The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Decisions: Evidence from Italy

Based on a study of new investment announcements from 1989 to 1995 by Italian firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find a positive stock price reaction to new investment decisions. The stock price reaction is larger for joint venture announcements. The market response is also larger for non-state owned companies and when the announcement is released in a period of rising stock prices. The announced investment has no impact on the non-voting shares but increases the voting shares' market price through a significant revaluation of their vote-segment. We find some evidence that new investments lead to management's private benefits rather than towards firm value. This is consistent with the typical Italian corporate governance structure, where a majority shareholder safely controls a listed company while having only a fractional claim on the firm's cash flows.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Do synergies exist in related acquisitions? A meta-analysis of acquisition studies

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) aim to increase the wealth of shareholders of the acquiring company, in particular by creating synergies. It is often assumed that relatedness is a source of synergies. Our study distinguishes between business, cultural, technological, and size relatedness. It discusses the reasons why these different forms of relatedness can lead to an acquisition success and we conduct a meta-analysis of 67 prior M&A studies. Results indicate that positive effects can be expected under specific conditions only and have a limited overall impact on acquisition success. A moderator analysis finds that synergies stemming from relatedness depend on industry-, country-, and investor-characteristics.

The cross-border hostile bid fight between Scania in Sweden and the two German companies MAN and Volkswagen: institutional change and the mandatory bid rule

International hostile takeovers provide a unique context for studying how corporate governance mechanisms migrate across countries. This paper is prompted by a case study of the cross-border takeover fight between the target companies Scania (Sweden) and MAN (Germany) and the involvement of the owners of Volkswagen, Porsche (both Germany) and Investor (Sweden), 1999–2014. It reveals how incumbent owners in Germany and Sweden—two countries with a history of corporate control through blockholdings, corporatist-governance, state control (Germany) and multiple voting shares (Sweden)—manage to take advantage of the minority shareholders through arbitraging the differences in implementation of a new governance device across borders. The study focuses in particular on the mandatory bid rule (MBR) that forces a shareholder who passes a certain threshold of ownership to bid for the rest of the shares. The study reveals over twenty incidents of breaches of the idea of the MBR, to the detriment of minority shareholders. Building on institutional theory and sociology, the study provides useful insight into how incumbent actors may use bargaining power to capture a new regulation and circumvent it. Furthermore, the case illustrates the importance of legitimacy in the efforts to converge corporate governance systems. Thirdly, it adds to the critique of the mandatory bid rule in countries with a governance system supporting blockholders. Overall, the study raises a number of important issues regarding how national politics shape corporate governance and responds to new actors and coalitions of actors entering the scene. A convergence of takeover regulation not compatible with the legal framework might result in a less efficient than anticipated outcome of the market for corporate control. These results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective that key actors may have a vested interest in resisting change.     

Corporate control and underinvestment

This paper reports a study of how the benefits that large shareholders derive from their control of a firm affect the equity issue and investment decisions of the firm. I introduce an explicit agency cost structure based on the benefits of control of the largest shareholder. In a simple extension of the model developed by Myers and Majluf (J Financial Econ 13:187–221, 1984), I show that underinvestment is aggravated when there are benefits of being in control and these benefits are diluted if equity is issued to finance an investment project. Using a large panel of US data, I find that the concerns of large shareholders about the dilution of ownership and control cause firms to issue less equity and to invest less than would otherwise be the case. I also find that it makes no significant difference whether new shares are issued to old shareholders or new shareholders.     

Cross-border mergers and the cross-border effect: the case of the automotive supply industry

In this paper we examine stock price reactions to cross-border mergers and acquisitions in a particular industry, the automotive supply industry. We show that cross-border transactions entail a pronounced value creation for the acquiring shareholders and that this value creation also holds for transcontinental transactions, which to our knowledge have not been investigated so far. Splitting the sample by different types of targets indicates that the value creation mainly stems from takeovers of subsidiaries. By examining differences between national and international takeovers in cross-section, we sustain the recent evidence of a negative cross-border effect (i.e., cross-border mergers and acquisitions entail lower announcement returns than national ones).

Is Cash Dividend Policy a Tool for Tunneling or Masking Expropriations?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

本文利用我国2004～2008年上市公司平衡面板数据检验终极控制股东与现金股利之间的关系.研究发现,在其他条件相同的情况下,现金流量权与现金股利支付水平显著负相关;控制权和现金流量权分离度与现金股利支行水平显著正相关.这表明终极控制股东并不是把现金股利作为“掏空”的工具,而是把现金股利作为掩饰“掏空”的面具.     

股权分割、公司业绩与投资者保护

本文首先回顾了股权分割与公司业绩的相关文献 ,发现并没有一致的实证依据证明股权分割损害了上市公司的业绩。在此基础上 ,我们构建了一个更为广泛的上市公司1995～2001年的面板数据样本 ,对上市公司股权分割与公司业绩的关系以及公司上市后的业绩变迁进行了实证的研究 ,结果发现:(1)公司的业绩与非流通股 (国家股、法人股 )比例呈显著的U形关系 ,非流通股独大或独小并没有对公司业绩产生不利影响 ,相反适度混合的股权结构对公司业绩是最不利的;(2)上市公司在上市后的经营业绩整体呈逐年加速下滑趋势 ,而股权分割的差异对该趋势无显著的影响。我们认为 ,把股权分割当成是中国股市问题的核心是具有误导性的 ,私有产权和全流通并不能消除股票市场的委托代理问题。我国股票市场问题的关键在于缺乏有效的投资者保护机制 ,无法对政府、大股东和管理层的剥削行为进行约束 ,导致市场诚信的丧失。在制度性缺失的环境中 ,不同性质的公司控制者的行为方式不会有本质上的差异。我们认为股权问题的解决必须以投资者保护为基础 ,在我国大陆法系的架构下 ,当务之急是推动立法保护私有产权的合法权益 ,并通过引入“集体诉讼”和“辩方举证”机制加强投资者保护的效率     

Managerial Risk‐taking in International Acquisitions in the Brewery Industry: Institutional and Ownership Influences Compared

This paper deals with the role that institutional differences play in managerial risk‐taking when firms engage in international acquisitions. It is assumed that multinational corporations (MNCs) have different interests and capabilities when dealing with international acquisition, which in the authors’ view are significantly shaped by specific home country institutional influences. This study concerns the question of how different forms of ownership – concentrated (e.g. family and bank based) and dispersed (stock market based) – influence risk‐taking and managerial decision‐making in large international acquisitions. Comparing a total of 12 large acquisitions of four leading MNCs in the global brewery industry, the paper shows that mutually reinforcing influences of country of origin (coordinated vs liberal market economies) and ownership (family ownership vs stock market ownership) lead to different risk profiles and managerial risk‐taking with regard to international acquisitions.     

股权分置改革后IPO抑价与大股东的减持行为研究

股改后IPO公司大股东可能存在后市减持的动机。通过对股改前后在A股上市发行的555只新股进行实证研究发现,股改后第2～第10大股东持股比例越高的新股IPO抑价率越高,并且在上市后第13个月的股价相对市场指数下跌的幅度越大,而股改前则不存在这样的现象。研究结果表明,股改后新股大股东在12个月限售期满以后可能存在减持行为,而为了给后市减持提供更高的获利空间,大股东可能拉高新股的首日价格,从而造成了极高的IPO抑价率。     

解禁股份交易中的“择时”行为与大股东侵害

本文以股改后的解禁股份出售事件为研究对象,考察这一过程中的内幕交易与大股东侵害问题。研究发现,大股东在解禁股份交易中具有显著的择时能力,表现为通过出售股份赚取了超常收益、也及时规避了损失;股东对上市公司的控制力有助增强其择时能力,但由于信息优势在主动型内幕交易和被动型内幕交易中的不对称作用,只有控制力较强的股东才更有可能及时规避损失;股东关系有助于弥补控制力的不足,在与公司控股股东关系密切的情况下,控制力较弱股东也能在股份交易中及时规避损失。研究从股东控制力和股东关系两个角度,较为全面地分析了大股东侵害的可能途径;研究发现为思考全流通背景下的大股东侵害问题提出了新思路,也为加强对解禁股份的交易监管提供了理论依据。     

Shareholders ad Corprate Elections

Concern about the need to address the problem of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders has led to calls on shareholders to exercise their voting rights at the annual general meetings. It is argued here that the distribution of shareholding in the UK companies creates a complex pattern of incentives and disincentives for the holders of even larger blocks of shares to participate in the voting process. Whether the effort to participate is rewarded depends in an unpredictable manner on the distribution of large block shareholdings, and also on the percentage of the holders of small parcels who exercise their right to vote. A clear choice set is needed to arrive at a rational decision concerning the exercise of franchise, but that is not available.     

国有股和法人股对公司业绩的影响--公用事业型上市公司的实证研究

公司的股份集中于少数几个大股东手中是中国公司股权结构的一个普遍特征,研究这些大股东如何凭借其持股地位影响公司业绩是中国公司股权结构研究的一个非常重要的问题.本文选取了在上交所上市的公用事业型公司1998年至2002年的平行数据进行实证研究,结果表明,法人股对公司业绩有积极影响,国有股对公司业绩的影响视具体情况而定.     

国有股减持中的代理冲突、股权价值与路径依赖

本文认为国有股减持中政府、公众投资者和承销商等利益相关者之间没有形成“多赢”的局面 ,实际上是国有股减持涉及的代理关系中相关各方之间利益冲突的表现。其根源在于公众投资者在现行上市公司股权结构和治理结构中对股权价值的低水平预期。由于国有股东不会轻易放弃其私有收益 ,使得国有股减持中存在着路径依赖 ,所以 ,在现行的减持方案下国有股出售受阻 ,就谈不上国有股减持有改善上市公司治理结构和提高证券市场功能效率的意义。要达到现行《减持办法》中确定的国有股减持目标 ,必须在政府与公众投资者之间实现激励相容。这实际上是要政府“让利”于投资者 ,打破目前的股权结构、治理结构和相关法律法规的路径依赖 ,从证券市场功能完善、健康发展以及由之实现的国民经济战略调整中获得更多的收益。     

Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany

In this paper we address the question whether insider ownership affects corporate performance. Evidence from studies dealing with Anglo-Saxon countries is rather inconclusive, especially because results seem to be significantly affected by endogeneity. Economically, this is due to the fact that in these countries insider ownership seems to be mainly driven by management’s compensation contracts. We argue that Germany is different in this regard, as insider ownership is often related to family control, stock-based compensation is less widespread, and the market for corporate control used to be less developed. Starting from this presumption, our data allows an unbiased observation as to whether insider ownership affects firm performance. Using a pooled data set of 648 firm observations for the years 2003 and 1998, we find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance—as measured by stock price performance, market-to-book ratio and return on assets—and insider ownership. This relationship seems to be rather robust, even if we account for potential endogeneity by applying a 2SLS regression approach. Furthermore, the results hold for a sub-sample of firms that did not have a stock-based compensation program in place. Moreover, we find outside block ownership as well as more concentrated insider ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Overall, the results indicate that ownership structure might be an important variable explaining the long term value creation in the corporate sector.

大股东性质与企业绩效——国有股减持的一个经验证据

以我国上市公司为样本,研究了大股东所有权性质变更对公司绩效的影响。所选样本在样本区间的实证结果表明,从总体上看,企业由政府直接控制型公司转变为非政府直接控制型公司后,仅表现出显著的盈余管理,公司盈利能力没有发生变化。进一步分析发现,其中发生了高层管理人员更换(简称“高层更换”)的公司,短期盈利能力显著提高;面临激烈市场竞争的企业,盈利能力得到了根本改善。研究结果为国有股减持和股权多元化提供了经验证据,论证了引入市场导向的大股东、健全经营者任免机制和加强市场竞争对深化企业改革的意义。     

Agency conflicts,executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from Sweden

Based on a unique country set up with concentrated ownership of firms, strong representation of major shareholders on boards and one of the highest percentages of firms with dual-class shares worldwide I study CEO pay-performance sensitivity in Swedish listed firms in the years 2001–2013. Focusing on Type II agency conflict, I find that that pay-performance sensitivity in family-controlled firms with family CEOs is significantly lower than in other types of firms, and that dual-class firms have significantly lower sensitivity of pay to accounting performance than non-dual-class firms. The results suggest that in firms with type II agency conflicts compensation practices may be driven either by family ties or by the power preferences of the controlling shareholder that uses compensation to align CEO’s interest with his/her will rather than with financial performance. The study also documents that the link between CEO pay and performance disappears in the 2010–2013 period following the implementation of the European Recommendations regarding executive compensation. This finding is in contrast to the stipulated goal of the European Commission, ‘to ensure pay for performance’ (European Commission 2009).     

股利政策的股东财富效应:来自中国股市的经验证据

国内现有文献关于上市公司股利政策的研究,主要集中在股利政策的信号传递理论、代理成本理论和影响因素三个方面,对上市公司通过股利分配实现股东高回报率的股东财富效应研究较少,而国外从税收政策变化和税负差异的角度研究股利政策财富效应并不适合中国的情况。为此,本文基于我国上市公司股权分置的特殊治理结构,以2003-2004年所有分配股利的上市公司为样本,实证检验了我国上市公司股利政策的股东财富效应。研究表明,分配现金股利使非流通股股东实现高回报率,流通股股东获得股票股利的较高短期收益率。     

Effects of corporate equity ownership on firm value

We investigate the valuation effects related to corporate minority block purchases for a European sample of 113 purchases over 1993–2006. We argue that corporate block ownership, as opposed to institutional or individual block ownership, has several unique characteristics and can create significant short- and long-term wealth for target and acquiring firm shareholders. Because target firms that exhibit signs of inefficient monitoring or agency problems benefit the most, we conclude that corporate block ownerships can align incentives and mitigate information problems in corporate business relationships.     

融资受限、大股东“圈钱”与再发行募集资金滥用

中国上市公司再发行后业绩恶化与其投资行为不当有关,文章分析了股权结构、大股东圈钱、融资受限等因素对投资不当行为的影响.以1998—2001年配股样本进行实证检验,结果发现再发行前的资金储备程度越高,大股东参与再发行程度越低,募集资金滥用的可能性也越大,而大股东持股比例、股权制衡因素则对资金滥用可能性的影响不显著.这表明由于融资受限引起的资金储备动机和大股东圈钱动机是影响中国上市公司募集资金滥用的主要原因.文中的政策意义在于,再发行审批时应把再发行前的资金储备比例作为一个审批指标,并要求大股东积极参与再发行,以减少上市公司的再发行圈钱行为.