Time preferences and consumer behavior

We investigate the predictive power of survey-elicited time preferences. The discount factor elicited from choice experiments using real payments predicts various health, energy, and financial outcomes, including overall self-reported health, smoking, installing energy-efficient lighting, and credit card balance. Allowing for time-inconsistent preferences, both the long-run and present-bias discount factors (δ and β) are also significantly associated in the expected direction with several outcomes. We consider several hypotheses regarding the strength of the association between discount factors and outcomes, such as salience of the outcome or liquidity constraints.     

Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We formulate two such principles, replacement and deletion, and we show that, under approval voting, a voter who accepts those two principles and who knows how the other voters will vote will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. We then discuss the consequences of this result for a number of standard principles of preference extension in view of sincere voting under approval voting.     

On risk aversion,classical demand theory,and KM preferences

Building on Kihlstrom and Mirman (Journal of Economic Theory, 8(3), 361–388, 1974)’s formulation of risk aversion in the case of multidimensional utility functions, we study the effect of risk aversion on optimal behavior in a general consumer’s maximization problem under uncertainty. We completely characterize the relationship between changes in risk aversion and classical demand theory. We show that the effect of risk aversion on optimal behavior depends on the income and substitution effects. Moreover, the effect of risk aversion is determined not by the riskiness of the risky good, but rather the riskiness of the utility gamble associated with each decision.     

Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value

The main purpose of this article is to introduce the weighted ENSC value for cooperative transferable utility games which takes into account players’ selfishness about the payoff allocations. Similar to Shapley’s idea of a one-by-one formation of the grand coalition [Shapley (1953)], we first provide a procedural implementation of the weighted ENSC value depending on players’ selfishness as well as their marginal contributions to the grand coalition. Second, in the spirit of the nucleolus [Schmeidler (1969)], we prove that the weighted ENSC value is obtained by lexicographically minimizing a complaint vector associated with a new complaint criterion relying on players’ selfishness.

     

Negotiation and Defeasible Decision Making

In economically meaningful interactions negotiations are particularly important because they allow agents to improve their information about the environment and even to change accordingly their own characteristics. In each step of a negotiation an agent has to emit a message. This message conveys information about her preferences and endowments. Given that the information she uses to decide which message to emit comes from beliefs generated in previous stages of the negotiation, she has to cope with the uncertainty associated with them. The assessment of the states of the world also evolves during the negotiation. In this paper we analyze the intertwined dynamics of beliefs and decision, in order to determine conditions on the agents that allow them to reach agreements. The framework for decision making we consider here is based on defeasible evaluation of possibilities: an argument for a choice defeats another one if it is based on a computation that better uses all the available information.     

Indecisiveness aversion and preference for commitment

We present an axiomatic model of preferences over menus that is motivated by three assumptions. First, the decision maker is uncertain ex ante (i.e., at the time of choosing a menu) about her ex post (i.e., at the time of choosing an option within her chosen menu) preferences over options, and she anticipates that this subjective uncertainty will not resolve before the ex post stage. Second, she is averse to ex post indecisiveness (i.e., to having to choose between options that she cannot rank with certainty). Third, when evaluating a menu she discards options that are dominated (i.e., inferior to another option whatever her ex post preferences may be) and restricts attention to the undominated ones. Under these assumptions, the decision maker has a preference for commitment in the sense of preferring menus with fewer undominated alternatives. We derive a representation in which the decision maker’s uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state space, which in turn determines which options are undominated in a given menu, and in which the decision maker fears, whenever indecisive, to choose an option that will turn out to be the worst (undominated) one according to the realization of her ex post preferences.     

Depression Treatment and Cost Offset for Rural Community Residents with Depression

ABSTRACT

This study examined the relationship between costs of treating physical problems and costs of treating depression, for 322 rural residents with depression. Multiple regressions were used to control for sociodemographics, depression severity, and physical and mental health comorbidities at baseline. The results indicated a $1.42 (n = 322) reduction in the costs of treating physical problems for a $1.00 increase in the costs of treating depression. The reduction was $2.61 (p < 0.05) among those receiving depression treatment (n = 125). These findings suggest a net savings from depression treatment, in addition to other benefits such as improved symptoms and functioning and increased productivity.     

Resolving some contradictions in the theory of linear opinion pools

Bradley (Theory Decis 85:5–20, 2018) develops some theory of the linear opinion pool, in apparent contradiction to results of Dawid et al. (Test 4:263–314, 1995). We investigate the sources of these contradictions, and in particular identify a mathematical error in Bradley (2018) that invalidates his main result.

     

Common genetic effects on risk-taking preferences and choices

Although prior research has shown that risk-taking preferences and choices are correlated across many domains, there is a dearth of research investigating whether these correlations are primarily the result of genetic or environmental factors. We examine the extent to which common genetic factors account for the association between general risk-taking preferences and domain-specific risk-taking preferences, and between general risk-taking preferences and risk taking choices in financial investments, stock market participation and business formation. Using data from 1898 monozygotic (MZ) and 1344 same-sex dizygotic (DZ) twins, we find that general risk-taking shares a common genetic component with domain-specific risk-taking preferences and risk-taking choices.

     

On the cardinal utility equivalence of biseparable preferences

We establish a simple condition, based on the willingness to bet on events, under which two biseparable preferences have cardinally equivalent utilities

     

A “Pseudo-endowment” effect,and its implications for some recent nonexpected utility models

This article describes a modification of the Allais paradox that induces preferences inconsistent with two conditions weaker than the independence axiom, namely quasi-convexity (a special case of which is the betweenness axom), and Hypothesis II of Machina (also called fanning-out). These violations can be formally derived from prospect theory by invoking a nonliner transformation of probability into decision weight.I would like to thank David Bell, Vijay Krishna, John Pratt, and especially Colin Camerer for helpful comments and criticism.     

A foundation of Bayesian statistics (How to deal with fears)

A rational statistical decision maker whose preferences satisfy Savage's axioms will minimize a Bayesian risk function: the expectation with respect to a revealed (or subjective) probability distribution of a loss (or negative utility) function over the consequences of the statistical decision problem. However, the nice expected utility form of the Bayesian risk criterion is nothing but a representation of special preferences. The subjective probability is defined together with the utility (or loss) function and it is not possible, in general, to use a given loss function - say a quadratic loss - and to elicit independently a subjective distribution.I construct the Bayesian risk criterion with a set of five axioms, each with a simple mathematical implication. This construction clearly shows that the subjective probability that is revealed by a decider's preferences is nothing but a (Radon) measure equivalent to a linear functional (the criterion). The functions on which the criterion operates are expected utilities in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. It then becomes clear that the subjective distribution cannot be eliciteda priori, independently of the utility function on consequences.However, if one considers a statistical decision problem by itself, losses, defined by a given loss function, become the consequences of the decisions. It can be imagined that experienced statisticians are used to dealing with different losses and are able to compare them (i.e. have preferences, or fears over a set of possible losses). Using suitable axioms over these preferences, one can represent them by a (linear) criterion: this criterion is the expectation of losses with respect to a (revealed) distribution. It must be noted that such a distribution is a measure and need not be a probability distribution.     

Does time inconsistency differ between gain and loss? An intra-personal comparison using a non-parametric elicitation method

Several studies on time preference have found time inconsistency in both gain and loss preferences. However, the relationship between the two within the same person remains unclear; that is, does an individual who demonstrates time inconsistency for gain outcomes do so for losses as well? This paper reports on individuals’ time inconsistency for gains and losses in a laboratory setting. To obtain a precise comparison of individuals’ time inconsistency for gains and losses, we used Rohde’s “DI (decreasing impatience)-index” (Manag Sci 65(4):1700–1716, 2018) and measured the level of time inconsistency, rather than merely identifying whether TI was present. This index represents how strongly a person exhibits present bias, and easily extends to the comparison between gain and loss preferences within the same person. Further, it allows the experiment to test for so-called future bias, which has been a focus area in recent time inconsistency literature. It is elicited through a non-parametric method, which avoids any specification errors in the analysis. Our findings are as follows: first, we found future bias in preferences for not only gains but also losses, and we confirmed that this tendency is consistent with previous findings on preferences for gains. Second, a positive correlation between time inconsistency for gains and losses was found at the individual level. Indeed, we could not find a significant difference between the two in most cases.

     

Some special forms of aggressiveness in activity group therapy and their impact on the therapist

Internal World and External Reality: Object Relations Theory Applied. Otto F. Kernberg, M.D. (New York: Jason Aronson, 1980.)

Treatment of the Obsessive Personality. Leon Salzman. (New York: Jason Aronson, 1980.)

Social Work Practice: People and Environments. Ed. Carel P. Germain. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.)

The Life Model of Social Work Practice. Carel Germain and Alex Gitterman. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.)

Social Science Research and Decision‐Making. Carol H. Weiss. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.)     

A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs

When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that preferences over acts conditional on event E happening, do not depend on lotteries received on E ^c, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representation with multiple priors, and have common induced preferences over lotteries. The paper shows that when all priors give positive probability to an event E, a certain coherence property between conditional and unconditional preferences is satisfied if and only if the set of subjective probability measures considered by the agent given E is obtained by updating all subjective prior probability measures using Bayes rule.     

A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880–1952

Brian Easlea, Witch‐hunting, Magic and the New Philosophy. An Introduction to Debates of the Scientific Revolution 1450–1750 (1980), xii+283 (Harvester Press, Brighton, £25, paperback £8.50).

Peter Laslett, Karla Oosterveen and Richard M. Smith (eds), Bastardy and its Comparative History: Studies in the history of illegitimacy and marital nonconformism in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, North America, Jamaica and Japan (1980), xv+431 (Edward Arnold, £24.00).

Jonathan Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: the Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen 1499–1610 (1980), xv+402 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, £14.40); James B. Wood, The Nobility of the Election of Bayeux, 1463–1666 (1980), xiv+220 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, £8.80).

Christopher R. Friedrichs, Urban Society in an Age of War: Nördlingen, 1580–1720 (1980), xvii+350 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, £13.60).

Tony Dickson (ed.), Scottish Capitalism: Class, State and Nation from before the Union to the Present (1980), 335 (Lawrence &; Wishart, £9.50).

John Brewer and John Styles (eds), An Ungovernable People: The English and their law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (1980), 400+4 plates (Hutchinson, £12.50).

Harvey J. Graff, The Literacy Myth: Literacy and Social Structure in the Nineteenth‐Century City (1979), xxii + 352 (Academic Press, New York, n.p.). Carl F. Kaestle and Maris A. Vinovskis, Education and Social Change in Nineteenth‐Century Massachusetts (1980), xxi + 349 (Cambridge University Press, £17–50).

Toni Offermann, Arbeiterbewegung und liberales Bürgertum in Deutschland 1850–1863 (1979), 623 (Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn, DM 108) (The Labour Movement and the Liberal Bourgeoisie in Germany 1850–1863)

Joseph Melling (ed.), Housing, Social Policy and the State (1980), 233 (Croom Helm, £10.95).

Stuart Macintyre, A Proletarian Science: Marxism in Britain 1917–1933 (1980), xii + 286 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, £12.00).

Stuart Macintyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working‐class Militancy in Interwar Britain (1980), 213 (Croom Helm, £11.95).