THE INCENTIVES FOR RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

This paper considers both the incentives for and the welfare effects of resale price maintenance (RPM) in retail markets characterized by imperfect consumer information. In markets where point-of-sale information on the product is essential for sales and information on prices is costly, RPM permits manufacturers with some monopoly power to resolve two incentive conflicts with retailers. First, because retailers with price-setting powers do not appropriate the gains in profit to an upstream manufacturer from actions taken to increase demand, their incentives to inform consumers of the product and to set low prices are inadequate. This purely vertical externality results in the classic "double mark-up" of final prices. Second, when consumers' costs of price search vary, stores offering low prices and no information can exist in the market equilibrium. These discount houses free-ride on the informational services of high-price informing retail outlets — a horizontal externality. In the imperfect information setting of this paper, (1) administered pricing improves monopolists' profits by resolving the incentive conflict; (2) the profitable use of a price floor reduces the maximum retail price charged and may reduce the average retail price; (3) price floors or administered prices can be Pareto-improving and more likely welfare (surplus)-improving; (4) price floors are welfare-improving.     

RETAIL REDLINING: ARE GASOLINE PRICES HIGHER IN POOR AND MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS?

This study uses new data on retail gasoline prices in three cities to provide evidence on the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and consumer prices. We find that prices do not vary greatly with neighborhood racial composition, but that prices are higher in poor neighborhoods. For a 10% point increase in poor families relative to middle‐upper income families, retail gasoline prices increase by an average of 0.70%. Two‐thirds of this differential is explained by cost, competition, and demand characteristics of poor neighborhoods. The remaining differential likely reflects price discrimination in response to lower competition and/or more inelastic demand in poor neighborhoods. (JEL D43, J15, L71)     

PERFECT COMPETITION, URBANIZATION, AND TAX INCIDENCE IN THE RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET

We use monthly gasoline price data for all 50 U.S. states over the period 1984–1999 to examine the incidence of state gasoline excise taxes. Our estimation results indicate full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer. In addition, although we find that gasoline retail prices demonstrate asymmetric responses to changes in gasoline wholesale prices , we find only limited evidence of such behavior for retail prices with respect to gasoline excise taxes. Finally, we find that gasoline markets in urban states exhibit full shifting, but those in rural states (with less competition) demonstrate somewhat less than full shifting . ( JEL H22)     

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: THE CASE OF MULTIATTRIBUTE PRODUCTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMERS

We examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about the quality attributes of their products. In particular, we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and heterogeneous consumers. We show that there exist certain configurations of consumers' multidimensional preferences under which a firm, no matter whether producing a high‐ or low‐quality product, may choose not to reveal the quality even with zero disclosure costs. The failure of information unraveling arises when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demand, which triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for competing firms. As a result, the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory. (JEL L15, L5)     

Retail attribute sensitivity and shopping patronage

Using conjoint analysis the sensitivity for the four most important retail attributes: price, quality, assortment and locational convinience for food stores is measured for a sample of 400 consumers in Tilburg, The Netherlands. In a second wave the actual shopping behavior is measured using a self-administrated questionnaire. The sensitivity scores are used separately and in conjunction, as sensitivity patterns, to explain patterns of shopping behavior as well as separate shopping characteristics. The relationships found, suggest the usefulness of this kind of approach as it gives in-depth insight into shopping behavior and choice of grocery store.     

DISCOUNT PRICING

We investigate the practice of framing a price as a discount from an earlier price, with information such as “was $200, now $100.” We discuss two reasons why a discounted price—rather than a merely low price—can make a consumer more willing to purchase. First, a high initial price can indicate the seller has chosen to supply a high-quality product. Second, when a seller with limited stock runs a clearance sale, later consumers infer that unsold stock has higher expected quality when its initial price was higher. We also suggest a behavioral explanation, which is that consumers with reference-dependence preferences are more likely to buy if they perceive the price as a bargain relative to the earlier price. Discount pricing is therefore an effective marketing technique, and a seller may wish to deceive potential customers by offering a false discount. The welfare effects of regulation to prevent fictitious pricing are subtle, with potential unintended consequences, and depend on whether consumers are sophisticated or naive. (JEL D18, D42, D83, L15, M31)     

It’s about the process,not the result: An fMRI approach to explore the encoding of explicit and implicit price information

This research examines the neurophysiological correlates of consumers’ price memory processes. We focus on the explicit and implicit dimensions of consumers’ price knowledge and use an experimental functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study to assess how the encoding of task-dependent price memory affects the choice process and neural activation. The findings of our study add to the field of consumer neuroscience by demonstrating how neural correlates of explicit and implicit task-dependent price memory can shed light on processes that guide consumer decision-making. Over the course of our experiment we found that consumers did not always make consistent decisions, but that their decisions were influenced by explicit components of price memory. Implicit price memory components seem to have a more supportive role in the decision-making process. In summary, we found that price memory is a dynamic construct that is influenced by unconscious and neurophysiological processes, and we conclude that a neurophysiological perspective can add value for consumer and marketing research.     

Differences in Factors Attracting Consumers to Taiwan's Supermarkets and Traditional Wet Markets

Exit interviews were used to summarize factors attracting consumers to six supermarkets and three wet markets in a representative city. Using the history of the marketplace as the foundation for analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of the two retail formats are introduced and are compared to the consumer response data. Findings indicate that the decline of Taiwan's traditional markets will probably continue until all are replaced by new retail formats. Currently, the traditional market is in the weakest of all the retail positions since it supplies the needs of a shrinking population of older consumers with preferences and shopping behaviors unlike those of younger, nontraditional consumers. Supermarket expansion is slowing because new hypermarkets, convenience stores, and warehouse stores are competing to satisfy the needs of the younger, more mobile target population. Overall, store formats that provide lower prices, sales promotions, a good environment, good product quality, and good service have the greatest opportunity to build consumer loyalty and increase market share.     

A THEORY OF BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY

In horizontal mergers, concentration is often measured with the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI). This index yields the price–cost margins in Cournot competition. In many modern merger cases, both buyers and sellers have market power, and indeed, the buyers and sellers may be the same set of firms. In such cases, the HHI is inapplicable. We develop an alternative theory that has similar data requirements as the HHI, applies to intermediate good industries with arbitrary numbers of firms on both sides, and specializes to the HHI when buyers have no market power. The more inelastic is the downstream demand, the more captive production and consumption (not traded in the intermediate market) affects price–cost margins. The analysis is applied to the merger of the gasoline refining and retail assets of Exxon and Mobil in the western United States. (JEL L13, L41)     

Pre-commitment vs. flexibility: Uncertainty and distribution reform in P.R. China

Chinese economic reform is remarkably different from the East European reforms in which the Chinese model emphasizes competition over privatization. This paper explains why Chinese distribution reform is successful although the Chinese government has made no attempt in privatizing her inefficient state-owned enterprises. By extending Coughlan's (1985) price competition model to endogenize the pre-commitment versus flexibility decision, it is shown that reducing uncertainty can encourage enterprises to pre-commit their investment which allows further development of the retail sectors. This result supports the gradual pace of distribution reform policy of China. By contrast, the “revolutionary” East European model inevitably creates high uncertainty in the society and enterprises are unwilling to pre-commit their investment.     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

A GUIDE TO THE PITFALLS OF IDENTIFYING PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper demonstrates that plausible cost-based explanations exist for what are commonly perceived to be cases of price discrimination. We explain such commonly discussed problems as the price spreads of retail gasoline products, the "high" price of dinners at restaurants, the "high" price of popcorn at movie theaters, and the fact that airline ticket prices vary with how long the ticket is purchased before the flight's departure. Our explanations benefit from not relying on consumer ignorance or implicit collusion among numerous sellers.     

Purchase deadline as a moderator of the effects of price uncertainty on search duration

A longstanding theoretical tenet in the economic psychology literature is that consumers respond to greater price uncertainty by increasing search. The generality of this tenet was investigated in the context of a moderating variable, purchase deadline. It was hypothesized that the effect of increased price uncertainty, as reflected by both cross-sectional price variability and longitudinal price variability, was moderated by temporal proximity to a purchase deadline. The hypothesis was tested by analyzing purchase data from a sample of consumers with known purchase deadlines searching for rental trucks. The results indicated that search increased in response to greater price uncertainty for distant deadlines but decreased in response to greater price uncertainty for proximal deadlines.     

IMPACT OF COMPETITION,INVESTMENT, AND REGULATION ON PRICES OF MOBILE SERVICES: EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

In this paper, we assess the impact of competition, investment, and regulation on prices of mobile services in France. We estimate hedonic price regressions using data on tariff plans offered by the main mobile telecommunications operator in France between May 2011 and December 2014. In this time period, the obtained quality‐adjusted price index decreased by about 42.8% as compared to a decline in weighted average prices without quality‐adjustment of 8.7%. In a second step, we relate the quality‐adjusted prices to a set of competition, investment, and regulation variables and find that the launch of 4G networks by mobile operators was the main driver of price reductions for classic tariffs with commitment. Low‐cost tariffs without commitment which were introduced to pre‐empt the entry of low‐cost competitor declined at the time of entry. Moreover, we find that regulation, which is approximated by the level of mobile termination charges and international roaming price caps for voice and data, has a joint significant impact on quality‐adjusted prices. In percentage terms, competition is responsible for about 23.4% of total price decline and investments in 4G for 56.1%. We conclude that the reduction in quality‐adjusted prices in the last years was largely caused by competition between operators for a new 4G technology and by entry of a fourth low‐cost operator. (JEL L13, L50, L96)     

PRODUCT COMPATIBILITY HINDERS PRE-EMPTIVE ADVERTISING

This paper considers competition in systems of complementary products and examines how compatibility affects the use of informative advertising by an incumbent to deter entry. Advertising increases demand for a product; customers become price sensitive and competition increases, pre-empting new market entrants. However, compatibility reduces competition, so incumbent advertising becomes less effective at deterring entry and additional, costly advertising would be required to induce deterrence. Moreover, compatibility increases advertising by a potential entrant; with efficient advertising technology, consumers are informed about all products and the incumbent cannot deter entry by using additional advertising. Therefore, product standardization policies that encourage compatibility can support new market entrants by discouraging pre-emptive advertising strategies. (JEL D21, D43, L13, L15)     

MOTIVATION CROWDING IN REAL CONSUMPTION DECISIONS: WHO IS MESSING WITH MY GROCERIES?

We present evidence of crowding out of intrinsic motivation in real purchasing decisions from a field experiment in a large supermarket chain. We compare three instruments, a label, a subsidy, and a neutral price change, in their ability to induce consumers to switch from dirty to clean products. Interestingly, a subsidy framed as an intervention is less effective than either a label or a neutrally framed price change. We argue that this provides a new explanation for crowding behavior: consumers are resistant to having the line of demarcation between public and private decision making moved in either direction. (JEL C93, Q18, Q54, Q58, H23, H41)     

THE WELFARE COSTS OF RATIONING BY WAITING

With price controls and rationing by waiting, rational consumers increase the quantity bought per purchase. This individually rational response is socially wasteful and the cost of making it is a deadweight loss. This cost plus the value of time spent in queues may exceed the total rent transferred from suppliers to consumers by price controls; i.e., the value of resources spent competing for the rent may exceed the rent itself. This point is illustrated by an empirical application to gasoline price controls. Rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent transferred.     

Food‐Retail Development and the Myth of Everyday Low Prices: The Case of Brazil

This article analyses the changes in Brazilian food retailing by investigating the co‐existence of, and the pricing variation across, large supermarket chains and small independent supermarkets. It uses cointegration tests to show that, despite the widespread belief that small supermarkets are inefficient and charge higher prices, they in fact charge lower prices. Accordingly, in contrast to the prevailing literature on food‐retail development, competition in food retail is complex and cannot be described as a simple Darwinian process of market concentration. The article explores the survival of small retail and its consequences for the current discussion on modern food retail in developing countries.     

THE AMBIGUOUS CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-DUMPING LAWS

The anti-dumping law is most often applied in oligopolistic industries, while most analyses focus on the monopoly model. I analyze a duopoly model where a foreign firm engages in price-based dumping. Under Cournot behavior, the anti-dumping law has ambiguous price and welfare effects. When the home firm is a Stackleberg leader, two disquieting effects emerge. First, the home firm can use the anti-dumping law to curtail competition even when the foreign firm does not initially engage in dumping. Second, the anti-dumping law can increase profits of both firms at the expense of domestic consumers.