Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity

We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality.     

Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions

The objective of this paper is to describe various applications of a requirement of solidarity pertaining to situations in which the preferences of some of the agents may change. It says that the welfares of all agents whose preferences are fixed should be affected in the same direction: they should all weakly gain, or they should all weakly lose. We show how this condition, which we name “welfare-domination under preference-replacement”, can help in evaluating allocation rules. We discuss it in several contexts: private good allocation in classical economies, public good decision, binary choice with quasi-linear preferences, economies with indivisible goods, economies with single-peaked preferences, both in the private good case and in the public good case, and economies with time. For some of these models the implications of the property are well understood. For others, we state a number of open problems. Received: 2 January 1997/Accepted: 26 February 1998     

Rationing in the presence of baselines

We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this general model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care sector, water distribution in drought periods). We introduce (and characterize) a natural class of allocation methods for this model. Any method within the class is associated with a rule in the standard rationing model, and we show that if the latter obeys some focal properties, the former obeys them too.     

The replacement principle in economies with indivisible goods

 We consider the problem of allocating a list of indivisible goods and some amount of an infinitely divisible good among agents with equal rights on these resources, and investigate the implications of the following requirement on allocation rules: when the preferences of some of the agents change, all agents whose preferences are fixed should (weakly) gain, or they should all (weakly) lose. This condition is an application of a general principle of solidarity discussed in Thomson (1990b) under the name “replacement principle”. We look for selections from the no-envy solution satisfying this property. We show that in the general case, when the number of objects is arbitrary, there is no such selection. However, in the one-object case (a single prize), up to Pareto-indifference, there is only one selection from the no-envy solution satisfying the property. Such a solution always selects an envy-free allocation at which the winner of the prize is indifferent between his bundle and the losers’ common bundle. Received: 15 May 1995 / Accepted: 5 June 1996     

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good

We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We characterize the set of mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, equal compensation, and demand monotonicity. There are three types of mechanisms which have the following properties: (i) they determine the allocation of monetary compensation depending on who receives the indivisible good; (ii) they allocate the indivisible good to one of the pre-specified (one or two) agent(s); and (iii) they disregard preferences of agents other than the pre-specified agent(s). This result implies that the presence of an indivisible good induces serious asymmetry in mechanisms. Received: 26 March 1996 / Accepted: 23 September 1997     

The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games

In this study, we provide the conditions for efficient provision of a public good in a participation game in which a non-negative integer number of units of the public good can be provided. In the case in which at most one unit of the public good can be provided, we provide refinements of Nash equilibria at which agents choose only a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and provide sufficient conditions for cost-sharing rules that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation. In the case of a multi-unit public good, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium with an efficient allocation and prove that Nash equilibria are less likely to support efficient allocations if the participation of many agents is needed for efficient provision of the public good in the case of identical agents. I would like to thank Koichi Tadenuma, Yukihiro Nishimura, Toshiyuki Fujita, John Weymark, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato, Toshiji Miyakawa, Motohiro Sato, Takashi Shimizu, Nobue Suzuki, and Dirk T. G. Rübbelke for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank the anonymous referees for detailed comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the Japanese Economic Research Foundation and the Grand-in-Aid for Young Scientists (Start-up) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Any remaining errors are my own.     

Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy in The economics of market disequilibrium, Academic, New York, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: there is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaueddomain.     

A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation

This paper uses the Clarke mechanism to construct an incentive compatible t âtonnement process which converges to the Lindahl allocation of a stylized public good economy when consumers have quadratic preferences. We show truth-telling to be an ex-post perfect equilibrium in the infinite horizon game induced by the tâtonnement.     

Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains

We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible good among a group of agents in which each agent demands at most one unit of the good and money payment or receipt is required. Under general preference domains that may contain non quasi-linear preferences, the Vickrey allocation rule is characterized by axioms for equity and continuity without use of efficiency: namely, the Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, weak envy-freeness for equals, non-imposition, and continuity of welfare.     

Social security in Italy: towards a mixed system?

We evaluate recent reforms of Italian social security with respect to both the (long) transition and the new steady state, as defined by the notional defined contribution formula. The first is hardly sustainable in the face of the projected sharp increase in the dependency ratio. The second is hardly compatible with a good allocation of risks, given the preponderance of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) component. We believe that further reforms will have to be enacted within PAYG (with a correction to "seniority pensions") and beyond PAYG, with the introduction of an opting-out clause directed at readjusting the relative weights of the two components in households' retirement wealth. The opting-out clause could be combined with TFR (severance pay) diversion, which in itself appears insufficient to realize such an adjustment. Recent government proposals (2001) are briefly discussed.     

Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach

In this paper we study the problem of the determination of a fair allocation in a co-insurance problem, i.e., how some insurance companies have to share the risk and the premium. We develop two procedures that produce a proportional and an equitable allocation, respectively. The procedures are applied to a real situation arising from environmental risk and the resulting allocations are compared with the classical quota share allocation and with an envy-free allocation resulting from a procedure presented in Fragnelli and Marina (Insur. Math Econ 33:75–85, 2003).     

FAIR ALLOCATION WHEN PLAYERS' PREFERENCES ARE UNKNOWN

Suppose an arbitrator needs to allocate an asset among two players, whose claims on the asset are incompatible. The allocation outcome is said to be fair if the arbitrator awards an outcome that brings the same utility payoff to the two players whenever the two players' claims are symmetric and the allocation set is symmetric. In conjunction with other natural axioms, this fairness requirement implies a unique allocation outcome for any claims problem. We propose a mechanism which can be used by the arbitrator to implement this allocation outcome, even when the players' preferences are unknown to the arbitrator. (JEL C78, D63, J52)     

Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy

We consider an economy with two agents, “firm” and “worker.” The firm owns a technology which transforms a single input into a single output and the worker owns a limited amount of input good, for example, leisure. The firm is interested in profit measured in terms of output and the worker's preferences are defined over the input-output space. Manipulability comes not only from a lack of information about the (worker's) preferences but also about the technology. With a possibility for manipulation, can we still obtain efficient allocations? We show that there is no allocation mechanism which is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial. Received: 30 March 1998/Accepted: 06 July 1999     

The Geopolitics of Formosa

The authors outline an innovative activity that helps teachers make the abstract concepts of scarcity and allocation concrete in the K-12 classroom. Students evaluate the scarcity of chocolate and often determine, incorrectly, that the candy is not scarce because there is enough for each student to have one piece. After students reveal their preferences for the candy, they compare the total number of candies desired with the number of candies available. Because it is almost always the case that preferences cannot be met, students can easily see that candy is scarce. As with any scare resource, an allocation method is required. Students explore different alternatives for allocating the scarce good among competing consumers. The authors share results from three implementations of this activity.     

创新驱动，加快发展上海流通产业

流通产业是现代服务业的重要组成部分,该产业增长具有超越整体经济增长的潜力。上海的流通产业历史悠久、基础好,在全国具有领先优势。未来30年,上海将发展成为“全球城市（The Global City）”,成为全球指挥和控制中心以及资源配置中心。与上海城市发展的脉络一致,上海流通产业需要加快创新步伐,不断提高市场引导力、资源配置力、科技支撑力、综合竞争力。到2020年,上海将基本建成具有国际国内两个市场资源配置功能、与我国经济贸易地位相匹配的国际贸易中心。     

An empirical analysis of the time allocation of Italian couples: are they responsive?

The literature suggests that in Italy husbands contribute less to unpaid household work than in any other European country, while women have the lowest market employment rates. Here we examine the time allocation of Italian couples on which there are surprisingly few studies to date. We analyze simultaneously the time allocated by husband and wife to market work, childcare and housework, allowing for various interactions. We use data drawn from the Italian national Time Use Survey 2002–2003 for the analysis. We find that spousal time allocation is sensitive to personal and household characteristics, such as, in particular, education and children’s age. Evidence shows that men married to more highly educated women spend more time with their children. The husband’s own characteristics have less of an effect on women’s time allocation. We also find that patterns differ substantially between weekends and weekdays. The estimated correlations between the unobservable factors affecting the couple’s time allocation suggest that the time devoted by parents to childcare is complementary and that the time they devote to housework is substitutable across weekends and other weekdays.     

Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation

Suppose that a certain quantity M of money and a finite number of indivisible items are to be distributed among n people, all of whom have equal claims on the whole. Different allocations are presented using various criteria of fairness in the special case where each player's utility function is additively separable. An allocation is “money-egalitarian-equivalent” (MEE) if each player's monetary valuation of his or her bundle is a fixed constant. We show that there is an essentially unique allocation that is MEE and Pareto-optimal; it is also envy-free. Alternatively, the “gain” of a player may be defined as the difference between how the player evaluates his bundle and an exact nth part of the whole according to his numerical evaluation of the whole. A “gain-maximin” criterion would maximize the minimum gain obtained by any player. We show that Knaster's procedure finds an allocation which is optimal under the gain-maximin criterion. That allocation is not necessarily envy-free, so we also find the envy-free allocation that is optimal under the gain-maximin criterion among all envy-free allocations. It turns out that, even though there exist allocations that are simultaneously envy-free and Pareto-optimal, this optimal allocation may fail to be Pareto-optimal, and it may also violate monotonicity criteria. Received: 30 September 1996/Accepted: 6 March 2002 The author would like to thank Professor William Thomson for a discussion on this subject; and he would like to thank the anonymous referees, who made many substantive suggestions for improving this paper – shortening it, streamlining the arguments, improving the terminology, making further ties with the literature, and improving the exposition.     

Applied ethics and allocation of foreign aid: disparity in pretensions and practice

We explore the applied ethics of development aid and humanitarian assistance, and juxtapose these with claimed objectives and factors that influence the choice of recipients. Despite some diversity among donors, ethical considerations appear not to be a prominent factor for allocation of aid. Although recipients’ need is not entirely ignored, donors’ self‐interest and herd behaviour, and recipients’ merits and voting in the United Nations, play crucial roles in allocation decisions. Likely to be shunned are complex emergencies and fragile states, the overlapping settings for action of development and humanitarian aid. Donors should take to heart and put into practice that allocation of aid is an ethical endeavour that should rest on proper needs assessment, established objectives and adopted agreements.     

Endogenous productivity and equality of opportunity

We consider a production economy ??à la Mirrlees?? in which the earnings capability of individuals is endogenous. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences and their propensity to benefit from a given investment in human capital. We look for allocation rules satisfying properties that capture the objective of equalizing opportunities. We characterize four allocation rules that both encompass different perspectives of equality of opportunity and justify different levels of public intervention.