Modernization and the demographic transition: cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of a revised model

Problems associated with past research on the fertility-development issue are identified in this article, and a model of the macro-level determinants of fertility -- a model informed by the revised theory of fertility transition -- is specified. This model is estimated both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. In addition, a model is specified that assesses the importance of a family planning program effort on fertility change in less developed countries. The effects on fertility change of other variables is controlled. Using crude birth rates for 117 countries, the model is operationalized and the revised model is applied to 1974 rates. A longitudinal model of 1955-1959 to 1974 change in rates is then tested. The final model for 81 less developed countries from the original set of 117 countries includes a measure of family planning effort. Results support the view that high levels of modernization increase motivation to control fertility, but they also show that excessive reliance on developmental change in less developed countries to bring about fetility declines would prolong unnecessarily the current period of rapid population growth. The dominant role of modernization in the models that lack data on family planning programs only facilitates understanding of the past. Modernization is not the only road to future lower fertility. Modernization, abortion, and family planning programs are explicit policy relevant variables. It was found that legalized abortion has a large and independent impact on lowering birth rates and that family planning programs also reduce unwanted births in less developed countries. These programs were the most important factor related to change in 1955-1959 to 1974 crude birth rate.     

Education and fertility: policy implications for developing countries

Efforts to reduce the high rates of population growth in Africa are largely hampered by a social and political climate which does not recognize high birth rates as a problem. Only 2 countries (Kenya and Ghana) are actively antinatalist officially, the rest being actively pronatalist or taking no firm stand. The author argues that support for family planning will grow only when governments support mass education programs. A framework showing the linkages between fertility and formal education is developed. On the demographic level, pursuit of higher levels of education delays entry into marriage, directly and through pursuit of occupations which do not encourage early marriage. Lowered infant mortality through improved utilization of modern health care by the educated also leads to reduced fertility. On the sociocultural level, migration to urban centers among the educated leads to new cultural norms and constraints on large families from the pursuit of modern careers. The author asserts that the inverse relation between education and fertility is well known, and that national support for mass education is needed to speed economic development, change the position of women and alter peoples' values.     

Fertility Determinants and Economic Uncertainty: An Assessment Using European Panel Data

This study examined the determinants of fertility, using panel data for 27 European countries. We employed panel co-integration to estimate fertility as function of demographic and economic variables. We showed that low fertility in most industrialized countries in Europe is due to low infant mortality rates, high female employment, low nuptiality rate, and high opportunity cost of having children. Using two measures of economic uncertainty, which are associated with labor market decisions—a production (an output) volatility measure and the unemployment rate—we examined to what extent economic insecurities affect fertility decisions. The empirical results showed that both measures of economic uncertainty have a significant negative impact on fertility implying that labor market insecurities might be a significant factor affecting fertility decisions.     

Evaluating a basic-needs strategy and population policies: the BACHUE approach

The BACHUE model, a dynamic simulation technique developed within the International Labour Organization's World Employment Program, has been applied to the Philippines. The model simulates behavior and consequences in a number of key areas: fertility, marriage, migration, savings and expenditure, and labor force participation for households and a macro-model for demand, ouput, employment, and income. The design and development of the model are discussed in detail. The model was run for a series of 13 experiments ranging from nationlization of modern sectors, increasing self-employment, movement toward labor-intensive techniques, changes in growth rates of various sectors, and a reduction in fertility by 2% over 1976-1985, an increase over the 1% assumed in the base run. Runs R-2 to R-11 all showed that a change in basic needs is associated with significant declines in fertility, largely because of increasing education and decreasing mortality. Better economic conditions in rural areas also reduced migration. R-13 which examined the effects of a family planning program of moderate size on ultimate fertility, showed that even by year 2000 the effects were small. The population is reduced 5% over the run which assumes negative income tax and government subsidies to poor families but the gain in income per adult is less than 4%. Any real improvement in income as the result of family planning will take 40-50 years to achieve. Economic incentives, on the other hand, have much faster demographic results. The models also show that rural-urban migration is responsive to policy changes. Planners are cautioned that the model is not a picture of the entire range of human behavior but is an adjunct for use in analyzing interaction between policies.     

Socio-economic fertility theories and their relevance to population policy

A theory of fertility is necessary to assess the justification for family planning and to understand the effectiveness of the programs. 3 possibilities for uses of a theory of fertility are discussed: 1) assessment of population projections, 2) indications of what can be expected from family planning, and 3) assessment of population control projects. Birthrates are high, but fertility rates in developing countries are between 40% and 60% below the maximum possible. Social and cultural elements and economic incentives and constraints play a role in keeping the birthrates high. Economic development is frequently accompanied by a drop in fertility, but economic development implies other simultaneous changes which influence fertility rates. Gary Becker's fertility theory holds that with higher income people would purchase more children, the people behaving as they would in purchasing consumer durables. However, higher income groups frequently have fewer children. Becker says that higher income families want high-quality children who are more expensive. A pure economic theory does not explain all of the fertility variations; it is necessary to take account of the socioeconomic processes that result from economic development. Family planning policies that influence people's motivations should be developed.     

International Migration and the Demographic Transition: A Two‐Way Interaction

The paper explores the relationship between the demographic transition and international migration, that is, between population dynamics and direct connectivity between peoples. The first part examines how ideas conveyed by migrants to non‐migrants of their community of origin are susceptible to impact on practices that lead to the reduction of birth rates in source countries of migration and concludes that international migration may be one of the mechanisms through which demographic transition is disseminated. The second part shows that declining birth rates in origin countries generate a new profile of the migrant and suggests that future migrants will typically leave no spouses or children in the home country and therefore their objective will no longer be to improve the family’s standing at home for the mere reason that there is no longer such a family, but to increase opportunities for themselves. Migration policies of origin countries on remittances as well as those of destination countries on family reunification will have to be reconsidered.     

An examination of the problem of unwanted population growth in Africa and the existing facilities for training family planning personnel

Population planning is as important as economic planning and should be applied both at the national and personal levels. Population control and socioeconomic development are intrinsic to each other. Proverty, illiteracy, political instability, and social retardation are found in the countries with high birth rates. Most African nations tend to think of the population in terms of density rather than growth potential. Family planning programs should be accorded the same priority as maternal-child health, but African countries are often not equipped financially or professionally to support family planning workers under the same conditions as other medical personnel could be accomplished locally rather than overseas, thus saving about $204,000 in the East African Region and $213,000 in the West African Region. The success of the trainees' program will depend on the degree to whichf amily planning programs are integrated with other medical services; insight into traditiona l sexual patterns, and tact and skill of personnel.     

Population and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa

The intricate interrelationships between population and development in sub-Saharan Africa are examined and the prospects are considered for converting the abundant human resources into an effective development asset. The demographic trends that characterize the sub-Saharan region at this time differ markedly from what is happening in other parts of the developing world. In Africa, death rates have come down slightly (17/1000 in 1980-85 in contrast to 20/1000 in 1970-75); there has been practically no change in the birthrate. Consequently, population growth rates are on the rise throughout Africa although there are differences within the regions. The various factors responsible for high fertility in African societies and the consequences of the continuing high fertility often are mutually reinforcing. For example, low health and educational standards are likely to lead women to have large numbers of children, but these conditions are themselves the result of the population growth, which requires an expansion of health care and educational facilities that hard-pressed national budgets cannot provide. In Africa, the growth rate of the youth population is increasing even faster than that of the population as a whole -- from 3.1% in 1980-85 to an estimated 3.4% in 1990-95. The most critical problem posed by such growth rates is an increased demand for food. Countries which cannot adequately feed their growing populations are unlikely to be significantly more successful in satisfying their other basic needs. Whether educated or healthy or not, Africa's growing numbers of children represent major economic problems for countries with a low level of economic growth. There is little hope of effectively absorbing all the new entrants who swell the labor market each year, and the indirect consequences for the economy of rapid demographic growth are no less serious. Presently, Africa is the scene of major and particularly distressing movements of population as the drought has forced people to move long distances in search of food relief. It is too soon to tell whether or how much of the lands left behind can be rehabilitated and again become productive. The question arises as to whether appropriate policies, supported by adequate funds and technical know-how, can convert Africa's millions of young people from being a brake on development into a resource for the future. Policies and strategies that may be most appropriate to this end are: to take sufficient cognizance of the interrelationship between population and development and hence to be prepared to take the necessary steps to ensure that the two remain in balance; to realize that family planning programs mean more than a reduction in fertility but also the possibility of reducing infant and maternal mortality and morbidity; to back whatever family planning programs governments introduce; to plan comprehensively; and to effectively carry out the development strategies.     

Assessing the effects of monetized food aid on: reproductive behavior in rural Honduras

This article describes the methodology and findings of a study undertaken to assess whether the monetization of non-emergency food aid has adversely influenced national family planning program efforts in Honduras. Due to time constraints, an ex-post, non-equivalent group design was the strongest feasible study design. In the study, women receiving food aid in the form of cash coupons were compared with women receiving food rations and a third group of comparable women who were not food aid recipients on three types of outcomes: recent fertility, fertility preferences, and contraceptive use (both current and intended). A ‘sample selection’ model was used in the analysis to control for unobserved differences between comparison groups. No compelling evidence for either adverse demand- or supply-side effects was observed.     

Can demographic transition only be explained by altruistic and neo-Malthusian models?

Previous researches on demographic transition are based on models incorporating altruism in their utility function. These models are all neo-Malthusian in their essence, since they assume a positive relationship between income and fertility rates. This paper presents a model which departs from the neo-Malthusian frameworks in its definition of altruism. This framework better fits the data and socio-economic context of the early nineteenth century, a period where fertility rates went up. This paper stresses that the evolution of capital, wages and child labor may provide an alternate explanation for the observed pattern of fertility rates during the early European industrialization.     

Education and changing reproductive behavior in Ghana

It has recently been posited by several researchers that a fertility transition is under way in Ghana. Such fertility decline would be the first instance on the west coast of Africa. Data from the 1988 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey allows closer assessment of this earlier speculation. Review of the data suggests that earlier assertions of the existence of fertility transition were premature and hastily drawn from fragmented evidence. Little evidence exists to support any hypothesis of a fertility turnaround in ghana. The findings are, however, cautiously optimistic with some indication that continued increases in the proportion of women with some secondary education may yet induce a fertility transition in the country. The author notes the lack of individual motivation to reduce fertility in Ghana and questions the merit of continuing family planning programs in such an atmosphere. Measures to reach men in family planning messages and to expand the level of women's education are recommended. Success in reducing fertility in Kenya as a result of increasing women's education is noted.     

Cohabitation in Spain: No Longer a Marginal Path to Family Formation

Although many indicators reflect the marked retreat from marriage occurring in Spain since the 1980s, the diffusion of cohabitation has been slow. The confluence of very low and late fertility, latest‐late marriage, and low cohabitation has been largely regarded as defying the predictions of the second demographic transition and has fueled a debate over the distinctiveness of the Mediterranean model of family formation. Comparative analyses based on the Family and Fertility Survey documented the marginal role of cohabitation in Spain and in the rest of southern European countries by the mid‐1990s. In this research, the authors used more recent data from the 2006 Spanish Fertility, Family and Values Survey (N = 5,750) to reveal that cohabitation has spread significantly among younger cohorts and hence can no longer be considered as playing a marginal role in the family formation process.     

Transition from the Lactational Amenorrhea Method to other modern family planning methods in rural Bangladesh: Barrier analysis and implications for behavior change communication program intervention design

The timely transition from Lactational Amenorrhea Method (LAM)² to another modern family planning method contributes to healthy spacing of pregnancies by increasing the adoption of family planning during the first year postpartum. Yet, literature suggests challenges in completing a timely LAM transition. To guide program implementation in Bangladesh, this study identified factors influencing women's transition decisions.Eighty postpartum women, comprising 40 who transitioned from LAM³ and 40 who did not,⁴ participated. Half of each group participated in in-depth interviews to explore the decision-making process. All participants responded to a “Barrier Analysis” questionnaire to identify differences in eight behavioral determinants.More than half of transitioners switched to another modern method before or within the same month that LAM ended. Of the 18 transitioners who delayed,⁵ 15 waited for menses to return. For non-transitioners, key barriers included waiting for menses to return, misconceptions on return to fertility, and perceived lack of familial support. The LAM transition can help women prevent unintended pregnancy during the first year postpartum. Increased emphasis on counseling women about the risk of pregnancy, and misconceptions about personal fertility patterns are critical for facilitating the transition. Strategies should also include interventions that train health workers and improve social support.     

The Baby Boom and Its Explanations*

This article examines explanations of the sharp rise in the birth rate that occurred in the United States during the late 1940s and the 1950s (the so-called "baby boom") in light of recent research on the nature and magnitude of its demographic components. The paper includes a review of the fertility surveys that derived from concern about postwar fertility trends, a discussion of the kind and relative importance of the demographic components constituting the fertility increase of the period, an assessment of explanations of the baby boom, and a interpretation of one of the components– the rise in average family size-that was a demographically small, but theoretically significant, part of the upturn in the birth rate.     

World population trends in 1960-70

The rapid rise in world population for the 4 periods 1950-1955, 1955 -1960, 1960-1965, and 1965-1970 is mainly due to a decline in the crude death rate from 24/1000 in 1950-1955 to 16.1/1000 in 1965-1970. 1950 was a turning-point in mortality rates because for the first time public health measures became widely available in less developed regions. These less developed regions contained 63.4% of the world population in 1930, 65.5% in 1950, and 70.0% in 1970. World population increased by 22% in 1960-1970, compared to 20% in 1950-1960, which was twice as much as the 20% registered for the 20 years 1930-1950. Developed regions contributed a 14% increase between 1950-1960 and 12% between 1960-1970; in less developed regions the increases were 23% and 27% respectively. Demographic conferences have begun to neglect mortality, but this is still a vital part of total population growth. Evidence is that the mortality decline in less developed countries is beginning to level off so that previous population projections may not be reached. What decline has been seen in crude birth rates in less developed countries is largely attributable to declines in East Asia, notably in the People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and other Chinese or Chinese culture-related populations, as well as some of the smaller Latin American countries and some small islands off Africa. Such demographic giants as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and sub-Saharan Africa have shown little change. In areas with high fertility there are more mothers under age 20 and more births to women over age 35 while in low-fertility areas births are concentrated in the 20-35 year groups. An interesting example is Japan which has 50% of its births to mothers 25-29 years of age. Less developed countries have a larger proportion o f the population under age 14 while developed countries which have had lower fertility for a number of years have larger numbers in the older age groups. In less developed areas the greatest burdens are associated with child-rearing while welfare for the aged is the great concern in the more developed areas of the world. The great trend toward urbanization in all parts of the world means that the population problems commanding greatest attention are those associated with large and fast-growing cities.     

“Minutes to Midnight”: Problems and Promises

Abstract

This paper assesses the relative impact of direct and indirect determinants of marital fertility in Pakistan, where the vast majority of women do not use any method of fertility regulation. Data came from the 1990/91 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey, and models were estimated for women aged 15–49, 15–24, 25–34 and 35–49. The younger cohort may be the vanguard of change; change which may be masked by investigating only the conventional 15–49 age group. Findings indicate that unlike the older cohorts, the younger cohort does not have negative and significant relationships between education, employment and fertility; and, that the current use of family planning is positive and significant with fertility for the 35–49 cohort only. These findings suggest that there is a threshold or minimum number of children that a woman must produce before determinants such as current use of family planning, education and employment impact fertility.     

Education and fertility in Iran

Studies providing evidence concerning literacy's relationship to fertility in Iran are reviewed. Reliable demographic data are unavailable for Iran before the 1st census in 1956. The 1966 census revealed a reversal of the normally expected larger female population, with a sex ratio of 107 men for every 100 women. The female population in Iran is accorded low status; only 29.6% of the population over the age of 10 was literate according to the 1966 census. A negative relationship between literacy or levels of education and fertility seems to have become a basic tenet of demographic theory. The hypothesis that as a woman's education increases she has fewer children has been confirmed in numerous studies, and, in response to this information, the Iranian government has sponsored several projects which incorporate family planning education into literacy projects. In view of the associations noted in other studies of the relationship between education and fertility, it seems wise to examine the effects of education on fertility in Iran. None of the studies reviewed give conclusive evidence that literacy is unrelated to fertility in Iran. Several of the studies reveal built-in biases: the husbands in Siassi's study were all military personnel; Gulick interviewed women who were already attending family planning clinics; Edlefsen and Liberman made some highly abstract and speculative predictions, and Lieberman et al. were basically measuring incomes instead of education. All of the studies do, however, give some indication of an irregular effect of education on fertility in Iran and swggest the need for further study of this variable.     

Costs,Benefits, and Management Considerations of a Prepaid Student Dental Health Plan

Abstract

The Student Dental Health Program (SDHP) is an open panel, prepaid dental insurance plan at the University of Alabama in Birmingham. The program was developed primarily to provide optimal dental health service; however the SDHP also serves educational and research functions that are consistent with the objectives of the university. The student bodies of the Schools of Dentistry, Medicine, Nursing, and Optometry constitute the enrollee population.

Total cost rose from $18,418 in 1969–70 with 862 enrollees, to $70,930 in 1975–76 with 1,618 enrollees. During the same period the number of procedures completed increased from 2,868 to 6,796, with the average cost per procedure increasing from $6.42 to $10.44. The number of restorative services declined and preventive services increased. In 1976–77 benefits per student treated were estimated at $80 as compared to the annual fee of $48. The value of unmet needs upon entrance to the program averaged $59 per enrollee in 1974–75. By 1976–77 this figure was reduced to $26 due to implementation of an initial screening. The program is self-supporting due to a variety of cost containment measures. On balance, the program can be considered successful and beneficial to all parties concerned.     

TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF FEMINIST AND DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON FERTILITY

In explaining fertility and reproduction and emerging patterns of childbearing, both demographers and feminists have centered their thinking on women's status (economic and social), women's changing roles and life experiences (increased labor force participation, increased availability of reproductive options, declining marriage rates in many parts of the industrialized world, and the centrality of women to development), and women as agents in micro- and macrolevel changes in family, fertility, and economic change. Although demography has recently begun to integrate feminist perspectives into fertility explanations, there is not yet a synthesis of feminist theoretical insights with demographic questions. Drawing from recent thinking on global and national political and policy challenges in the less and more developed worlds, to the epistemological shifts in knowledge of reproduction/mothering, to changes in the technologies of reproduction, this article moves toward an integration of feminist and demographic perspectives on fertility.
…far from the economic dependence of women working in the interests of motherhood, it is the steadily acting cause of a pathological maternity and a declining birthrate.
Charlotte Perkins Stetson, Women and Economics , 1899     

Child‐free and unmarried: Changes in the life planning of young east German women

Using evidence from demographic and survey data, this research examines how one decade of postsocialism has changed the life planning of young East German women. Aggregate data reflect marriage and fertility postponement and increased nonmarital birth rates and cohabitation. The analysis shows East German women's “stubbornness” ( Dölling, 2003 ) in adhering to life perspectives in line with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) standard biography (high nonmarital childbearing, high work orientation, rejection of the homemaker status, desire to combine work and family). The most important findings are that (a) motherhood is postponed to increase child‐free time, (b) cohabitation is increasingly becoming an alternative to marriage, (c) marriage (but not partnership) is increasingly optional for childbearing, and (d) employment is prioritized over family formation.