Social Representations Theory: A Progressive Research Programme for Social Psychology

The study “Psychoanalysis—its image and its public” intimates that common sense is increasingly informed by science. But common sense asserts its autonomy and, in turn, may affect the trajectory of science. This is a process that leads to many differentiations—in common sense, in scientific innovation and in political and regulatory structures. Bauer and Gaskell's toblerone model of triangles of mediation provided a distillation of their reading of “La Psychanalyse.” Here it was argued that representations are multi‐modal phenomena necessitating the use of multiple methodologies (comparative and longitudinal; qualitative and quantitative). In this paper we briefly summarise these arguments and elaborate ways in which social representation theory can be considered a progressive research programme. “Progressive” because as the theory has developed it has extended the range and depth of its conceptual basis; it provides a new synthesis for the social scientific understanding of the phenomena of common sense and of representation; it acts as an antidote to the reductionism of public opinion and, finally, it is a stimulus to depart from disciplinary silos. However, there remain unresolved issues: how to segment the relevant social milieus and how to close the feedback loop from common sense to science?     

The Social Psychology of "Pseudoscience": A Brief History

The word 'pseudoscience' is a marker of changing worries about science and being a scientist. It played an important role in the philosophical debate on demarcating science from other activities, and was used in popular writings to distance science from cranky theories with scientific pretensions. These uses consolidated a comforting unity in science, a communal space from which pseudoscience is excluded, and the user's right to belong is asserted. The urgency of this process dwindled when attempts to find a formal demarcation petered out, and the growth of social constructionism denied science any special access to truth. The reaction to this led to the science wars, which ushered in a new anxiety in the use of 'pseudoscience', especially from the least secure branches. But recent writings on the disunity of science reveal how the sense of support drawn from it may be based on an illusion, creating a disunity of pseudoscience as well as of science.     

The Epistemological Significance of the Theory of Social Representations

The theory of social representations must be understood in terms of its proper epistemology so that it can accomplish its full potential in social sciences. This is often difficult to achieve because researchers comprehend it in terms of concepts that are part of static and individualistic Newtonian epistemology rather than in terms of dynamic and relational Einsteinian epistemology. This article considers three signposts that Moscovici identifies and analyses in the theory of relativity, namely the relation between epistemology and science, theory and method, and the argument against the explanation of effects by their causes. The following question is posed: are these signposts also characteristic of the theory of social representations? This question is examined focusing on interactional epistemology, theory and method and the diversity of natural thinking and communication. Moscovici's Psychoanalysis shows that natural thinking appears in a plurality of modes according to the situation in which it takes place and according to social groups towards which it is directed. Natural thinking is controversial and communication‐centred. Different professionals, groups and lay people use different kinds of speaking and different communicative genres when they try to resolve “the same” problem. The article suggests that bringing together dialogicality, dialogical linguistics and the theory of social representations may open up new possibilities for theoretical developments in social psychology.     

Criticizing the Critic: Comments on Jahoda's (2012) Critique of Discursive Social Psychology

Jahoda (2012) criticizes discursive social psychology (DSP) on several different grounds; specifically, he argues that DSP has opaque methodological procedures, is of questionable scientific merit, involves over‐interpretation of its data, and implicitly claims its findings to be universal rather than contextually specific. We challenge these criticisms by arguing that observational studies of the kind typical within DSP research have a perfectly valid place within a scientific social psychology, that the interpretations made by DSP researchers should be seen in the context of a temporally extended research process in which they are subject to criticism and potential replication, and that Jahoda is himself guilty of over‐interpretation by inferring claims of universality when such an inference is not warranted by the data (i.e. the qualitative content of the sample of research papers considered by Jahoda).     

社会表征理论述评——一种旨在整合心理与社会的理论视角

本文梳理了社会表征理论的历史脉络及其内涵,评述了其理论创新之处及其相关研究,认为社会表征理论作为一种重返人文主义话语形态的新生理论,对美国社会心理学话语霸权具有不可低估的解构作用,但有待于进一步精致化。     

Embodiment and the Construction of Social Knowledge: Towards an Integration of Embodiment and Social Representations Theory

Recent developments in the psychological and social sciences have seen a surge of attention to concepts of embodiment. The burgeoning field of embodied cognition, as well as the long‐standing tradition of phenomenological philosophy, offer valuable insights for theorising how people come to understand the world around them. However, the implications of human embodiment have been largely neglected by one of the key frameworks for conceptualising the development of social knowledge: Social Representations Theory. This article seeks to spark a dialogue between Social Representations Theory and embodiment research. It outlines the position the body occupies in the existing theoretical and empirical social representations literature, and argues that incorporating concepts gleaned from embodiment research may facilitate a more comprehensive account of the aetiology of social representations. The value of analytic attention to embodiment is illustrated with reference to a recent study of social representations of neuroscience, which suggested that embodied experience can shape the extent to which people engage with certain topics, the conditions under which they do so, and the conceptual and affective content of the ensuing representations. The article argues that expanding Social Representations Theory's methodological and conceptual toolkit, in order to illuminate the interplay between embodied experience and social communication in the development of common‐sense knowledge, promises productive directions for empirical and theoretical advancement.     

Social Advocacy for Equal Marriage: The Politics of "Rights" and the Psychology of "Mental Health"

Using the contemporary issue of equal access to marriage for same-sex couples as a case study, we examine two distinctive frameworks within which social advocacy may be pursued. We argue that when we speak as psychologists, we use a discourse of mental health; when we speak as social activists, we use a discourse of human rights and justice. Although these two frameworks may converge in supporting equal access to marriage, they represent radically different ways of understanding inequality and advocating for social change. A discourse of mental health focuses on psychological damage or deficit (caused, for example, by the social exclusion of particular groups or individuals. A discourse of rights asserts universally-applicable principles of equality, justice, freedom, and dignity. Further, the paradigmatic framework of psychology as an approach to understanding human beings in the world seems fundamentally antithetical to the conceptual framework of human rights, as a basis for social justice.     

Making Sense of Absence: Towards a Typology of Absence in Social Representations Theory and Research

Identifying, locating and interpreting both what is present and what is not present in theory and data lies at the core of scientific practice. Most experienced researchers know that social reality and psychological phenomena cannot always be apprehended directly, and that the forces that shape them must often be inferred rather than positively demonstrated. Yet, the important analytical problems raised by absence have rarely occupied the centre stage in professional journals. The aim of this paper is to sensitise researchers to the problem of absence. It considers the various guises in which absences may appear, their repercussions in the research process, and the solutions that researchers have used to render absences visible. The paper focuses on the issue of absence as it appears in theory and research on social representations. A typology of absence, structured in terms of the research process, is proposed. The typology is intended purely as a heuristic tool. It identifies and discusses forms of theoretical, methodological, empirical and analytical/interpretive absences. This typology is used to explore forms of absence and their interrelationships throughout the research process in three studies on social representations. The discussion as a whole contributes to reaffirming the radical character of the theory of social representations by stressing how the latter locates the space of explanation at the interface between individual and collective representations, between social and cognitive processes, between intentional and non-conscious dynamics, and between material and symbolic realities.     

Anti-oppressive Social Work Practice with Women in Prison: Discursive Reconstructions and Alternative Practices

Correspondence to Shoshana Pollack, Faculty of Social Work, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5. E-mail: spollack{at}wlu.ca Summary An anti-oppressive practice (AOP) framework emphasizes issuesof power and oppression within the provision of social workservices themselves as well as within the lives of clients whohave been marginalized and oppressed (Preston-Shoot, 1995; Garciaand Melendez, 1997). AOP seeks to deindividualize clients’problems in order to see them within the wider social contextof their lives. In addition, this framework attempts to moveaway from an ‘expert’ model of service deliverytowards one that is more inclusive of clients’ experiencesand that incorporates a recognition of coping and resistenceto oppression. In this paper I discuss how an AOP frameworkcan contribute to our understanding of and interventions withwomen in prison. In particular, I will focus upon how we canbetter understand and respond to women’s mental healthissues and the experience of imprisonment. Peer support servicesare examined as an example of AOP programming for women in prison.     

Verbal Discrimination: A Neglected Chapter in the Social Psychology Of Aggression

While in our culture it is a common experience that hurting others is done more frequently by means of words than by physical force, the phenomena of verbal aggression and verbal discrimination have largely been neglected in the psychology of aggression. Connecting the research fields of aggression, discrimination, and discourse, and discussing the common definition of aggression as intentional harmdoing, it is argued that verbal discrimination, i.e., the verbal treatment of others as members of an allegedly inferior group or category, must be considered a case of aggression as this practice is a violation of other persons' rights or dignity.