer and the tie-making group, i.e., whether the vetoer belongs to the tie-making group or not, determines the power structure of the rule.     

Self-selective social choice functions

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters’ preferences is complete, the voters’ preferences on alternatives induce voters’ preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself, when it is also used for choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (Econometrica 68: 981–995, 2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we introduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes more interesting and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.     

Order restricted preferences and majority rule

This paper develops the social choice foundations of a restriction that, in different guises, is utilized in a number of economic models; illuminates the key features of these models; and provides a specific class of applications. Order Restriction (on triples) is strictly weaker than Single Peakedness (or Single Cavedness) but strictly stronger than Sen's Value Restriction. It therefore guarantees quasi-transitivity of majority rule. This condition is most useful in models where there is a natural ordering of the individuals, not the alternatives. We show for a class of applications that1) it may be imposed through conditions with meaningful economic interpretations;2) imposing Single Peakedness weakens the usefulness of the models; 3) directly establishing Value Restriction is difficult and has not been done.I thank Bob Anderson for his help over a long period of time. I also thank the participants in many seminars at U.C. Berkeley. All remaining errors are my own.     

No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality

We consider fair collective choice functions (hereafter fair CCFs) which associate with each profile of extended preference orderings and each set of feasible social states a subset of the set of Pareto efficient and envy-free states for the preference profile. Our main objective is to examine compatibility of fair social choices with collective rationality. We formulate desirable properties of collective rationality, and look for CCFs satisfying them. Next, we show that any fair CCF violates most of collective rationality properties. Moreover, one of our results implies that no fair CCF can be rationalized by a social preference relation.     

Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain

Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray [3] shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial. Received: 8 October 2001/Accepted: 4 June 2002     

Arrow��s theorem and max-star transitivity

In the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences, a central question is how to represent the transitivity of a fuzzy binary relation. Arguably the most general way of doing this is to assume a form of transitivity called max-star transitivity. The star operator in this formulation is commonly taken to be a triangular norm. The familiar max- min transitivity condition is a member of this family, but there are infinitely many others. Restricting attention to fuzzy aggregation rules that satisfy counterparts of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, we characterise the set of triangular norms that permit preference aggregation to be non-dictatorial. This set contains all and only those norms that contain a zero divisor.     

A general concept of scoring rules: general definitions,statistical inference,and empirical illustrations

We develop the general conceptual, mathematical and statistical foundations of behavioral social choice for scoring rules. Traditional scoring rules are difficult to assess empirically because one rarely observes the deterministic complete linear orders that they require as input. We provide a general concept of scoring rules in terms of a broad range of mathematical representations of preference or utility, namely arbitrary finite binary relations, probability distributions over such relations, real valued multi-criteria utility vectors and real valued random utility representations. We extend Regenwetter et al.’s (Behavioral social choice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) statistical framework to a more general setting. We illustrate the general modeling and statistical tools by applying them to four well known sets of survey data. We illustrate two potential problems that have previously received little attention and that deserve systematic study in the future: (1) Scoring rule outcomes can suffer from model dependence in that the social welfare functions computed from ballot, survey, or hypothetical data may depend on implicit or explicit modeling assumptions. (2) Scoring rule outcomes may suffer from low statistical confidence in that the correct assessment of social orders from empirical data can be far from certain. We also illustrate the empirical congruence among conceptually competing social choice methods.     

The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

The vulnerability of a social choice function to coalitional manipulation of preferences is defined as the proportion of voting situations in which the social choice function can be manipulated by a coalition of individuals. In this paper, we provide exact relations giving the vulnerability of four specific social choice functions (plurality rule, anti-plurality rule, plurality with runoff, anti-plurality with runoff) in three-alternative elections. Plurality with runoff appears to be less vulnerable than the other three rules.     

Fuzzy preferences and Arrow-type problems in social choice

There are alternative ways of decomposing a given fuzzy weak preference relation into its antisymmetric and symmetric components. In this paper I have provided support to one among these alternative specifications. It is shown that on this specification the fuzzy analogue of the General Possibility Theorem is valid even when the transitivity restrictions on the individual and the social preference relations are relatively weak. In the special case where the individual preference relations are exact but the social preference relation is permitted to be fuzzy it is possible to distinguish between different degrees of power of the dictator. This power increases with the strength of the transitivity requirement.For comments on an earlier version of the paper I am indebted to an anonymous referee, an anonymous member of the Board of Editors and to participants in the 1991 Annual Conference of the Indian Econometric Society at North Bengal University, India. However, I retain sole responsibility for any error(s) that the paper may contain.