Gender role orientation and gaming behavior revisited: examining mediated and moderated effects

The article presents results of a study that examined the influence of gender role orientations on gaming motivations, game genre preferences, and different play styles. Applying social role theory, it was hypothesized that femininity and masculinity influence gender-typed motivations (social interaction, competition, and challenge) and preferences (role-playing and action games) as well as gender-typed behavior (cooperative play and competitive play). After collecting empirical data through an online survey, hypotheses were tested by structural equation modeling. Moreover, moderating effects of sociodemographic characteristics (biological gender, age, and educational level) were examined. Findings provide evidence for the existence of gender-typed motives of play, genre preferences, and – mediated by motivations and preferences – gaming behavior. Group analyses support a biosocial model of gender-typed gaming behavior because gender-typing of motives, preferences, and play styles varies in strength and direction by biological gender, age, and educational level.     

VOTING EXPRESSIVELY

We address a common criticism directed toward models of expressive voting that they are ad hoc in nature. To that end, we propose a foundation for expressive behavior that is based on a novel theory of social preferences under risk. Under our proposal, expressive considerations in behavior arise from the particular way in which risky social prospects are assessed by decision‐makers who want to interpret their choices as moral. To illustrate the scope of our framework, we use it to address some key questions in the literature on expressive voting: why, for expressive considerations, might voters vote against their self‐interest in large elections and why might such elections exhibit a moral bias. Specifically, we consider an electoral set‐up with two alternatives and explain why, when the size of the electorate is large, voters may want to vote for the alternative they deem morally superior even if this alternative happens to be strictly less preferred, in an all‐inclusive sense, than the other. (JEL D01, D03, D81, D72, A13)     

DIRECT TESTS OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These data have inspired the development of models of social preferences that assume agents have preferences for equity and efficiency as well as their own material payoffs. Empirical failure of the economic man model comes from experiments that provide direct tests of its distinguishing characteristic: indifference to the payoffs of others. This paper reports an experiment that subjects popular social preferences models to the same type of empirical challenge. We report direct tests of the distinguishing characteristics of these models: preference for allocations that have higher efficiency and greater equity. (JEL A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63)     

LIMITED LIABILITY,MORAL HAZARD,AND RISK TAKING: A SAFETY NET GAME EXPERIMENT

We model the safety net problem as a social dilemma game involving moral hazard, risk taking, and limited liability. The safety net game is compared to both an individual decision task involving full liability and the deterministic public goods game. We report experimental data to show that limited liability leads to higher risk taking in comparison to full liability; nevertheless, the difference is much smaller than predicted by theory. In the safety net game, subjects behave as if socially responsible for the losses they impose on the group. With repetition, nevertheless, a gradual emergence of the moral hazard problem arises. (JEL C9, D7, D8, H4, I1, I3)     

Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences

Much work in social choice theory takes individual preferences as uninvestigated inputs into aggregation functions designed to reflect considerations of fairness. Advances in experimental and behavioural economics show that fairness can also be an important motivation in the preferences of individuals themselves. A proper characterisation of how fairness concerns enter such preferences can enrich the informational basis of many social choice exercises. This paper proposes axiomatic foundations for individual fairness-motivated preferences that cover most of the models developed to rationalise observed behaviour in experiments. These models fall into two classes: Outcome-based models, which see preferences as defined only over distributive outcomes, and context-dependent models, which allow rankings over distributive outcomes to change systematically with non-outcome factors. I accommodate outcome-based and context-sensitive fairness concerns by modelling fairness-motivated preferences as a reference-dependent preference structure. I first present a set of axioms and two theorems that generate commonly used outcome-based models as special cases. I then generalise the axiomatic basis to allow for reference-dependence, and derive a simple functional form in which the weight on each person’s payoff depends on a reference vector of how much each person deserves.     

Network public goods with asymmetric information about cooperation preferences and network degree

We propose a game theoretical model of one-shot network public goods formalizing the ‘closure argument’ that cooperation is more frequent in denser groups or networks. Equilibrium analyses show that (i) an ‘inefficiency problem’ exists: players all preferring mutual cooperation need not all cooperate; (ii) in dyads, groups and networks with degree independence, first order stochastic dominance shifts of the distribution of cooperation preferences or the degree distribution (weakly) increases cooperation, and (iii) the latter result does not hold for networks with degree dependence. Hence the closure argument always holds in networks satisfying degree independence but not in other networks.     

Is a continuous rational social aggregation impossible on continuum spaces?

This paper provides a global topological setting for the social choice theory on continuum spaces of alternatives, in contrast to the local differentiable setting of Chichilnisky. Chichilnisky proved that a rational continuous social choice must be discontinuous in her setting. Our paper revisits her theorem to trace the source of this discontinuity. We find that the discontinuity is irrelevant to social aggregation, per se. The main theorem states that there exist a number of continuous social utility maps which are anonymous and satisfy the Pareto condition. As a corollary, we show that there exist corresponding continuous social welfare functions, if singularity is not separated from regular preferences in social preference topology. This extends the possibility result of Jonnes-Zhang-Simpson on linear preferences, to the general ones. The notion of singularity of preferences, relative to the given mathematical structure of an alternative space, is carefully studied.     

NETWORK STRUCTURE IN A LINK FORMATION GAME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In this article, we use an experiment to evaluate the performance of alternative refinements in a Myersonian link formation game with a supermodular payoff function. Our results show that a non‐cooperative refinement, the global games (GG) approach, outperforms alternative cooperative refinements (strong Nash equilibrium, coalition‐proof Nash equilibrium, and pairwise stable Nash equilibrium) in explaining the observed experimental behavior in the static game of complete information with three players. The results are robust to some comparative statics and the GG approach shows a high predictive power under incomplete information. However, under repeated interaction or with a greater number of players, the GG approach loses predictive power, but so do the cooperative refinements. The results illustrate the importance of coordination failure in practice and the need to design mechanisms to reduce this effect in practical decision‐making problems. (JEL C70, C92, D20, D44, D82)     

Bewertungsspiele. Von der Handlungs- zur Koordinationstheorie

Unsolved problems in the theory of action spread at the level of the coordination social activities. If action theories work with shortened “models of man” also the answers to questions about the possibility of social order, of hierarchie and of the cooperation on the market fall short of requirements. Goal attainment and social recognition are two widely disparate theoretical cornerstones on which hitherto separate theoretical buildings were raised. By contrast, a concept of the social game, which should be introduce here, connects the both moments: Games are goal-oriented interactions in which people recognize themselves mutually. The game player can recognize each other only in the sense that the game is normative regulated. The goal-orientation is thus normative broken. The social recognition is, however, relateled to and relativized by the game success. The theorem of the social game offers solutions to the problem of action coordination in the hierarchy and on the market.     

Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test

Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.     

Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity

The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter’s and the subjects’ models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We primarily focus on experiments designed to test a hypothesis by comparing behavior across two or more games and highlight the drawbacks of using a between-subjects design or a within subjects design. An alternative design for laboratory experiments is proposed which may alleviate this concern especially in studies of social preferences. We argue that the proposed design does not introduce any conceptual problems in addition to those that are already present in the between and within subjects designs and may alleviate some of the problems inherent to these designs in certain cases. We also use the proposed design to answer some questions that have attracted continued attention in the literature on social preferences in general and reciprocity in particular.     

Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of legislatures—most important, that legislators can change their vote after seeing how their fellow legislators have voted—then the only possible equilibrium is one where all legislators ignore their policy preferences. That is, each legislator votes as if he or she is not pivotal. The result, consistent with empirical studies of Congress, suggests that legislators should tend to vote sincerely, rather than sophisticatedly. In this paper we examine how outcomes change if we change the rules for voting. Namely, instead of a simultaneous game, we consider a game where legislators vote sequentially in a pre-determined order. We show that, opposite to the simultaneous game, an alternative wins if and only if a majority of legislators’ policy preferences favor that alternative. Our results suggest that if Congress adopted this change in rules, then sophisticated voting would become frequent instead of rare.     

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL

We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. (JEL C72, C91, D71, D83)     

The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games

 We characterize games which induce truthful revelation of the players’ preferences, either as dominant strategies (straightforward games) or in Nash equilibria. Strategies are statements of individual preferences on R ⁿ . Outcomes are social preferences. Preferences over outcomes are defined by a distance from a bliss point. We prove that g is straightforward if and only if g is locally constant or dictatorial (LCD), i.e., coordinate-wise either a constant or a projection map locally for almost all strategy profiles. We also establish that: (i) If a game is straightforward and respects unanimity, then the map g must be continuous, (ii) Straightforwardness is a nowhere dense property, (iii) There exist differentiable straightforward games which are non-dictatorial. (iv) If a social choice rule is Nash implementable, then it is straightforward and locally constant or dictatorial. Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996     

PERCEIVED GAME UNCERTAINTY,SUSPENSE AND THE DEMAND FOR SPORT

This study tries bridging between different behavioral economic explanations for the lack of support of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis in spectator sports. We test a measure of perceived game uncertainty that is comparable to objective measures frequently tested in the literature. Econometric results suggest that fans do not perceive closeness of a game differently than how economists have tended to measure it. However, fans' perceptions of suspensefulness are distinct from their perceptions of game uncertainty. Moreover, the finding that fans' preferences for game uncertainty are dominated by loss aversion also emerges—independently of fanship status—in our stated‐preference setting. (JEL L83, D12, Z2)     

Do today’s sociologists really appreciate Weber’s essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism?

It is noted that Max Weber is held in very high regard by the majority of contemporary sociologists, while his essay, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, is generally considered his most important as well as his most famous work. However attention is drawn to the marked contradiction between the practice of today’s sociologists in routinely heaping praise on this essay and the fact that their own self‐confessed theoretical statements constitute a direct rejection of Weber’s approach. This contradiction is illustrated by demonstrating that although The Protestant Ethic is essentially an examination of the role of motives in human action the concept of motive is effectively missing from contemporary sociology. A possible explanation for this apparent contradiction is then considered in the form of the claim that those theoretical positions favoured by contemporary sociologists could be considered as ‘developed out of’ or ‘descended from’ Weber’s theory of ‘motivational understanding’. This however is shown to be an untenable claim, given that the vocabulary of motives perspective, the treatment of motives as reasons, and rational choice theory all represent straightforward rejections of Weber’s position. Consequently it is concluded that there remains an unresolved and largely unrecognised contradiction between the iconic status accorded to Weber’s essay by contemporary sociologists and their own very obvious rejection of his theoretical approach.     

DO SOCIAL PREFERENCES INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY? FIELD EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM FISHERMEN IN TOYAMA BAY

In addition to showing that student measures of social preference, a concern for outcomes achieved by other reference agents, are quite different from those obtained in the field with participants who face social dilemmas in their daily lives, we find links between the social preferences of our field participants and their productivity at work. We also find that the field stock of social preferences evolves endogenously with respect to how widely team production is utilized. Because the link between productivity and social preference is strong, we provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take notice of social preferences. (JEL C93, D21, D24, H41, J24, M52, Z13)     

Assigning volunteer tasks: The relation between task preferences and functional motives of youth volunteers

In this paper we aim to explore the relationship between volunteer motives and task preferences in order to provide volunteer managers with better insight in how tasks can be assigned to keep youth volunteers satisfied. Earlier seminal contributions have either taken a pure functional approach – where various types of motives are supposed to be at the base of any type of volunteer work – or a differentiated approach, where particular motives relate to specific task preferences. However, empirical results reported in the literature do not justify the preference of one approach above the other. To investigate whether one of the approaches is superior, or whether a combination of both is more appropriate, we perform a canonical correlation analysis for a set of functional motives and a set of task preferences (N = 2158). Five distinct relationships (canonical variate pairs) of motives and preferences are found. Results show that a ‘functional basis’ exists where all motives relate to a basic set of tasks. Additionally, a more differentiated approach towards volunteer motives and task preferences has to be taken, as we find four other relationships where specific motives are satisfied by assigning particular sets of tasks.     

Game Theoretical Formulations of The Olson Problem*

Abstract This paper takes up one of the basic themes of Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press 1965). that is a group size as a cause of suboptimal provision of collective or public goods. A general framework is developed for classifying collective action situations involving public goods provisions. This framework focuses on the two characteristics: relations between contribution and provision, and rivalness or jointness in consumption of the collective goods. This framework distinguishes six types of collective actions, for each of which a game theoretical formulation is developed to obtain. models concerning social movements against (or for) new legislations, a petition for the recall of an official, a strike, lobbying, building a lighthouse, creation of a database, etc. These models, formulated either as an N-person chicken game or as an N-person prisoner's dilemma game. are examined with respect to how a group size affects non-cooperative equilibria and their Paretooptimality. There is no group size effect in the collective action situations formulated as an N-person chicken game, while large groups may suffer from suboptimal provision of the public goods in the collective action situations formulated as an N-person prisoner's dilemma game. Two types of the group size effect in N-person prisoner's dilemmas must be distinguished. In some cases. “no contribution” is the equilibrium regardless of the group size. but increase in the group size makes the equilibrium Pareto-deficient. In other cases, increase in the group size changes the equilibrium from the Pareto-efficient one with N contributors to the deficient one with no contributors.     

Huck Finn and the game model gloss

Several authors have cited the metaphor of game playing as an analytical device to study social behavior. Traditionally, the game model has been used either to promote a more strict or instrumental control upon actual social behavior or to match a formal game model construction of a social event with actual behavior in everyday life, and through this method shed light upon aspects which otherwise would be overlooked. In another connection, various authors have discussed the concept of glossing in social relations. This paper uses Mark Twain's last chapters ofThe Adventures of Huckleberry Finn to explicate how the game model can be used as a gloss. The game model gloss then is a unique combination of sociological conceptualizations presented through the medium of a lively literary allegory. We feel this paper extends the concept of glossing and furthers the understanding of the game metaphor in sociological theory.This paper has been presented at the Spring 1977 meetings of the Southern Sociological Society in Atlanta, Georgia.