PAY SECRECY AND EFFORT PROVISION

Pay secrecy is often justified on the ground of concerns about the detrimental consequences of intra‐firm pay comparisons for work morale and performance. Surprisingly, however, there is only limited empirical evidence that the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort provision. In this paper, I study pay comparison effects in a gift‐exchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. I compare effort choices made by employees in a “pay secrecy” treatment and in two “public wages” treatments where employees are informed of the wage paid to the co‐worker. In one “public wages” treatment the employer can choose both wages she pays to the employees, while in the other treatment the wage paid to one employee is regulated exogenously. I show that pay disclosure can be detrimental for effort provision if employees are treated unequally. (JEL A13, C92, J31)     

The relative effect of unionization and interjurisdictional competition on municipal wages

This study analyzes the effect on municipal employee wages of interjurisdictional competition in municipal service markets. The impact of market conditions are analyzed utilizing a bureaucracy model of local governmental decision making. The study develops hypotheses concerning the degree of competition in this market, constructs empirical measures of competition, and investigates the relationship between competition and wage levels for three categories of municipal workers. The empirical results suggest that local market conditions may be as important a determinant of local wages as local labor market conditions, including union membership. Also, the wage effect of unionization appears to be greater in less competitive local government environments. Financial support from the Earhart Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to thank Werner Hirsch, Roger Folsom, and Geoffrey Nunn for helpful comments.     

Parenthood wage penalties in a double income society

We estimate how parenthood affects hourly wages using panel data for Norwegian employees in the years 1997–2007. Though smaller than for most other OECD countries, we find substantial wage penalties to motherhood, ranging from a 1.2 % wage reduction for women with lower secondary education to 4.9 % for women with more than four years of higher education. Human capital measures such as work experience and paid parental leave do not explain the wage penalties, indicating that in the Norwegian institutional context, mothers are protected from adverse wage effects due to career breaks. We do however find large heterogeneity in the effects, with the largest penalties for mothers working full time and in the private sector. Contrary to most studies using US data and to previous research from Norway, we find a small wage penalty also to fatherhood. Also for men, the penalty is greater for those who work full time and in the private sector. A substantial share of the fatherhood wage penalty is explained by paternity leave.     

Workers, Unions, and Takeovers

How do takeovers affect workers?? wages and job security in the short-run? What role does the labor union play in mitigating these effects? I answer these two questions by analyzing wage and employment outcomes of over 4,000 public firms that were acquired between 1981 and 2002, using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. I find that target establishments exhibit a net contraction in wages and employment, relative to comparable establishments after takeovers. Targets?? establishments in more unionized industries experience worse wage and employment outcomes after takeovers. These adverse effects are exacerbated when the establishment is located in a state with Right-to-work laws where unions face a less favorable bargaining environment. These findings indicate that target firms?? employees are negatively affected by takeovers and that their labor unions do not mitigate these negative effects.     

Uncertainty and front-end loading of labor agreements

Uncertainty of future prices is offered as an explanation for front-end loading of real wages in nominal wage contracts. Exploitation of mutually beneficial gains from trade between risk-neutral employers and employees implies an expected future real wage that is lower the greater is the uncertainty of future prices, and the observed extent of front-end loading is consistent with plausible values of uncertainty of future prices. I would like to thank, without implicating, M. L. Burstein, George Fallis, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

UNCERTAINTY AND STICKY-DOWNWARD BUT UPWARD-MOBILE WAGES

The usual search models of unemployment hold that firms do not offer wage cuts to employees in time of slack demand because the employees have alternatives open to them at wages higher than the reduced wage that would be required to maintain full employment. This paper extends these models by considering employees as choosing in conditions of uncertainty and showing that refusal to accept a wage cut is often rational in the absence of a higher alternative wage. Additional implications are derived for union behavior and simultaneous inflation and unemployment.     

Auswirkungen Der Familiengründung Auf Den Berufsverlauf Von Männern

In this article we use longitudinal data from the German socio-economic Panel to examine the relationship between parenthood and labour market outcomes for men. Both traditional sociological and economical perspectives predict a positive effect of fatherhood on wages, whereas the spreading idea of a modern fatherhood suggests that, at least, fathers of the younger generation tend to reduce their working hours and thus accept wage reductions. Our focus is on the effect of fatherhood on wage growth, hours worked and interfirm mobility. We find that fathers receive higher wages than married men without children, even when controlling for selection into fatherhood. The positive income effect of fatherhood results from greater on-the-job wage growth. However, fathers are not likely to increase their wage by working longer hours or leaving their current employer for a better paid position.     

How state exceptions to employment-at-will affect wages

Little research has been conducted on the effects of state adoption of exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment-at-will, which states that both employees and employers have the right to terminate an employment relationship at any time for any reason. I examine how these exceptions affect wages and find that, as predicted, the two are inversely related. All three commonly adopted exceptions are negatively related to the wage rate, with state adoption being associated with up to a three percent reduction in wages.     

Union density effects in the supermarket industry

Unions provide higher than competitive wages for members, but their effect on non-union wages is not clear. We investigate the effect of union density on supermarket wages from 1986 to 1993, a period of declining real wages and declining union membership. Full-information maximum likelihood techniques are used to estimate log wage equations for both the union and nonunion sectors. Decomposition techniques then separate the union wage premium into the relative effects of densities and union membership. We find a significant, positive effect of union density for both union and nonunion employees. This effect explains approximately one-third of the union-nonunion wage differential. This research was conducted while Johansson was a graduate research assistant at the University of Minnesota.     

The Effects of Prevailing Wage Laws: A Comparison of Individual Workers'' Wages Earned on and off Prevailing Wage Construction Projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on non-prevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market.     

The effects of prevailing wage laws: A comparison of individual workers’ wages earned on and off prevailing wage construction projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on nonprevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market. This research was done originally for the Program Review and Investigations Committee of the Kentucky State Legislature. I thank the staff of the Program Review and Investigations Committee and the Legisla-tive Research Commission for assistance with data collection and Mark Berger for helpful comments. Due to confidentiality requirements, the data cannot be made available.     

Regional wages and subjective measures of employment opportunities

We utilise a rich set of regional labour market variables to explain regional variation in Norwegian manufacturing wages. In particular, regional indicators of labour market conditions are computed from survey data in which respondents are asked to evaluate local employment opportunities. We find that average reported satisfaction with local job prospects and other survey-based indicators perform better in regional wage equations than traditional labour market variables, including the regional unemployment rate. Our results suggest that subjective measures of employment opportunities provide useful information about wage pressure.     

Let the Sunshine in: An Analysis of the Placement and Pay of University Presidents and the Effects of Open Records Statutes

This paper examines how personal, institutional, and legal factors affect where college presidents are placed and how much they earn given their placements. We find that controlling for selection into institutional type is important, suggesting that presidents nonrandomly sort into institutions based on unobserved characteristics that also relate to wages. We also find evidence that state “sunshine” laws governing whether applicants’ names must be disclosed in searches are related to placements and wages. Presidents hired in states that exempt the names of all but finalists from disclosure are more likely to be placed in public research universities and less likely to be placed in private institutions. There is also evidence that presidents hired in open records states earn compensating differentials, but we are ultimately unable to distinguish this from a state-specific effect. We also find wage discounts for presidents hired at times with larger numbers of states with open records and with exemptions to disclosure for non-finalists. Thus, presidents and institutions appear to respond to market-wide incentives created by sunshine laws.     

Boards of trustees must assume responsibility for making alcohol prevention on campus a top priority

ABSTRACT

Few colleges have made the prevention of alcohol-related injuries and deaths an institutional priority, and even fewer have implemented prevention strategies with a solid evidentiary base. We look to presidents to provide leadership on this issue, but those who do are atypical. Boards of trustees should step in by asserting that student wellness be a primary focus in the institution's strategic plan, with specific, measurable goals; holding the president accountable for progress in reducing high-risk drinking and its consequences; and mandating a line item in the annual budget, with adequate staffing and revenues to put evidence-based practices in place. Boards will be more likely to respond when led to focus on the cost implications of the campus alcohol problem; the link between high-risk drinking and mission-critical institutional objectives such as academic performance, student engagement, and retention; and the institution's potential liability if evidence-based prevention strategies are not in place.     

Fixing minimum wage levels in developing countries: Common failures and remedies

Some developing countries have set their minimum wages too high or too low to constitute a meaningful constraint on employers. The article compares minimum wages worldwide, proposes several ways of measuring them in developing countries and discusses whether they are effective thresholds in those countries. The second part of the article considers the institutional factors leading countries to set minimum wages at extreme levels. The author concludes that the minimum wage is used as a policy instrument to several ends – wage negotiation, deflation and social dialogue – which results in the absence of a wage floor, weak collective bargaining, or non‐compliance.     

CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION AND THE ROLE OF WAGE INCENTIVES WITH ENDOGENOUS MONITORING TECHNOLOGY

The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation. In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that the government finds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty. Deviating from the existing literature, we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter bribery. We find that the government is better‐off either completely eliminating corruption or accepting corruption by offering wages lower than the market wage. Offering public wage premium that does not deter bribery is suboptimal. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through wage incentives or monitoring. The role of wage incentives decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. (JEL D73, H26, J33, J41)     

Participation in union activities: A multivariate analysis

Multivariate analysis is used to estimate a model of member participation in local union activities. A sample of 387 members of the UAW living in the Detroit area was drawn from the1961 Detroit Area Study: Work Group Influence and Political Participation. It was hypothesized that participation would be positively associated with level of schooling, current wages, seniority, skilled jobs, job dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction with the local union, desire for another job, commitment to the labor movement, and getting along with others. OLS and Logit estimation techniques were used and support was found for all hypotheses except those related to wage levels and seniority.     

In pursuit of a living wage: The ethical and economic thought of father John A. Ryan from the late 1890s until the new deal

Abstract

Father Ryan frequently cited Pope Leo XIII's major encyclical, Rerum novarum (On the Condition of Labor) to lend the support of traditional Catholic social teaching to social and labor reform. Advocating “sane individualism,” Ryan was the first American to argue convincingly that employers were bound in strict justice to pay employees at least a living wage, and his ethical influence gained wide appeal due to his conservative yet fair‐minded approach to distributive justice. Ryan supported labor unions and economic planning as means to gain fair wages and stock ownership for all workers and emphasized income redistribution to reduce depressionary underconsumption.     

Voluntary contributions and wages in nonprofit organizations

Voluntary work provides a major source of labor for many nonprofit organizations. Consequences of volunteers and paid staff working alongside each other in nonprofits are well documented. This article contributes to this strand of literature and investigates whether the presence of volunteer work influences paid employees' wages in nonprofit organizations. We estimated a multilevel wage equation accounting for personal characteristics of workers and characteristics of nonprofits. The analysis revealed that nonprofit organizations engaging volunteers pay lower wages to their employees. Our findings contribute to the understanding of wage‐setting behavior of nonprofits and improve the methodological approach of empirical research in this field.     

Market hours,household work,child care,and wage rates of partners: an empirical analysis

The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the effect of partners’ wages on partners’ allocation of time. Earlier studies concluded that wage rates are an important determinant of partners’ hours of market and non-market work and also that house work may lower married women’s wage rates. However, the bulk of earlier literature in this area failed to account for the endogeneity of wages or the simultaneity of partners’ time allocation choices. Here we take a reduced form approach and specify a ten simultaneous equations model of wage rates, employment and hours of market work, house work and childcare of parents. Non-participants are included in the model. We exploit a rich time use dataset for France to estimate the model. We find that the own wage affects positively own market hours and negatively own house work and childcare hours. The wage of the father has a significantly negative effect on the mother’s market hours while her wage rate has a significantly positive effect on his house work hours.