LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE EURO AREA CRISIS: AN EMPIRICAL DSGE MODEL

We estimate a medium‐scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the Euro area with limited asset market participation (LAMP). Our results suggest that in the recent European Monetary Union years LAMP is particularly sizable (39% during 1993–2012) and important to understand business cycle features. The Bayes factor and the forecasting performance show that the LAMP model is preferred to its representative household counterpart. In the representative agent model the risk premium shock is the main driver of output volatility in order to match consumption correlation with output. In the LAMP model this role is played by the investment‐specific shock, because non‐Ricardian households introduce a Keynesian multiplier effect and raise the correlation between consumption and investments. We also detect the contractionary role of monetary policy shocks during the post‐2007 years. In this period consumption of non‐Ricardian households fell dramatically, but this outcome might have been avoided by a more aggressive policy stance. (JEL C11, C13, C32, E21, E32, E37)     

IDENTIFYING THE ROLE OF RISK SHOCKS IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE USING STOCK PRICE DATA

I analyze the sources of U.S. business cycle fluctuations in an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with a rich set of nominal and real rigidities and various exogenous disturbances. The model includes a shock to the expected risk‐premium, which introduces a time‐varying wedge between the policy rate set by the central bank and the cost‐of‐capital of firms. In the aggregate data, most U.S. corporations finance their investment using internal funds, and stock prices reveal the opportunity cost of this type of financing. I therefore use corporate market value and dividend data in the Bayesian estimation of the model to identify risk shocks. Variance decomposition exercises show that these shocks account for a substantial part of the variation in the stock market, as well as the variation in output and investment, especially at short forecast horizons. The variation of these variables at longer forecast horizons are mainly captured by shocks to investment‐specific technological change. Historical decomposition points to the important role played by risk shocks in the run up of stock prices and output in the late 90s, and in the reversal of these variables in the early 2000s and during the recent recession. (JEL E32, E44)     

THE SHIFTS IN LEAD-LAG PROPERTIES OF THE U.S. BUSINESS CYCLE

We document shifts in the lead-lag properties of the U.S. business cycle since the mid-1980s. Specifically, (1) the well-known inverted leading indicator property of real interest rates has completely vanished; (2) labor productivity switched from positively leading to negatively lagging output and labor inputs over the cycle; and (3) the unemployment rate shifted from lagging productivity negatively to leading positively. Many contemporary business cycle models produce counterfactual cross-correlations revealing that popular frictions and shocks provide an incomplete account of business cycle comovement. Determining the underlying sources of these shifts in the lead-lag properties and their consequences for macroeconomic forecasts is therefore a promising direction for future research. (JEL E24, E32, E43)     

FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES

This article provides a quantitative assessment of the role of financial frictions in the choice of exchange rate regimes. I use a two‐country model with sticky prices to compare different exchange rate arrangements. I simulate the model without and with borrowing constraints on investment, under monetary policy and technology shocks. I find that the stabilization properties of floating exchange rate regimes in face of foreign shocks are enhanced relative to fixed exchange rate in presence of credit frictions. In presence of symmetric and correlated shock, fixed exchange rates regimes can perform better than floating. This analysis can have important policy implications for accession countries joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II system and with high degrees of credit frictions. (JEL E3, E42, E44, E52, F41)     

SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND MACROECONOMIC (IN)STABILITY

This article examines the quantitative interrelations between sectoral composition of public spending and equilibrium (in)determinacy in a two‐sector real business cycle model with positive productive externalities in investment. When government purchases of consumption and investment goods are set as constant fractions of their respective sectoral output, we show that the public‐consumption share plays no role in the model's local dynamics, and that a sufficiently high public‐investment share can stabilize the economy against endogenous belief‐driven cyclical fluctuations. When each type of government spending is postulated as a constant proportion of the economy's total output, we find that there exists a trade‐off between public consumption versus investment expenditures to yield saddle‐path stability and equilibrium uniqueness. (JEL E32, E62, O41)     

A MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL FOR INDIA

A New Keynesian monetary business cycle model is constructed to study why monetary transmission in India is weak. Our models feature banking and financial sector frictions as well as an informal sector. The predominant channel of monetary transmission is a credit channel. Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent effect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. The presence of an informal sector hinders monetary transmission. Contrary to the consensus view, financial repression in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. (JEL E31, E32, E44, E52, E63)     

THE U.S. LABOR INCOME SHARE AND AUTOMATION SHOCKS

The causes and consequences of the 1964–2016 swings in the U.S. labor income share/labor share (LS) are parsed through the lens of a structural model estimated on aggregate and LS series jointly. Where conventional models fall short, the present model yields a counter-cyclical LS unconditionally and in response to demand and monetary policy shocks, as well as a small wage pro-cyclicality, via moderate wage indexation. Shifts in automation, workers' market power, investment efficiency, and the relative price of investment account for 54%, 24%, 6%, and 4% of LS fluctuations, respectively. Automation shocks explain the lion's share of the post-2007 cyclical LS tumble and 11% of output cycles, and generate a distinctive counter-cyclical labor response. (JEL E32, E25, E52)     

THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF THE OUTPUT GAP: A BAYESIAN DSGE APPROACH

We estimate the output gap that is consistent with a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, where the output gap is defined as a deviation of output from its flexible‐price equilibrium, using Bayesian methods. Our output gap illustrates the U.S. business cycles well, compared with other estimates. We find that the main source of the output gap movements is the demand shocks, but that the productivity shocks contributed to the stable output gap in the late 1990s. The robustness analysis shows that the estimated output gap is sensitive to the specification for monetary policy rules. (JEL E30, E32, C11)     

THE RELATIVE STICKINESS OF WAGES AND PRICES

While many modern business cycle theories posit the existence of nominal wage and/or output price stickiness, their relative importance remains an unsettled issue. Using a structural VAR model, this paper exploits evidence on the behavior of real wages to assess the relative importance of these two sources of stickiness. The empirical results suggest that a positive shock to aggregate demand causes a significant temporary fall in real wages. This is taken as evidence that sticky wages have played a more important role than sticky prices in transmitting aggregate demand shocks to real economic activity in the post-war U.S. (JEL E32)     

CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES AND MONETARY POLICY WITH LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION

This article explores the interaction between consumption externalities and limited asset market participation (LAMP) in the standard New‐Keynesian model. We assess the performance of simple Taylor‐type interest rate rules with respect to (a) equilibrium determinacy, (b) the model's ability to simultaneously generate output and inflation volatility similar to the pre‐Volcker era, and (c) the model's response to a technology shock. We find that when individual preferences are affected by average household consumption (Aggregate Consumption Externality), stronger externalities increase the range of LAMP for which multiple equilibria arise even if the policy rule satisfies the Taylor principle. The interaction of LAMP and externalities can generate vast inflation/output relative volatility in line with the one observed in the data in the 1970s. According to our analysis, consumption externalities also affect the responses of endogenous variables to total factor productivity shocks. (JEL E4, E5)     

ON ENDOGENOUS BUSINESS CYCLES UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO VARIETY AND SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITY

We examine the theoretical as well as quantitative interrelations between endogenous business cycles, increasing returns to product variety and sector‐specific productive externalities within a two‐sector real business cycle model. In a calibrated version of our benchmark closed‐economy setting, the threshold level of investment externalities needed for equilibrium indeterminacy is found to be monotonically increasing in the degree of market competitiveness. We also study the model's local stability properties (i) when the parameters that govern the level of intermediate‐good producers' market power and the strength of variety effects are disentangled; and (ii) in the context of a small open economy. (JEL E30, E32, O41)     

ENTRY AND EXIT,PRODUCT VARIETY,AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We study the stochastic behavior of a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. Each seller sells his product in the consumption goods as well as the investment goods market and has market power in both. Consumers derive utility from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of all the consumption goods and augment their capital stock by a CES aggregate of all the investment goods. We analyze the equilibrium of this economy allowing for an endogenous determination of the number of firms and therefore of products. The principal effect we wish to highlight is the endogenous propagation and magnification of technology and preference disturbances through product space variations. (JEL E32, D43, L16)     

THE EFFECT OF BUSINESS CYCLES ON GROWTH: KEYNES VS. SCHUMPETER

In contrast to recent 'neo-Schumpeterian' models, which argue that business cycles are good for growth, we develop a 'neo-Keynesian' model, where monopolistically competitive firms set prices and produce output in advance of the realization of (stochastic) monetary velocity. In such a setting, there is an asymmetry in the effect of business cycles on income: recessions are bad, because the representative firm is demand-constrained and its unsold output is wasted, but booms are not good, because the firm is output-constrained and cannot produce any more output. A more severe business cycle thus reduces the expected income of a firm, and the expected return to investment, which reduces the growth rate of the economy. ( JEL E32, E52, O41, L13)     

UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS OF CONSUMER DURABLE ADJUSTMENTS

This article examines whether adjustment frictions help account for the patterns of household consumption expenditures observed in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, namely, that the variance of log durable expenditure is four times larger than that of log nondurable expenditure for annual data and this gap substantially widens for quarterly data. Estimating a structural model of household consumption with nondurable and durable goods with the simulated method of moments, I find that the fixed costs associated with durable adjustments are important in matching the cross‐sectional moments. Using the estimated model, I also examine the response of nondurable and durable expenditures to income shocks. (JEL D12, D91, E21)     

INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF EURO AREA VERSUS U.S. POLICY UNCERTAINTY: A FAVAR APPROACH

Estimating a large‐scale factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model for 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member countries, we quantify the global effects of economic policy uncertainty shocks. More specifically, we check whether the signs, the magnitude, and the persistence profile are consistent with the literature on the real and financial sector effects of uncertainty. In that respect, we compare the impacts of a U.S. and a Euro area policy uncertainty shock. According to our results, an increase in economic policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on economic activity (gross domestic product), consumer prices, equity prices, and interest rates. Uncertainty shocks cause deeper recessions in Continental Europe (except Germany) than in Anglo‐Saxon countries. U.S. uncertainty shocks have a bigger impact than those for the Euro area. Economic policy uncertainty does not only affect that country where the shock originates but also has large cross‐border effects. We also find a high degree of synchronization among the responses of national variables to a (foreign) uncertainty shock, indicating evidence of an international business cycle. With respect to the responses of national long‐term interest rates to an economic policy uncertainty shock, our results reveal a strong “North‐South” divide within the Euro area with rates decreasing less significantly in the South. Moreover, economic policy uncertainty shocks emerging in one region quickly raise uncertainty outside the region of origin. (JEL C32, F42, D80)     

LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization. (JEL E32, E44, E52)     

INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT VARIABILITY AND REAL WAGE FLUCTUATIONS: DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS

The cyclical behavior of the real wage differentiates between the empirical validity of major new Keynesian sticky-wage and sticky-price explanations of business cycles. Across industries of the United States, an increase in price flexibility relative to wage flexibility correlates with a reduction in output fluctuations in the face of demand shocks. Further, industrial real output variability does not vary significantly with nominal wage flexibility. In contrast, an increase in price flexibility moderates industrial real output variability. Consistently, an increase in the real wage response to demand shocks correlates with an increase in industrial output variability. ( JEL E32, E31)     

BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS WITH THE DIVISION OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

In the mainstream real business cycle (RBC) model, labor can be viewed as temporary employment since the firm's demand for labor behaves directly in response to stochastic productivity shocks in each period. This paper provides a tractable way of analyzing fluctuations in permanent and temporary employment over the business cycle, as well as the underlying driving forces. This inclusion of heterogeneity helps reconcile the RBC model with the U.S. data given that temporary employees in general only account for a small proportion of total private‐sector employment (about 2%–3%). We draw an explicit division between permanent and temporary employment and resort to this separation to account for stylized facts that characterize a two‐tier labor market. In particular, with regard to the U.S. labor market, our benchmark model can well explain the motivating facts: (1) temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent employment, (2) the share of temporary employment (the ratio of temporary to aggregate employment) exhibits strong pro‐cyclicality, (3) permanent employment lags by two quarters on average, and (4) the correlation between temporary employment and output is stronger than that involving the permanent counterpart. The quantitative analysis suggests that our proposed channels explain the main facts well and the model further provides plausible reasoning for a firm's labor hoarding. (JEL E24, E32)     

MONEY,OUTPUT, AND INFLATION IN THE LONGER TERM: MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, 1880–2001

We study how fluctuations in money growth correlate with fluctuations in real output growth and inflation. Using band‐pass filters, we extract cycles from each time series that last 2–8 (business cycles) and 8–40 (longer‐term cycles) years. We employ annual data, 1880–2001 without gaps, for 11 industrial countries. Fluctuations in money growth do not play a systematic role at business cycle frequencies. However, money growth leads or affects contemporaneously inflation, but not real output growth, in the longer run. Also, formal break tests indicate no structural changes for the longer‐term money growth and inflation relationship, despite changes in policy regimes.(JEL E3)