Ambiguity when playing coordination games across cultures

Cultural differences can be a source of ambiguity in coordination games. As players are likely to experience more ambiguity when playing a different culture, we expect players to choose safer strategies. We run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-subjects design, we vary the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. We compare the responses of British and East Asian students at the University of Exeter and show the cultural identity of the opponent by physical appearance. While we find no significant differences between treatments for East Asians, the British choose the safer option in the stag hunt and demand more of the pie in the bargaining game when faced with an opponent from a different culture.

     

Who gains from information asymmetry?

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player’s type is known to both players, the other is private information and known only to the player himself. We compare the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-sided private information contest to the Nash equilibrium with no private information, in which both players know the type of the other player. We show conditions under which uncertainty increases the investment of the uninformed player and the rent dissipation of the contest, while decreasing the expected net payoff of the informed player. In addition, we consider conditions under which the informed player—before knowing his own type—prefers that the uninformed player knows his type. Moreover, we show conditions for the existence/non-existence of equilibrium in a two-stage contest in which the informed player declares his type (or does not declare) in the first stage and in the second stage the two players play according to the information available to them.     

Where o’ where did my baseball cards go?: Race,performance, and placement in the Topps ERA, 1956–1980

On the surface, baseball cards appear to be little more than uninteresting object of child's play; yet they provide invaluable data for assessing unique aspects of the social order. They reveal much about the state of society when they were produced and the people who collected them. This paper examines the unique numbering system the Topps company developed to differentiate among the “royalty of the diamond” from 1956 to 1980. Their system assigned to each card in a set a number that explicitly designated its placement, while implicitly establishing a hierarchical ordering among the players, ostensibly based on performance. It is arguable whether the numbering system Topps developed was based on performance or the ascribed characteristic of race. The results of our work suggest that player performance, not race, was the primary factor in the assignment of “prestigious” card numbers in Topps’ system.     

Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat

We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a dollar, each player receives what he demanded; if the sum of demands is greater than a dollar, all players receive zero. We modify this second part, which involves a harsh punishment. In the modified game \((D\!D^{\prime })\) , if the demands are incompatible, then players have one more chance. In particular, they play an ultimatum game to avoid the excess. In the two-player version of this game, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which players demand (and receive) an equal share of the dollar. We also provide an \(n\) -player extension of our mechanism. Finally, the mechanism we propose eliminates not only all pure strategy equilibria involving unequal divisions of the dollar, but also all equilibria where players mix over different demands in the first stage.     

Differential customer racial attitudes toward scandal and patriotism: The Mitchell Report,the Olympics,race, and baseball memorabilia

This paper investigates differential customer racial reaction to negative and positive publicity related to professional athletes. In terms of negative publicity, it analyzes the effect of mention in the Mitchell Report on the price of baseball cards. In regards to positive publicity, it considers the impact of having been identified as a member of the United States Olympic or national team. After controlling for player productivity with performance statistics, the effects of being mentioned in the Mitchell Report are isolated within regression analysis to draw conclusions concerning customer racial attitudes toward the steroids scandal. Similar analysis is conducted to see the impact of being seen as a baseball representative of the United States. Regression results are consistent with the conclusion that negative publicity devalues the cards of nonWhite players but not of White players. Positive publicity, however, increases the value of a player's card regardless of ethnicity.     

Race and baseball memorabilia revisited

This paper extends previous research on customer racial discrimination in the market for baseball memorabilia. Specifically, it investigates if there is evidence that differential prices for baseball cards can be explained at least in part by race. First, it analyzes 2008 prices for cards of recently retired players and compares these results to a previously published study. Then it re-examines the 1994 price differentials found in the previous study by analyzing the 2008 prices for those cards. In particular, changes in the effect of race on card prices motivate a discussion about how attitudes toward race have varied over time.     

Best-of-two contests with psychological effects

We study a best-of-two contest with two homogeneous players (teams). The winner is the player who wins in both stages. In the case of one victory for each team, a draw determines the identity of the winner. Each team has a value of winning the contest as well as a value of winning a single game. A team’s value of winning a game at its home field is higher than its value of winning a game away from home. We show that if winning in the first stage provides a psychological advantage in the second stage, each team would prefer to play the second stage at its home field.     

Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoffs.     

Cognitive Algebra in Sport Decision-Making

Two studies examined whether simple algebraic rules that have been shown to be operative in many applied settings may also be found in sport decision-making. The theoretical framework for these studies was the Functional Theory of Cognition (Anderson, Contributions to information integration theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1996). The way in which novices but already experienced team sport players (soccer, basketball, and handball players) combine different informational cues (relative importance of the game, numerical status of the team, current score, and time left to play) for deciding a quick restart of play near the end of a match was examined. The basic finding are consistent with the proposition that the knowledge bases at work for judging the appropriateness of this type of sport decisions are structured according to simple algebraic rules.     

Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games

We consider cooperative games which are modified by subordination to communication networks. Two players i and j will be able to cooperate only if they pay for the cost w _ij of their communication link (i,j). Coalitions of players are treated similarly and a new characteristic function form game is developed thus. We also examine incentive for players to cooperate in such situations as well as a related index of a player's communicative strength.     

Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games

Players often have flexibility in when they move and thus whether a game is played simultaneously or sequentially may be endogenously determined. For 2 × 2 games, we analyze this using an extended game. In a stage prior to actual play, players choose in which of two periods to move. A player moving at the first opportunity knows when his opponent will move. A player moving at the second turn learns the first mover's action. If both select the same turn, they play a simultaneous move subgame.If both players have dominant strategies in the basic game, equilibrium payoffs in the basic and extended games are identical. If only one player has a dominant strategy or if the unique equilibrium in the basic game is in mixed strategies, then the extended game equilibrium payoffs differ if and only if some pair of pure strategies Pareto dominates the basic game simultaneous play payoffs. If so, sequential play attains the Pareto dominating payoffs. The mixed strategy equilibrium occurs only when it is not Pareto dominated by some pair of pure strategies.In an alternative extended game, players cannot observe delay by opponents at the first turn. Results for 2×2 games are essentially the same as with observable delay, differing only when only one player has a dominant strategy.     

A Comparison of Subsidized Guardianship and Child Welfare Adoptive Families Served by the Illinois Adoption and Guardianship Preservation Program

Abstract

This study compares the outcomes of 113 subsidized guardianship families and 733 child welfare adoptive families served by a therapeutic counseling program for adoptive/guardianship families at risk of child placement or dissolution. No significant differences are found in the percentage of children in placement at the end of services or the level or parental commitment to their children. Children in subsidized guardianship families are more likely to be minority children who are older at removal from their birth families and at placement with their current families. Also they are less likely to have a history of abuse than children in adoptive families.     

Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma

We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of means. The main result establishes that a cooperation at almost all stages of the game is an equilibrium outcome if the complexity of the machines the players may use is limited enough and if the length T of the repeated game is sufficiently large. This result persists when more than T states are allowed in the player’s automaton. We further consider a variant of the model in which the two players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by perceptrons and prove that the players can cooperate at most of the stages provided that the complexity of their perceptrons is sufficiently reduced.     

Effective choice in the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma tournament

This paper discusses the results of a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma computer tournament. In the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma tournament each pair of players interacts only once. But players can establish and detect reputations because they know how their current opponent has behaved in previous games with other players. The results show that cooperation is worthwhile, even in single-shot games, provided the outcomes of previous games are common knowledge.Reality is a game, but you shouldn't take a game for reality(Pragmaticist Proverb)     

Managing the science in the presence of financial conflict of interest

ABSTRACT

We consider the question of why (primarily) and how (secondarily) to perform scientific oversight of research performed by investigators with a financial conflict of interest (COI). One way to frame the trade-off of having investigators with financial COI participate in research is through a decision rule: “Our institution is willing for financially conflicted investigators to participate in research around their intellectual property if (a) the science is likely to be significantly better with their participation (or if other significant benefits accrue); and (b) the COI can be adequately managed”.

A key component of COI management is the demonstration that the underlying science is sufficiently rigorous and transparent, and in turn, a scientific oversight plan is a key element of that demonstration. Scientific oversight plans should be proactively generated, by individuals (i.e., scientific reviewers) who are independent and expert, and they should assess the rigor and transparency of the research, in a fashion which is fair and efficient.

Abbreviations: COI: conflict of interest; SOP: scientific oversight plan     

Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games

Brams and Taylor 1994 presented a version of the divide-the-dollar game (DD), which they call DD1. DD1 suffers from the following drawback: when each player demands approximately the entire dollar, then if the least greedy player is unique, then this player obtains approximately the entire dollar even if he is only slightly less greedy than the other players. I introduce a parametrized family of 2-person DD games, whose “endpoints” (the games that correspond to the extreme points of the parameter space) are (1) a variant of DD1, and (2) a game that completely overcomes the greediness-related problem. I also study an n-person generalization of this family. Finally, I show that the modeling choice between discrete and continuous bids may have far-reaching implications in DD games.     

Adverse Childhood Experiences and Substance Use History among Vulnerable Older Adults Living in Public Housing

ABSTRACT

Previous research shows strong correlations between adverse childhood experiences (ACE) and later life health. The current study examines the relationship between ACEs and substance use among older adults living in public housing. Results show that about one-third of participants had four or more ACEs, and ACE score predicted likelihood of substance use history. Over half of older adults with four or more ACEs experienced substance abuse in their lifetime compared to one out of ten older adults with less than four ACEs. Findings shed light on a vulnerable group and point to next steps in research and practice.     

Joint Beliefs in Conflictual Coordination Games

The traditional solution concept for noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium, which contains an implicit assumption that players probability distributions satisfy t probabilistic independence. However, in games with more than two players, relaxing this assumption results in a more general equilibrium concept based on joint beliefs (Vanderschraaf, 1995). This article explores the implications of this joint-beliefs equilibrium concept for two kinds of conflictual coordination games: crisis bargaining and public goods provision. We find that, using updating consistent with Bayes rule, players beliefs converge to equilibria in joint beliefs which do not satisfy probabilistic independence. In addition, joint beliefs greatly expand the set of mixed equilibria. On the face of it, allowing for joint beliefs might be expected to increase the prospects for coordination. However, we show that if players use joint beliefs, which may be more likely as the number of players increases, then the prospects for coordination in these games declines vis-à-vis independent beliefs.     

Religion and Abortion Attitudes Among U.S. Hispanics: Findings from the 1990 Latino National Political Survey*

Objective. The goal of this article is to examine the relationship between religious involvement, gauged mainly in terms of affiliation and frequency of attendance at services, and abortion attitudes among three major Hispanic subgroups: Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans. Method. The study analyzes data from the Latino National Political Survey, a sample of over 2,700 U.S. Hispanics completed in 1990. Results. Committed (i.e., regularly attending) Hispanic Protestants, most of whom belong to conservative groups, are more strongly pro‐life than any other segment of the Latino population, and are much more likely than others to support a total abortion ban. Committed Catholics also tend to hold pro‐life views, but they are relatively more likely to endorse an abortion ban that includes exceptions for rape, incest, and threats to the mother's life. Less devoted Catholics and Protestants generally do not differ from religiously unaffiliated Hispanics in their abortion views. There are also modest variations in the links between religious involvement and abortion attitudes across the three Latino subgroups. Conclusion. Religious factors are highly important predictors of Hispanics' preferences regarding abortion policies. Contrary to some previous discussions, it is committed Protestants, more so than Catholics, who are the staunchest opponents of abortion in the Latino population.