Who is banked in low income families? The effects of gender and bargaining power

We use data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances and a framework that accounts for intrahousehold dynamics to examine bank account ownership for low-income couples. We find that even among families who are banked, some family members are not. Those without accounts may lack access to financial services, be at a disadvantage within their families, or face financial risks if their partnerships end. Our results indicate that men and women are equally likely to be banked, but the factors predicting whether or not they have accounts differ. Women with more bargaining power are more likely to hold bank accounts and their families are more likely to be banked. Moreover, individual characteristics of male and the female partners have different effects on the chances that they, their partners, or their families are banked.     

Gender differences in the earnings produced by a middle range education: The case of Canadian ‘colleges’

In this paper we use data on consecutive cohorts of recent graduates from community colleges or community college-like institutions to address the following questions about the gender earnings gap: i) What was the trend in the gender earnings gap for these recent graduates? ii) What role in the observed trends in the gender earnings gap was played by occupational demand? iii) How and to what extent did the domestic division of labour contribute to the gender earnings gap in this young sample? We find that the gap fell then rose, that occupational demand played a role in these shifts, and that the domestic division of labour did indeed contribute to the gap in this young sample. Furthermore, our results point to a process of cumulation of factors that increase the earnings gap which has both substantive and methodological implications.     

Perceptions as the crucial link? The mediating role of neighborhood perceptions in the relationship between the neighborhood context and neighborhood cohesion

This study examines the effects of neighborhood racial in-group size, economic deprivation and the prevalence of crime on neighborhood cohesion among U.S. whites. We explore to what extent residents' perceptions of their neighborhood mediate these macro-micro relationships. We use a recent individual-level data set, the American Social Fabric Study (2012/2013), enriched with contextual-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2010) and employ multi-level structural equation models. We show that the racial in-group size is positively related to neighborhood cohesion and that neighborhood cohesion is lower in communities with a high crime rate. Individuals' perceptions of the racial in-group size partly mediate the relationship between the objective racial in-group size and neighborhood cohesion. Residents’ perceptions of unsafety from crime also appear to be a mediating factor, not only for the objective crime rate but also for the objective racial in-group size. This is in line with our idea that racial stereotypes link racial minorities to crime whereby neighborhoods with a large non-white population are perceived to be more unsafe. Residents of the same neighborhood differ in how they perceive the degree of economic decay of the neighborhood and this causes them to evaluate neighborhood cohesion differently, however perceptions of neighborhood economic decay do not explain the link between the objective neighborhood context and neighborhood cohesion.     

Item non-response in open-ended questions: Who does not answer on the meaning of left and right?

The left-right ideological dimension plays a central role in political science research. The meaning of left and right is often based on analyses of responses to open-ended survey questions. In the 2008 German General Social Survey, item non-response to two particular open-ended questions on the meaning of left and right was considerable and calls for analyses of the value of the data have been received. In our paper we investigate item non-response to these two open-ended questions in terms of cognitive abilities, motivational aspects, and finally, in relation to the left-right self-placement scale itself. Item non-response in the open-ended questions is not based on randomness alone, and analyses show some significant systematic results. Thus, the open-ended questions seem to be biased and the validity of this data is questionable in some respect. In this context, left-right self-placement of non-respondents and “cognitive don’t knowers” need to be given careful consideration.     

Why is the sex gap in feelings of depression wider in high gender equity countries? The effect of children on the psychological well-being of men and women

This study uses data from 23 countries in the World Values Survey and the National Survey of Families and Households and finds that the sex gap in feelings of depression is wider in high gender equity societies even though overall levels of feelings of depression are lower. Using hierarchical logistic modeling, we find that the sex difference in feelings of depression is wider in high gender equity societies because children increase depression for women in high gender equity societies, while they reduce depression for women without paid employment in low gender equity societies. There is little difference in the effect of children on feelings of depression for men across societies.     

‘It's The Sun Wot Won It’: Evidence of media influence on political attitudes and voting from a UK quasi-natural experiment

Do print media significantly impact political attitudes and party identification? To examine this question, we draw on a rare quasi-natural experiment that occurred when The Sun, a right-leaning UK tabloid, shifted its support to the Labour party in 1997 and back to the Conservative party in 2010. We compared changes in party identification and political attitudes among Sun readers with non-readers and other newspaper readerships. We find that The Sun's endorsements were associated with a significant increase in readers' support for Labour in 1997, approximately 525,000 votes, and its switch back was associated with about 550,000 extra votes for the Conservatives in 2010. Although we observed changes in readers' party preference, there was no effect on underlying political preferences. The magnitude of these changes, about 2% of the popular vote, would have been unable to alter the outcome of the 1997 General Election, but may have affected the 2010 Election.