论我国未来《民法典》中的民事责任制度

按照传统大陆民法体系，民事责任也是民事义务；按照中国现行立法体系，民事义务也是民事责任，这是一个概念混淆、逻辑混乱的制度体系。目前，我国民法中的民事权利和民事义务呈现出两极世界的构架，无法达到民事主体间的利益平衡，必须将民事责任制度从民事义务（债务）中剥离出来，建立“民事权利---民事义务---民事责任”相互支撑的三元世界。只有民事责任发挥特有的保障功能，才能达到权利与义务的动态平衡，实现民法公平、正义的价值理念。民事义务的本质是民事权利实现的必要条件，民事责任的本质是为权利实现提供救济，本质上的差别，为民事责任制度的单独构建提供了理论基础和构建空间，因此在未来的《民法典》中，构建独立的民事责任体系显得尤为重要。目前民法体系中的民事责任包括“强制履行”责任，但“强制履行”应属于民事义务范畴，履行义务的内容通常来源于合同的约定或法律的直接规定，而不应当属于民事责任范畴。在民事责任的归责原则中，公平责任原则具有过错责任和无过错责任无法替代的功能，其作为一项独立的民事责任归责原则应当被《民法典》所认可。     

试论《民法通则》中的民事责任

<正> 民事责任,是公民或法人违反民事义务所应承担的责任。长期以来,我国的法律体系不完备,没有一部比较完整的、具有中国社会主义特色的专门民事法规,使得公民或法人在民事活动中不能了解自己的民事权利和义务,也不能了解违反民事义务的法律后果。《民法通则》公布后,在这个方面已转变为有法可依,公民或法人有必要尽快熟悉自己在民事活动中怎样依法维护民事权利,履行民事义务,承担民事责任。     

论民事制裁的依据及适用范围

我国民事制裁的依据是《民法通则》第134条第3款,这是计划经济条件下用行政手段管理与调整民事法律关系的延续.目前我国的民事制裁割断了与民事责任的联系,使得民事制裁制度缺少法理基础支持,其适用范围与行政制裁范围存在重叠与冲突,使得民事制裁与行政制裁在司法实践中的矛盾无法解决.在民事诉讼中适用民事制裁,破坏了司法的被动性,容易造成司法权威的损害.从民事责任角度界定民事制裁的概念是解决问题的关键,民事制裁是与民事义务、民事责任相关联的概念,是平等民事主体之间的责任承担方式,民事制裁的适用范围应当与民事责任相适应,限制在当事人民事法律关系权利义务范围之内.     

民事责任归责问题的理论思考

民事责任的归责是指民事行为人违反法定义务或约定义务后,依什么为根据来使行为人承担强制性的不利后果。民事责任的归责基础是民事违约行为或违法行为对他人的权利或利益造成了损害。民事责任的归责基础和归责要素是两个既有区别又有联系的概念。由行为、损害、过错、因果关系、主体的特殊角色的不同组合构成了民事责任归责要素的内容。确定民事责任的归责原则需考虑以下规则:合理性规则、公正性规则、可操作性规则和逻辑性规则。     

试论保险人说明义务

与投保人告知义务相比无论是在学术研究领域还是在保险展业实践中 ,保险人的说明义务一直未被予以应有的重视。强调保险人说明义务 ,对维护处于缔约弱势的投保人的合法权益 ,实现公平正义 ,有着重要作用。本文拟从保险人说明义务的内涵、法理依据、说明与明确说明的区别以及说明标准四个方面来探讨保险人的说明义务。     

投保人与保险人基于如实告知义务的博弈分析

在不完全信息状态下,投保人和保险人之间基于如实告知义务展开了一场博弈。保险人倚仗其享有的法定合同解除权,通过为投保人设置"保险人陷阱"的方式制造其将怠于严格核保的假象,引诱投保人投保。投保人则基于保险人将为不严格核保的预期,选择了为不如实告知的策略。保险人和投保人基于如实告知义务进行博弈的结果是形成了(怠于严格核保,不如实告知)的策略组合。然而,如此博弈的结局已明显偏离了保险立法的本旨。因此,进行如实告知义务制度的重构,创设保险人的信息提供义务,剥夺特定情况下保险人的法定合同解除权,使投保人和保险人之间博弈的结局回归保险本质,意义重大。     

投保人缔约过失根本违约判断标准

在合同义务理性化发展视域下,违约行为出现了先前和向后扩张的态势,必然导致根本违约形态的拓展.不同法系对于投保人违反先合同告之义务应承担的责任经历了债法的改革及学理上的争鸣.投保人与保险人签订保险合同过程中,若违反了先合同告之义务,致使保险人的保险利益丧失,而保险合同有效成立场合,能否构成根本违约?判断标准是什么?在实务中张某保险合同告之义务案引发了笔者构建缔约过失根本违约的思考.缔约过失根本违约的提出是合同义务理性化发展的必然结果,其判断标准包括合同有效成立、投保人违反的是先合同告之义务、投保人违反先合同告之义务造成严重损害致使保险人合同目的落空、投保人须主观上有过错,包括故意和过失以及保险人对投保人未如实履行先合同告之义务不知情.     

客观责任初探

传统民法理论认为,过错是责令民事违法行为人承担民事责任的必备条件,而对客观责任应否作为一项独立的民事归责原则,学术界争议颇大。学者往往是虽不否认其存在,但又主张其不应视为一项独立的民事归责原则,国内现有的民法教材或论著也基本采取这种观点。笔者以为不然,略陈浅见,旨在就教。 一、过错责任与客观责任 是否以过错为构成民事责任的必备要件,是过错责任与客观责任的基本区别。凡以过错为构成民事责任的必备要件的,称过错责任。“有过错、有责任;无过错、无责任。”是过错责任的基本要求。传统民法理论认为过错包括故意和过失两种形…     

论民事虚假诉讼的法律规制

民事虚假诉讼的频发对现有的法律漏洞提出了挑战,针对其产生的原因应该从完善民事程序法、民事实体法和刑事责任等方面进行规制.具体的措施是在民事诉讼法中确立法院更强的审查权、在民事责任法中规定虚假诉讼者承担侵权责任、在刑事法律中引入虚假诉讼罪.     

论合同责任

罗马法将民事责任分为两种:“合同责任”与“侵权责任”,大陆法国家继承了这一分类法。英美法稍有不同,把民事责任分为:违反合同的责任、违反信托的责任及侵权责任。合同责任与合同义务(债务),是两个不同的法律概念。所谓合同债务,是合同中规定当事人应为的一定行为。债务人按照合同规定正确履行债务,不会发生责任问题。只有当债务人不履行或不适当履行债务时,才发生合同责任。所谓合同责任,即法律视不履行或不适当履行合同债务为违法行为,使行为人处于一种受制裁之法律地位。合同责任是合同法律制度长期发展的结果。习惯法时代,曾经通行一种用名誉作为债务担保的责任制度。债务人违反合同时,债权人即当众公开宣     

我国民法基本制度生态化探究

生态文明时代要求法律制度进行不同程度的生态化.在各种法律制度生态化历程中,民法制度的生态化起着相当重要的作用.民法基本制度的生态化是民法生态化的重要内容,它包括人格权制度的生态化、物权制度的生态化、合同制度的生态化、侵权责任制度的生态化.这其中,环境人格权是人格权制度生态化的主要内容；生态性用益物权是物权制度生态化的重要组成部分；环境物权交易合同是合同制度生态化的主要方面.以损害风险预防、现实损害救济赔偿、恢复责任承担为切入点,采用无过错责任与过错加重责任并用的原则,贯彻环境损害全程监管与责任追究的理念,对环境污染与生态破坏的源头与过程实行全面的控制与追责是侵权责任制度生态化的基本要素.     

自然人民事责任能力性质的再思考

传统的以行为能力为前提,识别能力为核心的民事责任能力理论与民法的诸多制度和理论产生了冲突和矛盾。现代侵权法的发展为我们重新定位民事责任能力的地位创造了条件。民事责任能力属于权利能力的结论既合乎理论,又切合实际。以识别能力为基础的过责能力和作为人格内容的民事责任能力相区别才是探讨自然人的民事责任能力性质的合理方法。     

Guaranteed renewability in insurance

We propose a guaranteed renewability (GR) insurance in which a sequence of premiums would enable insurers to break even and would be chosen by both low- and high-risk buyers, whether or not they had suffered a loss. The premium schedule would continually decline over time, as the insurer collects more information to determine who the low-risk buyers are. The highest premiums are charged initially to protect the insurer if low-risk individuals leave for the spot market. The concluding portion of the article discusses the limitations of a GR policy in the health and environmental liability area, the most serious being instability in estimates of underlying loss trends.     

Adverse selection and equilibrium in liability insurance markets

Models of asymmetric information in insurance markets typically consider insurance buyers with Bernoulli loss distributions differing in expected loss. This article analyzes markets where buyer loss distributions are characterized by mean-preserving spreads and insurers can classify applicants in terms of expected values but not by risk. Because liability losses are characterized by skewed continuous probability distributions, both discrete and continuous loss distributions are considered. In contrast to the single separating equilibrium in the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market, multiple separating equilibria are identified in this article: three in the discrete case and four in the continuous case. The possibility of extreme discontinuities in insurer policy offers provides a new explanation for crises in liability insurance markets.The support of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners is gratefully acknowledged.     

Bad news about bad news: the disclosure of risks to insurability in research consent processes

One of the phenomena associated with research is "incidental findings," that is, unexpected findings made during the research, and outside the scope of the research, which have potential health importance. One underappreciated risk of incidental findings is the potential loss of the research subject's insurability; or if a research subject fails to disclose incidental findings when applying for insurance, the insurance contract may be voidable by the insurer. In this article, we seek to explain the insurability risks associated with incidental findings and to make recommendations for how researchers and research ethics committees should address the issue of disclosure of these risks.     

Optimal insurance without expected utility: The dual theory and the linearity of insurance contracts

Models of the insurance markets and institutions are routinely based on expected utility. Since EU is being challenged by an increasing number of decision models, we examine whether EU-based models are robust in their predictions. To do so, we rework some basic models of optimal insurance contracts and equilibrium using the “dual” theory to EU of Yaari. When there is a single, insurable source of risk, dual theory permits only corner solutions if the contract itself is linear. This contrasts sharply with EU. Nonlinearity, and thereby the possibility of interior solutions, is introduced in two ways. First, the contract itself is nonlinear, i.e., a deductible insurance policy. Or second, the decision maker is subject to some background risk such as uninsurable risky assets or default of the insurer. When decision problems are subject to nonlinearity, the predictions on optimal insurance are more similar to, though not identical with, those generated with EU.     

Insurance supply with capacity constraints and endogenous insolvency risk

Negative shocks to industry capital and significant capital adjustment costs have been offered as an explanation of periodic “crises” in the property-liability insurance market. According to these capacity constraint models, in which post-shock production must meet a solvency constraint, increases in price can cause some or perhaps all of the cost of a negative shock to capital to be shifted to policyholders. This article develops a model of insurance supply with capacity constraints and endogenous insolvency risk that incorporates limited liability and potential loss of insurer intangible capital. If industry demand is inelastic with respect to price and capital, the model predicts that price will increase following a negative shock to capital, but by less than the amount needed to fully offset the shock. Equity value and the expected recovery by policyholders for post-shock production are predicted to decline. Elastic demand mitigates shock-induced price increases.     

Premium Risk and Managed Care

This paper analyzes how individuals can insure premium risk and obtain high quality health insurance in a managed care environment. Insurers choose health care providers. Only a fraction of high risk individuals is unambiguously identifiable in front of a court. Premium insurance is not able to reach a first-best risk allocation while health insurers have an incentive to stint on quality under guaranteed renewable contracts. It is shown that a contract exists which can implement the first-best. This contract specifies payments to individuals and a third party upon switching to create a credible self-commitment by the insurer to provide high quality.     

Compensation for What? An Analysis of Insurance Strategies for Repairable Assets

We define a repairable asset as an irreplaceable commodity whose quality is at risk, but can be partly restored at a cost. Examples are houses, automobiles and, especially, health, for which standard monetary approaches are oversimplified. To optimize the value of insurance, the insurer and the insured have to agree upon repair strategies (when to fix the asset and how much) and compensation rules (how much money to receive for other goods). We clarify the role of the consumer's preferences in the properties of the contract, and we highlight the relationship between repair strategies and the super- or submodular structure of the repair technology.