MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS

We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry deterrence. In a sequential game with entry deterrence, an incumbent decides whether to incur a cost to deter potential entrants. We show that the model with sequential games with strategic deterrence provides the best fit to the data. We conclude that the results reject the hypothesis of a static model and support the hypothesis of the existence of strategic entry deterrence. (JEL L1)     

ENTRY DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances between airlines have on airfare, but little is known of the market entry deterrent impact of strategic alliances. Using a structural econometric model, this paper examines the market entry deterrent impact of codesharing, a form of strategic alliance, between incumbent carriers in domestic air travel markets. We find evidence of market entry deterrence, but deterrence impact depends on the specific type of codesharing between market incumbents as well as the identity of the potential entrant. We quantify the extent to which market incumbents' codesharing influences potential entrants' market entry cost and probability of market entry. (JEL L13, L93)     

ENTRY AND EXIT,PRODUCT VARIETY,AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We study the stochastic behavior of a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. Each seller sells his product in the consumption goods as well as the investment goods market and has market power in both. Consumers derive utility from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of all the consumption goods and augment their capital stock by a CES aggregate of all the investment goods. We analyze the equilibrium of this economy allowing for an endogenous determination of the number of firms and therefore of products. The principal effect we wish to highlight is the endogenous propagation and magnification of technology and preference disturbances through product space variations. (JEL E32, D43, L16)     

MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND CONSUMER PRODUCT PRICES

This article examines the interaction of commercial media and retail producers of well-known consumer products when advertising is used to differentiate brands. In particular, I address how competition in the media market affects choices of advertising and program quality. The results suggest counterintuitively that advertisers may actually prefer media markets with less competition for audiences. Product differentiation through advertising is more effective when media markets are less competitive, leading to higher prices for advertised products. As a result, media concentration may lead to higher profits for advertising firms if the additional revenue exceeds the higher advertising costs associated with media concentration. (JEL L11 , L82 , M37 )     

ENTRY BARRIERS,COMPETITION, AND TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION

I build a model of technology adoption to study the quantitative effect of entry barriers on total factor productivity (TFP). In my model, incumbent firms choose technologies that are sufficiently productive to deter entry from a potential competitor. I show that higher entry barriers help to deter entry and lead to the choice of less productive technologies. A novelty of my work is that I use a direct measure of entry barriers. I find that reducing entry barriers from their average level in the poorest 30% of countries to their U.S. level leads to a sizeable increase in aggregate TFP of 12%. (JEL O11, O43)     

STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST‐VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS

By restricting bidders to be qualified dealers, wholesale automobile auctions exclude the bidders who place the highest value on the vehicles: consumers. This article provides an explanation for this puzzling entry restriction by modeling the inventory‐management decisions of a firm. If an automobile dealer has more vehicles in inventory than is optimal, it cannot reduce its inventory by selling directly to consumers without impacting the demand for the automobiles that remain. However, if the dealer sells his/her excess inventory to a competitor, the demand for his/her remaining vehicles increases as the competitor responds by acquiring fewer additional vehicles. We demonstrate that for any market demand function and any cost of the competitor acquiring additional vehicles, a dealer with excess inventory does better by selling a subset of its vehicles to a competitor rather than directly to consumers. We discuss the market for wholesale automobiles in relation to other markets where goods are also auctioned but where entry is not restricted to qualified dealers. Doing so allows us to compare our inventory‐management explanation to common explanations provided by industry practitioners. We find that intuitive alternative stories do not consistently explain practices across markets. (JEL D44, L11, L62)     

HOW DOES ADVERTISING AFFECT MARKET PERFORMANCE? A NOTE ON GENERIC ADVERTISING

We propose a novel approach to estimating the effect of advertising on market performance that relies on the preferences of firms participating in generic advertising programs. Generic advertising campaigns provide a unique window to observe advertising effects on market performance, because rotations in market demand systematically redistribute advertising rents among firms according to observable characteristics on producer size. We examine producer attitudes towards generic advertising in the “Beef. It's What's for Dinner!” campaign of the U.S. Beef Checkoff program, the subject of the recent and controversial Supreme Court ruling on generic advertising as a form of government speech. We find the likelihood producers favor an expansion of the advertising program increases in their operating scale. This finding is consistent with an advertising campaign that has led to a counterclockwise rotation of market demand and a commensurate increase in market performance in the U.S. beef market. (JEL L1, M37, Q13)     

LEFT FOR DEAD: ANTI‐COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR IN ORBITAL SPACE

In a dynamic investment framework with depreciation, we show incumbent satellite operators have incentives to “warehouse” a fraction of their assigned spectrum and orbital slots, keeping nonoperational assets in place, which reduces output, increases prices, and diminishes social welfare. Exploring three distinct market structures, we model firms' incentives to warehouse, and show conditions under which firms choose to warehouse rather than replace nonfunctioning satellites. We find a dominant firm with a competitive fringe produces more and longer duration warehousing relative to perfect competition or monopoly. Regulators could remediate warehousing by increasing a firm's marginal costs, or by increasing the probability of reallocating orbital slots that do not have a fully functioning satellite. (JEL L9, L5)     

‘America’ in Indian Advertising: Change and Impact

The aims of this article are threefold: One, to focus on the advertising and marketing communications situating the presence of the USA in India. Two, to address three issues concerning the where, how, and impact dimensions of marking the US presence in Indian advertising. In that process an attempt will be made to integrate three aspects of advertising, namely: marketing, media, and linguistics. Three, to account for US corporate culture as it manifests itself in advertising. Central to our discussion are two product types: consumer products (e.g. Coke, Pepsi, Kellogg’s cereals, or Cadbury’s chocolates) and socially-sensitive, or ‘taboo’, products (e.g. condoms, alcohol, and breath fresheners).     

Occupational licensing and the transition from welfare to work

Occupational licensing laws erect barriers to entry into various labor markets, impeding the upward mobility of welfare recipients seeking to transition into employment. This paper, recognizing that labor market interventions have often been used precisely because of this effect, proceeds to examine various restrictions which directly affect low-skilled workers in the U.S. economy who now have stronger incentives to participate in labor markets in response to recent welfare policy reforms. Three distinct types of labor market restrictions are identified: (1) the licensing of professional, high-skilled occupations tends to crowd workers into lower-skilled occupations, lowering such wages and thus weakening work incentives among the welfare population; (2) quantity license restrictions (permits which set quotas limiting the overall number of suppliers in a market) suppress demand for low-skilled workers, and may substantially reduce work opportunities and, thus, incentives. Taxi license restrictions alone, for instance, may result in several hundreds of thousands of lost employment opportunities throughout the United States; and (3) quality license restrictions, where entrants face higher entry costs (typically through educational requirements above the requirements of the market), may paradoxically provide welfare recipients with enhanced opportunities for employment, particularly when coupled with job-training subsidies typically extended to welfare recipients. This we call a “de facto liberalization” of occupational licensure. While incumbent workers are certain to resist enhanced entry by welfare recipients into licensed occupations, vocational schools should aggressively support such entry, affording a possible realpolitik to the migration path envisioned. More interestingly, once entry has accelerated under de facto liberalization, occupational license rents will predictably decline, thus increasing the likelihood of explicit liberalization, and further opening labor markets to competitive entry.     

CONTRACTS AS RENT‐SEEKING DEVICES: EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN SOCCER

Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent‐seeking devices vis‐à‐vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework in the context of European professional soccer where (incumbent) teams and players sign binding contracts which, however, are frequently renegotiated when other teams (entrants) want to hire the player. Because they weaken entrants in renegotiations, long‐term contracts are useful rent‐seeking devices for the contracting parties. However, they reduce the likelihood of (mutually beneficial) transfers, which generates a trade‐off in the spirit of Aghion and Bolton (1987). Using a data set from the German “Bundesliga,” our model predictions are broadly confirmed. (JEL L14, J63, L40, L83)     

PRODUCT DIVERSITY,DEMAND STRUCTURES,AND OPTIMAL TAXATION

This article studies optimal taxation in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model with endogenous entry. We compare the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model to three alternative demand structures: oligopolistic competition in prices, oligopolistic competition in quantities, and translog preferences. Our economy is characterized by two distortions: a labor distortion due to the misalignment of markups on goods and leisure, and an entry distortion due to the misalignment of the consumer surplus effect and the profit destruction effect of entry. The two distortions interact in determining the wedge between the market‐driven and optimal level of product diversity. We show how optimal labor and entry taxes depend on the prevailing demand structure, the nature and size of entry costs, and the degree of substitutability between goods. (JEL E22, E61, E62)     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY

This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands. (JEL D43, L11, L13)     

SUPERMARKETS AS A NATURAL OLIGOPOLY

This paper proposes and tests a model of supermarket competition based upon an endogenous fixed cost (EFC) framework (Sutton, J. Sunk Cost and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of Concentration. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.). The relevance of the EFC framework to supermarket competition stems from the industry's surprisingly uniform competitive structure: irrespective of the size of the local market, a small number of firms (between three and six) capture the majority of sales. As markets grow, local rivalry drives firms to expand their fixed investments, limiting the number of firms that can profitably enter even the largest markets. Although markets stay concentrated, competition remains fierce, reflecting the inherently rivalrous nature of the underlying competitive mechanism. The goal of this paper is to identify the strategic focus of this rivalry, namely the drive to provide an ever greater variety of consumer products, and to eliminate alternative explanations for the observed structure by highlighting the unique form of firm conduct that characterizes this industry. (JEL D21, D43, L11, L13, L22, L81)     

DEMAND FOR DIFFERENTIATED DURABLE PRODUCTS: THE CASE OF THE U.S. COMPUTER PRINTER MARKET

This paper develops an estimation technique for analyzing the impact of technological change on the dynamics of consumer demand in a differentiated durable products industry. The paper presents a dynamic model of consumer demand for differentiated durable products that explicitly accounts for consumers' expectations of future product quality and consumers' outflow from the market that arises endogenously from their purchase decisions. The timing of consumers' purchases is formalized as an optimal stopping problem. A solution to that problem defines the hazard rate of product adoptions, while the nested discrete choice model determines the alternative‐specific purchase probabilities. Integrating individual decisions over the population distribution generates rich dynamics of aggregate and product‐level sales. The empirical part of the paper applies the model to data on the U.S. computer printer market for 1998–1999. The estimates support the hypothesis of consumers' forward‐looking behavior, allowing for better demand forecasts and improved measures of welfare gains from introducing new products. (JEL L11, C35, D91)     

OPTIMAL PRICE OF ENTRY INTO A COMPETITION

A continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit‐maximizing firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I show that an increase in the value of each prize leads the firm to raise the price while keeping the intensity of entry fixed. Conversely, when the mass of prizes increases, the firm initially keeps the price constant while allowing entry to increase; and later—raises the price. (JEL C72, D82, D83)     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

EMISSION TAXES,CLEAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION,AND PRODUCT MARKET COLLUSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We use a laboratory experiment to study the link between cooperative research and development (R&D) in clean technology and collusion in a downstream product market in the presence of a time‐consistent emissions tax. Such a tax creates additional interconnections between firms, in addition to the standard technological spillovers. Our results show a strong link between R&D cooperation and market collusion under symmetric R&D spillovers in a duopoly, but when the spillovers are asymmetric, R&D cooperation does not necessarily result in collusion. With symmetric spillovers, the link between R&D cooperation and collusion remains strong even in three‐ and four‐firm industries. (JEL C90, L5, O30, Q55)     

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION UNDER CONGESTION: HOTELLING WAS RIGHT

We introduce negative network externalities—“congestion costs”—into H. Hotelling's (1929) model of spatial competition with linear transportation costs. For any firm locations on opposite sides of the midpoint, a pure strategy price equilibrium exists and is unique if congestion costs are strong enough relative to transportation costs. We analyze product differentiation and find that Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation comes closer to holding in the presence of congestion costs. The greater are congestion costs, the less differentiated products can be in (locationally symmetric) equilibrium. In fact, minimum differentiation comes arbitrarily close to holding depending on the magnitude of these costs relative to transportation costs. Intuitively, greater congestion effects stabilize competition at closer quarters, eliminating aggressive pricing equilibria. Thus, negative network externalities can play a significant role in product differentiation. (JEL D21, L15, R12)     

EX ANTE EFFICIENT MECHANISM WITH PRIVATE ENTRY COSTS

This paper studies ex ante efficient resource allocation mechanism in an environment where agents endowed with their private values must incur private entry costs to participate. Due to the nature of this bidimensional screening problem and the difficulty in fully characterizing all implementable endogenous entries, the domain of the related social planner's problem that is essential for establishing the existence of efficient mechanism needs to be carefully designed. We find that a second-price auction among the entrants with a reserve price equal to the seller's valuation is ex ante efficient, and any ex ante efficient mechanism must be ex post efficient. (JEL D44, D61, D82)