An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution

I prove that ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’ characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-player bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solutions that satisfy these two properties are not lower hemi-continuous. These different results refine the analysis of Chun (Econ Lett 34:311–316, 1990). I also highlight a rather unexpected link with the result of Dagan et al. (Soc Choice Welfare 19:811–823, 2002).     

Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for "good" ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued. Professor Sertel passed away on January 25, 2003.     

Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems

 In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Received: 8 August 1994/Accepted: 12 February 1996     

A solution for two-person bargaining problems

Everyday bargaining problems are often solved by tossing a coin. A solution for two-person bargaining problems is axiomatized, which is a Pareto-optimal generalization of this coin tossing method. The super-additive solution of Perles and Maschler is also shown to be a generalization of this method. Various properties of our solution are studied, including continuity and risk sensitivity, and compared with properties of other solutions discussed in the literature.This study was financed by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. I like to thank an anonymous referee for useful comments.     

Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with and without claims

Following an idea due to Thomson (Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, 25: 431–441) we examine the role of reference functions in the axiomatic approach to the solution of bargaining problems with and without claims. A reference function is a means of summarizing essential features of a bargaining problem. Axioms like Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Monotonicity are then reformulated with respect to this reference function. Under some weak conditions on the reference function we obtain characterizations of different parametrized classes of solutions. We present several examples of reference functions and thereby recover many well-known solutions to bargaining problems with and without claims.This paper is part of the author’s Ph.D. thesis at Bielefeld University, Germany. The author is particularly grateful to Walter Trockel for his advice and to an associate editor and two referees for their helpful comments. Financial support through a scholarship of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) at the graduate college ‘‘Mathematical Economics’’ is gratefully acknowledged.     

Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution

Given a bargaining problem, the relative utilitarian (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer’s utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one. We show that RU is “optimal” in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over the set of all bargaining solutions) under any partial ordering which satisfies certain axioms of fairness and consistency; this result is closely analogous to the result of Segal (J Polit Econ 108(3):569–589, 2000). Second, RU offers each person the maximum expected utility amongst all rescaling-invariant solutions, when it is applied to a random sequence of future bargaining problems generated using a certain class of distributions; this is recalls the results of Harsanyi (J Polit Econ 61:434–435, 1953) and Karni (Econometrica 66(6):1405–1415, 1998).     

A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution

This paper follows van Damme (1986) in presenting a meta bargaining approach that justifies the Nash bargaining solution. But in contrast to van Damme's procedure our meta bargaining game is universal in the sense that all bargaining solutions are allowed as strategic choices in the meta bargaining game. Also our result holds true for any number n of players. Received: 31 July 2000/Accepted: 19 March 2001     

Truncated Egalitarian solutions

A family of solutions to the bargaining problem with a variable population, generalizing the Egalitarian solution, is introduced under the name of Truncated Egalitarian solutions. A Truncated Egalitarian solution solves small problems at thier Egalitarian outcome and larger problems at some fixed and therefore non-optimal point, violations of optimality being more severe for large than for small groups. Any solution satisfying Symmetry, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Continuity and Monotonicity (when the claims of more agents have to be accomodated, all agents should sacrifice) coincides with a Truncated Egalitarian solution except perhaps when only two agents are involved, in which case utility substitutions are possible in some limited range.     

Labor laws: Then and now

Our thesis is that the statutes governing labor market behavior were passed in a vastly different economic and institutional environment from that which prevails today. The underlying assumptions used to justify those laws are for the most part unrealistic in today’s altered economic climate. The problems of the 1930s or the 1960s are not the problems of the 1990s, and the solutions have changed as well. We show this by exploring four areas of labor law: collective bargaining, wages and hours, income security, and civil rights. The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by the John M. Olin Institute for Employment Practice and Policy.     

Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people’s impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people’s judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the ‘constrained equal-award’ solution.     

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.     

New labour rights indicators: Method and trends for 2000–15

This article describes a new method for constructing indicators of freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB) rights based on the coding of violations in nine textual sources, including six from the ILO, and texts from national legislation. The indicators were constructed for 185 ILO member States for five years between 2000 and 2015 and launched in 2015 by the Center for Global Workers’ Rights at Penn State University, together with the Global Labour University. Following a Resolution by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians in October 2018, the method provides the basis for Sustainable Development Goal indicator 8.8.2 on labour rights.     

Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points

We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate an ex ante efficiency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generalizations of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields a subclass of these solutions. By employing maximin efficiency and an invariance property that implies individual rationality, a new axiomatization of the monotone path solutions is obtained. Furthermore, we examine the consequences of employing efficiency axioms based on alternative decision criteria. Received: 17 March 2000/Accepted: 15 January 2001     

Partially monotonic bargaining solutions

The purpose of the paper is to study partially monotonic solutions for two-person bargaining problems. Partial monotonicity relates to the uncertainty a player has about the solution before bargaining. If the minimum utility a player can expect is greater in game T than in game S, and if T contains more alternatives than S, this may bring him to expect that his utility at the solution is greater in T than in S. Partially monotonic solutions reflect these expectations.One partially monotonic solution is axiomatized. The axioms of symmetry and independence of linear transformations are not explicitly assumed, although the solution has also these properties. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is shown to be the only continuous partially monotonic solution.This study was financed by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. I like to thank an associate editor and a referee for their valuable suggestions, and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation Study Group on Public Economics for useful discussions     

Globalization and Its Countermovement: Marxian Contention or Polanyian Resistance?

This article surveys the scholarship on the countermovement against the diffusion of capitalism and market economy in the Global South. We identify two streams of analysis in the literature. On the one hand, scholars observe contentious politics instances where the spread of capitalist production relations enables the associational capacity and bargaining power of social classes. On the other hand, there are voluminous studies on contentious politics in the Global South where groups such as peasants, shopkeepers, and urban poor resist the intensification of the market economy. We use Beverly Silver's distinction between Marx‐type and Polanyi‐type protests, which focuses on how globalization makes and unmakes social groups, to unpack the heterogeneity of the impacts and experiences of globalization. We argue that although Silver's distinction is of great analytical value, there are strong warrants for separating the effects of the market economy from capitalism in studying contentious politics against globalization. Such an analytical strategy (i) expands the scope of the distinction between Marxian and Polanyian contention to social groups other than the working class and (ii) emphasizes that the roots of these struggles lie in the interconnected diffusion of capitalism and market economy.     

Who Benefits from Production Outcomes? Gendered Production Relations among Climate‐Smart Agriculture Technology Users in Rural Ethiopia

The use of agricultural technologies is generally expected to increase production and household incomes. Gendered disparities in making use of agricultural outcomes could result in inequitable agricultural development. However, too little is known about whether the use of agricultural technologies improves gendered production relations, particularly in the Global South. This study investigates the question of gender‐equitable production relations by drawing on empirical data from women and men smallholders involved in conservation agriculture and small‐scale irrigation schemes in three study areas in Ethiopia. Findings show that the use of agricultural technologies does not improve unequal gendered production relations; rather, gender norms that exist within patriarchal social structures continue to influence production relations in at least three ways. First, societal norms restrict women from asserting their self‐interest in gendered bargaining. Second, there is a customary law in all the study areas that allows men (but not women) to inherit land—thus providing men with better bargaining and decision‐making positions over production outcomes, as they bring land to the marriage. Third, the restricted access of women to rural institutional services further contributes to unequal gendered production relations, as these services support men more than women in the use of agricultural technologies for enhanced production.     

Collective Bargaining and Community College Faculty: What Is the Wage Impact?

Studies that measure the impacts of collective bargaining on the salary of faculty in two-year colleges are limited. Most studies of faculty unions have used data that combine faculty in both two-year and four-year institutions. Recent work has demonstrated that past estimates of the impacts of unions on full-time faculty salaries in higher education suffer from multiple data, methodological, and statistical problems. This paper addresses these deficiencies, and the results support the claim that collective bargaining increases faculty salaries in two-year institutions, though by less than previously documented.     

An emerging transnational industrial relations? Exploring the prospects for cross‐border labour bargaining

Global union federations (GUFs) and multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been concluding “international framework agreements” (IFAs) to protect their interests amidst the globalizing economic landscape. By modelling the underlying bargaining processes, the authors show that IFAs can be expected when both sides exhibit risk aversion, although the agreement will favour the less risk‐averse side. Since globalization has created fewer vulnerabilities for MNEs than for GUFs, IFAs have so far typically delivered only minimal benefits for labour. But this should change in the future if strengthened transnational union capacities and abilities to threaten MNEs with reputational costs bring greater equalization of attitudes towards risk.     

Supplying lead firms,intangible assets and power in global value chains: Explaining governance in the fertilizer chain

Global suppliers of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and agrochemicals exert increasing degrees of power in global value chains (GVCs). Although the GVC literature has explained how global buyers govern GVCs from the buying-end, the question of how global suppliers achieve governance from the supplying-end remains underexplored. We address this gap by combining a multidimensional typology of power with literature on intangible assets. We argue that intangible assets are crucial resources for global suppliers to morph otherwise ungovernable supply chains for undifferentiated input commodities into more sophisticated and governable GVCs. We illustrate our argument with the case of the global fertilizer supplier, YARA International. YARA's intangible asset investments were instrumental in governing the value chain integration of Tanzanian smallholder farmers. They allowed YARA to exert more than bargaining power (demonstrative, institutional and constitutive power) and to effectively position itself as supplying lead firm in Tanzania's agro-industrial GVC.     

Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic, the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit, if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.