On the consistency of choice

Consistency of choice is a fundamental and recurring theme in decision theory, social choice theory, behavioral economics, and psychological sciences. The purpose of this paper is to study the consistency of choice independent of the particular decision model at hand. Consistency is viewed as an inherently logical concept that is fundamentally void of connotation and is thus disentangled from traditional rationality or consistency conditions imposed on decision models. The proposed formalization of consistency takes two forms: internal consistency, which refers to the property that a choice model does not generate contradictory statements; and semantic consistency, which refers to the idea that a theory’s predictions are valid with respect to some observed data. In addressing semantic consistency, the relationship between theory and data is analyzed in terms of so-called duality mappings, which allow a passage between the two universes in a way that consistency is preserved. The formalization of consistency concepts relies on adapting the revealed preference theory to the context-dependent setting. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the proposed framework and how it relates to classical revealed preference theory and other formalizations of the relationship between the theory and reality of choice.     

Multiple-Stage Decision-Making: The Effect of Planning Horizon Length on Dynamic Consistency

Many decisions involve multiple stages of choices and events, and these decisions can be represented graphically as decision trees. Optimal decision strategies for decision trees are commonly determined by a backward induction analysis that demands adherence to three fundamental consistency principles: dynamic, consequential, and strategic. Previous research (Busemeyer et al. 2000, J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 129, 530) found that decision-makers tend to exhibit violations of dynamic and strategic consistency at rates significantly higher than choice inconsistency across various levels of potential reward. The current research extends these findings under new conditions; specifically, it explores the extent to which these principles are violated as a function of the planning horizon length of the decision tree. Results from two experiments suggest that dynamic inconsistency increases as tree length increases; these results are explained within a dynamic approach–avoidance framework. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Dynamic Choice and NonExpected Utility

This paper explores how some widely studied classes of nonexpected utility models could be used in dynamic choice situations. A new "sequential consistency" condition is introduced for single-stage and multi-stage decision problems. Sequential consistency requires that if a decision maker has committed to a family of models (e.g., the multiple priors family, the rank-dependent family, or the betweenness family) then he use the same family throughout. Conditions are presented under which dynamic consistency, consequentialism, and sequential consistency can be simultaneously preserved for a nonexpected utility maximizer. An important class of applications concerns cases where the exact sequence of decisions and events, and thus the dynamic structure of the decision problem, is relevant to the decision maker. It is shown that for the multiple priors model, dynamic consistency, consequentialism, and sequential consistency can all be preserved. The result removes the argument that nonexpected utility models cannot be consistently used in dynamic choice situations. Rank-dependent and betweenness models can only be used in a restrictive manner, where deviation from expected utility is allowed in at most one stage.     

The Use of Base Rate Information as a Function of Experienced Consistency

Three experiments examine the effect of base rate consistency under direct experience. Base rate consistency was manipulated by blocking trials and setting base rate choice reinforcement to be either consistent or inconsistent across trial blocks. Experiment 1 shows that, contrary to the usual finding, participants use base rate information more than individuating information when it is consistent, but less when it is inconsistent. In Experiment 2, this effect was replicated, and transferred in verbal questions posed subsequently. Despite experience with consistent base rates increasing sensitivity to base rates in word problems, verbal responses were far from normative. In Experiment 3, participants’ use of base rates was once again moderated by its consistency, but this effect was itself moderated by the diagnosticity of base rate information. Participants were highly accurate in estimating experienced base rates. These studies demonstrate that base rate usage is complex and a function of how base rates are presented (experienced versus summary statistics) and response format (choice proportions versus probability estimates). Knowledge of base rates was insufficient for proper usage in verbal word problems. Although choice proportions showed a sophisticated sensitivity to experienced base rate information, participants seemed unable to demonstrate a similar sophistication when given typical word problems indicating that base rate neglect is a function of information representation and not an inherent processing bias.     

Negotiation and Defeasible Decision Making

In economically meaningful interactions negotiations are particularly important because they allow agents to improve their information about the environment and even to change accordingly their own characteristics. In each step of a negotiation an agent has to emit a message. This message conveys information about her preferences and endowments. Given that the information she uses to decide which message to emit comes from beliefs generated in previous stages of the negotiation, she has to cope with the uncertainty associated with them. The assessment of the states of the world also evolves during the negotiation. In this paper we analyze the intertwined dynamics of beliefs and decision, in order to determine conditions on the agents that allow them to reach agreements. The framework for decision making we consider here is based on defeasible evaluation of possibilities: an argument for a choice defeats another one if it is based on a computation that better uses all the available information.     

Context dependence and consistency in dynamic choice under uncertainty: the case of anticipated regret

We examine if and to what extent choice dispositions can allow dependence on contexts and maintain consistency over time, in a dynamic environment under uncertainty. We focus on one of the context dependence properties, opportunity dependence because of being affected by anticipated regret, where the consequentialist choice framework is maintained. There are two sources of potential inconsistency: one is arrival of information, and the other is changing opportunities. First, we go over the general method of resolution of potential inconsistency, by taking any kinds of inconsistency as given constraints. Second, we characterize a class of choice dispositions that are consistent to information arrival, but may be inconsistent to changing opportunities. Finally, we consider the overall requirement of dynamic consistency and show that it necessarily implies each of consistency to information arrival and independence of choice opportunities. The last result states that the two kinds of potential inconsistency cannot “compensate” each other to recover dynamic consistency overall.     

Local utility functions

In Machina's approach to generalised expected utility theory, decision makers maximise a choice functional which is smooth but not linear in the probabilities. When evaluating small changes, the choice functional can be approximated by the expectation of a local utility function. This local utility function is not however invariant under large changes in risk. This paper gives a simple explicit formula which can be used to write down the local utility functions of some common decision rules.     

Constraints and the Measurement of Freedom of Choice

This paper introduces considerations about constraints in the construction of measures of an agent's freedom. It starts with motivating the exercise from both the philosophical and the informational point of view. Then it presents two rankings of opportunity sets based on information about the extent of options and the constraints that a decision maker faces. The first ranking measures freedom as variety of choice; the second as non-restrictedness in choice.     

A representation of preferences by the Choquet integral with respect to a 2-additive capacity

In the context of Multiple criteria decision analysis, we present the necessary and sufficient conditions allowing to represent an ordinal preferential information provided by the decision maker by a Choquet integral w.r.t a 2-additive capacity. We provide also a characterization of this type of preferential information by a belief function which can be viewed as a capacity. These characterizations are based on three axioms, namely strict cycle-free preferences and some monotonicity conditions called MOPI and 2-MOPI.     

Behavioral patterns and reduction of sub-optimality: an experimental choice analysis

This paper attempts to identify behavioral patterns and compare their average success considering several criteria of bounded rationality. Experimentally observed choice behavior in various decision tasks is used to assess heterogeneity in how individual participants respond to 15 randomly ordered portfolio choices, each of which is experienced twice. Treatments differ in (not) granting probability information and in (not) eliciting aspirations. Since in our setting neither other regarding concerns nor risk attitude matter and probability of the binary chance move is (optimal) choice irrelevant, categorizing decision types relies on parameter dependence and choice adaptations. We find that most participants reduce systematically sub-optimality when following the identified criteria.     

Instrumental rationality and cognitive rationality

Beside instrumental rationality, concerned with consistency between available means and pursued objectives, cognitive rationality, concerned with consistency between current beliefs and detained information, is nowadays bursting in economic theory. For an individual decision, the two notions are expressed structurally in similar forms, but they heavily interact in the deliberation process, especially when the agent is searching relevant information on his environment and his own determiners. In a game framework, the players' representations are formalized in a more and more sophisticated way, and are closely interwoven with their preferences in contemporary equilibrium notions as well as in selection between corresponding equilibrium points.     

Emotional decision-makers and anomalous attitudes towards information

We use a simple version of the Psychological Expected Utility Model (Caplin and Leahy, Q J Econ 116:55–80, 2001) to analyze the optimal choice of information accuracy by an individual who is concerned with anticipatory feeling. The individual faces the following trade-off: on the one hand information may lead to emotional costs, on the other the higher the information accuracy, the higher the efficiency of decision-making. We completely and explicitly characterize how anticipatory utility depends on information accuracy, and study the optimal amount of information acquisition. We obtain simple and explicit conditions under which the individual prefers no-information or partial information gathering. We show that anomalous attitudes towards information can be more frequent and articulated than previously thought.     

What can the regression model of human judgment learn from multi-attribute decision theory?

Zeleny's recent conjecture that multi-attribute decision theory may help to overcome the inadequacies of the linear regression model is incorrect. Recognition of the information processing advantages inherent in multiple -attribute decision situations combined with a requirement of transitivity itself implies linear objective functions. This follows from some recent developments by a psychologist and an economist in the analysis of individual and collective decision processes, developments which do not take as their starting point the paradigm of choice offered in utility theory.     

现代国有企业制度与管理层的外部选择

政府对国有企业管理层的外部选择既不是现代国有企业制度不完善的表现,也不可能取代国有企业的制度改革,相反,外部选择和现代企业制度特别是企业治理结构都是保证国有企业性质和绩效不可或缺的有机组成部分.只有二者形成事前选择与事后监督的动态制约体系,才能克服国有企业中的制度失灵和管理者行为的不一致性问题.事实表明,国有企业管理者行为的不一致的原因主要在于国有企业制度不完善,因而改正的办法是深化制度改革,而不是简单地代之以强化外部选择.     

Revealed preference and linear utility

We study a Linear Axiom of Revealed Preference (LARP) that characterizes the consistency of a choice function with respect to a preference order satisfying the independence axiom. In addition, LARP characterizes lexicographic linear utility rationality when the choice space is a convex subset of a finite-dimensional real vector space, and LARP characterizes linear utility rationality when the choice space corresponds to a finite choice experiment.     

Education and anomalies in decision making: Experimental evidence from Chinese adult twins

We estimate the effects of education on two dimensions of decision making behavior—risk and time—beyond those considered to be normal-ranged to encompass behavioral anomalies with respect to expected utility as well as time consistency. We conduct a number of incentivized choice experiments on Chinese adult twins to measure decision making behavior, and use a within-twin-pair fixed-effects estimator to deal with unobservable family-specific effects. The estimation results show that a higher education level tends to reduce the degree of risk aversion towards moderate prospects, moderate hazards, and longshot prospects. For anomalies under risk and uncertainty, college graduates exhibit significantly more Allais-type behavior compared to high school dropouts, while high school graduates exhibit more ambiguity aversion as well as a familiarity preference relative to high school dropouts. For decision making involving time, a higher education level tends to reduce the degree of impatience, and to reduce behavioral anomalies including hyperbolic discounting, dread, and hopefulness. The experimental observations suggest that people with a higher education level tend to exhibit more behavioral anomalies in risk attitudes but fewer behavioral anomalies involving time, hence implying that education has multi-functions in preference formation and human capability building. This study contributes to the understanding of the nature of these behavioral anomalies and the roles of education in human decision making.     

Incorporating Framing into Prospect Theory Modeling: A Mixture-Model Approach

This paper illustrates the use of a statistical technique, finite mixture models, to fit the parameters in cumulative prospect theory. For a given decision, some individuals may adopt a gain frame, while others may adopt a loss frame. By using finite mixture models, the best fitting parameters can be obtained for the two subgroups, even though the information about subjective frames was not available. Our application uses two health insurance survey datasets collected by Rand and Chinese State Natural Science Foundation, respectively. The results are compared with previous studies on framing effects and parameterizations of prospect theory.     

Even Risk-Averters may Love Risk

A decision maker bets on the outcomes of a sequence of coin-tossings. At the beginning of the game the decision maker can choose one of two coins to play the game. This initial choice is irreversible. The coins can be biased and the player is uncertain about the nature of one (or possibly both) coin(s). If the player is an expected-utility maximizer, her choice of the coin will depend on different elements: the nature of the game (namely, whether she can observe the outcomes of the previous tosses before making her next decision), her utility function, the prior distribution on the bias of the coin. We will show that even a risk averter might optimally choose a riskier coin when learning is allowed. We will express most of our results in the language of stochastic orderings, allowing comparisons that are valid for large classes of utility functions.