The North Korean famine and its demographic impact

The North Korean famine began in 1995 and its ill effects, while peaking in the late 1990s,undoubtedly linger. Recent conjectures on excess deaths caused by the famine range widely from about 200,000 to 3 million or more. This article assesses the demographic impact of the famine with greater rigor than has previously been attempted and describes the unique setting in which the famine occurred. The analysis begins with a pair of population projections based on mortality statistics from two sources. Given their contradictory implications, the analysis turns to less direct evidence of famine‐related mortality. That evidence includes China's demographic experience during the Great Leap Forward and recent measurements of child malnutrition in North Korea. Crosscountry comparisons translate this malnutrition into corresponding levels of infant mortality. The article concludes that famine‐related deaths in North Korea from 1995 to 2000 most likely numbered between 600,000 and 1 million.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

The impact of war, famine, and economic decline on marital fertility in ethiopia

We examine recent fertility trends in Ethiopia for evidence of short- and long-term responses to famine, political events, and economic decline. We use retrospective data on children ever born from the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey to estimate trends in annual marital conception probabilities, controlling for women's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The results of our analysis provide evidence of significant short-term declines in conception probabilities during years of famine and major political and economic upheaval. In the longer term, marital fertility in both urban and rural areas declined in the 1980s after increasing moderately in the 1970s.     

Demographic transition and population aging in Korea

"This paper describes the process of population aging in conjunction with the demographic transition in [South Korea]. Korea has recently experienced rapid decreases of both mortality and fertility, which have brought about the rapid process of population aging. The speed of...population aging in Korea is projected as one of the fastest in the world. Population aging brings about changing patterns of family composition, especially new trends of living arrangements of the elderly. Since the process of population aging [began] in Korea, the proportion of [those] living alone and [of those] living with spouse only have significantly increased."     

Natural Increase: A New Source of Population Growth in Emerging Hispanic Destinations in the United States

Updated US Census Bureau estimates and race/ethnic‐specific birth and death data for the post‐2000 period are used to highlight the increasing role of natural increase as an engine of population growth in emerging Hispanic destinations. Newly emerging Hispanic growth areas are distinguished from established and high‐growth areas from the 1990s. The findings document that recent Hispanic population gains have been generated increasingly by natural increase—the excess of Hispanic births over deaths. Hispanics accounted for 46 percent of the population gain and 53 percent of the natural increase in nonmetro America in 2000–2005. Yet, Hispanics represented only 5.4 percent of the nonmetro population in 2000. In metro areas, they accounted for 50 percent of the population gain and 47 percent of the natural increase, although they comprised only 14 percent of the metro population. Current trends suggest that the ascendancy of the US Hispanic population is likely to continue unabated, whether restrictive immigration legislation is enacted or not. The growth of the Hispanic population, caused increasingly by natural increase, has taken on a demographic momentum of its own.     

Diverging Demography: Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Contributions to U.S. Population Redistribution and Diversity

The substantial growth and geographic dispersion of Hispanics is among the most important demographic trends in recent U.S. demographic history. Our county-level study examines how widespread Hispanic natural increase and net migration has combined with the demographic change among non-Hispanics to produce an increasingly diverse population. This paper uses U.S. Census Bureau data and special tabulations of race/ethnic specific births and deaths from NCHS to highlight the demographic role of Hispanics as an engine of new county population growth and ethnoracial diversity across the U.S. landscape. It highlights key demographic processes—natural increase and net migration—that accounted for 1990–2010 changes in the absolute and relative sizes of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations. Hispanics accounted for the majority of all U.S. population growth between 2000 and 2010. Yet, Hispanics represented only 16 % of the U.S. population in 2010. Most previous research has focused on Hispanic immigration; here, we examine how natural increase and net migration among both the Hispanic and non-Hispanic population contribute to the nation’s growing diversity. Indeed, the demographic impact of rapid Hispanic growth has been reinforced by minimal white population growth due to low fertility, fewer women of reproductive age and growing mortality among the aging white population America’s burgeoning Hispanic population has left a large demographic footprint that is magnified by low and declining fertility and increasing mortality among America’s aging non-Hispanic population.     

Population Trends in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan America: Selective Deconcentration and the Rural Rebound

This study uses revised annual population estimates that incorporate adjustments from the 2000 Census to backcast demographic change for U.S. counties during the 1990s. These data are supplemented with new post-censal population estimates for 2001–2003. We use these data to examine demographic trends in the late 1990s and first years of the new century. Our findings are consistent with a model suggesting that a selective deconcentration of the U.S. population is underway. Our findings also confirm the occurrence of the rural rebound in the first half of the 1990s and a waning of this rebound in the late 1990s. Post-censal data also suggest a modest upturn in nonmetropolitan population growth rates in 2001–2003.     

Changes in the family status of elderly women in Korea

As a result of sharp declines in fertility and mortality, the aging of the Korean population has proceeded rapidly and is likely to continue in full force for some time. In societies such as Korea, where families traditionally have been the only efficient source of support for the elderly, an aging population poses a threat because families have fewer descendants available to care for increasing numbers of surviving elderly persons. The exact magnitude of the reduction in the supply of kin depends on details of the demographic trends and cannot be evaluated a priori. In this paper we use family-status life tables to assess the effects of changes in demographic processes on the family status of elderly women and to project trends in elderly women's family status.     

Demographic Transitions and Changes in the Living Arrangements of Children: The Netherlands 1850–2010

The transformation of Europe’s demographic regime over the past two centuries has led to considerable changes in the living arrangements of children. We study long-term changes, making use of three datasets covering the living arrangements of children born between 1850 and 1993 in the Netherlands: a historical national sample of children born between 1850 and 1922, a retrospective survey covering children born between 1923 and 1985, and data from the national population registry relating to children born between 1986 and 1993. We describe the changes in terms of whether fathers, mothers, and stepparents lived with these children at birth and at age 15. We observe a massive increase in the percentage of children growing up in a complete family between the 1850–1879 cohort and the mid-twentieth century cohorts and a return to nineteenth-century conditions in the most recent birth cohort. Time spent in a complete family increased continuously from the mid-nineteenth century on, to decrease again from the 1960s on.     

Cuba: the demography of revolution

Cuba's post-revolution demographic trends, especially in regard to fertility and emigration, and the causes and consequences of these trends, were examined using available statistical data. The authors maintain that both fertility and emigration trends were highly infuenced by economic factors. The trends are described in the context of the social and economic changes instituted by the revolutionary government. Government policies were aimed at 1) eradicating inequalities in housing, income, education, and health; 2) improving the status of women; and 3) upgrading the living standards of the rural population. Government policies did alleviate many social problems and greatly improved the health and educational status of the population; however, these policies had a marked adverse effect on economic performance. The demographic transition began in Cuba earlier than in most other developing countries and it began long before the 1959 revolution. These earlier changes must be taken into account when assessing the impact of post-revolution policies on demographic trends. Cuba's birthrate declined from 26-14.8/1000 population between 1959-1979 and the total fertility rate declined from 3.7-1.9 between 1970-1978; however, during the 1960s there was a baby boom and the birth rate for 1963 exceeded 35/1000 population. The baby boom was largely a response to the temporary improvement in economic conditions which occurred shortly after the revolution. The decline in fertility during the 1970s was due in part to the increased availability of abortion and contraceptive services and to a decline in the marriage rate; however, Cuba's deteriorating economy was also a major contributing factor. The baby boom of the 1960s is negativley affecting the current economy of the country. Individuals born during the baby boom are entering adulthood and are contributing toward Cuba's current unemployment problems. Prior to the revolution, Cuba experienced a high rate of in-migration. Immediately after the revolution this pattern was reversed and between 1959-1980 more than 800,000 Cubans emigrated. Most of these emigrants went to the U.S. A large proportion of the earlier emigrants were members of the upper and middle socioeconomic classes. Recent emigrants were more evenly representative of all segments of Cuba's population. The socioeconomic characteristics of the emigrants are described and their adjustment in the U.S. is discussed. Tables provide statistical data on Cuba's demographic trends.     

Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death Register

Economic and demographic historians who have studied Japan's early modern period argue that preventive checks to fertility were the primary cause of Japan's stationary population in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that the role of ‘positive’ checks was negligible. This paper presents evidence and a claim that mortality crises – famines in particular – also played an important role in checking population growth during this period. It analyses data from the death register of Ogen-ji, a Buddhist temple in the Hida region of central Japan. These data provide a remarkably detailed picture of the short-term demographic consequences of Japan's last great famine, the Tenpō famine of the 1830s. ‘Normal’ mortality patterns, by age and sex, are compared with patterns of mortality during the famine. Mortality of males rose considerably more than that of females, with the greatest rise occurring among young boys aged 5–14 and adult men aged 30–59. A surprising finding was that mortality at ages 0–4 rose relatively little, in part a consequence of a marked fall in the number of births during the famine. The Tenpō subsistence crisis was not the sole cause of population stagnation in the Ogen-ji population, but it was a prominent feature of the ‘high mortality regime’ that this population experienced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.     

Present and forecasted demographic problems in Poland to the year 2010

The author describes potential future demographic trends in Poland, with attention to economic conditions, the labor force, demographic aging, family allowances, excess mortality, population size, and age distribution.     

Demographic Trends in Ukraine: Past,Present, and Future

Ukraine, during the first half of the twentieth century, underwent a series of man‐made demographic catastrophes—World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1932/33 famine linked to land collectivization, the massive deportations and executions of Stalin's Great Terror, and World War II. This article assembles estimates of the demographic impact of these deadly events. In their absence, it is estimated that Ukraine's hypothetical population would have been 87 million on the eve of independence in 1991, instead of its actual 52 million. Pre‐independence demographic losses were episodic and driven by external forces. By contrast, since independence in 1991, Ukraine has experienced a sustained demographic crisis of its own making. Ukraine's population declined from 52 million in 1990 to 45 million by 2013. Fertility, while it has recovered from its lowest point, remains at a TFR of about 1.5—far below replacement. Emigration, although the greatest hemorrhage of young people in the 1990s is over, is still of concern. The loss of Crimea and the unsettled state of affairs in Southeastern Ukraine give further cause for concern.     

计划生育政策的人口效应

文章试图估计计划生育政策使我国少生了多少人。利用1980~2008年世界140多个国家的数据来模拟在没有计划生育政策影响下经济社会变量与人口变量的相关关系,并据此对中国无计划生育条件下的总和生育率进行测算。将测算出来的无计划生育条件下的总和生育率和中国实际总和生育率分别代入模型进行人口模拟,比较无计划生育条件下和现实条件下人口增长的不同过程和结果。研究表明:无计划生育条件下,我国2008年生育率水平的预测值大概在2.5左右。1972~2008年间,排除经济社会发展的影响,单纯由于计划生育的作用,中国少生了4.58亿人。     

Population change in the former Soviet Republics

Demographic trends in the former Soviet Republics and Russia are summarized and discussed in this publication. The former Soviet Republics in Europe as well as Georgia and Armenia had completed or almost completed their demographic transition before October 1991. Other Central Asian republics experienced reduced mortality, but, despite rapid declines, fertility is still above replacement level (at 3-4 children per woman). The economic and social dislocation of the breakup of the republics has hastened fertility decline. The annual population growth rate of the USSR in the mid-1980s was 0.9%; this rate declined to 0.4% in 1991, and the decline has continued. The 1991 population of the USSR was 289.1 million. Between 1989 and 1991, the crude birth rate was 18/1000 population, and the crude death rate was 10/1000. The net migration rate of -4/1000 helped to reduce growth. Total fertility in the USSR was 2.3 children in 1990. In Russia, fertility declined from 1.9 in 1990 to 1.4 in 1993. The preferred family size in Russia was 1.9 in 1990 and 1.5 in 1993. This decline occurred due to lack of confidence in the economy and insufficient income. Only 19% of women used contraception in 1990. Marriages declined after 1990. Age pyramids were similar in the republics in that there was a narrowing in the proportion aged 45-49 years, and the male population aged over 65 years was diminished, due to the effect of World War II. The cohort of those aged 20-24 years in 1992 was very small due to the small parental birth cohort. The differences in the republics was characterized as broad-based in the younger ages because of high fertility. The number of childbearing women will remain large. Life expectancy has been 70 years since the 1950s and has declined in some republics due to substandard health care, lack of job safety measures, and alcoholism. Some republics experienced increased life expectancy, but, after 1991, mortality increased. Tajikistan had the highest infant mortality of 47/1000 live births in 1993. A demographic profile provided for each republic offers several population projection scenarios.     

The boundaries of genocide: Quantifying the uncertainty of the death toll during the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia (1975–79)

The range of estimates of excess deaths under Pol Pot's rule of Cambodia (1975–79) is too wide to be useful: they range from under 1 to over 3 million, with the more plausible estimates still varying from 1 to 2 million. By stochastically reconstructing population dynamics in Cambodia from extant historical and demographic data, we produced interpretable distributions of the death toll and other demographic indicators. The resulting 95?per cent simulation interval (1.2–2.8 million excess deaths) demonstrates substantial uncertainty over the exact scale of mortality, yet it still excludes nearly half of the previous death-toll estimates. The 1.5–2.25 million interval contains 69 per cent of the simulations for the actual number of excess deaths, more than the wider (1–2 million) range of previous plausible estimates. The median value of 1.9 million excess deaths represents 21?per cent of the population at risk.

Supplementary material for this article is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2015.1045546     

Demographic consequences of the 1984–1985 Ethiopian famine

This article analyzes demographic responses to the 1984-1985 Ethiopian famine and compares them with Bongaarts and Cain's (1982) hypothesized responses. After briefly describing the data collection, I estimate the age distribution and the age-specific mortality and fertility rates of Ethiopian famine victims in a resettlement area and compare these with mortality estimates for the 1972-1973 Bangladesh famine and with fertility estimates from the 1981 Ethiopian demographic survey. The results show that the mortality rate among Ethiopian famine victims was about seven times higher than the rate among the Bangladesh victims and that the Ethiopian famine-related mortality was general and not a function of household socioeconomic variables. The data also show a 26 percent lower total fertility rate among famine victims.     

Sweden faces zero population growth

In this discussion of Sweden as it approaches zero population growth, focus is on the following: population growth in perspective, fertility trends (childbearing concentrated and cohort versus period fertility), marital status (non-marital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and divorce), women's changing status (increasing education and increasing employment), constraints and supports for women's dual role (family allowances and housing), birth control (contraceptive methods and practice and abortion), mortality trends, changing age structure and the elderly (average population age and proportion of elderly and cost of elderly support), international migration (from emigration to immigration and demographic impact of immigration), immigration policy, recent population debate (immigration issues and facing zero population growth). Since 1900 the primary features of Sweden's demographic history are a continuing decline in the birth rate to very low levels -- relieved by some upward movement in the 1940s and 1960s -- and a marked shift in the migration balance from emigration to immigration. It is almost entirely because of immigration that Sweden's population growth rate has not yet turned negative. If Swedish women were to continue to bear children at the rate that all women in the reproductive ages actually did in 1978, each women would end up with an average well below the level necessary to exactly replace each adult in the population leaving migration out, an annual total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman would have to be sustained for births and deaths to be in balance under the low mortality conditions prevaling in Sweden.     

Aging in Japan: population policy implications

This article was prepared for the International Conference on Aging in the East and West in 1995. The focus is on trends in aging in Japan and demographic determinants and consequences. Findings are presented from a 1990 study conducted by the Institute of Population Problems on acceptance of alternative population policies aimed to slow population aging in Japan. Japan is the seventh most populous country in the world, and the current growth rate is around 0.3%. Declines in fertility and mortality have contributed to the low growth rate. Population aging accelerated over the decades. The present share of aged population is 14.1%. The aged population is expected to continue to increase from 14.9 million in 1990 to 32.7 million in 2020 (25.8% in 2025). Decreases in the aged population are not expected until after the mid-2040s. The proportion of very old (ages 75 years and older) will dramatically increase to 14.5% in 2025. The primary demographic determinant of population aging and fertility decline is identified as the higher proportion of never-married and the higher age at marriage. One of the consequences of population aging is the increase in the age dependency ratios and the aged-child ratios. The proportion of intergenerationally extended households declined over time, but the pace of decline has slowed recently. The proportion of aged in one person or couple only households has risen but not to the same extent as the West. The majority of older old still live with a married child. Logistic analysis of 1985 survey data reveal that the custom of the elderly living with the eldest child remains. The 1985 survey also revealed much indecision about a pronatalist policy or a fertility policy. Logistic analysis of 1990 public opinion survey data shows acceptance of immigration as a policy alternative to slowing population aging. Acceptance varied by socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors. A pronatalist policy received stronger acceptance. However, reference is made to Kojima's literature review, which suggests that indirect policies on fertility and a comprehensive family policy would be more effective in raising fertility than a population policy.     

U.S. Family Household Momentum and Dynamics: An Extension and Application of the ProFamy Method

The classic headship-rate method for demographic projections of households is not linked to demographic rates, projects a few household types without size, and does not deal with household members other than heads. By comparison, the ProFamy method uses demographic rates as input and projects more detailed household types, sizes, and living arrangements for all members of the population. Tests of projections from 1990 to 2000 using ProFamy and based on observed U.S. demographic rates before 1991 show that discrepancies between our projections and census observations in 2000 are reasonably small, validating the new method. Using data from national surveys and vital statistics, census microfiles, and the ProFamy method, we prepare projections of U.S. households from 2000 to 2050. Medium projections as well as projections based on smaller and larger family scenarios with corresponding combinations of assumptions of marriage/union formation and dissolution, fertility, mortality, and international migration are performed to analyze future trends of U.S. households and their possible higher and lower bounds, as well as enormous racial differentials. To our knowledge, the household projections reported in this article are the first to have found empirical evidence of family household momentum and to have provided informative low and high bounds of various indices of projected future households and living arrangements distributions based on possible changes in demographic parameters.