Gender differences in social risk taking

Women in Western societies are typically more risk averse than men in individual risk taking decisions. In real life, however, risk taking decisions are usually made in a social context. So far, empirical evidence whether gender differences are also present in the social risk taking domain is missing. We use a controlled experiment to analyze gender differences in social risk taking. We find that inequality aversion is the main driver for risk aversion in social risk taking. Disaggregating the data for males and females shows that this effect is mainly driven by strong inequality aversion of women. Moreover, by running the experiment with non-standard subjects from an egalitarian small-scale society, our results suggest that gender differences in social risk taking are culture-specific.     

ARE WOMEN MORE RISK AVERSE?

We find that single women exhibit relatively more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men. Using U.S. sample data, we examine household holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender differences in financial risk taking. As wealth increases, the proportion of wealth held as risky assets is estimated to increase by a smaller amount for single women than for single men. Gender differences in financial risk taking are also influenced by age, race, and number of children. Greater financial risk aversion may provide an explanation for women's lower levels of wealth compared with men's. ( JEL J16, D81, G11)     

An Examination of Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Divorce

ABSTRACT

Using the General Social Survey, this article examines the gender difference in attitudes toward divorce. Although previous studies have found that women have more tolerant attitudes toward divorce compared to men, we find that this gender difference depends on the measure. Our analysis indicates that women are more likely than men to advocate making divorce more difficult to obtain. We find a significant link between the Protestant faith and conservative attitudes toward divorce; taking into account religious factors reduced the gender difference in attitudes. Consistent with prior literature, our results indicate that different factors affect men's and women's views of divorce.     

Modernization and the gender gap in religiosity: Evidence from cross-national European surveys

The tendency of women to be more religious than men has been widely observed. Many theories have been offered to account for this difference, with explanations ranging from the biological to the sociological; no consensus on the explanation has been reached. Using data from the European Social Survey, the European Values Study and the International Social Survey Programme, in conjunction with a new method for measuring the gender gap, we compare different countries, generations and periods in Europe to address three key questions: (1) How much do the differences between men and women depend on what indicator of religiosity (e.g. affiliation, attendance, prayer, belief) is being considered? (2) Is there an association at the national level between the size of the gender gap and the degree of secularization or gender equality? (3) Is there a convergence in the religiosity of men and women across generations or over time? There is some evidence for such a narrowing of the gap in Europe—most noticeably in southern and Eastern Europe—but substantial differences persist. Even in countries that are comparatively secular and where gender inequality has been much reduced, women are considerably more likely than men to identify with a religion, to call themselves religious, and to participate in public and private religious activities.     

Beyond the Nuclear Family? Familism and Gender Ideology in Diverse Religious Communities

Religious familism, or ideology about "the good family," has been central to the culture and practice of local religious communities in the United States. Recent research has suggested that the "Ozzie and Harriet" familism dominant among mainstream religious groups in the 1950s religious expansion has remained formative for many local religious communities in the intervening decades. This research suggests that religious familism shapes how gender is symbolized and enacted in local religious communities and leads to differences in the meaning of religious participation for contemporary men and women. However, this work has been based largely on studies of white, middle-class religious communities. In this article, we analyze the relationship between family ideology and gender in three congregations chosen to exemplify those social locations where we would expect considerable distance from the 1950s "Ozzie and Harriet" ideal—one Hispanic Catholic parish, one African-American congregation in the black Church tradition, and one white liberal Protestant congregation that has adopted an open and affirming stance toward homosexuality and same-sex unions. We find considerable innovation in family-oriented rhetoric and ministry, and a range of gendered practices that prove considerably more inclusive than those found in previous research. We also find considerable symbolic affirmation of the value of more traditional gender roles and practices, particularly in the realm of the family, than we expected to find. We explore the implications of these findings for how we understand the production of gender in local religious communities and for the capacity of local religious communities to become truly gender-inclusive spaces.     

Moving Beyond Agency: A Review of Gender and Intimate Relationships in Conservative Religions

Studies of gender regimes within conservative religion have often focused on the dynamics of intimate relationships to separately analyze women's agency and men's authority. By bridging studies of men and women in a variety of intimate relationships, this article provides a relational analysis of how gender and religion intersect in daily life. Given the importance of marriage within conservative religions, I first review studies of married women and married men to illustrate the varied ways these institutions intersect. Next, I present findings from the limited but burgeoning scholarship on those who have not yet or cannot live up to the religious goal of heterosexual marriage: unmarried heterosexuals and gay and lesbian relationships.     

Religiosity,sexual behaviors,sexual motivations,and gender: A three-year longitudinal study

Longitudinal data are critical for examining associations of religiosity with sexual behaviors and motivations during college. We use hierarchical linear modeling on five semesters of data from a diverse sample of college students (N = 735) to examine within- and between-person associations between religious service attendance and importance of religion and sexual behaviors and motivations for and against sex and consider gender as a moderator. Between-person religiosity was associated with sexual behaviors and motivations whereas within-person religiosity was not. Students' sexual motivations co-varied across semesters with their religious service attendance and importance of religion. Our results indicated more restrictive associations between religiosity and sexual motivations for women than for men.     

The Gender Gap in Fear: Assessing the Interactive Effects of Gender and Perceived Risk on Fear of Crime

In this research we explore the interaction between gender and perceived risk of victimization on levels of fear of crime. Much of the previous research on the effects of gender on fear of crime assumes that crimes are not gendered and that the effects of gender would operate the same regardless of type of crime. Challenging this assumption, we examine crimes that disproportionately victimize women or men. We find that there is greater nuance in both fear of crime and perception of risk when explored in this way. In fact, men's fear of crime actually surpasses women's fear at high levels of perceived risk for those crimes in which men are more likely to be victimized. We offer explanations for this finding, concluding that gendered perceptions of crime and victimization may drive these differences. In sum, our study indicates that future research on fear of crime must be even further attuned to the gender gap in fear.     

Religion and subjective well-being among the elderly in China

Evidence from developed and developing countries alike demonstrates a strongly positive relationship between religiosity and happiness, particularly for women and particularly among the elderly. Using survey data from the oldest old in China, we find a strong negative relationship between religious participation and subjective well-being in a rich multivariate logistic framework that controls for demographics, health and disabilities, living arrangements, wealth and income, lifestyle and social networks, and location. In contrast to other studies, we also find that religion has a larger effect on subjective well-being on men than women.     

Children,Kitchen, Church: does ethnicity matter?

Ethnic differences in the allocation of non-market time are important, as they may shed more light on the integration level of ethnic minorities and on the factors that affect both household productivity and ethnic identity. In this paper we examine the role of ethnicity and gender by analyzing differences in the time spent on a range of activities employing the 2000 UK Time Use Survey. Based on the economics of religion and identity economic models, we hypothesize that if ethnic minority women have lower opportunity costs of time and a strong ‘ethnic’ or ‘traditionally female’ identity, they will engage more in ‘traditional’ home activities. Double-hurdle regression results indicate that while the effect for childcare is not significant when estimated for parents only, non-white women spend significantly more time on food management and particularly religious activities than white women, with the greatest effect of the latter being for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women.     

Gender attitudes,sexual violence,and HIV/AIDS risks among men and women in Cape Town,South Africa

This study examined gender attitudes and sexual violence‐supportive beliefs (rape myths) in a sample of South African men and women at risk for HIV transmission. Over 40% of women and 16% of men had been sexually assaulted, and more than one in five men openly admitted to having perpetrated sexual assault. Traditional attitudes toward women's social and gender roles, as well as rape myths, were endorsed by a significant minority of both men and women. Multivariate analyses showed that for men, sexual assault history and rape myth acceptance, along with alcohol and other drug use history, were significantly related to cumulative risks for HIV infection. In contrast, although we found that women were at substantial risk for sexually transmitted infection (STI), including HIV, women's risks were only related to lower levels of education and alcohol use history. We speculate that women's risks for STI/HIV are the product of partner characteristics and male‐dominated relationships, suggesting the critical importance of intervening with men to reduce women's risks for sexual assault and STI/HIV.     

THE RED, BLACK, AND GRAY MARKETS OF RELIGION IN CHINA

The economic approach to religion has confined its application to Christendom in spite of the ambition of the core theorists for its universal applicability. Moreover, the supply-side market theory focuses on one type of religiosity—religious participation (membership and attendance) in formal religious organizations. In an attempt to analyze the religious situation in contemporary China, a country with religious traditions and regulations drastically different from Europe and the Americas, I propose a triple-market model: a red market (officially permitted religions), a black market (officially banned religions), and a gray market (religions with an ambiguous legal/illegal status). The gray market concept accentuates noninstitutionalized religiosity. The triple-market model is useful to understand the complex religious situation in China, and it may be extendable to other societies as well.     

Gender Differences in Unemployment Dynamics and Initial Wages over the Business Cycle

Using administrative data from Spanish Social Security for the period 2002–2013, we explore differences between unemployed men and women in: their probabilities to find a job, their initial wages if they find a new job, and the likelihood to fall back into unemployment. We estimate bivariate proportional hazard models for unemployment duration and for the consecutive job duration for men and women separately, and decompose the gender gap using a non-linear Oaxaca decomposition. Gender differentials in labour market outcomes are procyclical, probably due to the procyclical nature of typically male occupations. While a higher level of education protects women in particular from unemployment, having children hampers women’s employment and initial wages after unemployment. There are lower gender gaps in the public sector and in high technology- firms. Decompositions show that the gender gaps are not explained by differences in sample composition. Indeed, if women had similar characteristics to men, the gender gap would be even wider.     

The Partisan Paradox: Religious Commitment and the Gender Gap in Party Identification

A large body of scholarly literature points to the growing influenceof religious devotion on U.S. partisanship. This article attemptsto reconcile the growing religious commitment cleavage in theAmerican party system with the commensurate growth in the gendergap. If women are, on average, more religiously devout thanmen, and if contemporary shifts in partisanship are disproportionatelyfounded on religious and cultural cleavages, then why are womenmore likely to identify with the Democratic Party? I pose threepossible explanations for this apparent paradox: (1) that theinfluence of religion is only considerable among the most committed;(2) that men and women politicize their religious beliefs indifferent ways; and (3) that gender differences in opinion onnonreligious issues sustain the partisan gap, over and abovethe conservative influence of religiosity. Findings from structuralequation analyses demonstrate that religious devotion affectsthe politics of men and women in similar ways. Religious commitmentaffects partisan choices but does not override the powerfuleffects of gender. Gender differences in support for the socialwelfare state and the preeminence of social welfare opinionin the partisan calculus of men and women largely explain thepersistence of the gender gap.     

Do values explain the low employment levels of Muslim women around the world? A within‐ and between‐country analysis

Using worldwide data from the World Values Survey (WVS) gathered in 2010–2014, we examine two distinct ways in which Islam may be associated with women's employment. We show that, within their countries, Muslim women are less likely to be employed than women of other religions. We also examine between‐country differences and find that, net of education and family statuses, the employment levels of women living in countries that are 90–100 per cent Muslim are not significantly different than those living in countries that are only 0–20 per cent Muslim. Then we test a prevailing view: that Islam discourages gender egalitarian values, and that these values – held by women themselves or people around them – explain why Muslim women are less likely to be employed than women of other religions within their own countries. Despite the rich measures of values in the WVS and a large sample, we find no evidence that values explain any of the lower employment of Muslim women, mainly because values have little or no effect on women's employment. Thus, we conclude that most of the world's gap in employment between Muslim women and other women is within‐country and is not explained by gender ideology. Future research should examine alternative hypotheses, including ethno‐religious discrimination.     

A pole new world: Maneuvering masculinity and sexuality among men who pole dance

Research on cisgender men's experiences in feminized or women-dominated sports, physical activities, and leisure time has revealed strategies men use to circumvent or maneuver stigmas to minimize negative perceptions. Pole dancing is an under-researched activity uniquely positioned to understand dynamics of gender and sexuality. In this research dialogue, we present preliminary results from 13 semi-structured interviews with U.S. men who pole dance to understand how they navigate masculinity and sexuality in pole dancing. First, we find men very strategically disclose their pole dancing to others in the context of the activity's connections to women, gay men, and sex work. Second, we note how men who “pole” often rely on gender essentialist tropes that reinforce the assumption of natural, biological differences between men and women in attempt to legitimize their participation. Third, men who pole are aware of the potential “creepiness” of their presence in pole dance spaces and use this as an opportunity for reflection. Exploring how men rationalize their participation in pole dance is useful to understand the gender and sexual dynamics of men's presence in women-dominated spaces and broader contemporary masculinities.     

Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians and Their Relationship with Gender Role Beliefs in a Sample of Chilean University Students

ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes the relation between gender role beliefs and prejudice toward gay men and lesbians in Chile. Participants were Chilean university students (N = 283). Results indicate that men are more prejudiced than women and religious people are more prejudiced than non-religious people. On the other hand, gender role beliefs mediate sex differences in prejudice. The participants' more traditional gender role beliefs hold more negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Men are more prejudiced than women, particularly in their attitudes toward gay men. In addition, sex differences in attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are mediated by gender role beliefs.     

Subjective well‐being in the new China: religion,social capital,and social status

We present the first nationally representative evidence on the relationship between religion and subjective well‐being for the case of China. Research on Western societies tends to find a positive association between being religious and level of well‐being. China provides an interesting critical case as the religious population is growing rapidly and the religious and socioeconomic environments are profoundly different from Western societies, implying different mechanisms might be at work. We hypothesize to find a positive association between religion and well‐being in China too, but argue social capital, for which strong evidence is often found in Western societies, is unlikely to be an important mechanism because religion in China is generally non‐congregational. Instead, we argue that the private and subjective dimension of religion matters for well‐being in China by helping adherents have an improved sense of social status relative to the non‐religious in the context of rapid social change and growing inequality. Our results generally support these predictions.     

Religion,Marriage Markets,and Assortative Mating in the United States

As interfaith marriage has become more common, religion is thought to be less important for sorting partners. Nevertheless, prior studies on religious assortative mating use samples of prevailing marriages, which miss how local marriage markets shape both partner selection and marriage timing. Drawing on search theory and data from 8,699 young adults (ages 18–31 years) in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997, the author examined the association between the concentration of coreligionists in local marriage markets and marriage timing and partner selection using event history methods. Religious concentration is associated with higher odds of transitioning to marriage and religious homogamy (conditional on marriage) for women and men at older ages (24–31 years) but not at younger ages (18–23 years). The association was also stronger for non‐Hispanic Whites when compared with other racial and ethnic groups. The findings indicate that religion remains relevant in sorting partners for many young adults in today's marriage market.