Television and Postfeminist Housekeeping: No Time for Mother

This feminist, qualitative study sheds light on how young Arab women used cyberactivism to participate in the wave of political and social transformations widely known as the Arab Spring. It argues that these activists leveraged social media to enact new forms of leadership, agency, and empowerment, since these online platforms enabled them to express themselves freely and their voices to be heard by the rest of the world, particularly the global media. This resulted in a multidimensional personal, social, political, and communicative revolution. This study is based on in-depth, personal interviews with more than twenty young Arab women citizen journalists, bloggers, and activists from Arab countries that witnessed political upheaval.     

Reply to the note by Frejka and Sardon on our paper ‘Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe’ and an erratum

The relation between socio-economic development and fertility is analysed for the Arab populations of Israel and the territories administered by Israel (i.e. the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Retrospective survey statistics are used to reconstruct the fertility patterns of currently married Arab women, along with a variety of census information. Fertility responses to socio-economic changes are traced out in detail for the period of the British Mandate, the first 20 years of statehood 1948–67, and the contemporary post-1967 period. The figures show that both Christian and Moslem Arab populations experienced similar high levels of fertility up to the late 1920s. Subsequently, there has been a negative relation between socio-economic development and fertility. In terms of levels of development and fertility decline the sub-populations are ranked in the following order: Israeli urban Christians; Israeli urban Moslems; Israeli rural Christians; Israeli rural Moslems; Moslems in the Administered Territories. The analysis suggests that the timing and rate of fertility reduction are related to the character of specific demographic, economic, and political changes that generate conflicts at the family level.     

A Population Policy Rationale for the Twenty‐First Century

I propose that the primary goal of twenty‐first‐century population policies should be to strengthen the human resource base for national and global sustainable development. I discuss the shortcomings of the three dominant twentieth‐century population policy rationales: acceptance of replacement‐level fertility as a demographic goal; realizing a “demographic dividend” from the changing age structure; and filling the “unmet need” for family planning. I demonstrate that in all three cases the explicit incorporation of education into the model changes the picture and makes female education a key population policy priority. Population policies under this new rationale could be viewed as public human resource management. I argue that 20 years after the Cairo ICPD the international community needs a new rationale for population policies in the context of sustainable development and that a focus on human capital development, in particular education and health, is the most promising approach.     

Beyond Material Explanations: Family Solidarity and Mortality,a Small Area‐level Analysis

Social solidarity, being embedded in a network of binding social relationships, tends to extend human longevity. Yet while average incomes in the Western world, and with them, life expectancies, have risen dramatically, the second demographic transition has occasioned a breakdown in traditional family forms. This article considers whether these trends in family life may have slowed the rise in life expectancy. I present a cross‐sectional analysis of Israeli statistical areas (SAs), for which I construct indexes of Standard of Living (SOL), Traditional Family Structure (TFS), and Religiosity (R). I show that (1) increases in all three of these indexes are associated with lower levels of mortality, (2) male mortality is more sensitive to differences in SOL and TFS than is female mortality, and (3) net of differences in SOL and TFS, there is no difference in the mortality levels of Arab and Jewish populations.     

The First Ladies and the Arab Spring: A textual analysis of the media coverage of the female counterparts of authoritarian oppression in the Middle East

In textually analyzing the media coverage of the First Ladies of the Arab Spring, this paper argues that the media's approach to understanding the role of women in the structures of political power in the Middle East is often either too simplistic or too driven by a desire to exoticize the East, making it even harder to visualize and imagine the face of real female political empowerment in the region. While demonizing and condemning the greed of Leila Ben-Ali and Suzanne Mubarak in the immediate aftermath of the protests, prior to the Arab Spring, the Western media also glorified the presidential wives and royalty, such as Asma Al-Assad and Queen Rania, as symbolizing reform and openness to change, and in doing so, revealed an Oriental gaze that dichotomizes the gendered nature of politics and effectively denies the possibility of examining the complexities of women's political engagement in the Middle East.     

The effect of political generation on identity and social change: Age cohort consequences

ABSTRACT

In this article, we explore how political generation affects the ways in which diverse individuals come together and change their social and personal identities. Drawing on 52 in-depth interviews with members of the Red Hat Society, we show that women draw on their political generation, and the gains of the women’s movement specifically, to oppose cultural constructions of aging. The Red Hat Society provides a “free space” for women to foster a collective identity that both visibly challenges aging norms and provides its members new standards for self-approval. We conclude by highlighting the importance of focusing on political generation to understand collective action over the life course and call for more scholarship on the function of political generation in social change.     

Demographic transition in Arab countries: A new perspective

This paper provides a new perspective on the fertility transition in Arab countries. It shows that the story of Arab fertility must be retold: the story is of a region with the highest fertility preferences, exhibiting reluctance to change due to the stranglehold of cultural forces, and just starting to respond to development forces. The paper shows that Arab regional experience is quite comparable to that of other developing countries and that, though the fertility decline occurred at a somewhat later date, the pace of decline more than compensates for this delay. Furthermore, the probing of country level experiences and forces underlying the transition shows the diversities of these experiences and the exaggeration of the role of cultural specificity. It also demonstrates that a large part of the decline in Arab fertility is due to changes in nuptiality. For some segments of society and some countries, these changes are not paralleled by increased opportunities for women to have more fulfilling lives. For these women, the fertility decline is not necessarily improving the quality of their lives and cannot be equated with progress and development.     

Divergent Patterns in the Ethnic Transformation of Societies

The uneven timing of the demographic transition in different countries of the world will lead to divergence between countries in ethnic and religious homogeneity. Developed‐country populations that began their fertility transitions relatively early are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to the ethnic origin and religion of their inhabitants, primarily as a result of high recent levels of immigration. Many demographic patterns of the developed world, such as low death and birth rates, are becoming universal. It might be expected that less developed countries will also turn from emigration to experiencing immigration, as their populations age and their economies develop. This essay suggests, however, that future ethnic diversity arising from immigration may be less marked in many of those developing countries than in the West, especially among latecomers to the fertility transition. Five reasons are advanced as impediments to the globalization of ethnic heterogeneity arising from immigration: demographic, economic, political, and factors related to resource constraints, and climate change. The essay considers what social, economic, and political consequences might arise if high levels of ethnic diversity, and possibly ethnic replacement, remained an idiosyncratic peculiarity of today's developed countries, which would therefore diverge in important ways from the rest of the world as the twenty‐first century unfolds.     

Long‐Term Population Projections and the US Social Security System

According to a report recently issued by the Technical Panel for the US Social Security Administration, the long‐term financial outlook for the system is worse than previously thought. The worsening projected by the panel in the long‐run funding imbalance of the Social Security System is mostly due to the recommendation by the panel to add an extra four years to the currently projected increase in life expectancy by 2075: from 81.8 years to 85.9 years. The panel recommended no change in the current intermediate projected long‐run TFR of 1.9 and net immigration of 900,000 persons per year. The recommendation to increase the projected gains in life expectancy was based on international trends as well as on historical trends in the United States and the absence of biological evidence ruling out such gains. Industrial countries have a history of under‐predicting the growth of their elderly population, and it is expected that large mortality adjustments may be needed in the projections for public pension programs also in industrial countries other than the United States.     

Is There a Stabilizing Selection Around Average Fertility in Modern Human Populations?

Possibly the greatest challenge for an evolutionary explanation of demographic transition is the fact that fertility levels universally start to fall first among the well‐to‐do, well‐educated, healthy classes, which can be explained only by some voluntary or at least adaptive action. The problem of how restraints on fertility could have evolved by natural selection has been tackled with group selection models as well as with stabilizing selection models. The latter model, which is critically discussed in this article, posits that some intermediate (rather than maximal) level of fertility is optimal for long‐term reproductive success. Tests of stabilizing selection in human populations are rare, their results inconclusive. Here four sets of data are analyzed: they are samples drawn from the 'class of 1950 of the US Military Academy at West Point (cohorts 1923–29), retired US noncommissioned officers (cohorts 1913–37), and western German and eastern German physicians (cohorts 1930–35), all containing fertility data over two generations, and from European royalty (cohorts 1790–1939) containing fertility data over four generations. Deterministic as well as stochastic fitness measures are used. It is found that maximal, not average, fertility in the first generation leads to maximal long‐term reproductive success. Also against prediction, no decreasing marginal fitness gains by increasing fertility can be observed. The findings leave little space for considering stabilizing selection as a plausible mechanism explaining the course of demographic transition but indicate instead that biological evolution today is as fast and vigorous as ever in human history. Even in large populations, all people living today may be the descendants of just some few percents—a much smaller proportion than generally believed— of the people living some generations ago.     

Development Trends in Islamic Societies: From Collective Wishes to Concerted Actions

Today, approximately one-fourth of the world’s population includes 1,620 million persons who are part of the expanding Islamic Ummah. Muslims are found in large numbers in all regions of the world but are concentrated in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and selected successor states to the former Soviet Union. Despite the obvious wealth of some Islamic nations most Muslims live under conditions of poverty, joblessness, illiteracy, ill health, social and political unrest and, in some regions, religious extremism. Using the extensively pre-tested Weighted Index of Social Progress, this paper reports a 40-year time series analysis of the nature, extent, and pace of social change that is taking place within 53 of the 57 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Data are reported at four levels of analysis. Selected data also are reported for both the OIC-as-a-whole and for the world-as-a-whole. The present analysis offers a sometimes bleak, but generally optimistic, picture of the dramatic differences that characterize development patterns within Islamic countries, subregions, and regions. Particular attention is given to: (a) the legacy of colonialism that persisted for some OIC states until as recently as 1991; (b) the recurrent social unrest that continues to characterize development in many Islamic states, e.g., the “Arab Spring” (Vision of Humanity 2012); (c) the presence or absence of marketable natural and human resources; and, (d) the significant contributions being made to the development of Islamic countries by the United Nations’ Millennium Development Campaign (United Nations 2005) and the OIC’s Ten-Year Programme of Action (OIC 2005). However, the important social gains reported in this paper for some countries and geographic regions remain highly variable, potentially reversible, unless the collective wishes of Islamic nations are translated into concerted actions both within OIC member states and the larger world community of nations.     

What demographers can learn from fruit fly actuarial models and biology

Historically demographers have viewed the results of actuarial studies of nonhuman species, particularly those on invertebrates such as fruit flies, as largely irrelevant to investigations on human populations. In this paper I present life table data from large scale studies on the Mediterranean fruit fly, and show that they provide important insights into fundamental aspects of mortality relevant to human populations: the trajectory of mortality at older ages, sex mortality differentials, the concept of maximal life span, and demographic heterogeneity and selection. An overriding theme of the paper is the need for demographers to acquire a heightened awareness of new developments in biology including areas such as evolutionary ecology, experimental demography, and molecular medicine.     

“Roll Back Malaria,Roll in Development”? Reassessing the Economic Burden of Malaria

Recent efforts to mobilize support for malaria control have highlighted the economic burden of malaria and the value of malaria control for generating economic development. These claims have a long history. Beginning in the early twentieth century, they became the primary justification for malaria‐control programs in the American South and in other parts of the globe, including British India. Economists conducted none of these studies. Following World War II and the development of new anti‐malarial drugs and pesticides, including DDT, malaria control and eradication were increasingly presented as instruments for eliminating economic underdevelopment. By the 1960s, however, economists and demographers began to raise serious substantive and methodological questions about the basis of these claims. Of particular concern was the role of rapid population growth, resulting in part from the decline of malaria mortality, in undermining the short‐term economic gains achieved through malaria control. Despite these concerns, malaria continues to be presented as an economic problem in the work of Jeffrey Sachs and others, justifying massive investments in malaria control. The methodological basis of these claims is examined. The paper concludes that while malaria takes a dreadful toll in human lives and causes significant economic losses for individuals, families, and some industries, the evidence linking malaria control to national economic growth remains unconvincing. In addition, the evidence suggests that there are potential costs to justifying malaria‐eradication campaigns on macroeconomic grounds.     

Stability and Change in Youths’ Political Interest

Political interest is a key for the survival and development of democracies. Therefore, it is important to establish when political interest develops. We examined changes in political interest—when and in which directions—among youths between 13 and 28 years of age. We followed five age groups of Swedish youths over 2 years, with a total of 2621 participants. Analysis of stability coefficients supported the idea that political interest becomes more stable with age. From their early twenties, youths’ political interest was found to be as stable as has been earlier reported for adults. Among adolescents, the lowest stability rate was observed in the youngest cohort (ages 13–15). The results also showed that, when taking the increase in political interest into account, the proportion of youths losing their interest in politics corresponded to the proportion of youths gaining interest over time. On the whole, this study brings new insights on the development of political interest over time. It provides empirical evidence on when political interest is most susceptible to change and on how it is likely to change. Implications for research and intervention are discussed.     

Support for democracy in cross-national perspective: The detrimental effect of economic inequality

Using survey data and national statistics on 35 modern democracies, this research explores the relationship between economic and political conditions and support for democracy. As expected from modernization theory, support for democracy tends to be highest in countries with a high level of economic development. More importantly, however, I contribute a new finding that income inequality matters much more. Specifically, citizens from countries with relatively low levels of income inequality tend to be more likely than others to support democracy. I also find that household income is positively related to support for democracy in most countries, though it tends to have its strongest effect if economic development is high and income inequality is low. Finally, even after taking into account the level of economic development in one's country, people from former Communist countries tend to have far less support for democracy than those from more established democracies.     

The Global Science Panel on Population in Sustainable Development

The forthcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa (26 August – 4 September 2002) has been called by the United Nations to consider strategies toward sustainable development in all its dimensions. Hence, its mandate is broader than that of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Conference). Population issues have previously been discussed in a separate series of World Population Conferences (Bucharest 1974, Mexico City 1984, Cairo 1994). With no new World Population Conference scheduled for 2004 and Johannesburg having a mandate that explicitly includes social and economic aspects, population as a key component of sustainable development should figure prominently in the deliberations. Yet, after the third of four preparatory meetings for WSSD (which ended in New York on 5 April), population considerations are absent from the planned agenda. A plausible explanation for this absence is bureaucratic: in most countries inputs to Johannesburg are being prepared mainly by environment ministries that have little experience in dealing with population questions. There may also be political reasons for not wanting to discuss population issues in Johannesburg. But, arguably, sustainable development strategies that do not take into account the diversity and the dynamics of human populations will fail. This is one of the conclusions of the Global Science Panel on Population and Environment. The Panel is an independent body of international experts from the fields of population and environment that was organized by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), and the United Nations University (UNU). (Members of the Panel acted in their individual capacity, rather than representing their institutions.) After a ten‐month preparatory process, in April 2002 the Panel finalized a statement that summarizes its understanding of the role of population in sustainable development and outlines key policy priorities. The full text of this statement, titled Population in sustainable development, is reproduced below.     

Understanding the demographic implications of climate change: estimates of localized population predictions under future scenarios of sea-level rise

Significant advances have been made to understand the interrelationship between humans and the environment in recent years, yet research has not produced useful localized estimates that link population forecasts to environmental change. Coarse, static population estimates that have little information on projected growth or spatial variability mask substantial impacts of environmental change on especially vulnerable populations. We estimate that 20 million people in the United States will be affected by sea-level rise by 2030 in selected regions that represent a range of sociodemographic characteristics and corresponding risks of vulnerability. Our results show that the impact of sea-level rise extends beyond the directly impacted counties due to migration networks that link inland and coastal areas and their populations. Substantial rates of population growth and migration are serious considerations for developing mitigation, adaptation, and planning strategies, and for future research on the social, demographic, and political dimensions of climate change.     

Social Media and Turkish Feminism: New resources for social activism

The recent democratic movements in the Middle East, especially in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, put forward a new kind of political activism accelerated by social media. Whereas in these countries the social media created opportunities for the social movement referred to as the “Arab Spring,” this paper looks at the neighboring country of Turkey and the role of social media in Turkish women's activism.     

Population goals and ecological strategies for spaceship earth

The last century has seen extraordinary growth in human populations and economies. This growth has imposed huge and ever-increasing pressures on Earth’s ecosystems, prompting fears concerning the integrity of their life-supporting functions and the high rate of extinction of species. Quite simply, ecological degradation threatens the interests and possibly the survival of future human populations. By the criterion of ecological sustainability, and given our current consumption rates and technologies, Earth is now overpopulated. In such times of great and threatening change it is important to reconsider human goals and enabling strategies. A fundamental goal is the sustained quality survival of human populations. Achieving this requires new paradigms of understanding and management, especially the realization that the human economic and social spheres are dependent on healthy, functioning ecosystems, and that most forms of growth are unsustainable. Socio-economic development must become ecologically sustainable with the maintenance of Earth’s life-support systems assuming priority. Developing integrated ecosystem management, cutting consumption, and negotiating optimum population sizes would be useful. This paper discusses these issues with emphasis on the Australian situation.     

Neoliberal homophobic discourse: heteronormative human capital and the exclusion of queer citizens

In this article, I examine the relationship between homophobic language use and its broader social context, focusing on how a U.S.-based, conservative Christian organization's institutionalized homophobic text-making practices seek to derive legitimacy from the broader political economic discourses associated with the neoliberal moment. Using the Family Research Council's statement on marriage and the family as the basis for analysis, I demonstrate how the organization seeks to represent lesbian and gay subjects and their kinship formations as a threat to human capital development because they are based on affectional relationships that neither reflect nor respond to the kinds of self-governance and marketization that neoliberalism requires of all citizen-subjects and their families. Linguistic strategies for creating such representations include lexical choices that avoid overtly identifying lesbian and gay subjects as the object of discussion, the creation of a taxonomy for what constitutes "proper" families-based on neoliberal principles--that implicitly excludes lesbian and gay kinship formations, and the use of neoliberal discourses of self-governance and marketization as the basis for that exclusion.