Eliciting decision weights by adapting de Finetti’s betting-odds method to prospect theory

This paper extends de Finetti’s betting-odds method for assessing subjective beliefs to ambiguous events. Thus, a tractable manner for measuring decision weights under ambiguity is obtained. De Finetti’s method is so transparent that decision makers can evaluate the relevant tradeoffs in complex situations. The resulting data can easily be analyzed, using nonparametric techniques. Our extension is implemented in an experiment on predicting next-day’s performance of the Dow Jones and Nikkei stock indexes, where we test the existence and nature of rank dependence, finding usual patterns. We also find violations of rank dependence.

Preferences and decision errors in the winner’s curse

The problem of asymmetric information causes a winner’s curse in many environments. Given many unsuccessful attempts to eliminate it, we hypothesize that some people ‘prefer’ the lotteries underlying the winner’s curse. Study 1 shows that after removing the hypothesized cause of error, asymmetric information, half the subjects still prefer winner’s curse lotteries, implying past efforts to de-bias the winner’s curse may have been more successful than previously recognized since subjects prefer these lotteries. Study 2 shows risk-seeking preferences only partially explain lottery preferences, while non-monetary sources of utility may explain the rest. Study 2 suggests lottery preferences are not independent of context, and offers methods to reduce the winner’s curse.

Correction to: Optimality of deductible: a characterization,with application to Yaari’s dual theory

Theory and Decision -     

Optimality of deductible: a characterization,with application to Yaari’s dual theory

Theory and Decision - The main purpose of this paper is to show that left-monotone risk aversion, a meaningful refinement of strong risk aversion, characterizes decision makers for whom deductible...     

On Hobbes’s state of nature and game theory

Hobbes’s state of nature is often analyzed in two-person two-action non-cooperative games. By definition, this literature only focuses on duels. Yet, if we consider general games, i.e., with more than two agents, analyzing Hobbes’s state of nature in terms of duel is not completely satisfactory, since it is a very specific interpretation of the war of all against all. Therefore, we propose a definition of the state of nature for games with an arbitrary number of players. We show that this definition coincides with the strategy profile considered as the state of nature in two-person games. Furthermore, we study what we call rational states of nature (that is, strategy profiles which are both states of nature and Nash equilibria). We show that in rational states of nature, the utility level of any agent is equal to his maximin payoff. We also show that rational states of nature always exist in inessential games. Finally, we prove the existence of states of nature in a class of (not necessarily inessential) symmetric games.     

Three pseudo-paradoxes in ‘quantum’ decision theory: Apparent effects of observation on probability and utility

In quantum domains, the measurement (or observation) of one of a pair of complementary variables introduces an unavoidable uncertainty in the value of that variable's complement. Such uncertainties are negligible in Newtonian worlds, where observations can be made without appreciably disturbing the observed system. Hence, one would not expect that an observation of a non-quantum probabilistic outcome could affect a probability distribution over subsequently possible states, in a way that would conflict with classical probability calculations. This paper examines three problems in which observations appear to affect the probabilities and expected utilities of subsequent outcomes, in ways which may appear paradoxical. Deeper analysis of these problems reveals that the anomalies arise, not from paradox, but rather from faulty inferences drawn from the observations themselves. Thus the notion of quantum decision theory is disparaged.     

A parametric analysis of prospect theory’s functionals for the general population

This article presents the results of an experiment that completely measures the utility function and probability weighting function for different positive and negative monetary outcomes, using a representative sample of N = 1,935 from the general public. The results confirm earlier findings in the lab, suggesting that utility is less pronounced than what is found in classical measurements where expected utility is assumed. Utility for losses is found to be convex, consistent with diminishing sensitivity, and the obtained loss-aversion coefficient of 1.6 is moderate but in agreement with contemporary evidence. The estimated probability weighting functions have an inverse-S shape and they imply pessimism in both domains. These results show that probability weighting is also an important phenomenon in the general population. Women and lower educated individuals are found to be more risk averse, in agreement with common findings. In contrast to previous studies that ascribed gender differences in risk attitudes solely to differences in the degree utility curvature, however, our results show that this finding is primarily driven by loss aversion and, for women, also by a more pessimistic psychological response toward the probability of obtaining the best possible outcome.     

We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory

We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharach??s theory, generalizing the interdependence hypothesis and building on his intuition about vacillation. It is a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can come to mind in the face of a decision problem. The vacillation model makes we-reasoning more easily usable in game theory.     

Are EU standards detrimental to Africa’s exports?

The high costs of complying with standards adversely affect export competitiveness. Existing evidence suggests that the harmonisation of standards to international benchmarks reduces compliance costs and is less trade-inhibiting, or may even be trade-promoting. This paper thus investigates how the regulatory margin in food standards affects Africa’s fish exports to the EU. We measure the regulatory margin in standards by comparing EU standards to the international scientifically-formulated benchmarks. Our results indicate that, relative to the international standards, EU fish standards are indeed non-inhibiting. Thus, the high number of fish exports from Africa rejected by the EU due to non-compliance with EU standards does not really suggest that the measures are overly restrictive but rather is an indication of the poor quality of Africa’s fish exports. This finding suggests a need for upgrades to Africa’s fish export quality, especially the fish supply chain infrastructure, through continuous improvements in fish export logistics facilitation and export promotion measures.     

Pascal’s and Tabarrok’s Wagers

In a recent paper A. Tabarrok [Believe in Pascal’s Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!, Theory and Decision 48, 123--128, 2000] argued that a believer who accepts Pascal’s Wager should in addition accept payment of any given fee in return for a given increase in the probability of reaching God. However the conclusion is obtained from manipulations of infinities which are not valid in an expected utility model. In this note, an alternative model is formulated in which Tabarrok’s conclusion can be obtained.     

A Realistic Path to Implementing China’s Budget Law

The core issue for the implementation of modern budget law is to optimize the satisfaction of society’s demand for public goods. The form of implementation mechanism that will best achieve this goal has thus become a major topic in the field of legal research. To go beyond the Anglo-Saxon budget model and construct a realistic path for the implementation of China’s budget law, this issue needs to be explored from the perspective of Chinese citizens in a way that safeguards the fundamental interests of the people and is premised on upholding and improving the People’s Congress system, so as to achieve a balance between internal and external budget allocation relationships. There are three routes to implementing China’s budget law: the political, the social, and the judicial. Under the first, citizens’ political identity interests are represented by deputies who oversee the budgetary powers of administrative bodies through the People’s Congress. Under the second, citizens individually or collectively participate, influence or even decide the allocation of public economic resources through dialogue, negotiation, reasoning and argument with the responsible budgetary agency in the course of the budget’s compilation, examination and approval, execution and supervision. Under the third, the establishment of a system for budgetary litigation allows citizens to participate in and supervise the implementation of the budget law, individually or collectively. This provides judicial security for the law’s implementation. These three realistic implementation routes represent the dialectical unity of concerted institutional effort aimed directly at effective implementation of budget law. Judicial interpretations of budget law implementation indicate the importance and urgency of promoting national governance capacity through reform of the legal systems governing finance and taxation. This explains the significant role of finance and taxation law in national governance.     

China’s social security response to COVID-19: Wider lessons learnt for social security’s contribution to social cohesion and inclusive economic development

China has adopted an array of special social security measures in response to the spread of the COVID-19 virus, to mitigate the downside social and economic impacts caused by the pandemic. Measures include the reduction, exemption and deferral of social security contributions by employers, the extension of benefits coverage for employees, and the provision of more accessible e-services by social insurance agencies. The article points out that a preliminary assessment of those measures would suggest that they have played a key role in supporting social cohesion and in stabilizing the economy. In a critical manner, the article compares the measures adopted in China with those of other countries, and identifies how China could learn from international practice and experience. Finally, and based on recent Chinese experience, the article presents proposals that seek to improve the longer-term contribution made by the Chinese social security system to realize the goals of social cohesion and inclusive economic development. As set out in China’s Social Insurance Law of 2010, the social security system should not only support a fair sharing of benefits of development, but also promote social harmony and stability.     

Exploring the Australian policy context relating to women’s reproductive choices

This study explored Australian federal level policy instruments which influence and impact on women’s reproductive choices and the consequences of those choices. A systematic policy search and mapping exercise was undertaken. Eighteen policy instruments were identified at the Federal level and were explored through a policy framework and thematic analysis. Findings indicate there are multiple layers of influence on women’s reproductive choices and the consequences of those choices, and the policy instruments interact in multiple dynamic, interconnected and contextual ways. Yet, they also lack cohesion and congruency, failing to account for women’s life circumstances while at the same time shifting the promoted position for women in each policy instrument. The policy instruments seek to regulate, control and selectively support women’s reproduction while simultaneously silencing, marginalising and reprimanding some groups of women.