An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity

This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact on state and local revenues.     

Intensity of management resistance: understanding the decline of unionization in the private sector

IX. Conclusions Although Lipset and Katchanovski present many of the major societal and structural causes that have influenced the decline of private sector unions, they have unfortunately omitted a factor that can account for as much as 40 percent of the decline in private sector union membership, i.e., intensity of management opposition. The managerial incentives to stop unionization are formidable because unions raise wages and reduce profits. Economic reasons for American managers to stop unionization have grown as the wage between union and nonunion workers has widened over the past 40 years especially relative to EU nations. In addition, as managerial accountability to shareholders has risen and pay related to performance has grown, top executives have attempted to raise productivity through high-performance workplace practices or lowering real wages. Since many of these practices rely on top-level executives being able to make decisions on personnel quickly without challenges from employees or due process, they have fought unions more vigorously in order to maintain this discretion over workplace decisions. Although this behavior by management may result in a more efficient allocation of resources from both a micro-and macroeconomic perspective, the losses to society occur in terms of greater income inequality and less employee voice at the workplace and in the political arena.     

The future of public sector collective bargaining in Canada

Conclusion Looking to the future of Canadian public sector labor relations, the glass is half full. Despite regular intervals when government fiscal and economic policy “trump” public sector bargaining rights through legislation, public sector unions and collective bargaining will survive. Public sector compensation and job security will likely continue to be at least comparable to the unionized private sector, and public sector union density should remain stable, at or near its currently high levels.     

Comparing Public and Private Sector Decision-Making Practices

Public and private sector decision making is studied with anexperiment. The study compares decision making in a tax-supportedgeneral purpose governmental agency with that done by a businessfirm selling to a market, using a simulation to capture differencesin the preferences and practices of mid-level managers workingin the two sectors. The simulation calls for participating managersto assess the risk and prospect of adopting budgets tailoredto match each sector. A cognitive culture that stresses analysis,speculation, bargaining, or networking is employed to fashiona budget appropriate for a public and a private sector organization,each with a controversial and a noncontroversial budget amount.The literature on public/private differences was consulted tomake predictions, suggesting that public sector managers wouldfavor bargaining and networking and private sector managerswould favor analysis and speculation. The cognitive style literaturesuggests that managers favor budgets constructed with an approachthat is consistent with their preferred cognitive style andsee less risk in the choice, except in a public setting whererisk would be unaffected. The study finds that private sectormanagers are more apt to support budget decisions made withanalysis and less likely to support them when bargaining isapplied. Public sector managers are less likely to support budgetdecisions backed by analysis and more likely to support thosethat are derived from bargaining with agency people.     

Private sector unions: The myth of decline

Conventional wisdom holds that private sector labor unions are in “crisis” due to the loss of millions of members over the past two decades which has resulted in a dramatic decline in their economic viability and political power. Financial data for selected years between 1960 and 1987 are analyzed to show that, contrary to prevailing opinion, private sector unions are financially prosperous despite membership erosion. Evidence is also presented which indicates that union political efforts and influence have increased rather than declined in recent years. Resources have been allocated to political advocacy to obtain a more favorable public policy environment for labor organizations and to achieve gains that have eluded unions in collective bargaining. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ms. Sybil Jones at the National Institute for Labor Relations Research.     

STRIKE DURATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:

This study examines the durations of strikes in selected occupations of the public and private sectors of the U. S. economy in the late post-World War II period. It asks whether differences in the legitimacy of unions and the legality of strikes alter the speed with which strikes end. Also, it argues that a curvilinear relationship between the institutionalization of strikes and unions and the termination rates of strikes exists. Data support hypotheses linking both the distribution of power resources and the institutional setting to the termination rates of different types of strikes (e.g., strikes under different contract statuses and over different issues). In general, where strikes are moderately institutionalized and precedents are being set, strikes end more slowly; at very high or very low levels of institutionalization, strikes end more rapidly.     

Equality Bargaining: Where,Who, Why?

It is common to identify a role for trade unions in combating sex inequality at work through collective bargaining. This article uses a survey of paid union officers to identify the context in which equality bargaining by unions is likely to occur, using the specific issue of bargaining on equal pay. It concludes that equality bargaining is a function of women’s voice within unions, the characteristics and preferences of bargainers themselves and of a favourable public policy environment. Bargaining on equal pay is also more likely in centralized negotiations that cover multiple employers.     

The future of public sector unionism in the United States

The future of nonpublic safety, non-teacher, non-federal public sector unions is bright. As a result of past success, the unions, led by AFSCME, have an organizing culture and sufficient power within the sector to maintain and increase density. However, the challenges that lie ahead in the 21st century will surely test the strength of AFSCME and the other public service unions. The large gains in public employee membership achieved in the last third of the 20th century are not likely to come with the relative ease with which they were achieved during that period. The remaining unorganized workers are in locations and occupations that have not been historically fertile ground for unions, public or private. In addition, the threat of privatization of jobs requires public unions to re-think their traditional strategies and organize in the more hostile private sector while simultaneously protecting the public sector from attacks. The public sector unions recognize that they have a tenuous grasp on their relatively strong position and must organize to maintain and strengthen their position. Absent dramatic changes in federal private sector labor law, and adoption of numerous public sector labor laws, the resources necessary for organization will be tremendous. The future is bright for the public sector unions only because they have demonstrated a willingness to adapt to change, make sacrifices, and deploy sufficient resources to achieve growth. The views herein are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of AFSCME.     

Public employee unions: A study in the economics of power

This paper examines how public employee unions influence the allocation of public sector jobs. The empirical results indicate that vote maximizing public officials’ employment decisions are influenced by the political clout of highly-unionized employees. The political clout of public-sector unions influences the functional distribution of public-sector jobs by increasing demand for the relatively more organized functions. These results suggest that consideration should be given to the growth of public sector collective bargaining in the allocation of public sector resources. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Bernard Lentz.     

Unionism and employment conflict resolution: Rethinking collective voice and its consequences

IX. Conclusions and Overall Assessment The central proposition advanced by F&;M is that the collective voice/response face of unionism more than counterbalances the monopoly face of unionism. Following this reasoning, it may be concluded that union workers would remain unionized and nonunion workers would become unionized. But what if the collective voice/response face of unionism does not more than counterbalance (let alone “dominate”) the monopoly face of unionism? Suppose that, consistent with the evidence presented herein, the exercise of voice in the employment relationship leads to further deterioration of the employment relationship rather than to the effective redress of worker grievances? In this circumstance, existing unions would lose members, and unorganized workers would choose not to become union members. Supposition aside, there is no question that unionization continues to decline sharply. When F&;M's book first appeared, about one in five private sector workers belonged to a union; today, less than one in eight private sector workers belongs to a union. But while F&;M and, later, Freeman and Rogers (1999), attributed the decline in unionization to employer/management opposition and weak labor law, some of this decline can be attributed to worker resistance. Such resistance may stem, in turn and following F&;M, from recognition of the net negative consequences of unionism's monopoly face, but also, and contrary to F&;M, from recognition of the net negative consequences of unionism's collective voice/response face. If workers judged unions' voice response face, in particular, grievance procedures, to be effective in redressing worker grievances, more union workers would likely remain union members and more unorganized workers would join unions — even in the “face” of employer opposition. While there is little question that there are widely varying types of real-world employment relationships or that unions are best suited to protecting worker interests in certain of these (usually highly adversarial) relationships, the fact that workers as a whole decreasingly choose to become union members suggests that they do not perceive union voice to be effective in redressing deteriorated employment relationships or to be more effective in this respect than nonunion voice options. Such reasoning is consistent with the picture sketched in this paper — a different picture from that forwarded by F&;M — of unionism and grievance procedures as largely reactive, adversarial-oriented mechanisms for dealing with workplace conflict resolution, especially in a pluralist, mixed-motive type of employment relationship.     

Exclusive representation and american industrial democracy: An historical reappraisal

Exclusive representation in the public sector has been defended on the basis of private sector experience, which purportedly demonstrates that stable, orderly, peaceful collective bargaining is otherwise impossible or impracticable. Nevertheless, nonexclusive collective bargaining was the norm in most industrial nations when the Wagner Act was passed in the 1930s, and it still is the rule outside the U.S. Historical evidence is presented for the thesis that exclusivity was adopted in the private sector primarily in order to pave the way for a corporative state. Peaceful, orderly collective bargaining by “responsible” unions in a competitive economy was a minor, secondary consideration. Editor’s Note: This Symposium was jointly sponsored by theJournal of Labor Research and the National Institute for Labor Relations Research and was held February 10, 1984 at the Westpark Hotel, Rosslyn, Virginia.     

Public employee unions and the privatization of “public” services

Public sector unions are strongly opposed to contracting with the private sector for the production of goods and services. Economic theory indicates that because of incentives the private sector should be much more efficient that the public sector — a proposition verified for numerous activities of state and local governments. This paper examines evidence at the federal level to show that substantial cost savings can be achieved by contracting out in that sector as well.     

Wage indexation: Social benefits and private incentives

The question addressed in this paper is: Do social benefits from wage indexation coincide with private incentives to incorporate COLA clauses in union contracts? In general, market forces provide an “approximately correct” solution so that legislative remedies are not required. Based on the work of Gray and Fischer, full indexation is beneficial when the economy is subjected to stochastic nominal shocks, but only partial indexation is optimal when real disturbances dominate. If unions and management of firms are risk-averse they both have an incentive to adopt full indexation when monetary uncertainty exists. On the other hand, when the economy faces real shocks, union negotiators oppose indexation if the demand for labor is elastic, but insist on full indexation if demand is inelastic. Managers of firms prefer nominal wage contracts in either case. This suggests that both parties will agree to omit COLA clauses in the first case, but are likely to compromise with partial indexation in the second case. A role for government intervention is indicated only to the extent that bargaining strength may dictate a degree of indexation that deviates from the social optimum. The analysis is extended briefly to other assumptions about the utility function of the two parties at the bargaining table.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

The relative effects of craft-level strikes: The case of airlines

One aspect of bargaining power is the ability of unions to impose losses on firms by striking. Using stock market data from 1963 through 1986, this study tests whether strikes by different crafts have resulted in different losses for airlines. The evidence indicates that strikes by pilots and mechanics initially reduced the share value of struck airlines and that strikes by airline workers in other jobs did not result in significant share value losses. There is no evidence that strikes have imposed permanent losses on air carriers. The authors thank Gordon Karels, David Rosenbaum, and Hendrik Van Den Berg for their helpful comments and thoughtful suggestions. We also thank Jerrold Glass of the Airline Industrial Relations Conference for providing the data on airline strikes.     

Union Organization in Great Britain

Union membership and density in Britain has experienced substantial decline since 1979. The fall in private sector membership and density has been much greater than in the public sector. The size of the union sector, measured by employer recognition, has shrunk. Membership decline has been accompanied by financial decline. Much of the decline occurred before 1997, under Conservative governments. Since 1997 and the return of a Labour government, the position has in some respects stabilized. Currently, unions have a substantially reduced economic impact, but a continued, if limited, role in workplace communication and grievance handling, often as part of a voice regime including nonunion elements.     

Labor Union Political Strategy in an Era of Decline and Revitalization

U.S. labor unions faced sharp membership losses over the last few decades, and some responded by ushering in a new, revitalized model of organizing. Yet we know little about how these forces may be shaping the political activities of the labor movement. Has crisis prompted unions to take aim at public policies inhibiting union vitality, or have unions turned outward to embrace broader social causes? This paper uses an original dataset of union appearances in congressional hearings to analyze unions’ legislative advocacy activities. Findings suggest substantial differences between those unions that are likely to appear in hearings on core labor‐related topics and those that appear in hearings on broad social issues: AFL‐CIO unions are more likely to participate in hearings on core labor issues, while unions commonly cited as “revitalized” and public sector unions are more likely to appear in hearings on broad social issues.     

Union views of managerial prerogatives revisited: The prospects for labor-management cooperation

Using data from a survey of AFL-CIO affiliated unions, I compare union views of managerial prerogatives in 1997 with those reported in a 1968 study. Unions today desire more input into the firm's decision-making process than in 1968, particularly with regard to issues traditionally reserved to management. Given management's traditional resistance to “outside” interference, more cooperative relationships between unions and managment may be problematic. I thank Richard Hoppins and Edwin Sexton for research assistance.     

Judging unions’ future using a historical perspective: the public policy choice between competition and unionization

VII. Conclusion In discussing the future of private sector union membership one needs to evaluate the early period of union ascendancy (1930s through the early 1950s) as well as the past few decades when unions have been in decline. We know trends currently in place are unfavorable to unions. What conditions would be favorable? When the earlier period of union growth us studied, two factors become prominent — the competitiveness of the labor market and the ability of unions to fullfill their major goal of either extracting economic rents or remedying market failures that result in exploitive employment relationship.     

Labor unions: Victims of their political success?

Conclusion A glimpse of the future of private sector unions may be gleaned from examining the past. Union densities have declined for nearly half a century, and structural and demographic changes, global competition, and various other factors have caused much of this decline. However, as recognized by early union leaders, legislative successes that diminish the role of collective bargaining naturally contribute to a diminished role for unions in the workplace and union decline must inevitably follow. We thank Bruce Kaufman for valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.