Cooperation between newcomers and incumbents: The role of normative disagreements

Cooperation in groups often requires individual members to make costly contributions that benefit the group as a whole. Prior research suggests that shared norms can help to support ingroup cooperation by prescribing common standards of how much to contribute. These common standards may be disrupted when groups undergo membership change, i.e., when members from outgroups enter the ingroup. When newcomers and incumbents have different notions about how much to contribute, a normative disagreement ensues that could undermine cooperation and the extent to which individuals identify with the group. In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate whether newcomers and incumbents disagree about how much to contribute in a public goods game with peer punishment. We examine whether normative disagreement between newcomers and incumbents affects newcomer-incumbent relations in terms of group identification, the emergence of a social norm, and costly punishment. The main goal is to test whether normative disagreement and the resulting newcomer-incumbent relations harm cooperation in terms of contributions to the common good. We find that normative disagreement between newcomers and incumbents negatively affects the emergence of a shared social norm and lowers feelings of group identification. Contrary to expectations, normative disagreement does not affect cooperation negatively. Instead, participants adjust their behavior to each other’s standards, using punishment for norm enforcement. This punishment is especially directed at low-contributing newcomers, leading them to conform to the incumbents’ higher contribution standards.     

LINKING WEALTH AND PUNISHMENT EFFECTIVENESS: PUNISHMENT AND COOPERATION UNDER CONGRUENT HETEROGENEITIES

Global and local cooperation in supplying global public goods is often insufficient. In this respect, laboratory experiments show that peer punishment is an effective cooperation-enhancing instrument. However, it is unclear whether peer punishment would facilitate cooperation and public good provision even under congruent heterogeneities in wealth and punishment effectiveness. To this end, we experimentally study the effect of peer punishment under joint heterogeneities, where either the richest or the poorest member is also the most effective punisher. We compare these joint heterogeneities to treatments with single heterogeneities in either endowment or punishment effectiveness and to a baseline symmetry treatment with homogeneous parties. We find that heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness does not matter for cooperation, whereas endowment heterogeneity reduces cooperation compared to symmetry. This is because rich members contribute a lower portion of their endowment to the public good than their poorer counterparts. We also observe that cooperation is higher under joint heterogeneities in endowment and punishment effectiveness than under endowment heterogeneity (with no differences than under symmetry). This holds even when the rich party gains less from cooperation and is the most effective punisher. (JEL C92, D74, H41)     

Altruistische Reziprozität. Theoretische Überlegungen und experimentelle Evidenz

Altruistic reciprocity means the unconditional tendency of ego to return any experienced action, no matter if the receiver is the same person ego has received the action from or not. Altruistic reciprocity is one candidate for the explanation of cooperation in anonymous, complex societies. In order to fulfill this function, altruistic reciprocity must work also with costly actions that are not socially controlled and directed to an anonymous third party. However, the experimental evidence shows no altruistic reciprocity if it is costly and directed to a third party. It remains unclear if there is costly and directed altruistic reciprocity. Reciprocity as a catalyzer of cooperation seems to be restricted to two situations: 1) Situations with social control where reciprocity is operative by social norms and/or strategic considerations. 2) Anonymous situations where reciprocity is cost-free and directed to the donor. Therefore, reciprocity seems not suitable as a motivator for cooperation in real anonymous situations, e.g. in a second-order free-rider problem.     

VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS

Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. ( JEL C92, D72, H41)     

More than ideology: perceived unfairness differentiates supporters of a new anti-austerity party from supporters of traditional left-wing parties / Más que ideología: la injusticia percibida diferencia a los simpatizantes de un nuevo partido antiausteridad de los simpatizantes de los partidos tradicionales de izquierda

After the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008, anti-austerity parties in South Europe have gained prominence and dramatically transformed the political landscape. In Spain, the emergence of PODEMOS, a left-wing, anti-austerity party, has jeopardized the traditional two-party system. However, little is known about the psychological reasons that prompted more than one million Spaniards to vote for a newly created party in its first elections. To fill this gap the present study examines why people intend to vote for PODEMOS as opposed to traditional left-wing parties. We found that in addition to conventional predictors of voting behaviour (ideological orientation and party identification), perceived unfairness — a key variable within the collective action theory — critically influenced the preference for PODEMOS as opposed to traditional left-wing parties. A qualitative analysis of the reasons that participants reported in an open question yielded similar results. These findings suggest that supporting an anti-austerity party might be considered a collective action aimed at promoting social change.     

Carry a big stick,or no stick at all: Punishment and endowment heterogeneity in the trust game

We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocity), the capacity of punishment (i.e., the deterrence hypothesis) and hidden costs of punishment (i.e., models of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation). Our results are hardly coherent with the first two (inequality aversion and deterrence), but roughly consistent with the latter.     

CUSTOMER OWNERSHIP AND QUALITY PROVISION IN PUBLIC SERVICES UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

The implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and nonhosting communities. The article focuses on the impact of participatory ownership on conflict resolution and social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect quality monitoring. We show that in such situations the participatory solution may help solve deadlocks that money transfers to a for‐profit operator cannot solve. The analysis highlights three main factors behind this fact. First, a customer‐owned cooperative internalizes, at least partially, the external effects generated by the project. Second, the alignment of cooperative members' preferences with those of the social planner reduces (in some cases eliminates) the distortions caused by information asymmetries. Third, cooperatives require less costly monitoring than their for‐profit counterparts. We also show that cooperatives' productive inefficiency with respect to for‐profits may emerge endogenously as a consequence of a lower pressure to compete on costs for the market. (JEL H23, L33, P13)     

Framing European integration in mediated public spheres: an increasing nationalization and contestation of European issues in party political communication?

This article proposes a claims-making analysis of party political communication over Europe in mediated public spheres in France, Ireland, the UK and Spain between 1993 and 2006. It demonstrates that office-seeking parties and especially the representatives of the executive power generally dominate Europeanized debates. In contrast, peripheral parties and other party actors such as party MPs and extra-parliamentary politicians face significant difficulties in obtaining visibility and resonance for their Europeanized frames. The empirical and longitudinal analysis also shows the prevalence of claims directed towards the EU level and of nationalized debates over Europe. Overall, even though critical engagements with Europe have progressed over time, the domination of mainstream parties and party actors in framing European integration and the pro-European consensus between office-seeking parties nevertheless limit the potential for contestation on European matters.     

Employer liability for third‐party sexual harassment

While most employers understand the scope of their responsibility to prevent sexual harassment between employees, the scope of an employer's responsibility to prevent sexual harassment by third parties is often less clear. Such third parties may include customers, clients, sales representatives, vendors, investors, or anyone in the workplace who is not a member of the employer's workforce. Although an employer may be unable to easily control non‐employee actions, it is legally obligated to respond to any third‐party sexual harassment of its employees that is brought to the employer's attention. With proper safeguards and remedial action, however, an employer can keep its employees safe from third‐party sexual harassment and protect itself from liability in the process. This Q&A explains employer liability for third‐party sexual harassment, describes the ramifications of an employer's failure to properly address or prevent it, and recommends strategies to reduce an employer's legal exposure.     

ENDOGENOUS DESTRUCTION IN CONFLICT: THEORY AND EXTENSIONS

This article develops a general equilibrium model of conflict to characterize the implications of endogenous destruction for bargaining and fighting. Specifically, we consider the scenario where two contending parties engage in bargaining to avoid fighting when there are direct costs (e.g., arms buildups) and indirect costs (e.g., destruction to consumable resources) of conflict. Without imposing specific functional form restrictions on conflict, production, and destruction technologies, we show their interactions in determining an optimal decision between fighting and bargaining. We find that, under the shadow of conflict, bargaining is costly as the contending parties always allocate more resources to arming for guarding settlement through bargaining than in the event of fighting. In contrast to conventional thinking that bargaining is Pareto superior over fighting, we show conditions under which fighting dominates bargaining as the Nash equilibrium choice. The positive analysis may help explain the general causes of fighting, without resorting to the assumption of incomplete information or misperceptions. (JEL D74, H56, C7)     

Nichts genaues weiss man nicht!?

What do voters really know about party platforms and how do they perceive the contents? Are there any relationships between party election platforms and electoral behavior? Despite of much research on parties, there are hardly any answers to these questions. If political parties devise programmes in order to influence political attitudes or electoral behavior, it will be necessary that these programmes are read by people. But it seems to be unclear if and how people do so. This article shows clearly that voters don’t know much about party manifestoes. Still, programmes are more important for voters than many people believe. Programmes are also an important factor for electoral behavior. But there is still a lack of data to get evident results.     

SEEKING UNMEDIATED POLITICAL INFORMATION IN A MEDIATED ENVIRONMENT: The uses and gratifications of political parties' e-newsletters

Political parties are increasingly attempting to communicate to sections of the electorate directly, in order to relay targeted messages. E-newsletters are one key communication mode that facilitates this strategy, and previous research indicates that these, like many communications using information and communication technology, offer much potential for the sender. This research focuses on the receiver, explicitly taking a uses and gratifications approach to understanding the function of e-newsletters for the UK electorate. Our findings suggest that the majority of receivers are committed party members who desire to receive information directly from the party that will help them in their campaigning and activist roles. There is, however, a minority of less-active, politically interested, subscribers who also use e-newsletters to aid their voter choice. The data suggest that e-newsletters are able to encourage subscribers to develop and build relationships with a political party, possibly becoming more active in their support than simply offering a vote at election times.     

中国城市社工与志愿者合作模式探析

社工与志愿者是城市社会管理创新的两支重要力量,近年来获得较快发展。但是,由于原来的管理体制分割、观念意识差异等影响,缺乏合作共享,削弱了社会服务的实效。最近,中国通过“第三方力量”的努力,建立“社工＋志愿者”合作的组织平台、资源体系,为城市社会管理提供更多的服务。     

MASTERING THE ART OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Online communication has become a central part in the communication repertoires of political actors in Western mass democracies. In Switzerland, where broadband, internet use, and media literacy are amongst the highest in the world, all major political parties run their own website and are active on social media. This article seeks to show how Swiss political parties deal with social media, how they implement it and how they use social media. The study builds on empirical data from a structural analysis of party websites, the official Facebook sites, and Twitter feeds. These social media sites were analysed for their resonance, update frequency, and thematic clusters focusing on information, mobilization, and participation. A weekly assessment of the user numbers illustrates the development of user resonance throughout the 2011 election year. While political parties claim to appreciate the dialogue and mobilization potentials of social media, they mainly use social media as an additional channel to spread information and electoral propaganda. The overall resonance is still on a very low level. The data seem to sustain the normalization hypothesis, as larger parties with more resources and voters are better able to generate effective communication and to mobilize online than small and marginal parties.     

Protests,signaling, and elections: conceptualizing opposition-movement interactions during Argentina’s anti-government protests (2012-2013)

ABSTRACT

This article explores the interface of protest movements and opposition parties, considering this remains conceptually under-specified. It does so by proposing a processual framework involving three mechanisms of party-movement interaction – signaling, frame-alignment, and coalition-building – at play in different phases of a contentious cycle unfolding under electoral conditions. Drawing on novel interview data, the article validates this proposal by tracing direct and indirect effects between protest signals, activists, and Argentine opposition parties during the year-long contentious cycle that preceded the defeat of the Kirchner government in the 2013 legislative elections. On this basis, it is argued that interactive dynamics between protest actors and political parties can significantly affect opposition politics, supporting the emergence of collaborative strategies that may have major electoral implications. The article thus makes relevant theoretical and empirical contributions, by both offering an analytical bridge between social movement and party politics literatures with potential for further elaboration, while illuminating new developments concerning the positioning of Latin American center-right parties in relation to mass protests.     

Seeing beyond the datasets: the unexploited structure of electoral and institutional data

We propose relational data modeling as a tool for replacing the ad hoc and uncoordinated approaches commonly used throughout the social sciences to gather, store, and disseminate data. We demonstrate relational data modeling using global electoral and political institutional data. We define a relational data model as a map of concepts, their attributes, and the relationships between concepts developed using a formal language and according to a set of rules. To demonstrate the methodology, we design a simple relational data model of six concepts: countries, parties, elections, districts, institutions, and election results. Furthermore, we introduce a data model to solve the particularly vexing issue of party discontinuity (party splits, mergers, and alliances). We show how the solution facilitates computational tasks, such as the calculation of core measures of political phenomena (ex: electoral volatility). Ultimately, a relational data approach will play a central role in collective investments to develop advanced data capabilities, and thereby advance the accuracy, pace, and transparency of scholarship in the social sciences.     

POLITICAL MODELS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE SHOULD BE REVIVED

Political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive. This paper addresses the second issue, demonstrating for U.S. real GNP, unemployment, and inflation that electoral cycles (persistent patterns across electoral terms) are significant, but apparently only for Republican incumbents, and that partisan cycles (persistent differences between parties) are also significant. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns, whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives.     

Languages of Class in US Party Platforms, 1880–1936

This article will explore the shifting use of class language in party platforms during the Lochner era, a period of increased class polarization, social unrest, and laissez faire judicial philosophy. It explores the ways in which political parties responded to the growing inequality of wealth and the judicial distaste for “class legislation.” Using as a dataset all available party platforms of the presidential elections years during this period, I analyze the impact of class identity and class consciousness on politics and social movements during this time, finding that (1) class language increased during this period, with its sharpest images and depictions found in third party platforms; (2) the use of class language was directly connected to calls for an end to “government by injunction” and very specific proposals for workers; (3) the two major parties often took on some of these specific recommendations in the following presidential cycle or cycles, but without the attendant class language; leading to (4) a general muting of explanations for the cause of industrial conflict (irrecoof industrialncilable interests of labor and capital) in favor of specific reforms leading to government as mediator, picked up primarily by the Democratic Party.