THE MATCHING OF HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND POLITICIANS

We use a Chinese firm‐director panel dataset to examine the matching of heterogeneous firms and politicians. On the basis of 36,308 detailed biographies, we identify individuals who previously held bureaucratic positions and classify the rank of each position in the Chinese political hierarchy. Using this direct measure of political capital, we examine how firms with heterogeneous productivity match politicians with different political strength. Our results indicate a positive assortative matching in the political capital market. More productive firms are paired with more powerful politicians. Furthermore, the preference for political capital relative to conventional human capital increases in firms' dependence on external financing and the inefficiency of local governments. Conditional on the endogenous matching, new hires with political capital receive more compensation than their co‐workers in the same cohort. The marginal effect of a one‐step rise on the political ladder significantly exceeds the marginal effect of raising education attainment from, for example, high school to college. (JEL D21, D73, J24, J31, O12)     

ON GENDER GAPS AND SELF‐FULFILLING EXPECTATIONS: ALTERNATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF PAID‐FOR TRAINING

This paper presents a model of self‐fulfilling expectations by firms and households which generates multiplicity of equilibria in pay and housework time allocation for ex‐ante identical spouses. Multiplicity arises from statistical discrimination exerted by firms in the provision of paid‐for training to workers, rather than from incentive problems in the labor market. Employers' beliefs about differences in spouses' reactions to housework shocks lead to symmetric (ungendered) and asymmetric (gendered) equilibria. We find that: (1) the ungendered equilibrium tends to prevail as aggregate productivity in the economy increases (regardless of the generosity of family aid policies), (2) the ungendered equilibrium could yield higher welfare under some scenarios, and (3) gender‐neutral job subsidies are more effective that gender‐targeted ones in removing the gendered equilibrium. (JEL J16, J70, J71)     

UNEMPLOYMENT AND OTHER MEASURES OF LABOR MARKET INEFFICIENCY: A COMPARISON OF U.K. AND U.S. LABOR MARKETS 1931–96

Although unemployment is often used as a measure of labor market inefficiency, economic theory indicates that market inefficiency is determined by both the gap between and the elasticities of supply and demand. Using time series data for the United States and United Kingdom, this article investigates how good the unemployment rate is as a measure of labor market inefficiency by calculating the deadweight loss associated with unemployment rates over time. Results show that the loss arising from unemployment is low across time and countries and that the unemployment rate is often a weak proxy for comparing labor market inefficiency. (JEL J6 )     

ROUTINIZATION‐BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION: UNDERSTANDING LABOR MARKET POLARIZATION

There is now ample evidence that jobs and wages have been polarizing at the extremes of the skill distribution since the early 1990s. Possible explanations include, among others, routinization‐biased technical change (technical progress substituting more easily for labor in performing routine rather than nonroutine tasks) and globalization (more specifically, offshore outsourcing by multinational firms). In this article, we develop a unified theoretical general equilibrium model and examine the implications of each competing hypotheses for labor market polarization. (JEL J21, J23, J24, F66)     

Induced inefficiency as a response to the union threat

Milkman and Mitchell (1995) extend Rosen’s (1969) threat-effect hypothesis to suggest that the threat of unionization can induce inefficient underutilization of labor by nonunion firms. If firms follow this strategy, the apparent paradox of competitive coexistence in the face of higher union wages reflects induced nonunion firm inefficiency rather than superior union firm efficiency. Furthermore, this strategy decreases demand for nonunion workers in a partially unionized industry. A generalized cost function analysis of data from sawmills in the Pacific Northwest yields evidence that nonunion firms use this strategy.     

PAYING MORE TO HIRE THE BEST? FOREIGN FIRMS,WAGES, AND WORKER MOBILITY

In the context of the debate on the labor‐market consequences of globalization, we adopt an original approach toward the identification of the wage differences between foreign and domestic firms: worker mobility. Using matched employer‐employee panel data for Portugal, we consider virtually all spells of interfirm mobility over a period of 10 yr. We find that foreign firms offer significantly more generous wage policies, although there is also a (smaller) selection effect. The results are robust to the consideration of displaced workers, wage growth differences in the new firms, and different subsets of workers. (JEL J31, J63, F23)     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

INFORMAL LABOR MARKETS AND ON‐THE‐JOB TRAINING: EVIDENCE FROM WAGE DATA

This study examines whether informal sector jobs are a source of training for young less‐educated workers. Controlling for worker and job characteristics, it is found that, in the early years of workers' careers in Mexico, wage growth in the informal sector is higher than in the formal sector. This result is consistent with general human capital investment on‐the‐job if the informal labor market is more competitive than the formal labor market due to frictions generated by labor regulations. (JEL O17, J24, J310)     

On-the-Job Search,Mismatch and Worker Heterogeneity

This paper empirically examines the search behavior of currently employed workers to understand changes in on-the-job search across different types of employed individuals and varying labor market conditions. Using data from the American Time Use Survey, we estimate the responsiveness of workers with varying levels of productivity and job-match quality to regional labor market conditions. We find that those workers who are less-productive, mismatched in their current position, and high-productivity, mismatched workers are more likely to engage in search than other workers. These results have implications for models built on job mismatch, as well as for models seeking to explain increasing inequality and wage dispersion.     

Employer Incentives for Providing Informal On-the-job Training in the Presence of On-the-job Search

We analyze the provision of informal general training in a frictional labor market in which employers cannot commit to training levels and workers cannot commit to stay. We demonstrate that employers’ training decisions are driven by both an investment motive, to improve productivity, and a compensation motive, to increase employee retention. The investment motive decreases with higher wages, while the compensation motive increases. In our calibration exercises, the former dominates, which creates a negative relationship between wages and training. Furthermore, in contrast to recent studies missing the compensation motive, lessening the search frictions raises overall training levels due to enhanced compensation motives, approaching Becker’s result for a frictionless labor market.     

Jacob Mincer,Experience and the Distribution of Earnings

This paper reviews Jacob Mincer's contributions to the analyses of earnings and the distribution of earnings through his pioneering focus on labor market experience or on-the-job training. It begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on the distribution of earnings in the pre-Mincer period, and then discusses his analysis of human capital and earnings developed in his 1957 doctoral dissertation and 1958 Journal of Political Economy (JPE) article. Further analyses of on-the-job training, and in particular estimates of the rate of return from on-the-job training, are presented in his 1962 JPE paper. The synergy between Mincer and Becker during the 1960s is discussed, as is the development of the schooling-earnings function by Gary S. Becker and Barry R. Chiswick (1966). Jacob Mincer extended this relationship by incorporating experience to form the human capital earnings function in his Schooling, Experience and Earnings (1974). Subsequent modifications, extensions, tests of robustness and the wide applicability of the human capital earnings function are presented.     

EXTENSIVE SEARCH, INTENSIVE SEARCH, AND HIRING COSTS: NEW EVIDENCE ON EMPLOYER HIRING ACTIVITY

This paper presents recent evidence on employer search to fill a position. A 1982 employer survey sponsored by the National Institute of Education and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education provides the basis for analyzing employer search and hiring costs. The paper examines the effects of such factors as employer size, dismissal costs, unionization, on-the-job training, adjustment costs, capital, and labor market conditions on intensive employer search, extensive employer search, and hiring costs. Intensive employer search is measured by the average number of hours the employer spends recruiting, screening, and interviewing per applicant. Extensive search is measured by the number of applicants seen per applicant interviewed and the number interviewed per employment.     

LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION AND LOSS OF SKILL

We examine the impact of discrimination on labor market performance when workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during an unemployment experience. Within a search and matching framework, we show that both natives and immigrants are affected by discrimination. Discrimination in one sector has positive spillovers, inducing employment to increase in the other sector and the effect on labor market performance therefore depends on whether discrimination is present in only one sector or in both. Discrimination may induce workers to train more or less than natives after having lost their skills, dependent upon in which sector there is discrimination. Net output tends to be most negatively affected by discrimination among high‐skilled workers. (JEL J15, J31, J61, J64, J71)     

A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labor market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly nonlinear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence. (JEL E32, J41)     

SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO? CAREER CHOICES FOR YOUNG WORKERS IN LATIN AMERICA

This paper presents the first estimates of the returns to formal labor market experience and tenure in a developing country context. We take advantage of rich matched employer–employee data from Brazil and Chile, exploiting job displacement as a source of identification. We find positive returns to both dimensions in these countries, with larger returns to tenure in Brazil and larger returns to experience in Chile. Our findings suggest the more rigid Brazilian labor legislation may encourage firms to invest in young workers' specific skills. Chile's institutions, on the contrary, might promote the acquisition of general skills. (JEL J24, J31, M50)     

EMPLOYMENT AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS EFFECTS OF OBSERVED NONWAGE LABOR COSTS

To assess the employment effects of labor costs, it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm‐worker data set, we estimate a long‐run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security and income tax). We find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers' contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%. (JEL J23, J32)     

HYSTERESIS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper provides a simple, tractable way of incorporating “hysteresis,” in which persistent unemployment takes on structural characteristics, into a macroeconomic model. Hysteresis is modeled as deterioration in labor market matching efficiency as the average duration of unemployment increases. This is embedded in a basic New Keynesian macro model. A decline in labor market matching efficiency would be consistent with the observed rightward shift of the Beveridge curve since the 2007–2009 recession. Hysteresis is shown to lead to larger and more persistent responses of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration to productivity, intertemporal preference, and monetary shocks. Hysteresis also generates an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. (JEL E24, J64, E32)     

THE CONSEQUENCES OF (DE)REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long‐term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long‐term employment can result either from offering long‐term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching. Treatments differ in how regulations restrict the employer's flexibility in adapting the employment contract. All treatments allow for longer contract duration as well as for mutually opting to be rematched. Effort is chosen by employees after a contract is concluded. Treatments vary from no contract flexibility to no restriction at all. Will more (downward) flexibility be used in ongoing employment but reduce labor market efficiency? And will regulation crowd out long‐term employment, in the form of long‐term contracts or voluntary rematching? (JEL C72, C90, F16, J21, J24, L10)     

LEARNING BUT NOT EARNING? THE IMPACT OF JOB CORPS TRAINING ON HISPANIC YOUTH

Why did Hispanics who participated in Job Corps (JC) training not experience earnings gains like whites and blacks, despite achieving similar human capital gains? We find that the differential labor market outcomes of each group are related to the different levels of local labor market unemployment rates (LUR) they face. Furthermore, the groups exhibit differential impacts on their earnings from the LUR they face, which also vary by randomization status. We find that (a) blacks and Hispanics face higher LUR that mitigate their potential gains from JC and (b) JC “shields” whites from adverse LUR, but not blacks and Hispanics. (JEL J24, J13, J15)     

MODELING INFORMALITY FORMALLY: HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS

Informality is widespread in most developing countries. In Latin America, 50% of salaried employees work informally. Three stylized facts characterize informality: (1) small firms tend to operate informally while large firms tend to operate formally; (2) unskilled workers tend to be informal while skilled ones have formal jobs; (3) ceteris paribus, secondary workers (a worker other than the household head) are less likely to operate formally than primary workers. We develop a model that accounts for all these facts. In our model, both heterogeneous firms and workers have preferences over the sector they operate and choose optimally whether to function formally or informally. There are two labor markets, one formal and the other informal, and both firms and workers act unconstrained in them. By contrast, a prominent feature of the preexisting literature is that workers' decisions play no role in determining the equilibrium of the economy. In our model, policies that reduce the supply of workers in the informal labor market at given wages will increase the level of formality in the economy. This has noteworthy implications for the design of social programs in developing countries. We also show that an increase in the participation of secondary workers would tend to raise the level of informality in the economy. (JEL J24, J33)