Social and economic factors in Hong Kong's fertility decline

Abstract In both developed and underdeveloped areas, many attempts have been made to alter the course of fertility through family planning intervention. Doubtless the availability of such services facilitates birth control for those who already desire to use it. Whether or not such exogenous interventions have any independent effect upon the operation of endogenous forces in the economy and society is, however, more problematical. Where fertility declines have been observed, family planning services have often been made widely available only after the decline in fertility had already set in. Nonetheless, observers have often attempted to attribute some fraction of the continuing decline in fertility to the operation of family planning activities. One especially notable case is that of Hong Kong, which provides some of the more persuasive evidence about the independent effects of family planning intervention.     

Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.     

A review of the studies on fertility transition in China]

This article is a summary of papers and analysis in recent years on fertility transition and the association between fertility decline and socioeconomic development in China. These papers discuss the causes of fertility decline and the role of family planning programs in demographic transition. The major points are: 1. The demographic transition in China has the same characteristics as in the countries that have completed the transition. The transition had already started in the more developed areas or completed in a few large cities before family planning programs were implemented. 2. The role of family planning programs is to lead and to accelerate the demographic transition, which is the key idea of the "induced fertility transition". 3. The socioeconomic development and family planning programs worked together to affect the fertility decline, however socioeconomic development is the fundamental factor. Without the existence of the socioeconomic development, which included the changes in the function of family, traditional ideas on fertility, increased level of education, the status of women and social security system; the family planning program is not likely to make an impact.     

An attempt at evaluation of the economic and social factors [influencing] the Polish population's fertility formation

This analysis of economic determinants of fertility in Poland shows that couples' fertility decisions are negatively influenced by factors affecting family income. Social and demographic factors were found to be unrelated to fertility. 17 socioeconomic measures were grouped as those expressing the level of economic development and determining family income size, those reflecting the level of socioeconomic development and determining the level of children's education, and those characterizing the level of social development and determining the need for health care and social security. The level of actual fertility is modeled as a linear function of variables in a main components factor analysis. Average monthly pay in the national economy (37.6%), the sold industrial production per person (13.8%), and the global agricultural production per person (13.2%) account for 64.6% of the variance. Among the social factors, findings indicate that a higher feeling of security is related to lower fertility, but economic factors have a stronger influence. Voivodeships are grouped as having low levels of economic development (24), as having high educational levels (24), and as having low levels of social security (24). Voivodeships with low levels of economic development and high parity include all the grouped voivodeships with the exception of three. Low-security voivodeships showed mixed patterns of fertility. High-education voivodeships showed a weak correlation with high fertility. Only three voivodeships have low economic and security factors and high education factors, and only one voivodeship has high fertility. Of the three voivodeships with high security and economic factors and low education factors, all have low parity.     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

Regional paths to fertility transition

New sources of data on national fertility declines are used to examine the nature of fertility transition in major regions. These regions are defined by geographical and cultural criteria as well as by the forces attempting to shape fertility control. Particular attention is devoted to the timing of the onsets of fertility decline in the different countries of each region, and the rapidity of fertility decline within each country. The study finds greater similarities between the transitions than have sometimes been assumed.     

Alternative approaches to fertility transition

"Using anomalies of the Italian case as the basis, the aim of this article is to verify how the theoretical framework [of demographic transition] put forward by Lesthaeghe can be interpreted.... While the changes in mores in the Italy of the economic boom were a component of the large-scale processes of secularization, rationalization and modernization specific to the [first demographic transition], the practices, values and models of the collective imagination characterizing the second phase of Lesthaeghe's [second demographic transition] are marked by a state of mind that cannot be put down to the 'spirit of the age' during the years of large-scale modernization, but to the emancipatory and 'rational' falling away of many of the barriers to the unfolding of individual life destiny over and above that based on class, gender and age."     

Urbanization and the fertility transition in Ghana

This paper examines the way in which migration and urban residence operate to alter fertility outcomes. While urban-rural fertility differentials have long been established for most developing societies, the nature of these differences among migrants and between migrants and those of succeeding generations is not well understood. The evidence presented here suggests that rural-urban migration and urbanization may contribute positively to processes of fertility transition. Using data from the 1998 Kumasi Peri-Urban Survey, which included a 5-year retrospective monthly calendar of childbearing, we suggest that migrants adapt quickly to an urban environment. Our results also reveal generational differences in recent and cumulative fertility. While migrants exhibit higher cumulative fertility than urban residents of the second and third generation, their fertility is significantly lower than rural averages in Ghana. Children of migrants exhibit childbearing patterns quite similar to those in higher-order generations. Most noteworthy is the nature of the disparities in childbearing patterns between migrants and the succeeding generations. Migrant women have higher lifetime fertility than urban natives. Migrant women also exhibit higher fertility over the last 5 years than second generation or high-order urban natives. But these first generation women exhibit lower fertility (vs. urban natives) for the year immediately prior to the survey. These patterns lend support to an interpretation that combines rather than opposes theories of selectivity, disruption, adaptation and socialization. We conclude by discussing mechanisms that might explain these interrelated processes of fertility adjustment and suggest that policies discouraging rural-urban migration need to be revisited.     

The influence of first generation fertility and economic status on second generation fertility

This paper examines the impact of parental economic status and family size on the actual and expected fertility of adult children using longitudinal data from two generations of families participating in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. There was a modest positive relationship between first generation family size and second generation fertility. More importantly, the ideal family size of the parental family was more closely related to fertility behavior and plans in the second generation than was actual parental family size. In addition, the data revealed the hypothesized negative correlation between parental financial status and second generation fertility behavior and plans. Several mechanisms which could produce the correlation between parental characteristics and the fertility of their children are explored.The analysis reported in this paper was supported by Contract NO1-HD-42856 from the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development, Center for Population Research. Dr. Thornton is affiliated with the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Requests for reprints should be directed to him.     

The fertility transition around the world

In this paper, we study the evolution of the distribution of fertility rates across the world from 1950 to 2005 using parametric mixture models. We demonstrate the existence of twin peaks and the division of the world’s countries in two distinct components: a high-fertility regime and a low-fertility regime. Whereas the significance of twin peaks vanishes over time, the two fertility regimes continue to exists over the whole observation period. In 1950, about two thirds of the world’s countries belonged to the high-fertility regime and the rest constituted the low-fertility regime. By the year 2005, this picture has reversed. Within both the low- and the high-fertility regime, the average fertility rate declined, with a larger absolute decline within the high-fertility regime. Visually, the two peaks moved closer together. For the low-fertility regime, we find both β- and σ -convergence but we cannot establish any convergence pattern for the high-fertility regime. Our results support the idea of conditional convergence where the condition is the successful initiation of the fertility transition. The results are less supportive of the existence of a unique high-fertility equilibrium.     

Abortion and contraception in the Korean fertility transition

Abstract In this paper the relationship between the use of abortion and contraception among married women in a society experiencing uronid decline in fertility is analysed using data from the Korean National Fertility Survey of 1974. The level and pattern of abortion before and after modern contraceptives became widely available are described, and the implications of the changing patterns of abortion and contraception are discussed.     

Different features and conditions of the fertility transition in the developed countries and the developing countries]

Differences between the demographic transition experienced by developed countries and that currently being experienced by developing countries are first discussed. The author then stresses the need for developing countries to lower fertility in order to foster socioeconomic development, rather than waiting for economic development to bring about reductions in fertility.     

Change of marital fertility in China from 1964 to 1981]

In 1982 the Chinese National Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide (excepting Taiwan and Tibet) .001 random sampling of the total population to gather data on the fertility and age structures of married women. In comparing general marital fertility and standardized fertility, findings show that from 1964 to 1970 both rates averaged 225.1/1000. When family planning work began on a wide scale in 1971, the rates steadily declined, reaching 116.7/1000 in 1980. However, in 1967-68 the standard fertility rate rose by 21.34% due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and in 1980-81 the rate increased by 13.2%, indicating that problems still remain in family planning. The total marital fertility rate dropped 2.84/1000 from 1964 to 1981. The rate of decline in rural areas was greater than in the cities, but the cities had a larger percentage decline than the countryside. In the 5-year periods of 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980, marital fertility rates tended to decline in 1970 and 1975 among women aged 30-40 years because during those periods greater control was placed on women having multiple children. For 1980 and 1975, combined total rates for 15-19 year olds dropped 17.1%, but the combined total rates of 30-49 year olds dropped by 61.2%, indicating that in recent years the drop in marital fertility is mostly among those over 30 years of age.     

Short-term fluctuations in fertility and economic activity in Israel

This paper investigates the relation between fluctuations in fertility and in economic activity in Israel over the period 1950–1970. The paper opens with some comments on the theoretical basis for expecting procyclical behavior of fertility. This is followed by analysis of annual data of total fertility, unemployment, GNP and an index of industrial production. Total fertility tends to respond to the cyclical indicators among Jews from Europe and America, those born in Israel and those from Asian and African countries, but the response is larger among the former. Cyclical response can be discerned also in the fertility of the non-Jewish population. The performance of the alternative cyclical indicators is compared. Some examination of data on marriage suggests that the cyclical response of birth is not just a reflection of the cyclical response of marriage. In the annual data there is a tendency for.Jewish fertility to be more related to the contemporaneous cyclical indicator than the lagged indicator, while the reverse is true for the non-Jewish population. Examination of quarterly and monthly data for a shorter period corroborates this finding. Many factors are involved in determining the lag between an observed cyclical indicator and observed birth; it is being conjectured that the prevalence of abortions in the Jewish population is one contributing factor to the difference in the lag between.Jews and Arabs.     

经济因素与生育率关系新探——来自西安市长安区农村的实地调查

经济因素对生育率具有重要的影响，但经济因素对生育率的影响是通过中间变量来实现的．笔者对西安市长安区农村调查所得数据做了分析，得出经济发展引发的宏观结构变化为生育率的下降提供了基本条件．而生养成本上升和农民的相对贫困既是抑制生育率上升的因素，也是生育率不能进一步下降的原因的结论。     

Factors affecting fertility of natives and migrants in urban Brazil

Abstract Modernization is expected to change the patterns of population growth of developing countries. The primary reason explaining the fast rate of population growth of these nations has been established as that of the reductions of mortality! which marks the first stage of demographic transition. The second stage in this process is the reduction in fertility which counterbalances lowered mortality and therefore reduces the rate of population growth. This latter phase has been achieved in modern industrial societies.     

The economic theory of fertility over three decades

After a promising start some three decades ago, the application of micro-economic analysis to fertility studies has proved disappointing. It has not led to an increased understanding of fertility decisions nor to the policy insights which had been expected. This paper considers the reasons for this disappointment. It reviews briefly the development of the now dominant version of the economic approach to fertility analysis, the so-called "Chicago Model". It concludes that several basic conceptual and theoretical weaknesses of this approach have led it up a blind alley. The paper concludes with suggestions for new assumptions and approaches which may make the theory more relevant for policy programmes.     

Social security and fertility: An international perspective

A number of population scholars have asserted that social security programs such as old-age programs lead to decreased fertility levels because parents need not rely on children for "security" in old age. There is, however, a paucity of empirical data on the above. This paper analyzes 67 countries and shows that social security programs have a measurable negative effect on subsequent levels of fertility. In fact, the social security programs appear to have as much of an independent impact on fertility as do the traditional correlates of fertility (infant mortality, education and per capita income).     

World fertility and the women's situation]

In 1981, total number of childbearing women in the world reached 9.8 hundred million. Their socioeconomic status and fertility level are very important data for the study of women's liberation and population control. Facing limited natural resources and a constant growing demand, many nations are studying how to control the population growth and achieve a "zero population growth." In nations with a high GNP, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and France, fertility is low. On the contrary, countries in central and south Asia and most parts of Africa are the poorest economically, and their fertility rate has remained very high. Another factor which is related to the fertility level is the degree of women's participation in the labor market. In Europe and North America, the percentage of women's participation in economic activities is high, and fertility is low. In Latin America and Africa, fertility is high, and the percentage of women's participation in economic labor is low. From the above, we may conclude that promotion of women's participation in the labor market and better employment conditions will reduce fertility. Another 2 factors related to fertility are marriage age and birth control rate. Late marriage and the extensive use of birth control measures are effective methods for reducing fertility. All the above mentioned factors are closely related to the woman's educational background. If women receive a better education and find better employment opportunities, delay their marriage age, and take birth control measures, fertility will be reduced and the population growth will be under control.