LOCUS OF CONTROL AND JOB TURNOVER

In this article, I investigate how a worker's locus of control, that is, the perception of control over daily events, affects job‐to‐job and job‐to‐nonemployment turnover. I find that an increase in internality—the degree to which respondents believe that the outcomes of their life events are determined by their own actions versus external factors—increases job‐to‐job transitions. In addition, the annual wage growth rate and the wage gains from job‐to‐job transitions increase with internality. The influence of the locus of control on job‐to‐nonemployment turnover, however, is insignificant on controlling for the worker's level of attained education. (JEL D83, J63)     

LABOR'S SHARE,THE FIRM'S MARKET POWER,AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

We investigate the relationship between labor's share, firm's market power, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor input using an approach based on an unobserved components model. The approach yields time‐varying estimates of market power and the elasticity. Evidence on the market power of firms (which we find to be rising since 2000) gives a deeper understanding of movements in labor's share and the labor wedge. The generated values of the elasticity yield revised estimates of total factor productivity growth which is informative about the extent of the downward bias inherent in traditional estimates which use labor's share as a proxy for the elasticity. (JEL O47, C32, E25)     

ARE WORKERS WILLING TO PAY TO JOIN A BETTER TEAM?

Using data from the Major League Baseball free‐agent market, this study is the first to show that the productivity expected of the team a worker will join produces a significant, negative compensating wage differential. The younger workers in the sample drive this result, trading 25% of their wages to join teams with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher. This investment can be recouped if a reasonable increase in human capital occurs. These results are robust to contract length‐wage simultaneity and indicate that investment in human capital motivates the observed tradeoff, suggesting a new pathway through which human capital accumulation can affect wages. Reliable measures of workers' own past productivity and the productivity expected of a worker's future team provide key advantages to identifying these effects. (JEL J31, J24, M54)     

Effects of positive attitude and optimism on wage and employment: A double selection approach

Using two samples from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), a longitudinal data set from the United States, and following a double selection approach, the current study estimates the worker's employment and wage equations simultaneously with positive attitude and optimism as additional explanatory variables. Modeling employment as a bivariate decision process, the study examines different factors that influence the worker's labor market participation decision, the employer's hiring decision and the wage rate. The study finds the evidence that the worker's positive attitude and optimism affect the worker's employment probability from different angles: the former through the participation decision and the latter through the hiring decision. Following an alternative approach, this study also provides strong support to the earlier finding that positive attitude affects the worker's wage positively. Interestingly, the effects of attitude variables on the worker's wage are found to be quite comparable in magnitude to the wage effects of the traditional human capital variables.     

LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS WITH SEARCH FRICTIONS AND FAIR WAGE CONSIDERATIONS

Fairness considerations in wage setting can improve the ability of the Diamond‐Mortensen‐Pissarides search and matching model to account for U.S. labor market dynamics. Firms' production is influenced by workers' effort input, which depends on whether workers consider the employment relation as fair. A typical worker's effort is determined in a comparison of individual current wage with wage norms, including the outside option, the individual past wage, and the wage level in the steady state. The fairness considerations in the search framework give rise to endogenous real wage rigidity, and realistic volatilities of unemployment, vacancies, and labor market tightness. (JEL E24, E32, J64)     

GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE WHEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN CAPITAL ARE COMPLEMENTS

This article presents a model of endogenous growth, in which a firm's technology and a country's human capital stock are complementary in the production of output. Production technologies are created by costly research and development (R&D) and are owned by firms that can freely choose where in the world to produce. Both production and R&D have a positive effect on a country's human capital stock. While all countries typically grow at the same rate in the long run, they differ in their levels of human capital, per capita output, and the quality of the technologies that are used in production. A country's relative position in terms of productivity is history dependent. Countries that start out with a lower human capital stock or industrialize later end up with a lower per capita GDP in long‐term equilibrium. (JEL O4, O33, O47)     

CONSEQUENCES OF OFFSHORING TO DEVELOPING NATIONS: LABOR-MARKET OUTCOMES,WELFARE, AND CORRECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

Our parsimonious two-country (developed country and developing country) model of offshoring provides nuanced results. These include cases where wages monotonically improve, as well as where wages exhibit an inverted-U relationship with offshoring cost reductions. We identify conditions under which these relationships hold. Since global welfare always rises with improvements in offshoring technology, we find that there is a role for a minimum wage (alternatively, wage tax) in the developing country. We derive such a policy's optimal level. There is also the possibility of a developed country optimal offshoring tax for extracting terms-of-trade benefits. We, finally, analyze the two-country Nash equilibrium in policies. (JEL F11, F13, F16, F66, O19, O24)     

STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT,INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,AND CONTRACTUAL R&D

This study examines the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in contractual research and development (R&D) in developing countries. We find that strong IPRs provide incentives for firms, both multinational and local, to specialize in R&D activities in which they have competitive advantage (the specialization effect). They also facilitate the switching process from imitators to potential innovators for local firms (the switching effect). Moreover, we also demonstrate that a multinational firm's strategic IPRs enforcement behavior can be an effective instrument for subsidizing contractual R&D in developing countries (the subsidizing effect). We further illustrate how a policy mix of IPRs and a foreign direct investment subsidy in these countries affects R&D activities by adding an offshore R&D subsidiary as an additional organizational form. (JEL L13, O31, O34)     

WAGES,EMPLOYMENT, AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORY

We report results from laboratory experiments designed to examine statistical discrimination. Our design expands upon existing research by generating data both on wage contracts and unemployment rates of directly competing worker groups. We find some evidence for statistical wage discrimination against workers having an identical expected productivity but a higher productivity variance. However, those same subjects are less likely to be unemployed, suggesting that our employer‐subjects view hiring choice and wage contracts as substitutable. A clear implication is that field data discrimination estimates based on wages alone may overestimate the true impact of such discrimination. (JEL C90, J71)     

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION,LAND MARKET,AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE CITIES

This article investigates how government intervention in land market affects China's urban development, using data from prefecture‐level cities between 2000 and 2010. We find that government intervention enlarges the impact of positive productivity shocks on housing price appreciation, through mainly the government control over residential land supply. However, we find no significant evidence that high government intervention constrains population growth and leads to wage increase. Such patterns of urban dynamics can be explained by the fact that migrant workers are the driving force behind China's urbanization, but they have limited housing demand and are not well compensated. (JEL P52, R12, H11)     

Determinants of executive compensation: The neoclassical model versus concept formation

Neoclassical economic theory describes employee compensation as being equal to the worker's marginal revenue product. Other explanations of the wage formation process exist. For example, concept formation may enable employees to manipulate organizations and thereby receive higher compensation without changing their physical productivity. This study tests the two wage models on a 1983 data set of the 100 highest paid American chief executive officers. During 1983, the data appears to support the neoclassical economic model; while, the psychological model is not fully rejected. By contrast in an earlier study, for 1981, the psychological model took precedence over the economic model. The study fully reconciles the contrasting findings by introducing `stickiness in wages to explain why concept formation impacts executive wages during stagnant economic periods, and why productivity assumes a greater role in setting executive compensation levels during robust economic periods.     

THE COLLAPSE AND RECOVERY OF THE CAPITAL SHARE IN EAST GERMANY AFTER 1989

After the 1990 unification, East Germany's capital income share plunged to 15.2% in 1991, then increased to 37.4% by 2015. To account for these large changes in the capital share, I model an economy that gains access to a higher productivity technology embodied in new plants. As existing low productivity plants decrease production, the capital share varies due to the nonconvex production technology: plants require a minimum amount of labor to produce output. Two policies—transfers and government‐mandated wage increases—have opposite effects on output growth, but contribute to lowering the capital share early in the transition. (JEL E20, E25, O11)     

Work hours,social value of leisure and globalisation

We examine how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption–leisure decisions in determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure externalities (e.g., due to social interactions). The latter are modelled by allowing a worker's marginal utility of leisure to be increasing in the leisure time taken by other workers. Coordination takes the form of internalising the leisure externality and other relevant constraints (e.g., labour demand). The extent of openness is measured by the degree of capital mobility. We find that: coordination lowers equilibrium work hours and raises the wage rate; there is a U-shaped (inverse-U-shaped) relationship between work hours (wages) and the degree of coordination; coordination is welfare improving; and, the gap between the coordinated and uncoordinated work hours (and the corresponding wage rates) is affected by the extent and nature of openness.     

BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS WITH THE DIVISION OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

In the mainstream real business cycle (RBC) model, labor can be viewed as temporary employment since the firm's demand for labor behaves directly in response to stochastic productivity shocks in each period. This paper provides a tractable way of analyzing fluctuations in permanent and temporary employment over the business cycle, as well as the underlying driving forces. This inclusion of heterogeneity helps reconcile the RBC model with the U.S. data given that temporary employees in general only account for a small proportion of total private‐sector employment (about 2%–3%). We draw an explicit division between permanent and temporary employment and resort to this separation to account for stylized facts that characterize a two‐tier labor market. In particular, with regard to the U.S. labor market, our benchmark model can well explain the motivating facts: (1) temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent employment, (2) the share of temporary employment (the ratio of temporary to aggregate employment) exhibits strong pro‐cyclicality, (3) permanent employment lags by two quarters on average, and (4) the correlation between temporary employment and output is stronger than that involving the permanent counterpart. The quantitative analysis suggests that our proposed channels explain the main facts well and the model further provides plausible reasoning for a firm's labor hoarding. (JEL E24, E32)     

DYNASTIC MANAGEMENT

The most striking difference in corporate‐governance arrangements between rich and poor countries is that the latter rely much more heavily on the dynastic family firm, where ownership and control are passed on from one generation to the other. We argue that if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision making, dynastic management is a failure of meritocracy that reduces a firm's total factor productivity (TFP). We present a simple model that studies the macroeconomic causes and consequences of dynastic management. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends, among other factors, on the imperfections of contractual enforcement. A plausible calibration suggests that, via dynastic management, poor contract enforcement may be a substantial contributor to observed cross‐country differences in aggregate TFP. (JEL O43, O47, G32)     

RENT CREATION AND RENT SHARING: NEW MEASURES AND IMPACTS ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

This analysis proposes new measures of rent creation and rent sharing and assesses their impact on productivity on cross‐country‐industry panel data. We find first that: (1) anticompetitive product market regulations positively affect rent creation and (2) employment protection legislation boosts hourly wages, particularly for low‐skill workers. However, we find no significant impact of this employment legislation on rent sharing, as the hourly wage increases are offset by a negative impact on hours worked. Second, using regulation indicators as instruments, we find that rent creation and rent sharing both have a substantial negative impact on total factor productivity. (JEL E22, E24, O30, L50, O43, O47, C23)     

Effects of positive attitude on earnings: Evidence from the US longitudinal data

To examine whether or not the worker's attitude to life affects his/her earnings, this study estimates wage equations with positive attitude as an explanatory variable under different econometric specifications. The results obtained from both cross-sectional and panel data confirm that positive and optimistic attitude to life influence the worker's wages positively, and that the magnitude of this effect is comparable to or even higher than the individual effects of the standard human capital variables on earnings. The study further demonstrates that in addition to its direct effects, positive attitude also affects earnings indirectly through its effects on schooling.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN GOODS AND SERVICES ACROSS THE HETEROGENEOUS STATES OF AMERICA

In this study, we examine the importance of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in goods and services for U.S. States during 1980–2007 by applying the dual growth accounting framework. We find that MFP growth was relatively high and converged in the goods sector, but was low and did not converge in services. Although low growth in MFP in services was due to declining real user cost, particularly in real estate services, the lack of convergence itself was due to variation in wage growth. We also document that while the gap between productivity and wage growth was higher in goods, the two series were more strongly correlated in services. Finally, states with higher initial human capital experienced higher growth in both sectors. (JEL O47, R11)     

MINIMUM WAGES,IMPORT STATUS,AND FIRMS' INNOVATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This study explores the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on innovation of different types of firms. We develop an open‐economy R&D‐based growth model and obtain the following result: raising the minimum wage reduces innovation of firms that use domestic inputs but increases innovation of firms that import foreign inputs. We test this result using city‐level data on minimum wages and firm‐level patent data in China. In accordance with our theory, we find that raising the minimum wage is associated with more innovation by importing firms and less by non‐importing firms. This result survives a battery of robustness checks. (JEL E24, F43, O31)     

Direct and indirect effects of happiness on wage: A simultaneous equations approach

Using data from the United Sates National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and following a two-stage method, the current study estimates wage, schooling and happiness equations simultaneously and demonstrates that happiness affects the worker's wage not only directly, but also indirectly through its direct effect on years of schooling. The simultaneous relation between happiness and schooling demonstrated in this study further suggests that schooling also affects wage both directly and indirectly through happiness. The study supports the argument presented in several earlier studies that higher income does not necessarily guarantee higher levels of happiness.