SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND MACROECONOMIC (IN)STABILITY

This article examines the quantitative interrelations between sectoral composition of public spending and equilibrium (in)determinacy in a two‐sector real business cycle model with positive productive externalities in investment. When government purchases of consumption and investment goods are set as constant fractions of their respective sectoral output, we show that the public‐consumption share plays no role in the model's local dynamics, and that a sufficiently high public‐investment share can stabilize the economy against endogenous belief‐driven cyclical fluctuations. When each type of government spending is postulated as a constant proportion of the economy's total output, we find that there exists a trade‐off between public consumption versus investment expenditures to yield saddle‐path stability and equilibrium uniqueness. (JEL E32, E62, O41)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

Piketty's Calibration Economics: Inequality and the Dissolution of Solutions?

Abstract

By popularising interest in inequality, Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century has made a significant contribution. It has helped to change the basic terms of debate regarding wealth and income. However, Capital exhibits several weaknesses. The overall statement of Piketty's 3 laws tends to confuse the reader by conflating capital with all forms of wealth, and capital with the current market valuation of wealth assets. The whole creates a form of empiricism by metrics or calibration. The aggregation also lends itself to data as history rather than as historically grounded explanation of evidence. Concomitantly, it lacks a theorisation of capitalism, of power, of the state, of social movements, and of social transformations. This affects the way in which possible solutions to inequality are conceived. However, it does provoke further grounds for ethical counterargument productive of more progressive solutions to the problems it highlights.     

GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE WHEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN CAPITAL ARE COMPLEMENTS

This article presents a model of endogenous growth, in which a firm's technology and a country's human capital stock are complementary in the production of output. Production technologies are created by costly research and development (R&D) and are owned by firms that can freely choose where in the world to produce. Both production and R&D have a positive effect on a country's human capital stock. While all countries typically grow at the same rate in the long run, they differ in their levels of human capital, per capita output, and the quality of the technologies that are used in production. A country's relative position in terms of productivity is history dependent. Countries that start out with a lower human capital stock or industrialize later end up with a lower per capita GDP in long‐term equilibrium. (JEL O4, O33, O47)     

Material conditions and ideas in global history

Since the rise of a “scientific” historiography in the nineteenth century, the role of ideas in history versus that of material forces has been a key philosophical problem. Thomas Piketty's Capital and Ideology (2019), read as a work of global history, offers a provocative rehearsal of this question. On the one hand, the book is an attempt to provide a narrative historical frame for the hard data of the World Inequality Database. On the other, paradoxically, it offers a defiant conclusion that ideology is, or at least could be, the key driver in social and institutional change towards universal progress. St Simon, Comte and Spencer have found their twenty‐first century heir. How can we historicize Piketty's impetus, both understanding its provenance and making sense of its limitations? One key issue is its roots in the traditions of National Accounts, which leads to an approach to the global which is stresses comparison over connection, and to an uncritical reproduction of the portrait of an egalitarian non‐capitalist Twentieth century painted by Kuznets during the Cold War. Another is its presentism, with the historical argument driven by an attempt to understand the c.1980–2020 conjuncture and its alternatives, and a connected overdependence on the support of a few historians. A third, a consequence in part of the inequalities between the quality of data we have for different parts of the world, and of Piketty's provenance and imagined audience, is a Eurocentric, even Gallocentric approach. A fourth is a very French republican refusal to address how class is complicated by identities of race and nation so that neither egalitarian policies nor ideologies provide remedies for the populist politics of right. None of these criticisms are in contradiction with our view that Capital and Ideology is a work of social theory of world historical importance.     

THE TURKISH CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT

During the 2011–2015 period, Turkey's current account deficit as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was one of the largest among the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries. In this paper, we examine if this deficit can be considered optimal using the Engel and Rogers's approach. In this framework, the current account of a country is determined by the expected discounted present value of its future share of world GDP relative to its current share. A country whose income is anticipated to rise relative to the rest of the world is expected to borrow now and run a current account deficit. Our findings suggest that Turkey's current account deficit in 2015 may be considered optimal if the Turkish economy's share in the world economy could continue to grow at rates similar to the past or to the predictions from professional forecasts. The same approach, however, indicates that the current account deficit in 2011, at its peak, was unlikely to be optimal. (JEL F32, F41, F43)     

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH DEMOCRACY

We provide a test of the impact of voters' political ideology on economic growth and of the role of preferences for government size as a transmission channel. We focus on France from the beginning of its stable democratic experience in 1871. A move of voters' ideology to the right increases economic growth over the total observation period. However, the growth effect of ideology is mediated by voters' preferences for government size only during the post‐World War II period. For reverse causality concerns, we use the political ideology of other historical democracies as an instrument variable for France's ideology. (JEL E6, O43, H11)     

ON ENDOGENOUS BUSINESS CYCLES UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO VARIETY AND SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITY

We examine the theoretical as well as quantitative interrelations between endogenous business cycles, increasing returns to product variety and sector‐specific productive externalities within a two‐sector real business cycle model. In a calibrated version of our benchmark closed‐economy setting, the threshold level of investment externalities needed for equilibrium indeterminacy is found to be monotonically increasing in the degree of market competitiveness. We also study the model's local stability properties (i) when the parameters that govern the level of intermediate‐good producers' market power and the strength of variety effects are disentangled; and (ii) in the context of a small open economy. (JEL E30, E32, O41)     

BRAIN DRAIN IN GLOBALIZATION: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FROM THE SENDING COUNTRIES' PERSPECTIVE

According to the economic literature, high‐skilled emigration may either harm or benefit developing economies. Recent research highlighted several positive and negative channels through which the brain drain operates. This paper aims at evaluating the relative magnitudes of various brain drain channels and quantifying their global impact on migrants' sending countries. For this purpose, we develop a 10‐region general equilibrium model of the world economy characterized by overlapping‐generations dynamics. Our findings suggest that the short‐run impact of brain drain on resident human capital is extremely crucial, as it affects not only the number of high‐skilled workers available to domestic production, but also the sending economy's capacity to innovate/adopt modern technologies. This latter effect is particularly important in globalization, where capital investments are made in places with high production efficiencies. Hence, despite positive feedback effects, those countries facing prevalent high‐skilled emigration are the most candid victims to brain drain. (JEL F22, J24, O57)     

AN OPEN‐ECONOMY MODEL WITH MONEY,ENDOGENOUS SEARCH,AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper describes a new monetary open‐economy model where firms have market power due to search frictions in the goods market, and endogenous search effort by consumers mitigates this market power. The optimal inflation rate generally depends positively on the cost of search effort, the cost of firm entry, and the cost of trade. Higher inflation always improves a country's terms‐of‐trade against its trading partners. I also characterize a general class of matching processes which offer a novel approach to modeling firm sales. (JEL D43, E40, F12)     

Piketty comes to South Africa

One of the most valuable features of Capital and Ideology is its concern to take history seriously and consider how the emergence of different political and economic regimes relate to discourses about fairness and justice across time. This paper pushes this agenda further by acknowledging that the experience of a few developed nations should not be taken as the template for the generalized study of inequality dynamics across time and space. In this paper, we interrogate Piketty's analysis and policy proposals against specificities that are central to understanding the production and reproduction of inequalities within South Africa. We reflect on the South African case, the structure of inequality and its changes since 1994. We review a battery of policy interventions that have been implemented to address inequality in the last 25 years. We emphasize that the long shadow cast by centuries of colonialism and various forms of apartheid strongly affirm Piketty's emphasis on understanding history. But this is both affirmation and critique given the foundational, imbedded impact that this specific legacy has had on post‐apartheid society and its policies. Piketty is aware that the levels of inequality in South Africa are so high that this is “unknown territory.” We map out some of this territory to reveal how these extreme initial wealth and racial inequities inform the reproduction of inequalities in all dimensions and undermine well intentioned policies. We claim that understanding extractive histories, imbedded wealth inequalities, and complex social and political institutions allows us to understand and confront some of the reasons why even in light of progressive policies, many of which are in line with the proposals from Piketty, government interventions have thus far failed to reduce inequality.     

Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education,class, multiparty competition,and redistribution in Western Europe

In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty's Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty's core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that, as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today's party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left‐libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left‐libertarian and radical right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.     

HAPPINESS,GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY†

If society's goal is to increase people's feelings of well‐being, economic growth in itself will not do the job. Full employment and a generous and comprehensive social safety net do increase happiness. Such policies are arguably affordable not only in higher income nations but also in countries that account for most of the population of the less‐developed world. These conclusions are suggested by an analysis of a wide range of evidence on happiness in countries throughout the world. (JEL I31, I38, O21, F20, D60, E60)     

LABOR'S SHARE,THE FIRM'S MARKET POWER,AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

We investigate the relationship between labor's share, firm's market power, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor input using an approach based on an unobserved components model. The approach yields time‐varying estimates of market power and the elasticity. Evidence on the market power of firms (which we find to be rising since 2000) gives a deeper understanding of movements in labor's share and the labor wedge. The generated values of the elasticity yield revised estimates of total factor productivity growth which is informative about the extent of the downward bias inherent in traditional estimates which use labor's share as a proxy for the elasticity. (JEL O47, C32, E25)     

THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS AT GRADUATION ON OVEREDUCATION

This article shows that unfavorable economic conditions at graduation decrease the likelihood of a good job‐worker match over a worker's subsequent career. Mismatch is quantified in terms of overeducation by both industry and occupation. The German Socio‐Economic Panel and region‐level unemployment rates from 1994 to 2012 are used. Instrumental variables estimates account for endogenous graduation timing. A single percentage point increase in regional unemployment causes an increase in the probability of overeducation of 1.6–1.7 percentage points for university graduates. Effects for technical tertiary education and apprenticeship graduates are smaller. Labor market entry conditions affect workers for up to 9 years after graduation. (JEL J23, J22, E32, I23)     

MILITARY SPENDING AND THE GROWTH‐MAXIMIZING ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC CAPITAL: A CROSS‐COUNTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long‐run equilibrium and we derive the growth‐maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth‐maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). Then we proceed with an empirical investigation of the theoretical implication of the model that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long‐run growth rate are non‐linear, following an inverse U‐shaped pattern. Using data of public investment in infrastructure and military capital formation, we derive empirical estimations that confirm the theoretical implications of the model. (JEL E62, H56, O40).     

CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES AND MONETARY POLICY WITH LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION

This article explores the interaction between consumption externalities and limited asset market participation (LAMP) in the standard New‐Keynesian model. We assess the performance of simple Taylor‐type interest rate rules with respect to (a) equilibrium determinacy, (b) the model's ability to simultaneously generate output and inflation volatility similar to the pre‐Volcker era, and (c) the model's response to a technology shock. We find that when individual preferences are affected by average household consumption (Aggregate Consumption Externality), stronger externalities increase the range of LAMP for which multiple equilibria arise even if the policy rule satisfies the Taylor principle. The interaction of LAMP and externalities can generate vast inflation/output relative volatility in line with the one observed in the data in the 1970s. According to our analysis, consumption externalities also affect the responses of endogenous variables to total factor productivity shocks. (JEL E4, E5)     

Property,wealth, and social change: Piketty as a social science engineer

This paper applauds the vision and originality of Piketty's Capital and Ideology. We draw attention to the distinctive methodological perspective which he adopts, which we liken to call “social science engineering.” This allows a problem oriented perspective on long‐term global social change which sidesteps siloed disciplinary debates in social science and history about the meaning of modernity, the rise of capitalism, the formation of social groups, and the primacy of nations. We bring out how his theory of property permits him to take forward his overarching insight that economic growth leads to wealth accumulation. This, therefore, challenges long standing sociological perspectives by insisting that modernity is a conservative, rather than a revolutionary and transformative process. We build on this essential contribution by noting some areas where his work can push forward even further, notably that his focus on shifting relativities obscures qualitative historical changes, and more particularly means his analysis of the 20th century is not as provocative as that of the 19th century.     

IS PHYSICAL INVESTMENT THE KEY TO CHINA'S GROWTH MIRACLE?

This paper applies Jones' test for the empirical validity of AK‐type models to the Chinese economy over the period 1952–2006 (Jones C. I., Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1995a, 495–525). We aim to establish whether large permanent movements in the physical investment rate cause permanent movements in output growth. The evidence indicates that the one‐sector AK model cannot be rejected. We also find that augmenting the model to allow for transitional dynamics—via imbalances in factor endowments, structural transformation, and R&D‐based technology transfer—does a better job in describing China's growth dynamics than the basic AK model. (JEL C22, O41, O47)