Projecting Australia's Fertility—Postscript

An accelerated decline in family size has led to a downward revision of projected fertility. Replacement fertility could be reached in the 1980s with births numbering about 250,000 a year. The population is approaching stability at the younger ages. The potential for poverty arising from large families may be halved in ten years.     

Thailand's reproductive revolution

Thailand has achieved a remarkable population revolution in the past 15 years, resulting in a fertility decline of 44%, the 3rd greatest decline of the major developing countries. Thailand is quite distinct from either China or South Korea, the leaders in fertility decline. It has neither China's authoritarian power system to enforce population control nor the highly developed, Westernized outlook of South Korea. Instead it achieved its astounding fertility drop through a noncoercive family planning program operating within a context of rapid social change and a cultural setting. Thailand's drop in population growth has touched almost all segments of Thai society. The preferred number of children among couples married less than 5 years has dropped in both rural and urban families at almost exactly the same rate, from about 3.2 in 1969 to 2.3 in 1984. Religious groups represent the only substantial difference in family size preference; Moslem women married less than 5 years stated a desired average of 3.1 children versus 2.3 for Buddhist women. The direct case of the fertility drop is a national increase in contraceptive use. In 1984, 65% of Thai women reported using contraception. The Thai population, however, was ripe for using contraception when it became available due to 1) mass media creating a desire for consumer goods, 2) the increased costs of education to parents, 3) the willingness of parents to trade off "parent repayment" from many children for a few quality children, 4) couples' autonomy in fertility decision making, 5) the high status of women in Thailand, and 6) the fact that Buddhism poses no barriers to contraception. Current trends show no immediate sign of change.     

Population,environment and sustainable development

The present population of Sri Lanka (17.7 million) is sufficient to create concern about the use, limitations, and waste of natural resources. Between 1871 and 1946, the population grew at an average rate of 1.4% annually, with high fertility and mortality. The population doubled between 1946 and 1981, and mortality declined. Between 1971 and 1991, the rate of growth declined due to a decrease in fertility and an increase in emigration. With a growth rate of 1.4%, the population will again double to 35 million by 2040. Technological improvements in Sri Lanka have led to an eight-fold increase in metric tons of rice production, but the growth in population has caused a deficiency in output so that basic per capita caloric requirements are not being met. Increased productivity has almost depleted the area available for cultivation, and the use of fertilizers to increase yields has environmental drawbacks. The high fertility of the 1970s contributed to increased labor force participation rates of 2.2%, which resulted in more people joining the labor force than leaving. Thus, the employment market has been unable to absorb the unemployed or potential new workers. Growth of the employment market may also conflict with environmental protection, as exemplified by the mining of the coral reef on the southwestern coast. The conversion of forests to agriculture resulted in forest losses of about 42,000 hectares per year during 1956-83. Deforestation is also occurring in the high forests due to increased pressure for fuelwood. In the wet zone, the use of forests for fuelwood is declining, but rubber wood is being harvested for industrial production. In order to slow population growth to replacement levels by the year 2000 (with a total population of 25 million), contraceptive prevalence must be increased to 72% at a cost of about $25 million.     

Evaluation of Fertility Levels and Adjustment of Fertility Policy: Based on the Current Situation of the Chinese Mainland’s Provincial Fertility Levels

During the 11^th Five-year Plan (2006-2010), the total fertility rate of the mainland of China was 1.481 and was stable with a slight decline, exhibiting a spatial pattern of moderately low fertility in the central and western regions, very low fertility in the east and extremely low fertility in the northeast. Except for a rebound in a few provinces and regions with extremely low fertility rates, the ratio of actual fertility rates to policy fertility rates is still falling. The reduced fertility rate is mainly driven by development, notably the proportion of the total population represented by the exuberantly fertile women of child-bearing age and their greater urbanization, growing level of non-agricultural employment and outflow from rural areas, as well as the assimilative effect of urban production, lifestyles and cultural concepts upon the agricultural population. Development has catalyzed an irreversible trend of declining fertility; existing fertility policy has proven insufficient to keep fertility rates stable at reasonably low levels. Policy-based rebounds may emerge in urban areas and the east and northeast, where family planning policy has been better implemented; on the other hand, a non-policy-based rebound may have been released. In the central and western rural areas, multiple births occur on average among only 4.12 percent of the younger generation of women. As fertility policy is adjusted and improved, fertility rebounds in transitional fertility policy adjustment can be effectively regulated through a gradual strategy which will not provoke a sharp rebound. The time is ripe for China to conduct a nationally unified adjustment of the existing fertility policy.     

Evaluation of Fertility Levels and Adjustment of Fertility Policy： Based on the Current Situation of the Chinese Mainland＇s Provincial Fertility Levels

“十一五”期间我国大陆的总和生育率为1．481,呈稳中有降态势,形成了“中、西部中度低水平,东部深度低水平,东北极度低水平”的空间格局。除少数极低生育率省区回升外,实际生育率及其与政策生育率的比值仍在下降。生育率下降的主要推动力是发展,突出表现为生育旺盛期育龄妇女比总人口和育龄妇女的城镇化、非农化水平高、人口外出流动比例大,以及城镇生产、生活方式和文化观念对农业人口的同化作用。发展促使生育率下降的趋势已不可逆转。现行生育政策难以使生育率稳定在合理的低水平。有可能引起政策性反弹的重点在计划生育基础较好的城镇和东部及东北地区;有可能引起非政策性反弹的势能,已基本释放;中、西部农村年轻一代妇女多胎生育平均只有4．12％。生育政策调整完善中的生育率反弹可通过渐进式策略实施有效调控,不会引起生育率大幅强烈反弹。我国生育政策全国统一调整时机已成熟。     

Changes in the Chinese Population’s Fertility Intentions: 1980-2011

On the basis of the findings of 227 surveys of Chinese fertility intentions over the years 1980-2011, this paper investigates the longitudinal changes in fertility intentions through cross-temporal meta-analysis. It is found that the ideal number of children for the Chinese trended downwards from 1980, but since 2000 the average number has remained basically stable at 1.6 to 1.8. In the 1980s, people’s fertility levels were higher than their fertility intentions. With economic and educational progress in China, both fertility levels and fertility intentions showed a downward trend, with the former declining faster than the latter. Since 1990, people’s fertility levels have been lower than their fertility intentions; that is, their actual number of children has been less than their ideal number. This provides an empirical basis for examining the changes in China’s fertility intentions and fertility levels.     

The relationship between ethnicity and fertility in New Zealand

While there is a global shift towards smaller families, some groups maintain relatively high fertility rates. The 2013 New Zealand census data were used to investigate the nature of fertility between ethnicities in New Zealand. The NZ Deprivation Index 2013 was used as a measure of socioeconomic status to determine the relationships with fertility. The results mirror research outside of New Zealand in that socioeconomic status is inversely correlated to fertility. Using crude average fertility rates, sole-ethnicity Pasifika and Māori ethnic groups still have substantially higher fertility than sole-ethnicity Europeans and Asians ethnic groups, even when simultaneously accounting for age, socioeconomic status, education, and religious affiliation. Christians have more children than individuals reportedly without any religion, and fertility rates drop on average for mothers who have higher formal qualifications. Our findings suggest that cultural, or other ethnic-specific factors differentially affect fertility for Māori, Pasifika, New Zealand European, and Asians as aggregated ethnic categories, respectively.     

The geography of fertility reduction in Kenya

Record high fertility levels were recorded for Kenya in the late 1970's; however, a fertility reversal was experienced during the 1980's. Recent studies by Njoru, Robinson and the National Research Council and data from the 1989 and 1993 KDHS indicate that the fertility decline is real and pervasive. The release of the 1989 census data provides researchers with an additional source to document the fertility decline and to identify the spatial pattern of fertility reduction at the province and district level. The geography of fertility reduction is explored by addressing differences in the annual rate of population growth for each province and district.     

Spatial differences in fertility decline in Kenya: evidence from recent fertility surveys

Province level fertility and socioeconomic development indicators from the 1989 and 1993 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys (KDHS) document the spatial pattern of Kenya’s recent fertility decline. Although the data suggest that substantial regional variations in fertility reduction exist, fertility reduction has been pervasive throughout the 1989–1993 period. More specifically, the 1989 and 1993 KDHS data indicate that low fertility levels characterize the Nairobi–Central Province core while high fertility levels characterize Coast, Rift Valley and Western Province. However, Western Province has experienced the greatest percentage reduction in fertility throughout the period suggesting that the regional gaps in fertility decline are closing. Persistent fertility decline has also occurred in rural and urban areas, and fertility limitation is supported by Kenyan males. Factors impacting continued fertility reduction efforts are identified.     

On changes in the age composition of the population and policy options for population planning

This analysis, based on 1978 data from official household registers, suggests that the 1983-2000 period will be critical for China's efforts to control population growth. If declines in the fertility rate are maintained, the possibility of stabilizing China's population at 800-900 million in the next century is feasible. If the population is to be kept under 1.2 billion by the year 2000, the general fertility rate must be lowered to 1.8 in 1985 and must decline 0.1 each 5 years thereafter until it reaches 1.5 in the year 2000. Once population growth is brought under control, it will be necessary to address consequent increases in the median age of the population. Those over 65 years of age will comprise 7.1-7.8% of the population in the year 2000, depending on whether fertility rates are low or high. The medium projection includes a population of 1.211 billion in the year 2000, approaching the peak value but allowing the fertility rate to rise slowly to guard against excessive aging of the population. The proportion of those over 65 years of age reaches a peak value of 20.2% in the year 2040. Overall, these projections suggest a "golden age" continuing until about 2020 in which the proportion of those both over 65 years and under 15 years will be rather low. The dependency ratio should begin to climb after 2020, reaching a peak in 2040 and stabilizing by 2070 at a level slightly higher than that existing today in developed countries. Since a rational age composition and a suitable decrease in the proportion of dependents are essential for economic growth, future analyses should focus on the quality of the population and not just population size. As long as birth rates continue to fall, the proportion of the dependent population will also fall and have a beneficial effect on China's economic development.     

Does female employment affect fertility? Evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper tests the validity of the proposition that there is a causal relationship between fertility choice and female employment in a multivariate framework during the period 1958–1998 in the United Kingdom. Following recent advances in economic and demographic theory the nexus between female employment and fertility is reexamined taking into account changes in the labor market and the overall real economic activity. Our key finding is that expanding the estimating equations to control for the influences of changes in real wages and real output creates a positive relationship between fertility and female employment and a negative relationship between fertility and real wages. Finally, fertility choice should not be considered exogenous to the female employment, the labor market or the growth process.     

Fertility Changes Among Immigrants: Generations,Neighborhoods, and Personal Characteristics*

Objective. To understand how adaptation/assimilation, disruption, and diffusion interact to produce changes in fertility levels among successive generations of Mexicans and Central Americans in the United States. Method. Using restricted access data that link individual data (CPS) to neighborhood data (census tracts), we examine the role of generation, personal characteristics, and neighborhood characteristics in determining children ever born (CEB). Results. There are significant differences in fertility across generations and, to a lesser extent, between women who live in ethnic enclaves and those who do not. Once personal characteristics are considered, the independent effect of generation on fertility is nearly eliminated. Personal characteristics dominate neighborhood characteristics in their ability to predict fertility. The most consistent predictor of CEB at the neighborhood level is the percentage of Hispanic adults. Conclusions. Personal characteristics dominate fertility change across generation, and were it not for increases in educational attainment, fertility might be higher in successive generations rather than lower or unchanged.     

How conservative are British attitudes to reproduction?

Current British attitudes concerning fertility are examined, and the probabilities that these will lead either to a further decline to below replacement-level fertility or to a level that will sustain population replacement are assessed. The author concludes that the optimistic, or replacement-level, alternative is the more likely. The evidence for this conclusion is examined, including evidence of conservative attitudes toward fertility and childbearing, and the relative stability of the family structure; comparisons are made with the situation elsewhere in Europe.     

Hindu-Muslim differential fertility: how much religious and how much socio?

Data from the Bangladesh Fertility Survey (BFS) of 1975 were used to test the hypotheses that the higher the socioeconomic status, the lower the fertility and the narrower the difference in fertility between Muslims and Hindus; and the lower the socioeconomic status, the higher the fertility and the greater the difference in fertility between Muslims and Hindus. The core group for analysis in this study of women married only once and reported to fecund includes 3914 Muslims and 824 Hindus. Actual analysis was based on fewer than these 4738 because of nonresponse to 1 or more pertinent interview questions used in this study. Multiple classification analysis (MCA) was used to analyze the data. Prior to adjustment for the effect of other variables, the fertility of Muslims was a little lower than that of Hindus. The average number of children born to Muslims was 3.89; it was 3.95 for Hindus. Fertility tended to decline with improvement in socioeconomic status, i.e., increase in the level of education, i.e., no formal and primary level, and this almost converged at the middle and higher educational levels. At the lower levels of education, i.e., no formal and 1-5 grades, Muslims had .19-.34 children more than Hindus. This difference was reduced to .07 children at the middle level education, i.e., 6-9 grades. At the higher level of education, Muslims had .09 fewer children than Hindus, and this difference was statistically significant. Prior to adjustment for the effect of other variables, the fertility of Muslims was higher than that of Hindus at almost every level of age at marriage. This picture was reversed when adjustment was made for the effect of other variables. At the lower levels of age at marriage, Muslims has .23-.20 more children than Hindus. At the middle age at marriage, Muslims had .08 fewer children than Hindus. This difference was statistically significant. There was virtually no difference between the 2 groups at the higher age at marriage, i.e., 20-21 years. The effect of urbanization on fertility by education differed for Hindus and Muslims. For Hindus, fertility at each level of education was higher in urban than in rural areas. For Muslims, fertility at each level of education, particularly at higher levels, was lower in urban than in rural areas. No significant difference was found in the use of contraception between Muslims and Hindus at higher levels of education, but at lower levels of education contraceptive use among Hindus was significantly higher than for Muslims. The findings suggest that with an improvement in education, fertility will decline with a corresponding increase in the use of contraception and the difference in fertility and use of contraception between Muslims and Hindus will disappear. The findings also support the tenet that development, especially education, is the best formula for reducing fertility in poor countries.     

Determinants of fertility: Results from a 1989 rural household survey in China

The relationship between family planning, socioeconomic conditions, and fertility was investigated in six rural villages of China. Data from a 1989 random household survey were used to test the hypothesis relating fertility (number of children born) to family planning policy (policy impact and free contraceptive provision) and socioeconomic conditions (education and income). The fertility behavior of two cohorts (the first refers to those married before 1969 and the second those between 1978 and 1980) was compared to examine the impact of strict family planning policy on fertility. The average number of children born was significantly fewer in the second cohort than the first cohort (1.6 versus 4.2) during the ten year span after marriage. The regression results indicate that family planning policy measures and female education have both direct and indirect (through influence on age at first marriage and contraceptive use) significant impact on fertility.     

The effect of tax-benefit policies on fertility and female labor force participation in the United States

This paper presents an investigation of the effects of the tax exemption for dependents and the child care tax credit on age-specific fertility rates and female labor supply for the U.S. 1948–1997. These policies are incorporated in a model that is tested within a cointegration framework for women of two age groups: 20–24 and 25–34 year olds. Tests indicate the existence of two cointegrating relations for each of the two age groups, and these are identified as a fertility equation and a female labor force participation equation, with signs and statistical significance supportive of the economic model. The tax exemption elasticity in the fertility equation for younger women is moderately large, but this policy variable is dominated by effects from changes in women's wages. The 25–34 year olds are less responsive to all economic changes, including the tax exemption, reflecting reduced flexibility in their timing of fertility.     

“老来得子”幸福吗？--农村地区大龄生子与心理健康分析

从生育行为主体出发、基于子女性别结构,利用2013年中国社会综合调查（ CGSS）数据,分析了大龄生子群体的心理健康状况。初步研究发现,大龄生子群体的心理健康低于非大龄生子群体,“老来得子”忧大于喜;“38岁前仅生女、38岁及以后生子”群体的心理健康低于“38岁前已生子、38岁及以后生子／女”群体。这说明,男孩偏好下的“老来得子”并不必然提高心理健康;生育作为复杂的人口事件,子女数量、子女性别以及生育年龄等均成为心理健康的扰动因素。     

Victorian values and the fertility decline: the case of Scotland

The author examines the final phase of the demographic transition in Scotland during the late nineteenth century. Particular attention is given to explanations developed by Joseph Banks concerning the fertility decline in England and Wales. Banks's analysis is reevaluated by applying it to data for Scotland. No clear pattern of fertility by occupation is found. It is suggested instead that both family size limitation and emphasis on higher education were results of value reorientations.     

Use-effectiveness of fertility awareness among the urban poor

The efficacy, the ability of Indian women to use the Billings' Ovulation Method, and its effectiveness in helping them to control their fertility was studied in a sample of urban poor living in the Delhi slums. No attempt was made to develop a design which would rigorously test the acceptability of the method because the study was concerned with: the question of the ability of poor women to define fertility and to avoid an unwanted pregnancy by avoiding sexual relations during the fertility period; and the efficacy and use-effectiveness of the modified method which had not been tested. The study, which extended over 36 months, recruited a sample of 5752 eligible acceptors of fertility living in the urban slums. Natural family planning (NFP) use requires recurrent decision making at 2 stages: in the beginning of the menstrual cycle to check for signs of fertility; and to abstain from sexual relations in the fertility period. Age was an important variable in the use of sexual abstinence oriented methods and fertility determining methods. 192 of the acceptors were below 19 years, 1545 between 20-24 years, 2089 between 25-29 years, 1236 between 30-34 years, 520 between 35-39 years, and 170 between 40-44 years. Of 4380 of the 5302 acceptors in Treatment 1 who began to use the method after menstruation, 7 (0.16%) had a profuse discharge and could not distinguish the change in mucus because of cervicitis which was treated in cycle 2. 663 (5.4%) acceptors did not see or feel fertile mucus but noticed patches of infertile mucus throughout the cycle. 419 (69.19%) of them had a family income of less than Rs300 and 25 (3.77%) were open cases of pulmonary tuberculosis. 16 acceptors (0.37%) noticed wetness and lubrication characteristic of fertile type mucus for about 2 hours, 145 (3.31%) for 3-4 hours, and 218 (4.98%) for nearly half a day. 867 (19.79%) had 1 day, 406 (9.27%) 1-1/2 days, 939 (21.44%) for 2 days, 291 (6.64%) 2-1/2 days, 636 (14.52%) for 3 days and 187 (4.27%) 3-1/2 to 4 days of fertile mucus. 1 acceptor had 5 days of fertile mucus. 4 acceptors failed to check regularly and therefore may have missed the fertile period. In Treatment 2 the initial decision to accept the use of the method was made by the 450 husbands before instructing their wives. The continuation rate of 91.86% for 12 months with a standard error of 0.67% was surprisingly high for a sample with low literacy and occupational status, low female work participation rates, small family size and a preference for sons with low motivation to use other methods. There were 9 unplanned pregnancies classified as method failures--pregnancies which occurred in acceptors who followed the method accoring to the instruction but got pregnant. The 1 year efficacy rate (life table analysis) was 99.86%. The 1-year use-effectiveness rate was 97.43% for the 5752 cohort. The high efficacy rate of the method can be due to 2 factors: the correct identification of the fertile mucus; and the ability to clearly distinguish between infertile and fertile mucus.     

Can increased educational attainment explain declining Indigenous fertility?

Prior research shows that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women are more likely to have children and have more children, on average, than non-Indigenous women. However, like those of the total Australian population, fertility rates of Indigenous women have been declining since the 1970s. The decline has been more significant in recent years. Between 2006 and 2016, an increasing proportion of Indigenous women postponed childbirth from their teens into their 20s and 30s, leading women to have fewer children over their lifetimes. During the same period, there was a rapid increase in educational attainment among the Indigenous population. This paper examines educational gradients in fertility among Indigenous women and whether the observed fertility decline is linked with the increased educational attainment. Using data from the 2006, 2011 and 2016 Australian Census of Population and Housing and applying a shift-share decomposition analysis, we find that education has been a big driver of falling fertility rates in non-remote areas. In remote areas, education has had a much smaller effect (except for youngest women).