The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

Unemployment,Nonstandard Employment,and Fertility: Insights From Japan’s “Lost 20 Years”

In this study, we examine relationships of unemployment and nonstandard employment with fertility. We focus on Japan, a country characterized by a prolonged economic downturn, significant increases in both unemployment and nonstandard employment, a strong link between marriage and childbearing, and pronounced gender differences in economic roles and opportunities. Analyses of retrospective employment, marriage, and fertility data for the period 1990–2006 indicate that changing employment circumstances for men are associated with lower levels of marriage, while changes in women’s employment are associated with higher levels of marital fertility. The latter association outweighs the former, and results of counterfactual standardization analyses indicate that Japan’s total fertility rate would have been 10 % to 20 % lower than the observed rate after 1995 if aggregate- and individual-level employment conditions had remained unchanged from the 1980s. We discuss the implications of these results in light of ongoing policy efforts to promote family formation and research on temporal and regional variation in men’s and women’s roles within the family.     

A theoretical analysis of antecedents of young couples’ fertility decisions and outcomes

Longitudinal survey data from 509 couples who at Time 1 interview had recently married or had their first child did not support the hypothesis that demographic factors influence fertility intentions, decisions, and outcomes only indirectly through their effects on attitudes and motivations. Husbands’ and wives’ attitudes exerted reciprocal influence on one another. However, while husbands’ sex-role traditionalism and motivation for parenthood strongly influenced wives’ traditionalism and motivation in the case of recently married couples, this pattern was reversed for riew parents. Birth control use was directly affected by wives’ fertility intentions, but not by husbands’ intentions. Difficulties in examining couple interaction variables such as relative power and the possible limitations of fitting these data to a complex theoretical model using LISREL are discussed.     

The Relevance of the 'Easterlin hypothesis' and the 'new home economics' to fertility movements in Great Britain

Summary The hypothesis that a family's economic status relative to its aspirations (relative economic status) is an important determinant of its fertility behaviour has been developed and applied to the explanation of swings in American fertility by R. A. Easterlin. However, a recent application by Butz and Ward of a model derived from the 'new home economics' (pioneered by Becker and Mincer) strongly suggests that relative economic status is not the dominant factor in explaining fertility movements in the U.S.A. Rather, both current men's and women's wages operate independently in explaining the movement in fertility, and in particular the decline in fertility is attributed to rising women's wages. In this paper we explore the relevance of both the Easterlin hypothesis and the hypotheses derived from the 'new home economics' to the 1955-75 fertility swing in Great Britain. We find that we must reject the Easterlin hypothesis on the basis of the measures of relative economic status suggested by Easterlin and Wachter. A variant of the Easterlin hypothesis suggested by Oppenheimer does receive some support from the available evidence, and the evidence provides strong support for the model of fertility behaviour derived from the 'new home economics', which emphasizes the distinction between the effects of changes in men's and women's real wages on fertility decisions. The cause of the fertility decline is attributed to rising women's wages and employment opportunities through their direct effect on the opportunity cost of time and children among working wives and through their effect on the labour force participation of married women of childbearing age. The test of this model and the estimates of its parameters are not definitive, however, because of deficiencies in the data and problems of statistical estimation. We nevertheless conclude that both this model and the Oppenheimer variant of the Easterlin hypothesis, as well as other elements of a more comprehensive economic theory of fertility, point to a continuation of low fertility and the possibility of a secular decline with fertility approaching some lower asymptote.     

Economic incentives for financial and residential independence

In this paper we examine the impact of the resources of children and of their parents on the children’s transition to residential and financial independence. Previous studies of this transition focused primarily on the impact of family structure and parent-child relationships on the decision to leave home, but much less is known about the role of economic factors in the transition to independence. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1968–1988, we estimate discrete-hazard models of the probability of achieving residential and financial independence. We find that the child’s wage opportunities and the parents’ income are important determinants of establishing independence. The effect of parental income changes with the child’s age. We also find some evidence that federal tax policy influences the decision to become independent, although the magnitude of this effect is quite small.     

Economic structure and fertility: A comparative analysis

This study empirically investigates the relationship between the economic structure of populations and their level of fertility, using data from censuses recently conducted in some 50 nations. Findings show that high rates of female labor force participation outside the home and low rates of economic activity of children depress a society’s fertility level, as measured by the crude birth rate or the child-woman ratio. It is also hypothesized, but not confirmed, that the per cent of unpaid family workers in a society is positively related to its fertility level. A model is presented that treats these three components of economic structure as intervening variables through which the exogenous variables, urbanization, industrialization, and education, operate in influencing the fertility level of a society.     

Expectations of additional children by race,parity, and selected socio-economic characteristics,United States: 1967

This is a study of fertility expectations of wives in relation to selected demographic and social and economic characteristics. The data for this study were obtained from a special survey conducted in 1967 from a probability sample of 30,000 households. The analyzed data show that the number of children expected in the next five years is inversely related to parity. Because of the inverse relationship, the expectations of additional children tend to be inversely related to age at marriage of wife, number of years married, and similar temporal variables. The data show also that there exists an inverse relationship between expectations of additional children and selected socio-economic characteristics, such as education of wife, occupation, and income of husband.     

The transmission of women’s fertility, human capital, and work orientation across immigrant generations

Using the 1995–2011 March Current Population Survey and 1970–2000 Census data, we find that the fertility, education, and labor supply of second-generation women (US-born women with at least one foreign-born parent) are significantly positively affected by the immigrant generation’s levels of these variables, with the effect of the fertility and labor supply of women from the mother’s source country generally larger than that of women from the father’s source country and the effect of the education of men from the father’s source country larger than that of women from the mother’s source country. We present some evidence that suggests our findings for fertility and labor supply are due at least in part to intergenerational transmission of gender roles. Transmission rates for immigrant fertility and labor supply between generations are higher than for education, but there is considerable intergenerational assimilation toward native levels for all three of these outcomes.     

Differential fertility in central India: A path analysis

This study is one of the few multivariate analyses of the relations of several demographic and socioeconomic variables to fertility and the use of contraception. For fertility, 56 of the 92 hypothesized paths are found to be significant at the .05 level or better. The five variables having a significant and direct effect on fertility, as shown by their path coefficients (p), are: duration of marriage (p= .721), spouse’s cohort (p= ?.093), spouse’s age at marriage (p = .052), caste (p = ?.071), and number of siblings of husband (p = .050). p] The use of contraception is affected by, in order of importance, the spouse’s education (p = .267), the husband’s education (p = .099), the husband’s income (p= .089), and surplus children, i.e., number of living children exceeding ideal number of children (p = .059). Child mortality, which is linked to number of living children and thus indirectly to surplus children, is affected by, in order of importance, the number of children ever born (p = .723), the husband’s education (p = \t-.166), the spouse’s absence by death or separation (p = .084), and family structure (p = \t-.035). p] The advantages and disadvantages of path analysis for this type of research are briefly mentioned.     

A comment on ‘social and economic factors in Hong Kong's fertility decline’ by Sui-Ying Wat and R. W. Hodge

The recent article by Wat and Hodge appears to make incorrect inferences about the relation of certain social and economic indicators (infant mortality, employment opportunities for women, and education) to Hong Kong's fertility decline, based on a multiple regression of these variables to the crude birth rate of Hong Kong for 1951–1967. Such modernization measures probably have at least a long-run causal relation to fertility decline. It is also possible that the family planning programme ofHong Kong may have added little to the effects, as the authors suggest. However, I do not believe that their multiple regression analysis establishes these conclusions.     

A Case for “Reverse One-Child” Policies in Japan and South Korea? Examining the Link Between Education Costs and Lowest-Low Fertility

Household spending on children’s pre-tertiary education is exceptionally high in Japan and South Korea, and has been cited as a cause of low fertility. Previous research attributes this high spending to a cultural emphasis on education in East Asian countries. In this paper, we argue that institutional factors, namely higher education and labor market systems, play an important role in reinforcing the pressure on parents to invest in their children’s education. We review evidence showing that graduating from a prestigious university has very high economic and social returns in Japan and South Korea, and examine the implications for fertility within the framework of quantity–quality models. Finally, we put forward ‘reverse one-child’ policies that directly address the unintended consequences of these institutional factors on fertility. These policies have the additional virtues of having very low fiscal requirements and reducing social inequality.     

Values and disvalues of children in successive childbearing decisions

The values and disvalues that wives and husbands in the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States attach to having another child are described from national survey data. Loglinear models are used to demonstrate that both country and parity affect value and disvalues rankings, but respondent’s sex does not. The differences in values and disvalues across parities suggest a multistage model of family formation, with perceptions of successive children linked to periods in family development. It is argued that this multistage. model is consistent with changes in the value of children in the fertility transition.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Religion and fertility in the United States: The importance of marriage patterns and hispanic origin

The marital fertility of white Catholic wives in the United States was higher than that of non-Catholic wives in 1977–1981, but when Hispanics were excluded, the differential disappeared; therefore, the Catholic-non-Catholic differential in recent years was due entirely to the higher fertility of Hispanic Catholics. The Total Fertility Rates (TFR) of Catholics were slightly lower in 1977–1981 than those for white Protestants, primarily because Catholic women tend to marry later than Protestant women. This finding was confirmed by multivariate analysis of data on children ever born. We examine some additional data and various theories to speculate on whether these patterns will last.     

Men’s Migration and Women’s Fertility in Rural Mozambique

Labor migration profoundly affects households throughout rural Africa. This study looks at how men’s labor migration influences marital fertility in a context where such migration has been massive while its economic returns are increasingly uncertain. Using data from a survey of married women in southern Mozambique, we start with an event-history analysis of birth rates among women married to migrants and those married to nonmigrants. The model detects a lower birth rate among migrants’ wives, which tends to be partially compensated for by an increased birth rate upon cessation of migration. An analysis of women’s lifetime fertility shows that it decreases as the time spent in migration by their husbands accrues. When we compare reproductive intentions stated by respondents with migrant and nonmigrant husbands, we find that migrants’ wives are more likely to want another child regardless of the number of living children, but the difference is significant only for women who see migration as economically benefiting their households. Yet, such women are also significantly more likely to use modern contraception than other women. We interpret these results in light of the debate on enhancing versus disrupting effects of labor migration on families and households in contemporary developing settings.     

Current primary investigation on the view of family planning of Chinese peasants]

The ideal number of children for 850 couples among 10 cities or counties and 20 villages in China were surveyed. Of the 850, only 1 wanted unlimited children, which accounted for 0.12% of the couples. About 33 desired more than 5, which accounted for 3.9%. However, most of the couples, about 81.4%, prefer 2 or 3 children. 3.2% of the couples were happy with 1 child in their life. In China, peasants still want more children because of their economic situation. There is no retirement and health insurance in the countryside, and the major labor force is in field work. Some consider males as better able to keep family heritage intact. Also, there is difference between agricultural and nonagricultural couples. Comparing the percentage of couples who want 2-3 children, 80% in agricultural sector and 92% in nonagricultural sector desired this number. The remainder of the agricultural group desired more than 3 children. Since economic reform started in the countryside in the early 80s, effects on fertility are seen. One is that peasants want more children because of a rising need for labor. On the other hand, many more opportunities are available to change careers and obtain more education, lowering fertility. However, a rise in fertility is predicted as people concentrate more on economic reform and economic development, increasing their need for children.     

Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

Books and Publications Received

Mexican fertility has remained at a high level (a crude birth rate of 42–46) in spite of rapid economic development and its concomitants: rising levels of urbanization, education, income, and female labour force participation, and falling levels of infant mortality and agricultural population, combined with rural-urban migration.

Data on child-woman ratios and children-ever-born statistics, for Mexico and each state, suggest that the constant crude birth rate is not masking age or region-specific declines in fertility.

Cross-section regressions are employed in an attempt to explain Mexico’s paradoxical fertility behaviour. Using measures of income, education, urbanization, occupational status, industrial composition, labour force participation, and the sex ratio, in a weighted log-linear form, a large portion of the variation in state adjusted child-woman ratios is explained by the ‘demographic transition’ variables. The only two which might possibly explain the trend in Mexican fertility are the income variable and the sex ratio, which have positive influences on Mexican fertility in 1960 and 1970.     

Fertility Decline,Girls’ Well-being,and Gender Gaps in Children’s Well-being in Poor Countries

The influences of recent dramatic declines in fertility on girls’ and boys’ well-being in poorer countries are understudied. In panels of 67–75 poorer countries, using 152–185 Demographic and Health Surveys spanning 1985–2008, we examined how declining total fertility and women’s increasing median age at first birth were associated with changes in girls’ well-being and gender gaps in children’s well-being, as reflected in their survival, nutrition, and access to preventive healthcare. In adjusted random-effects models, these changes in fertility were associated with gains in girls’ survival at ages 1–4 years, vaccination coverage at ages 12–23 months, and nutrition at 0–36 months (for women’s later first childbearing). Declining total fertility was associated with similar gains for boys and girls with respect to vaccination coverage but intensified gender gaps in mortality at ages 1–4 years and malnutrition at ages 0–36 months, especially in higher-son-preference populations. Later increases in women’s median age at first birth—reflecting more equitable gender norms—were associated with declines in these gaps. Promoting equitable investments in children through family planning programs in higher-fertility societies is warranted.     

Reporting of fertility events by men and women in rural Gambia

We conducted a survey of male and female fertility in rural villages in The Gambia and compared men and women's reports of recent pregnancy events in the aggregate and of children ever born for matched couples. Despite widespread polygyny and sex differences in fertility, men's and women's reports were similar. Small sex differences in reports of recent stillbirths and neonatal deaths were found. For matched couples, husbands reported 0.23 more children ever born than their wives on average, but discordant reporting had little effect on recent marital fertility rates. Modeling of discordant reports indicates that fertility reports are more likely to be underestimated by both men and women for their earliest marriages. Reliable fertility data can be collected from men in this population.