The Structure and Stability of Political Attitudes: Findings from the 1974-76 Dearborn Panel Study

This article examines the structure and stability of publicopinion between the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections. Thedata consist of a four-wave panel study of 800 residents inDearborn, Michigan; interviews were conducted in the springof 1974, 1975, and 1976 and in the fall of 1976 immediatelyafter the presidential election. The paper focuses on the structureof political attitudes, the stability of attitudes, and theimpact of attitudes on the presidential votes. A central thesisis that public opinion can be disaggregated into two clusters—theDisintegration Cluster and the Alignment Cluster—one ofwhich disrupts and one of which reinforces partisan voting.On the basis of correlations between the seven factors makingup the clusters, we anticipate neither a rapid realignment nora disintegration of the party system, but instability, withelection outcomes affected by attitudinal factors salient toa specific campaign. We find signs of increased crystallizationof political attitudes compared to the 1956–1958–1960national panel. Finally, our voting studies indicate that theDisintegration Cluster had a significant effect on the 1972election, but that issues in general had little impact in 1976,once controls were introduced for party identification and candidateimage.     

Challenges to professionalism and union voting intentions: The case of pharmacists

Using data from a national survey of pharmacists who are members of the American Pharmaceutical Association, we examine the union voting intentions of employee pharmacists. We find that union instrumentality regarding professionalism is a primary predictor of union voting intent among these employees. In addition, this predictor mediates the relationship between the level of professionalism at a pharmacist’s current employment situation and his or her expected union vote. Also important to union voting intent are respondent beliefs about union instrumentality regarding pecuniary issues, prior union experience, as well as overall job satisfaction. Implications for employers, unions, and researchers are drawn. We thank Mary Graham, Jann Skelton, Paul Swiercz, Terry Thomason, and participants at the Seventh Bar-gaining Group Conference at Michigan State University for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. This research was made possible by a grant from the American Pharmaceutical Association.     

Trend in Personal Finances and the Vote

This study investigates the relationship between perceived trendin family finances and voting for candidates of the incumbentpresidential party. Analysis of CPS/SRC survey data for the1956–1974 period provides considerable support for theresearch hypothesis of maximizing economic rationality at thepolls. A normal vote analysis supports the authenticity of thesefindings and reveals relatively strong effects in subpresidentialelectoral contests. Comparisons are drawn between the aggregateeffect of these perceptions on the outcome of congressionalelections and that of changes in per capita personal income,the main explanatory variable in leading studies based on aggregatedata.     

Voting power: an information theory approach

In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the importance of formal measures of voting power and of the relevance of such measures to real life political issues. Nevertheless, existing measures have been criticized, especially because of their dependence on the unrealistic assumption that different coalitions have equal probabilities. In this paper we show that the classical problem of measuring voting power can be naturally embedded in information theory. This perspective on voting power allows us to extend measures of voting power to cases in which there are dependencies among voters. In doing so, we distinguish between two different notions of a given voter’s power—‘control’ and ‘informativeness’—corresponding, respectively, to the average uncertainty regarding the outcome of a vote that remains when all others have voted and the average uncertainty that is eliminated when only the given voter has voted. This distinction settles a number of well-known paradoxes and enables the study of voting power on the basis of actual political behavior at all levels.     

Erratum

We have been informed by NORC that in our article, "Trends inAttitudes Toward Abortion: 1972–1976" (POQ 43: 181–89),an error appeared on page 182 directly following response 3to the abortion approval question. It read: [1972 survey did not include the word "own" in the question.] It has been pointed out to us by NORC staff that the word "own"was included in the 1972 survey question "ABHLTH" on abortioneven though it does not appear in either the 1972–1977Cumulative Codebook or the 1972–1978 Cumulative Codebookpublished by NORC. For further clarification it should be mentionedthat the Arney and Trescher article (1976: 118) cited in ourpaper specifically states, in brackets, that "own" was insertedin the 1973–1975 surveys but not in the 1972 question.     

The paradox of multiple elections

Assume that voters must choose between voting yes (Y) and voting no (N) on three propositions on a referendum. If the winning combination is NYY on the first, second, and third propositions, respectively, the paradox of multiple elections is that NYY can receive the fewest votes of the 2³ = 8 combinations. Several variants of this paradox are illustrated, and necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurrence, related to the “incoherence” of support, are given. The paradox is shown, via an isomorphism, to be a generalization of the well-known paradox of voting. One real-life example of the paradox involving voting on propositions in California, in which not a single voter voted on the winning side of all the propositions, is given. Several empirical examples of variants of the paradox that manifested themselves in federal elections – one of which led to divided government – and legislative votes in the US House of Representatives, are also analyzed. Possible normative implications of the paradox, such as allowing voters to vote directly for combinations using approval voting or the Borda count, are discussed. Received: 31 July 1996 / Accepted: 1 October 1996     

Do Yuppies Matter? Competing Explanations of Their Political Distinctiveness

"Yuppies"—young urban professionals—have often beenportrayed as an important new political force. Using data fromthe 1972–1985 cumulative General Social Survey data file,this article tests various explanations of the political distinctivenessof yuppies. The findings call into question the assumption thatyouth, urbanity, and professional status combine to form a distinctyuppie political culture above and beyond what would be expectedon the basis of an additive combination of these factors. Forthis and other reasons, the political importance of the yuppiephenomenon appears to have been overstated.     

The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited

This paper re-examines the so-called ‘chairman’s paradox‘ that was first noticed by Farquharson in his path breaking tract on sophisticated voting, Theory of Voting (1969). The Chairman’s paradox is concerned with the case of a three member committee in which a particular player who has a regular and a tie-breaking vote – the ‘chairman’ – not only will do worse in specific instances under the plurality procedure for three alternatives than if he did not have such a vote, but will also do worse overall. That is, the chairman’s a priori probability of success (‘getting what one wants’) for all possible games with linear (strict) preference orders is lower than that of the two regular members. It is demonstrated that this result, which comes about if voters act strategically rather than sincerely, is not as robust as it has been thought to be. By merely replacing the standard assumption of linear preference orders with weak preference orders, which allow for indifference, we can escape from the paradox for the canonical case of three players and three alternatives. With weak preference orders, the a priori success of the chairman is now greater than that of the other two players. We also point to a new paradox of sophisticated voting.     

The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Preferences,the Agenda Setter,and the Distribution of Power in the EU

In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64–p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting “yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.     

Response Effects in Sex Surveys

Two potential problems in sex surveys—respondent refusalsand invalid reporting—are examined for national and areaprobability samples of males and females. Little support isfound for the contention that sexual topics constitute a sensitiveresearch area in terms of respondent cooperation and candor.It is found that (1) respondent cooperation, as indicated byrefusals and terminations, is neither more nor less problematicin sex research than in surveys on other topics; (2) respondentreports of sexual matters are not systematically related tointerviewer characteristics such as gender, sexual experience,or technical competence; (3) respondent candor, when self-reported,also is not associated systematically with either interviewercharacteristics or demographic and sexual characteristics ofrespondents. This analysis does identify, however, evidencethat (4) sexual matters often are sensitive topics for interviewersand principal investigators, leading both to interviewer turnoverand the creative construction of unobtrusive data collectionprocedures.     

Construct Validity and Error Components of Survey Measures: A Structural Modeling Approach

Measurement errors can have profound effects on statisticalrelationships, and better information on the quality of measuresseems needed. This study uses a new technology—structuralmodeling of data from special supplements to regular surveys—togenerate estimates of construct validity, method effects (amajor source of correlated error), and residual error (mainlyrandom error) for a broad set of measures obtained from fivenational surveys and an organizational survey (total respondents= 7,706). Analysis of these estimates suggested that a typicalsurvey item, when administered by a respected survey organizationto a general population sample, can be expected to yield 50–83percent valid variance, 0–7 percent method effects variance,and 14–48 percent residual variance. Multivariate analysisshowed that over two-thirds of the variation in measurementquality could be explained by 13 survey design characteristics;characteristics of respondents explained a small additionalportion. Results provide: (a) information on design conditionsassociated with better (or worse) measurement quality, (b) empiricallybased suggestions for improving measurement quality in futuresurveys, and (c) a set of coefficients for predicting the qualityof measures not studied here.     

ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF "WINNING" TELEVISED CAMPAIGN DEBATES

This study explores the long-neglected impact of a candidatebeing perceived as the "winner" of political debates on individualvoting behaviour in West Germany. While there has been muchresearch on the effects of debates on perceptions of candidatepolicy stands and personality atttributes, there has been littlework that attempts to guage how much "winning" the debate helpsa candidate at the polls. I investigate this process with straightforwardprobit models of the vote choice, including party identificationand candiate evaluation as well as whether the individual judgeda particular candidate as the "winner", or "fared best" in thedebate. These models are run for the 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1983elections in West Germany. The results show that there is aconsistent impact of "winning" the debate on individual votingchoices in West Germany; controlling for party and other factors,there is a significantly higher probability of voting for theparty of the politician the respondent feels won the contest.Debates, then, do ultimately make a substabtial electoral difference.     

Quaternary dichotomous voting rules

In this article, we provide a general model of “quaternary” dichotomous voting rules (QVRs), namely, voting rules for making collective dichotomous decisions (to accept or reject a proposal), based on vote profiles in which four options are available to each voter: voting (“yes”, “no”, or “abstaining”) or staying home and not turning out. The model covers most of actual real-world dichotomus rules, where quorums are often required, and some of the extensions considered in the literature. In particular, we address and solve the question of the representability of QVRs by means of weighted rules and extend the notion of “dimension” of a rule.     

Gambling on the Lottery: Sociodemographic Correlates Across the Lifespan

Two representative U.S. telephone surveys of gambling were conducted—an adult survey of adults aged 18 years and older (n = 2,631) and a youth survey of young people aged 14–21 years old (n = 2,274). Because the questions and methods were the same or similar in both surveys, the data from these two surveys were combined into a single dataset to examine the prevalence and sociodemographic correlates of gambling and problem gambling across the lifespan. The present work focused specifically on gambling on the lottery which is the most prevalent form of gambling in the U.S. The frequency of gambling on the lottery increased sharply from mid adolescence to age 18 which is the legal age to purchase lottery tickets in most states; lottery play continued to increase into the thirties when it leveled off and remained high through the sixties and then decreased among those 70 years and older. Considering multiple sociodemographic factors together in a negative binomial regression, the average number of days of lottery gambling was significantly predicted by male gender, age, neighborhood disadvantage and whether or not lottery was legal in the state where the respondent lived. These findings can be used to inform policies regarding lotteries in the U.S.     

DEMOCRATIC INCUMBENTS AND THE 1984 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A CASE STUDY

This article examines the advantages a single Democratic incumbentutilized to win reelection in 1984 despite an overwhelming victoryby Ronald Reagan at the top of the ticket in the congressionaldistrict. The incumbent won reelection because of two typesof ticket splitting: Republican-inclined voters who voted forRepublican candidates for president and U.S. Senate and splitto vote for the Democratic incumbent for Congress, and Democraticvoters who supported Democratic candidates for U.S. Senate andCongress but split to vote for Ronald Reagan for president.Ticket splitting was found to be associated with basic politicalorientation—weak Republican and independent voters splitin favor of the Democratic incumbent and were far less likelyto vote a straight ticket for either party. Support for theDemocratic incumbent was explained in nonideological terms andwas based upon high recognition and favorability, constituentservice, voting record, and personal familiarity. For the Republicanchallenger, who never achieved a high level of recognition (despitesignificant campaign expenditure), support came almost solelyfrom the most partisan Republican members of the electorateand was based simply upon the party affiliation of the Republicanchallenger.     

Changing Patterns in American Voting Behavior, 1914-1980

This paper analyzes voting behavior for President, Senate, andHouse at the state level for the period 1914–80. The majorfinding of this study is that since World War II, there hasbeen a pronounced trend toward "particularization" in votingfor federal offices. This trend consists of more than the erosionof party attachments among the electorate; it also includesthe dissolution of other traditional electoral ties such aspresidential coattails, the midterm congressional swing, andincumbency. As a result of this trend, the vote in federal electionsis largely determined by factors which are unique to the specificsetting in which each election occurs and by the ability ofcandidates to convert these factors to their political advantagethrough mass media campaigns.     

Public Opinion du Jour: An Examination of the Spiral of Silence

This study investigates the spiral of silence theory using perceivedvote outcomes as well as actual vote behaviors. The first majorhypothesis—that those who see their position as gainingsupport will be more likely to discuss while those who see theirposition as losing support will be less likely to discuss—wassupported by the data. Some support was also found for the hypothesisthat individuals perceiving support for a certain candidatewould be more likely to express a preference for the candidate.Results also seemed to justify the Noelle-Neumann distinctionbetween the resistant hardcore and other types of citizens.The relative independence of perception of opinion judgmentsfrom own preferences also was investigated and support was foundfor this difference.     

Comparing Thistles and Roses: The Application of Governmental–Voluntary Sector Relations Theory to Scotland and England

Typologies of government–voluntary sector relations mostly categorize nation-level situations, and omit consideration of intra-national differences. They are also rarely subject to empirical testing and subsequent theoretical development. This paper reports on research to apply Kuhnle and Selle's (2002) relational typology, which characterizes the experience of “Britain,” to a study of Scottish and English voluntary organizations' relations with government. Contrary to Kuhnle and Selle, the paper demonstrates — through survey data — a divergence between Scotland and England, within the “British” context, and advances the case for further testing of such conceptual typologies. The methodological challenges in moving from a theoretical framework to a research design capable of field application, using survey methods, are illustrated and discussed. Further directions for theoretically led work are suggested.     

Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters

In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n ≥ 3 probabilistic voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory are “generically different” in a specific sense. More specifically, I first describe finite shyness (Anderson and Zame in Adv Theor Econ 1:1–62, 2000), a notion of genericity for infinite dimensional spaces. Using this notion, I show that, for any policy in the interior of the policy space and any candidate j, the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which simultaneously satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s probability of victory and j’s expected vote share at is finitely shy with respect to the set of n-dimensional profiles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic voting functions for which satisfies the first and second order conditions for maximization of j’s expected vote share.