PRICE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND FIRM SIZE

A number of U.S. State Departments of Transportation have adopted a price adjustment policy designed to limit cost fluctuations of oil‐based inputs in government procurement. Similar policies are common in defense contracting, and have been used to offset financial losses of health insurance companies in Medicare and the Affordable Care Act. We show that while all bidders submit lower bids after the policy is introduced, the extent of bid reduction diminishes with firm size. Small new firms are able to compete more frequently, promoting auction competition and efficiency. (JEL H4, H57, D44)     

INCOMPLETE OWNERSHIP, RENT DISSIPATION, AND THE RETURN TO RELATED INVESTMENTS

The welfare loss from free access resource use is examined in a general equilibrium model. Actions that intensify competition for the resource, either by lowering the private cost or raising the private benefit of using it, can raise this loss above the rent the resource would earn if owned. Such 'excess dissipation'is illustrated with examples applicable to unowned groundwater. Regulatory policies that fix inputs needed to acquire the resource work by transferring part of the resource's rent to controlled inputs. The resulting welfare effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between, and relative prices of, controlled and uncontrolled inputs.     

THE LIMITS TO GROWTH

This article examines aggregate real estate firm mortality rates in a group of metropolitan areas during the 1960s and 1970s. Real estate firms play a critical role in the local growth machine, yet no research has examined the environmental limits which these firms experience. A set of ecological hypotheses are constructed which detail the influence of task and institutional environments on aggregate firm mortality rates. The findings show the sensitivity of firms to their local context, although standard market forces are not operating. In addition, period differences suggest that larger societal forces interact with the local land market, increasing aggregate mortality rates over time. Results support recent observations of the local land market made by the "new urban sociology."     

ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This paper considers the behavior of the firm which faces uncertainty in its production process but can adjust its output once the uncertainty is resolved. Ex post adjustment, unlike previous treatments, involves a marginal cost penalty if more output is required and a lowering of price if too much is produced. With ex post adjustment allowed in this fashion, it is found that nonlinear risk preferences do not affect the sign of the firm's marginal risk premium at optimum ex ante output. The firm will produce less output than under certainty whether it is risk averse, risk neutral, or prefers risk.     

BETA, FIRM SIZE, and CONCENTRATION

The asset beta of a firm is defined as the uncertainty about the firm's future value scaled by its current value. Empirically, beta is negatively related to a firm's size and concentration in its major product market. This relation has been interpreted as evidence that monopoly power affects beta. This paper shows that this empirical result is also consistent with competitive product markets where greater firm size and concentration are due to greater efficiency in production. Thus, the correlation between beta, firm size and concentration is not prima facie evidence of widespread monopoly power.     

ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: REPLY

This reply responds to two comments on our 1986 article in this journal under the same title. The comments discuss a special case of the model which gives a certainty result, and also propose several alternative formulations of the model. The reply argues that the special certainty result is not an interesting or reasonable case, and discusses the relationship between the proposed alternative formulations and the original model. The influence of risk preferences on optimal output is analyzed through comparative statics for changes in risk in the context of the original model.     

ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: A COMMENT

This paper reconsiders the model presented by Flacco and Kroetch [1986]. It shows that with additive technological uncertainty the firm will produce and contract to sell the same output as under certainty. When the Flacco/Kroetch model is generalized to allow the firm to select contract commitments and planned output ex ante, no simple comparisons with certainty are possible. These results are broadly consistent with those obtained by Mills [1959; 1962] for demand uncertainty.     

A NOTE ON ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This paper analyzes the impact of production uncertainty on the firm's optimal output decision. If uncertainty is introduced by an additive risk variable, then short-run optimal output is unchanged, but the owner-manager's expected utility can change causing long-run output effects. If uncertainty is introduced by a multiplicative random variable, then short-run output can change as well.     

OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF WILDLIFE

The use of wildlife resources is governed by a combination of private contracts and public regulations. Most often, private landowners control access rights, and government agencies regulate hunting and other uses. This paper shows that these institutions depend on wildlife values and the ability of private landowners to control access to species that inhabit their land. Logit regressions and literary sources are used to test implications about private hunting rights and state regulations. The data support the view that private, legal, and political forces have led to institutions that vary in ways consistent with wealth maximization.     

SAFETY FIRST, BANKRUPTCY, AND THE PRICING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF THE FIRM

The paper analyzes the impact of imposing a constraint on the probability of bankruptcy for the pricing and investment choices of firms. Two models are presented in which a firm faces stochastic demand; in one costs are known with certainty, and in the other costs of production are probabilistic. In both cases the constraint induces a reduction in optimal price if demand is elastic. For less elastic demand, price increases may be indicated. With constant costs, the constraint lowers optimal investment. The results are applicable to the analysis of rating agencies' behavior, or to the design of bond covenants, especially for public utilities.     

ORGANIZED CRIME OR INDIVIDUAL CRIME? ENDOGENOUS SIZE OF A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION AND THE OPTIMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

This article develops a simple but general criminal decision framework in which individual crime and organized crime are coexisting alternatives to a potential offender. It enables us to endogenize the size of a criminal organization and explore interactive relationships among sizes of criminal organization, the crime rate, and the government's law enforcement strategies. We show that the method adopted to allocate the criminal organization's payoffs and the extra benefit provided by the criminal organization play crucial roles in an individual's decision to commit a crime and the way in which he or she commits that crime. The two factors also jointly determine the market structure for crime and the optimal law enforcement strategy to be adopted by a government. (JEL K4 )     

ENGINEERING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL INFANT: BRAIN SCIENCE,INFANT DEVELOPMENT TOYS,AND GOVERNMENTALITY

This essay re-situates current neurological research on infant brain development in terms of a matrix of cultural practices and pre-occupations. It contends that infant ‘brain science’ functions – in conjunction with the marketing promises of developmental toy manufacturers – as a form of ‘ritual magic’ (Nelson-Rowe, 1994) that ensures the transformation of ‘normal’ infants into idealized entrepreneurial subjects. Simultaneously, the discourse and practices of brain science extend and legitimize the extension of (Foucauldian) governmentality over lower income populations, which are perceived as threatening social and state security.     

AGENT COMPENSATION AND THE LIMITS OF BONDING

Agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect. This paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds. We conclude that entry fees which exceed agents' assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance. As a result, conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost. Such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves.     

GROWTH, WELFARE, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Using an endogenous growth model in which government purchases directly affect aggregate productivity and utility, fiscal policy experiments conducted here indicate that the macroeconomic effects of changes in fiscal policy are at least as sensitive to the mix of spending cuts as they are to the mix of tax cuts. In fact, reducing the size of the government actually reduces growth and welfare freductions in government expenditures are heavily weighted towards reductions in public capital or if the proceeds are not used to reduce capital taxation. In addition, across-the-board spending cuts are not likely to significantly improve growth and welfare. ( JEL E62, 041)