The impact of unions on job satisfaction,organizational commitment,and turnover

Conclusion The research on the exit-voice hypothesis, both in the United States and abroad, shows convincingly that most of the variance in the negative union effect on job satisfaction can be accounted for by job quality, industrial relation climate, and wages. Union members see their jobs as less attractive than do nonunion workers in terms of skill requirements, task complexity, the amount of autonomy or discretion available, and opportunities for promotion. Union members also perceive the supervision they receive and the labor-management relations they experience as less satisfactory. They are, however, clearly better off with respect to wages, benefits, and pensions. But when it comes to job satisfaction, the economic advantages of union jobs are not sufficient to compensate for job content and work environment factors. It comes as no surprise to the job satisfaction researcher that job content — the nature of the tasks people are given to do — weighs heavily in overall job satisfaction scores. While there are individual differences in the degree to which people prefer intrinsically interesting jobs, there is ample empirical evidence showing that autonomy, skill variety, complexity, challenge, and advancement are important determinants of people's affective reactions to their jobs (Deci, 1975; Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Kanfer, 1990). The relative importance of job content factors to overall job satisfaction is also mirrored in the most commonly used measures of job satisfaction (Weiss et al., 1967).     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

The Political and Civic Lives of Public Sector Workers: Unions and “Public Service Motivation”*

Public sector employees are highly engaged in civic and political life, from voting to volunteering. Scholars have theorized that this political activity stems from “public service motivation,” or the selection of publicly oriented individuals into public work. We build on this work by analyzing the role of public sector unions in shaping participation. Unions are central mobilizing organizations in political life, and one in three public sector workers are unionized. Special supplements of the Current Population Survey provide data on various forms of participation, sector, union membership, and union coverage. Logistic regressions find that unionized public sector workers have much higher odds of engaging in a range of activities compared to non‐union public workers, including protest, electoral politics, and political communication. Union membership impacts service work to a lesser extent, suggesting that unions are more central to political lives. These findings have implications for the consequences of union decline, including the class, race, and gender composition of who participates in democratic life.     

WHY DO WORKERS JOIN UNIONS? THE IMPORTANCE OF RENT SEEKING

Union status models ignore the fact that rent-seeking prospective members have an incentive to bid up entry costs so that higher union wage gains make union jobs more costly to obtain. The standard presumption that higher union wages cause firms to substitute toward higher quality workers is shown to be incorrect under most plausible assumptions; the observed positive correlation between wage gains and the propensity to join a union underestimates the size of the true supply response. The union/nonunion wage differential reveals more about the social cost of unions than the gain to an individual worker from union membership.     

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS CONTESTED GROUND IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: WORKER PERCEPTIONS AND SATISFACTION IN THE USPS

Many prior efforts have examined the personal characteristics of workers or the structural features of an organization that impact job satisfaction. By contrast, we examine organizational culture in the context of "high-performance work systems." We analyze the organizational culture of the United States Postal System, as it is presented in key organizational documents and perceived by workers. It is argued that a viable theory of job satisfaction in the modern workplace must treat worker perceptions, which spring from an organizational culture that is both prescribed and lived.     

How union mergers affect membership participation

Using data from a survey of union members, we explore how an amalgamation of two Swedish unions affects membership participation. The research literature on the topic is mostly anecdotal and speculative, suggesting that mergers might have detrimental effects on membership participation because they create large unions with centralized governance and administration. But in this study, we do not find a broad-based decline in membership participation measured before and after merger as well as in relation to a comparison union that did not merge. These results are discussed in terms of the national context of union mergers in Sweden and the ways that mergers are negotiated, presented, and implemented to preserve membership participation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Third International Conference on Emerging Union Structures: Reshaping Labour Market Institutions, Canberra, Australia in December 1997. The data collection for this project was supported by funds from the National Institute for Working Life in Stockholm.     

The effects of management practices on union election returns

This paper examines the importance of management suppression tactics on union activity in the United States. NLRB data on individual certification elections which have recently become available for the period 1972–1976 are merged with structural, demographic, and industry characteristics of the 96 largest SMSAs to ascertain the role of strategy versus structure in explaining union outcomes. The measures of election-generated membership outcomes are voter participation, the margin of pro-union votes, and union wins. Union suppression practices under study include consent elections, election delays, formal objections after unions win a certification election, elections overruled because of management unfair labor practices, elections held by management petition, and the number of unfair labor practice charges per representation election. Five of the six measures of suppression are significant determinants of some facet of union expansion after adjusting for structural characteristics of the area work force.     

The effect of type of union on member-nonmember wage differentials

The union-nonunion wage differential can be decomposed into bargaining and membership effects. While some analysts suggest that they are not separable and that bargaining power is a function of membership density, others argue that they are separable and that the former derives from monopoly power while the latter stems from socialization. Our results support the latter view. We derive estimates of bargaining and membership effects for workers covered by national, industrial, and craft union contracts as well as for all covered workers taken together. Since industrial and craft unions differ in structure and organization, we expect differences in the socialization effects among types of unions. It is clear from our results that union membership per se in each case gives a large positive wage advantage.     

Correlates of union membership and joining intentions in a unit of federal employees

Correlates of membership and joining intentions in the federal sector, where union representation is broadly available but membership is relatively low, are examined. Key independent variables — attitude toward joining, normative influence, perceived instrumentality of joining, union activism, and satisfaction with the union — are all positively correlated with both membership and joining intentions. In regression analyses, attitude toward joining predicted both membership and intentions. Union satisfaction and activism predicted membership, but normative influence and instrumentality did not; and normative influence and instrumentality predicted joining intentions, but union satisfaction and activism did not. Other important variables include: general attitude toward unions, which predicted both membership and intentions; membership in the previous union, which predicted intentions, but not membership; race, which predicted intentions, but not membership; satisfaction with pay, which predicted (negatively) joining intentions, but not membership; and satisfaction with fellow workers, which predicted membership, but not intentions. We attempt to explain why determinants of membership might differ from determinants of joining intentions. This research was supported by a grant from the John A. Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Paul D. Geyer on an earlier draft of the paper.     

Formalization,collectivization, and the demand for union services

Formalized collective bargaining rather than individual employer-employee negotiation is the fundamental characteristic of a unionized labor market. Formalization involves the substitution of rules for employer discretion. Collectivization substitutes simultaneous decision making on behalf of all workers in a unit for a set of individual employee decisions. Formalization and collectivization are present in nonunion as well as union labor markets and their extent varies within as well as between these two sectors. In particular, individuals may negotiate where they belong in a union environment, and the presence of rules invites negotiation over their interpretation. Nevertheless, because formalization and collectivization are obvious concomitants of trade union organization, their costs to both employers and employees should explain the probability of union organization, as well as the incidence of such antecedents of the modern trade union as the Italian padrone who acted as foreman, pay-master, and employment agency for newly-arrived immigrants to the United States; and the Indianjamdar, a construction industry recruiter-foreman. Our occasional observations of union-induced costreductions may appear to counter the implicit assumption in much of the trade union literature that unions always induce suboptimal combinations of factor inputs and factor payments (nonunion firms could choose union-induced parameters on their own and do not). Because these cost reductions may be accompanied by increased costs imposed by unions, however, the cost reductions discussed below imply nothing about overall effects of unions on employers or employees. I wish to thank John Pencavel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. For further analysis of these points, see Flanders (1968). See Epstein and Monat (1973) for a discussion of the services provided by labor contractors.     

Union membership,economic rents,and migration behavior

This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.     

Involvement with unions,union belief perspectives,and desires for union membership

This article addresses two theoretical problems associated with models of desires for union membership. First, does union involvement influence desires for membership by (1) locating unions in the routines of everyday life and thus engendering habitual desires for membership or (2) by shaping general beliefs about unions and, thus, creating ideological desires for membership? This study of the working class in Hamilton, Ontario supports both explanations, although the path of influence through beliefs is stronger. Second, why do a number of general union beliefs have net effects on desires for membership? This study finds that different types of beliefs are salient for different groups of workers. Therefore, a wide range of general beliefs must be considered if the desires for union membership of a diverse population are to be adequately predicted.     

Unions,incentive systems,and job design

I model the relationship between incentive systems and job design and how unions influence both. The basic idea is that it is easier to monitor worker effort for jobs designed to be routine and inflexible. Pay based on monitoring is used in this scenario rather than incentive pay based on production. Jobs with worker flexibility and autonomy call for incentives based more on output. Unions typically oppose output-based pay, thus inducing job design change. The empirical work supports this view and shows that incentive pay is much less likely for union workers and unions have a clear negative effect on job characteristics that lead to use of incentive pay. In particular, union jobs are more repetitive, have more measurable criteria, and involve less judgmental criteria and less data analysis.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

Sustaining and Developing Women's Trade Union Activism: A Gendered Project?

Against the background of heavy membership decline, the increasing importance of women as a source of members for unions and union efforts to attract women into membership, this paper explores the nature of women's union activism. The focus is on why women stay active in unions. The paper employs Klandermans' model as a framework for examining senior union women's activism. This study suggests that the model is gendered in that women's experiences and perceptions of trade unions are highly gender specific and further that their union activities are underpinned by a feminist paradigm. The women in the study expressed a strong desire to ensure that the union works for women, indicative of the gendered nature of their commitment to the union. They revealed gendered bargaining priorities and thus gendered perceptions of union instrumentality. Their social integration within the union is shown to be highly or partially contingent upon, formal and informal women's support networks.     

Unions and wage inequality

Summary and Conclusions The impact of unions on the structure of wages has recently attracted renewed interest as analysts have struggled to explain the rise in earnings inequality in several industrialized countries. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide a potentially valuable set of countries for examining this question. All three countries now collect comparable data on wages and union status in their regular labor force surveys. Several features of the collective bargaining institutions of these countries make them suitable for studying the relationship between unions and wage inequality. Bargaining is highly decentralized; there are no general mechanisms for extending collective bargaining provisions beyond the “organized” sector; and the fraction of the work force covered by collective bargaining is relatively modest. Thus it is possible to compare the structure of wages for workers covered by union contracts to those who are not covered, and potentially infer the effect of unions on overall wage inequality.     

Union membership and perceived powerlessness in southern US textiles*

Using Marxist, mass society, organizational, and social movements literatures, we distinguish alternative accounts of the relationship between union membership and perceived powerlessness. Then, we illustrate the distinctions with survey data on southern US textile workers. Logistic and ordinary least squares regression analyses suggest two interpretations for this group of workers: union membership influences perceived powerlessness by providing members a responsive organization that contrasts with their lack of control in the workplace; and perceived powerlessness, when combined with endorsement of collective strategies for change, encourages union membership. In the southern textile case, we find that race is associated with specific ideological leanings regarding collective strategies. The location of our sample, its particular position in the political economy of the US, and the relative immaturity of its union allow for instructive comparisons with other sociological treatments of work attitudes and collective action.     

Le contrôle du travail par les ouvriers : analyses à partir d'observations participantes

The sociology and anthropology of labor have long drawn attention to the ways employees exercise control over the work process, including in contexts where strong orders are given. The control of work is, in fact, an aspect of how participation and involvement in a collective organization are managed. Workers try to manage their participation (always collective but to varying degrees) in a firm in order to make work a gratifying or at least bearable experience. This involves at least three sorts of interventions linked to practical interests: managing relations with colleagues; managing the execution of tasks and activities; and managing relations with the staff. Focusing on the actor's viewpoint and objectives, this research based on participant observation examines how workers try to act so as to facilitate their activities in the short or middle run. Their efforts sometimes correspond to what the hierarchy expects but, at other times, to a form of rebellion.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Si,Se Puede</Emphasis>: Organizing Latino Immigrant Workers in South Omaha’s Meatpacking Industry

Faced with declining union membership and a growing immigrant workforce, the US labor movement has started to realize the importance of organizing immigrant workers. Yet the conventional wisdom among many within the movement is that immigrant workers are “unorganizable.” Based on a case study of a collaborative effort between the United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Omaha Together, One Community to organize an estimated 4,000 Latino immigrant meatpacking workers, I demonstrate not only the “organizability” of immigrant workers, but also the fact that they have been organizing themselves, with the help of a community-based organization, in the absence of union efforts. This case study suggests that in order to facilitate successful organizing campaigns among immigrant workers, unions need to reach out to community-based organizations and institutions that have established relationships with immigrant workers.

An analysis of the barriers to women becoming local union officers

This study examines the importance of barriers to the participation of women in local union activities. Male and female officers of local unions in Canada were surveyed to determine the importance of eight barriers to participation. The results indicate that the most important barriers are that women hold two jobs (at home and at work) and have no time for union activities; child care responsibilities prevent greater participation in unions; and women underestimate their abilities and believe that male employees are better suited to union officer positions. The analysis also explores differences in male and female ratings. Conclusions are reached regarding the importance of overcoming barriers at local levels in reducing the under-representation of women in national union governance. This study was supported by grants from the Canada Department of Labor and the University of Windsor. The authors wish to thank Elizabeth Rutherford for her research assistance.