A Method for Eliciting Utilities and its Application to Collective Choice

Designing a mechanism that provides a direct incentive for an individual to report her utility function over several alternatives is a difficult task. A framework for such mechanism design is the following: an individual (a decision maker) is faced with an optimization problem (e.g., maximization of expected utility), and a mechanism designer observes the decision maker’s action. The mechanism does reveal the individual’s utility truthfully if the mechanism designer, having observed the decision maker’s action, infers the decision maker’s utilities over several alternatives. This paper studies an example of such a mechanism and discusses its application to the problem of optimal social choice. Under certain simplifying assumptions about individuals’ utility functions and about how voters choose their voting strategies, this mechanism selects the alternative that maximizes Harsanyi’s social utility function and is Pareto-efficient.     

Why a Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry

This article further studies ex ante efficient auctions in the setting of Stegeman (1996 Participation costs and efficient auctions, Journal of Economic Theory 71, 228–259.), where there exist entry costs for bidders who know their valuations. An alternative method is established to address efficient auctions. This method illustrates the intuition why the ex ante efficient allocation is Bayesian implementable through the Stegeman (1996) auction (a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation and no entry fee). More importantly, our method leads to an alternative ex ante efficient auction that implements uniquely the efficient entry. Thus, this alternative auction solves the entry indeterminacy problem of the Stegeman (1996) auction, which generally induces inefficient entry equilibria besides the efficient ones.      

Nondegenerate Intervals of No-Trade Prices for Risk Averse Traders

According to the local risk-neutrality theorem an agent who has the opportunity to invest in an uncertain asset does not buy it or sell it short iff its expected value is equal to its price, independently of the agent's attitude towards risk. Contrary to that it is shown that, in the context of expected utility theory with differentiable vNM utility function, but without the assumption of stochastic constant returns to scale, nondegenerate intervals of no-trade prices may exist. With a quasiconcave expected utility function they do if, and only if, the agent is risk averse of order one.     

对依法规范股票价格的思考

我国的法律虽然有关于股票发行价格的规定 ,但却不全面、不合理。在实践中 ,股票的定价发行是在没有投资者参与的情况下 ,由发行人与有关方面确定的 ,这违反了公平、平等的证券法基本原则。对此 ,应当完善有关的法律、法规 ,增加关于股票发行价格的更加合理、具体的规定。在股票的二级市场上 ,股票的交易价格虽然有日涨跌幅的限制 ,但对于首日上市的股票价格却没有限制规定 ,应当在有关规定中增加相应的内容 ,对首日上市的股票价格也要予以限制。     

商品社会使用价值与市场价格规律论

现代经济理论的两大体系 ,都对价格的有关理论做出了说明。有一种说法 ,把马克思主义经济学的劳动价值论与当代西方主流经济学派的供求论综合起来 ,就应当可以得到较为完美的价格理论。但这是不可能的。解决问题的出路 ,只能是按马克思主义经济学的内在逻辑 ,深入研究商品的使用价值 ,通过商品价值和使用价值对商品价格做出完整的说明 ,同时破解在供求与价值决定上的相互循环论证 ,发展以劳动价值为基础的价格理论。商品的使用价值 ,具有自然使用价值和社会使用价值两重属性。商品的社会使用价值深刻地反映着商品交换的经济关系 ,由自然使用价值等一系列因素决定。商品社会使用价值 ,在量上最终表现为某一商品的社会需求量与生产供给量的比率 ,在不同的条件下具有不同的值。商品的市场价格 ,由商品价值或其转化形式与商品社会使用价值共同决定。社会使用价值比价值或其转化形式更复杂、更多样、更易变 ,是市场价格变化的主导因素。社会使用价值为 1的市场价格 ,即是市场均衡价格。所谓市场价格围绕商品价值或其转化形式上下波动 ,实质上应是围绕市场均衡价格上下波动。调节市场供求关系的根本因素 ,表面上看是商品价格 ,而实质上是市场供求的相互作用。     

Valuing Others’ Information under Imperfect Expectations

Sometimes we believe that others receive harmful information. However, Marschak’s value of information framework always assigns non-negative value under expected utility: it starts from the decision maker’s beliefs – and one can never anticipate information’s harmfulness for oneself. The impact of decision makers’ capabilities to process information and of their expectations remains hidden behind the individual and subjective perspective Marschak’s framework assumes. By introducing a second decision maker as a point of reference, this paper introduces a way for evaluating others’ information from a cross-individual, imperfect expectations perspective for agents maximising expected utility. We define the cross-value of information that can become negative – then the information is “harmful” from a cross-individual perspective – and we define (mutual) cost of limited information processing capabilities and imperfect expectations as an opportunity cost from this same point of reference. The simple relationship between these two expected utility-based concepts and Marschak’s framework is shown, and we discuss evaluating short-term reactions of stock market prices to new information as an important domain of valuing others’ information.      

股票市场非流通股全流通价格的选择与比较

中国股票市场流通制度的缺陷是市场系统性风险的根源所在 ,出路在于股票市场非流通股的全流通。全流通成功的关键在于合理确定全流通的股票价格。以预期每股收益为基础的全流通价格理论依据在于公司的资产价值而不是企业价值 ,企业价值不在于资产值多少钱 ,而在于这些资产每年能创造出多少利润。以数据的形式 ,从投资的公平与效率的角度 ,对非流通股全流通价格选择的净资产定价和每股收益定价进行了分析与比较。提出应以净资产值作为非流通股全流通的定价基础 ,以净资产配售方式逐步解决非流通股全流通问题。     

2006年国际油价预测及对以后走势的判断

预测国际油价是世界各国难以割舍的课题和研究的热点问题之一。2005年国际油价走势远远超出较为合理的域值范围;影响2005年国际油价上涨的原因很多,但影响国际油价的因素主要是:经济增长、欧佩克生产能力、非欧佩克生产能力、石油需求量、天然气价格、煤价、石油消费弹性系数、欧佩克供求差额、非欧佩克供求差额、库存等;同时,在确定国际油价预测模型的基础上,对2006-2010年国际油价走势进行判断。     

On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games

In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under the name of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium.’ There, the players’ reference points depend on the beliefs about their opponents’ strategies. The second type, the maximin loss aversion equilibrium, differs from the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in that the reference points are only based on the carriers of the strategies, not on the exact probabilities. In the third type, the safety level loss aversion equilibrium, the reference points depend on the values of the own payoff matrices. Finally, a comparative statics analysis is carried out of all three equilibrium concepts in 2 × 2 bimatrix games. It is established when a player benefits from his opponent falsely believing that he is loss averse.     

辩证看待社会主义市场经济的代价

从社会主义市场经济的追求目标、运用手段、价值主体及发展过程看,代价的产生有其客观必然性。同时,代价的产生与作为主体的人在思想、行为上的局限性和主观失误密切相关。社会主义市场经济的代价分为必要性代价和人为性代价,我们应客观地承认社会主义市场经济中代价的存在,并用发展的眼光看待它,正确把握社会主义市场经济代价的度,把必然性代价控制在最小范围内,减少或避免人为性代价的产生,使社会主义市场经济体制能顺利建成。     

我国商品住宅价格调控政策效果研究

1998年以来,我国房地产行业发展迅速,并逐步成为国民经济的支柱产业,极大地推动了我国的经济增长。但房价的过快增长也增加了人们的生活压力,并对经济运行造成不利影响。为了抑制房价的过快增长,国家推出了一系列的调控政策,包括金融政策、土地政策和税收政策。2010年政府推出了限购政策,通过抑制需求来控制房价。研究表明:1998至2002年的调控政策取得了较好的效果;2003至2008年调控效果不佳;2008年底至2009年政府并没有对房价进行有力调控;2009年末至2012年初,限购令的效果非常明显。     

Elementary proof that mean–variance implies quadratic utility

An extensive literature overlapping economics, statistical decision theory and finance, contrasts expected utility [EU] with the more recent framework of mean–variance (MV). A basic proposition is that MV follows from EU under the assumption of quadratic utility. A less recognized proposition, first raised by Markowitz, is that MV is fully justified under EU, if and only if utility is quadratic. The existing proof of this proposition relies on an assumption from EU, described here as “Buridan’s axiom” after the French philosopher’s fable of the ass that starved out of indifference between two bales of hay. To satisfy this axiom, MV must represent not only “pure” strategies, but also their probability mixtures, as points in the (σ, μ) plane. Markowitz and others have argued that probability mixtures are represented sufficiently by (σ, μ) only under quadratic utility, and hence that MV, interpreted as a mathematical re-expression of EU, implies quadratic utility. We prove a stronger form of this theorem, not involving or contradicting Buridan’s axiom, nor any more fundamental axiom of utility theory.     

论社会主义市场经济条件下的价格工作

国家宏观调控下主要由市场形成价格的机制已经成为我国的基本价格制度,但在充分发挥价格机制的作用,与国际价格接轨等方面尚存不是.应进一步解放思想,转变观念,坚持市场经济体制改革方向,进一步深化价格改革.要加强调查研究、分析预测,转变价格工作职能,改进价格工作方式方法,加快与国际市场接轨的步伐.     

Aspects concerning entropy and utility

Expected utility maximization problem is one of the most useful tools in mathematical finance, decision analysis and economics. Motivated by statistical model selection, via the principle of expected utility maximization, Friedman and Sandow (J Mach Learn Res 4:257–291, 2003a) considered the model performance question from the point of view of an investor who evaluates models based on the performance of the optimal strategies that the models suggest. They interpreted their performance measures in information theoretic terms and provided new generalizations of Shannon entropy and Kullback–Leibler relative entropy and called them U-entropy and U-relative entropy. In this article, a utility-based criterion for independence of two random variables is defined. Then, Markov’s inequality for probabilities is extended from the U-entropy viewpoint. Moreover, a lower bound for the U-relative entropy is obtained. Finally, a link between conditional U-entropy and conditional Renyi entropy is derived.     

Institutions matter! Why the Herder Problem is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma

In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent in the Herder Problem. Their absence does not ensure that players will achieve a welfare-enhancing, cooperative solution to the Herders Problem, but does create far more opportunity for players to alter the expected payoffs through cooperative arrangements. In a properly modeled Herder Problem—along the lines of an assurance game—defection would not always be the dominant strategy. Consequently, the Herder Problem is not in the nature of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.     

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard,long-term care insurance,and nursing home use

Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard occurs (i) if the parent’s decision to purchase long-term care (LTC) coverage undermines the child’s incentive to exert effort because the insurance protects the bequest from the cost of nursing home care, and (ii) when the parent purchases less LTC coverage, relying on child’s effort to keep him out of the nursing home. However, a “net” moral hazard effect obtains only if the two players’ responses to exogenous shocks fail to neutralize each other, entailing a negative relationship between child’s effort and parental LTC coverage. We focus on outcomes out of equilibrium, interpreting them as a break in the relationship resulting in no informal care provided and hence high probability nursing home admission. Changes in the parent’s initial wealth, LTC subsidy received, and child’s expected inheritance are shown to induce “net” moral hazard, in contradistinction to changes in child’s opportunity cost and share in the bequest.     

经济法视角下住宅房地产价格调控研究

我国自实行城镇住房制度改革后,房地产业飞速发展,在推动经济发展的同时,也导致我国部分地区出现了住宅房地产价格过高、上涨过快等问题.住宅房问题事关国计民生,国家政府运用经济的、法律的、行政的手段在调控房地产价格时,始终应当坚持权力法制、秩序稳定、社会公平的原则.在住宅房地产价格调控时,要修改和完善《价格法》,完善土地调控法律制度,完善住房保障法律体系,制定专门法规调整我国住宅房地产,逐步扩大经济适用房等保障性住房惠及的范围,完善相关调控主体法律责任.     

What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting

There are at least two plausible generalisations of subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: cumulative prospect theory (which relaxes the independence axiom) and Levi’s decision theory (which relaxes at least ordering). These theories call for a re-assessment of the minimal requirements of rational choice. Here, I consider how an analysis of sequential decision making contributes to this assessment. I criticise Hammond’s (Economica 44(176):337–350, 1977; Econ Philos 4:292–297, 1988a; Risk, decision and rationality, 1988b; Theory Decis 25:25–78, 1988c) ‘consequentialist’ argument for the SEU preference axioms, but go on to formulate a related diachronic-Dutch-book-style’ argument that better achieves Hammond’s aims. Some deny the importance of Dutch-book sure losses, however, in which case, Seidenfeld’s (Econ Philos 4:267–290, 1988a) argument that distinguishes between theories that relax independence and those that relax ordering is relevant. I unravel Seidenfeld’s argument in light of the various criticisms of it and show that the crux of the argument is somewhat different and much more persuasive than what others have taken it to be; the critical issue is the modelling of future choices between ‘indifferent’ decision-tree branches in the sequential setting. Finally, I consider how Seidenfeld’s conclusions might nonetheless be resisted.     

The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets: loss aversion or ‘bad-deal’ aversion?

Several experimental studies have reported that an otherwise robust regularity—the disparity between Willingness-To-Accept and Willingness-To-Pay—tends to be greatly reduced in repeated markets, posing a serious challenge to existing reference-dependent and reference-independent models alike. This article offers a new account of the evidence, based on the assumptions that individuals are affected by good and bad deals relative to the expected transaction price (price sensitivity), with bad deals having a larger impact on their utility (`bad-deal’ aversion). These features of preferences explain the existing evidence better than alternative approaches, including the most recent developments of loss aversion models.     

On the Application of Multiattribute Utility Theory to Models of Choice

Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, 643–669 (1961); Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, Garland Publishing (2001)) argued that uncertainty is not reducible to risk. At the center of Ellsberg’s argument lies a thought experiment that has come to be known as the three-color example. It has been observed that a significant number of sophisticated decision makers violate the requirements of subjective expected utility theory when they are confronted with Ellsberg’s three-color example. More generally, such decision makers are in conflict with either the ordering assumption or the independence assumption of subjective expected utility theory. While a clear majority of the theoretical responses to these violations have advocated maintaining ordering while relaxing independence, a persistent minority has advocated abandoning the ordering assumption. The purpose of this paper is to consider a similar dilemma that exists within the context of multiattribute models, where it arises by considering indeterminacy in the weighting of attributes rather than indeterminacy in the determination of probabilities as in Ellsberg’s example.