TRADE,GEOGRAPHY AND THE SKILL PREMIUM IN U.S. MANUFACTURING

A number of studies have suggested that countries (or regions) with access to larger markets have higher wages. In this paper, we examine whether access to larger markets affects skilled and unskilled workers differently. We develop a model relating two key measures of market size, market and supplier access, to industry value added prices. We then estimate the effects of growth in these measures on factor returns in U.S. manufacturing industries between 1984 and 1996. We find that growth in these measures can explain around 5% of the rise in the skill premium over the sample period. (JEL F12, F16, L60)     

CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN

The years since 1994 have witnessed the emergence of market design as a new discipline within economics, in which research and practice exert powerful mutual influences in matching and auction markets. The problem of designing well‐functioning auction markets has led economic designers to revisit such fundamental issues as the definitions of commodities, the ways participants communicate with markets, the trade‐offs between the incentives provided for truthful reporting and other attributes of mechanism performance, and the determinants of the scope of markets, especially whether and how trade in different goods is linked. (JEL D44, C78)     

ESTIMATING MARKET POWER IN HOMOGENOUS PRODUCT MARKETS USING A COMPOSED ERROR MODEL: APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY MARKET

This study proposes a novel econometric approach to estimating market power in homogenous product markets. We use a composed error model to estimate the stochastic part of firms' strategic pricing equation. This part is formed by two random variables: a traditional error term, which captures random shocks, and a random conduct term, which measures the degree of market power. This approach allows for the conduct parameter to vary flexibly across firms and within firms over time, and avoids ad hoc structural restrictions for identifying firms' conduct. The empirical application of our approach is based on a well‐known California wholesale electricity market data set, which has been rigorously used to study market power. Our results suggest that realization of market power varies over both time and firms, and reject the assumption of a common or time‐invariant conduct parameter. (JEL C34, C51, L13, L94)     

THE IMPACT OF TRADE COSTS ON FIRM ENTRY,EXPORTING, AND SURVIVAL IN KOREA

This study examines how changes in trade costs have affected entry, exit, productivity, and exporting in the Korean manufacturing sector. We verify several predictions of heterogeneous‐firm models of international trade. For example, falling import‐trade costs are associated with less entry and lower market shares among existing domestic firms, and higher total factor productivity for Korean manufacturing as a whole. The size of firms plays an important role in many of our results. New domestic firms are more likely to be small, but large firms are less likely to exit and more likely to have an increase in total factor productivity. (JEL F10, D24)     

LOST IN THE MAIL: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CRIME

Stealing, shirking, and opportunistic behavior in general can create barriers to the development of markets. The costs associated with such behavior are shared by both firms and individuals and can be large enough to even prevent the initiation of trade. Measurement of these costs is difficult because information is not available for transactions that fail to occur. We use a field experiment to identify opportunistic crime in a task that is important and relevant for trade: the delivery of mail. We subtly manipulate the content and information available in mail sent to households across neighborhoods that vary by income, and detected high levels of shirking and stealing. Eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its destination, and significantly more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something additional inside the envelope. Our results demonstrate the importance of transaction costs created by crime and that not all populations are equally affected. Middle‐income neighborhoods suffer the most. (JEL C93, K42, H41, L87, O21)     

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE COSTS IN DEVIATIONS FROM THE LAW‐OF‐ONE‐PRICE: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE DIRECTION OF TRADE

The full impact of trade costs in segmenting product markets cannot be captured by considering aggregate prices or in the absence of information on the direction of trade. We address this problem by utilizing product‐specific prices, cross‐sectional productivity indices, and bilateral trade flows, allowing us to identify the probable source of any one product. We show that trade costs in the form of transportation and distribution costs are important in determining international price differences and segmenting international markets. Physical distance relative to the origin has a precisely estimated positive impact on international deviations from the Law‐of‐One‐Price that is larger than estimates that do not account for the origin of each product. Based on our benchmark estimates, the price elasticity of distance was around 10% in 1990. (JEL F4)     

A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: HETEROGENEOUS WELFARE AND MIGRATION EFFECTS FROM THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE BREXIT

We use a quantitative model to study the implications of European integration for welfare and net migration flows across 1,280 European regions. The model suggests that an increase of trade barriers to the level of 1957 reduces welfare by about 5%–8% on average, depending on the presumed trade elasticity. However, remote regions may face initial welfare losses of up to 10%. These heterogeneous welfare effects cause estimated net migration of 1.9% of the population to the European geographic center implying that the dismantling of trade barriers in Europe has led to a more homogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity. With regard to the Brexit, we find moderate welfare losses for the United Kingdom of 1.05% in the most pessimistic scenario while continental Europe's welfare declines by 0.41%. (JEL F15, R12, R13, R23)     

WHO (ELSE) BENEFITS FROM ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION? COAL PRICES,NATURAL GAS,AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Deregulation of major industries over the past 40 years has produced large efficiency gains. However, distributional effects have been more difficult to assess. In the electricity sector, deregulation has vastly increased information available to market participants through the formation of wholesale markets. We test whether upstream suppliers, specifically railroads that transport coal from mines to power plants, use this information to capture economic rents that would otherwise accrue to electricity generators. We find railroads charge higher markups when rents are larger. This effect is larger for deregulated plants, highlighting an important distributional impact of deregulation. (JEL L11, L51, Q48)     

THE HOME MARKET EFFECT IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE

I show that military spending contributes to international arms proliferation through a push effect: large demand encourages production growth in the domestic market if transport costs are non‐negligible. Under increasing returns to scale, the country can then supply weapons on the global market at low prices. This is a manifestation of the home market effect (HME), which states that countries with higher demand for a differentiated good will be net exporters of that good. I construct a monopolistic competition model of international trade that accounts for differences in demand across countries, and test its predictions using post‐Cold War data. (JEL F1, H5, R1)     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE COMPOSITION OF LABOR MARKET TURNOVER

The composition of labor market turnover is shown to influence patterns of international trade. Job and worker turnover have opposing marginal effects on industry export intensity, highlighting the importance of relative turnover shares on either side of the labor market, as opposed to total volumes of labor mobility, in shaping economic outcomes. Industries with relatively greater shares of worker turnover export more of total production, and those with higher job turnover export less. Furthermore, relatively high job turnover hinders industry adjustment following trade liberalization. These predictions receive support for U.S. manufacturing industries using turnover data in the Quarterly Workforce Indicators available from the U.S. Census Bureau. (JEL F16)     

AUCTIONS WITH RESALE OPPORTUNITIES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue‐efficiency trade‐off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer‐advantaged resale case. (JEL D44, C92)     

CAPACITY CONSTRAINED EXPORTERS: IDENTIFYING INCREASING MARGINAL COST

This study revisits a central assumption of standard trade models: constant marginal cost technology. The presence of increasing marginal costs for exporters introduces significant market interdependence across borders missing from traditional models of international trade that rely on constant marginal cost technology. Such market interdependence represents an additional channel through which local shocks are transmitted globally. To identify increasing marginal cost at the level of the firm, we build in flexible production assumptions that nest increasing, decreasing, and constant marginal cost technology to an otherwise standard international trade model. We derive an estimating equation that can be taken directly to the data. Our structural equation explicitly guides our inference on the shape of the marginal cost curve from estimated coefficients. The results suggest that increasing marginal cost is predominant at the firm level. Moreover, utilizing plant‐level information on physical and financial capacity constraints, we find that the degree of increasing marginal cost is significantly exacerbated by both types of constraints. The evidence suggests that access to larger markets through greater international integration may not have the expected welfare gains typically predicted in standard models. (JEL F12, F14)     

THE DURATION OF FIRM‐DESTINATION EXPORT RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN, 1997–2006

This article uses survival analysis to investigate the duration of Spanish firms' trade relationships by destination over 1997–2006. Whereas firm export status is highly persistent, firms' destination portfolio is very dynamic: a typical firm‐country exporting relationship has a median duration of 2 years. Yet, if a firm manages to export to a country beyond 2 years the risk of exiting that market sharply falls afterwards. The results indicate that not only firm heterogeneity but also destination heterogeneity are crucial to explain survival in export markets. In particular, country (political) risk heavily shapes the effect of firm, product, and other destination characteristics on the length of trade relationships. Whereas firm productivity, comparative advantage, partners' GDP, and proximity enhance duration of trade with low‐risk countries, they have no effect on trade survival with high‐risk countries. On the contrary, information spillovers are particularly relevant to enhance survival of trade relationships with high‐risk countries. (JEL C41, F10, F14)     

TOXIC NEIGHBORS: FORECLOSURES AND SHORT‐SALES SPILLOVER EFFECTS FROM THE CURRENT HOUSING‐MARKET CRASH

Do home foreclosures and short sales equally affect neighbors? On average, no‐default homes sell anytime up to 6 months after sales of foreclosed neighbors suffer a cumulative spillover effect of about 10%. Including the market trend, the total effect increases to 40%. Controlling for foreclosure effects, short sales do not produce additional spillover effects. We apply a modified hedonic model to estimate spillover effects on neighbors, using January 2008 to June 2009 home transactions from one of the most impacted housing markets. Our findings apply to severely “thin” markets and may not be true for stable markets. We show that accurate estimates of spillover effects require correcting for the market trend, two types of time and spatial price interdependence, and the endogenous neighborhood price. (JEL R21, R22, R31, K2)     

FINANCIAL CONTAGION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE NETWORK

We combine data on international trade linkages with a network approach to map the global trading system as an interdependent complex network. This enables us to obtain indicators of how well connected a country is into the global trading system. We use these network‐based measures of connectedness to explain stock market returns during recent episodes of financial crisis. We find that a crisis is amplified if the epicenter country is better integrated into the trade network. However, target countries affected by such a shock are in turn better able to dissipate the impact if they are well integrated into the network. A network approach can help explain why the Mexican, Asian, and Russian financial crises were highly contagious, while the crises that originated in Venezuela and Argentina did not have such a virulent effect. We suggest that a network approach incorporating the cascading and diffusion of interdependent ripples when a shock hits a specific part of the global trade network provides us with an improved explanation of financial contagion. (JEL F10, F36, F40, G15)     

INTERNAL COCAINE TRAFFICKING AND ARMED VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA

This paper exploits time variations in international cocaine prices and potential trafficking routes within Colombia to estimate the effect of the illegal cocaine trade on changes in municipality homicide rates. I construct the potential internal cocaine-trafficking network and exploit the fact that different regions in Colombia have comparative advantages in serving different international markets. My results suggest that when cocaine prices increase in either the United States or Europe, homicide rates increase in municipalities strategically placed to serve each international market. (JEL D74, K42, F19)     

THE WELFARE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION

This paper analyzes the distributional welfare impact of trade liberalization reforms on heterogeneous households. We develop a static applied general equilibrium model, and using a Social Accounting Matrix and Household Expenditure Survey, we calibrate it to match Slovenian data. We simulate the case of Slovenia joining the EU and quantify its welfare impact on households that differ in terms of age, income, and education. Additionally, we compare this benchmark case with two alternative scenarios: (1) a free trade agreement between Slovenia and the EU and (2) a custom union arrangement where tariff revenues are rebated proportionally to the households. We find that while trade liberalization leads to falling consumer prices, increased production in the export sectors, and aggregate welfare gains, the differentiated welfare impacts across heterogeneous households vary in their degrees. (JEL D58, F14, F15)     

STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST‐VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS

By restricting bidders to be qualified dealers, wholesale automobile auctions exclude the bidders who place the highest value on the vehicles: consumers. This article provides an explanation for this puzzling entry restriction by modeling the inventory‐management decisions of a firm. If an automobile dealer has more vehicles in inventory than is optimal, it cannot reduce its inventory by selling directly to consumers without impacting the demand for the automobiles that remain. However, if the dealer sells his/her excess inventory to a competitor, the demand for his/her remaining vehicles increases as the competitor responds by acquiring fewer additional vehicles. We demonstrate that for any market demand function and any cost of the competitor acquiring additional vehicles, a dealer with excess inventory does better by selling a subset of its vehicles to a competitor rather than directly to consumers. We discuss the market for wholesale automobiles in relation to other markets where goods are also auctioned but where entry is not restricted to qualified dealers. Doing so allows us to compare our inventory‐management explanation to common explanations provided by industry practitioners. We find that intuitive alternative stories do not consistently explain practices across markets. (JEL D44, L11, L62)     

FIRM PRODUCTIVITY AND SALES DESTINATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM WITHIN CHINA

This paper builds on and extends the literature on the linkage between firm productivity and their export destinations to study the productivity of Chinese firms and their sales destinations in other provinces within China. Moving the study from international markets to domestic markets conveniently avoids the hard to control heterogeneity across different destination markets in international trade, as provincial markets within China are less heterogeneous than international markets but segmented by Chinese provincial borders. The paper explicitly controls the fact that many firms only sell in their home provinces by using the zero‐inflated negative binomial method. It finds that firms with higher productivity tend to sell in other provincial markets, and more productive firms enter more provincial markets. The results are robust. (JEL F15, D21, D24)     

Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets

We analyze markets in which the price of a traded commodity is such that the supply and the demand are unequal. Under standard assumptions, the agents then have single peaked preferences on their consumption or production choices. For such markets, we propose a class of Uniform trade rules each of which determines the volume of trade as the median of total demand, total supply, and an exogenous constant. Then these rules allocate this volume “uniformly” on either side of the market. We evaluate these “trade rules” on the basis of some standard axioms in the literature. We show that they uniquely satisfy Pareto optimality, strategy proofness, no-envy, and an informational simplicity axiom that we introduce. We also analyze the implications of anonymity, renegotiation proofness, and voluntary trade on this domain.