Fear and caring: Procedural justice,trust, and collective identification as antecedents of voluntary tax compliance

We investigated the interactive roles of procedural justice of the tax authority, trust in the tax authority, and identification with the nation in predicting voluntary tax compliance. Drawing from fairness heuristic theory and relational models of justice, we predicted that the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance that has been found particularly among citizens with low (vs. high) trust in the tax authorities is restricted to citizens who weakly (vs. strongly) identify with the nation. The results of a field study with samples of Ethiopian and US taxpayers as respondents largely support our predictions. This research integrates the role of important and well-studied social psychological factors that shape voluntary tax compliance and reveals support for the hypothesis in a developing (i.e., Ethiopia) and a developed (i.e., US) nation – nations with strongly divergent tax climates.     

Building versus maintaining a perceived confidence-based tax climate: Experimental evidence

A confidence-based climate between public administrations and citizens is essential. This paper argues and provides empirical evidence that depending on the perceived interaction history, different policies are needed to build versus maintain confidence. Applying the extended Slippery Slope Framework of tax compliance, an online and a laboratory experiment were conducted to explore whether tax authorities’ coercive and legitimate power have different effects depending on whether they are situated in an antagonism-based or confidence-based climate. Results showed that in an antagonism-based interaction climate, a combination of high coercive and high legitimate power changed the climate into a confidence-based interaction climate. In contrast, in a confidence-based climate the same power combination did not maintain but erode the climate. Results also suggest that confidence-based climates are maintained by low coercive power combined with high legitimate power. The paper concludes that interaction climates operate as psychological frames which guide how policy instruments affect taxpayers’ trust in the tax authorities.     

Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so that the audit probability depends on the joint decisions among the taxpayers. We compare the bounded rule to the widely studied flat-rate rule, where taxpayers are informed that they will be audited with a constant probability. The experimental evidence shows that, as theoretically predicted, the bounded rule induces the same level of compliance as the flat-rate rule when strategic uncertainty is low, and a higher level of compliance when strategic uncertainty is high. The bounded rule also induces distinctive tax evasion dynamics compared to the flat-rate rule. The results suggest that increasing the level of strategic uncertainty among taxpayers could be an effective device to deter tax evasion.     

Tax differentiation,lobbying, and welfare

To what extent a taxing authority should be granted the power to impose different tax schedules to different groups of taxpayers? Although the policy maker aims at maximizing social welfare, her tax policy may be distorted by the lobbying activity of taxpayers. In this political environment we characterize the conditions under which social welfare can be increased by restricting the set of tax instruments available to the policy maker; i.e., the scope of tax differentiation. We show that full differentiation is more costly, in terms of welfare distortions, when the lobbies are asymmetric in size, while minimal differentiation is more costly when the tax bases are asymmetric across different groups.     

Compliance costs caused by agency action? Empirical evidence and implications for tax compliance

Compliance costs of taxpayers should not only be affected by the tax law itself but also by its implementation through the tax authorities. In this paper we analyze the effect of authority behavior on the burden of complying with tax regulations. Using survey data of Belgian businesses, we develop an estimation strategy to overcome simultaneity bias by the construction of proxy variables. According to our estimate, a customer-unfriendly tax administration increases the average compliance burden by about 27%. Our outcome has interesting implications for further research. First of all, authority behavior does not only affect “soft” tax compliance factors like fairness and trust, but also “hard” aspects like costs. Second, the distribution of administrative cost burdens between the taxpayer side and the authorities may be important regarding the cost-efficiency of the tax system as a whole.     

The slippery slope framework on tax compliance: An attempt to formalization

Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) presented with the so-called ‘slippery slope’ framework a new approach to understand tax compliance. The slippery slope approach supposes two routes to tax compliance: deterrence of tax evasion by audits and fines on the one hand, and building a trusting relationship with taxpayers by services and support on the other hand. In this paper, the slippery slope framework is formalized by assuming two groups of taxpayers: compliance-minded and evasion-minded persons. Defining reaction functions for persons of both groups with respect to coercive and persuasive power instruments of tax authorities, the typical slippery slope picture emerges that characterises the authorities’ work. As a consequence, both groups of policy tools are considered necessary to generate tax compliance. In addition to that, it is shown that coercive and persuasive power may be substitutes or complements to each other, depending of the parameters of the taxpayers’ reaction functions. As a further crucial determinant of tax compliance, the behaviour of the fellow citizens with respect to taxpaying is identified.     

When do severe sanctions enhance compliance? The role of procedural fairness

Building on theoretical notions that severe sanctions (more than mild ones) can communicate that sanctioned behavior is morally unacceptable, we argued that particularly authorities who enact the sanction procedures in a fair manner stimulate compliance with their decisions. This is because such authorities should be considered legitimate to communicate what is morally acceptable and unacceptable. This interactive effect of sanction size and procedural fairness on compliance should thus be mediated by moral evaluations of the authority. A field survey and an experiment revealed support for these predictions. These results thus support a non-instrumental perspective on the effectiveness of sanction severity in increasing compliance with authorities.     

Empathy,sympathy, and tax compliance

This paper examines the effect of “empathy” and “sympathy” on tax compliance. We run a series of laboratory experiments in which we observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot Tax Compliance Games presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Importantly, we employ methods to identify subjects’ sympathy, such as the Davis Empathic Concern Scale and questions about frequency of prosocial behaviors; we also use priming in order to promote subjects’ empathy. Our results suggest that the presence of sympathy in most cases encourages more tax compliance. Our results also suggest that priming to elicit empathy also has a positive impact on tax compliance. These results support the inclusion of noneconomic factors in the analysis of tax compliance behavior.     

Social norms and tax compliance: Framing the decision to pay tax

Observed levels of tax compliance are higher than predicted levels (when predictions are based on Allingham and Sandmo's neoclassical model of tax evasion). They are higher if social norms recognise the importance of compliance. But how do social norms frame decisions to pay tax? Can prospect theory be applied to shed insight into the way that social norms exert their influence? An analysis of questionnaire responses (from Italy and from the UK) suggests that they exert their influence by changing the reference points that individuals use when they code changes as ‘gains’, or ‘losses’. The evidence suggests that social norms frame the decision to pay tax by changing individuals’ perceptions of their entitlement to income. This consideration is important when designing policy to deter evasion.     

A self-interest analysis of justice and tax compliance: How distributive justice moderates the effect of outcome favorability

Compliance with tax authorities has been studied mainly in the fields of economics and psychology. The focus has respectively been on self-interest motives and justice concerns in tax compliance. We argue that both concerns are less divergent than is often thought. Specifically, we studied the moderating role of distributive justice on the relationship between outcome favorability and tax compliance in two cross-sectional surveys. It is generally believed that favorable outcomes increase compliance because they decrease what can be gained from non-compliance. The present research addresses the role of distributive justice in this process. Since people believe that distributive fairness guarantees their long-term outcomes, favorable present outcomes now imply favorable future outcomes and unfavorable present outcomes now imply unfavorable future outcomes. Thus, we expected fair outcomes to result in a strong relationship between outcome favorability and compliance. On the basis that unfair outcomes are believed to result from chance, outcome favorability should have a weaker relationship with compliance when outcomes are unfair. Even when controlling for other variables, this prediction was supported by both studies.     

The Role of Procedural Justice in Public Personnel Management: Empirical Results from the Department of Defense

This article examines the relationship between federal employeeperceptions of procedural justice and work satisfaction rates,turnover intentions, and the degree to which employees trusttheir managers. As the federal government considers reformingthe civil service system, including changes to the proceduresused to discipline employees and resolve grievances, understandingthese relationships becomes particularly important. Analysisof Department of Defense data from the 2002 Federal Human CapitalSurvey indicates a significant, positive relationship betweenprocedural justice perceptions, satisfaction rates, and trustin management. Likewise, a significant and negative relationshipexists between procedural justice perceptions and turnover intentions.Interestingly, given similar levels of procedural justice perceptions,managers exhibit lower levels of satisfaction and trust andhigher turnover intentions. This study provides an importantbenchmark for Defense and other agencies that are redesigningpersonnel systems and serves as a caution against implementingsystems that employees may not view as either legitimate orjust.     

Contingent valuation method can increase procedural justice

We hypothesized that the contingent valuation method (CVM) can enhance the procedural justice of policy formation as perceived by people generally, which in turn increases public acceptance of policy. In Study 1, a survey (n=484) asked whether respondents would accept a one-off tax, the purpose of which would be to protect the natural environment of Yakushima Island, Japan. In one condition, the respondents were told that the amount of the one-off tax was determined using the CVM. In a second condition, no such instruction was given. In Study 2, 55 subjects were asked to indicate their acceptance, or otherwise, of a one-off tax for the protection of the natural environment of Yakushima Island when the tax was determined using the CVM, and when the tax was determined using cost–benefit analysis. The data from the survey and the experiment confirmed the hypothesis that the CVM enhanced the perceived procedural justice and acceptance of the tax.     

The belonging model of trust

Although we know that high‐quality employee–organization relationships are beneficial, these relationships are complex and not fully understood, especially among employees of nonprofit organizations. In particular, we know little about how these employees perceive trust, which may overlook an important contributor to effective management. We begin to address this issue by testing a new theoretical model that conceptualizes perceived insider status, psychological ownership, and organizational identification as foundations for the perception of justice and subsequent trust. Our results indicate that psychological ownership and perceived insider status relate to trust through procedural and interpersonal justice. These results contrast those typically found in for‐profit contexts in that organizational identification did not predict justice and that distributive and informational justice did not predict trust.     

The influence of tax authorities on the employment of tax practitioners: Empirical evidence from a survey and interview study

Tax practitioners play a crucial role in the degree of taxpayers’ compliance – a role that has increased as tax systems worldwide have become more complex. However, little is known about tax authorities’ impact on taxpayers’ decisions to employ tax practitioners. Based on earlier research on motivations to employ a tax practitioner and the extended slippery slope framework of tax compliance, we conducted two studies which provide some answers. A survey study – comprising a representative sample of 500 Austrian self-employed taxpayers – revealed that financial gain is not the most important reason to employ a tax practitioner but instead the motivation to avoid problems with the tax authorities. Related to that, we also find that taxpayers’ perception of tax authorities wielding coercive power motivates them to employ tax practitioners. In the interview study with 33 self-employed taxpayers and 30 tax auditors, taxpayers indicated that they sought to avoid contact with tax officers by employing tax practitioners. This finding was supported by tax officers who reported preferring interaction with tax practitioners over direct contact with taxpayers. The two studies point to the complex relationship between taxpayers, tax authorities and tax practitioners, and allow the drawing of theoretical and practical implications.     

Honesty or dishonesty of taxpayer communications in an enforcement regime

In many settings the true likelihood of capture when engaging in an illegal activity, such as tax evasion, is not well known to an individual. “Official” statements from the tax administration regarding enforcement effort provide some information. In addition, “informal”, or “unofficial”, communication among taxpayers can supplement these official announcements, but individuals do not know with certainty whether such unofficial information is honest (or accurate) versus dishonest (or inaccurate). We examine the truthfulness of an individual’s revelation of unofficial information to other individuals, along with the factors that affect any revelation, focusing on the intrinsic motivations for revelations. Our experimental design allows us to examine the type and the honesty of messages that an individual chooses to send to other individuals regarding their own audit outcome and their own compliance behavior. Our results indicate that most individuals send accurate messages about their own audit outcomes and their own compliance behaviors. Nevertheless, many individuals are also systematically dishonest about being audited; that is, we observe a significant tendency for individuals to claim that they were audited when they were not. We also observe a strong interaction between individuals’ audit outcomes and their compliance behaviors, so that individuals who engaged in tax evasion and who were audited were more truthful in their communications than those whose tax evasion went undetected.     

Measuring and explaining tax evasion: Improving self-reports using the crosswise model

Due to its sensitive nature, tax compliance is difficult to study empirically, and valid information on tax evasion is rare. More specifically, when directly asked on surveys, respondents are likely to underreport their evasion behavior. Such invalid responses not only bias prevalence estimates but may also obscure associations with individual predictors. To generate more valid estimates of tax evasion, we used a new method of data collection for sensitive questions, the crosswise model (CM). The CM is conceptually based on the randomized response technique (RRT), but due to its advanced design, it is better suited for large surveys than classical RRTs. In an experimental online survey, we compared the CM (N = 862) to standard direct questioning (DQ; N = 305). First, our results showed that the CM was able to elicit a higher proportion of self-stigmatizing reports of tax evasion by increasing privacy in the data collection process. Second, on average, we found stronger effects of our predictor variables on tax evasion in the CM condition compared with the DQ condition such that an egoistic personality and the opportunity for tax evasion predicted actual tax evasion only in the CM condition.     

AMBIGUITY ABOUT AUDIT PROBABILITY, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND TAXPAYER WELFARE

We show that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited (ambiguity) increases tax compliance for ambiguity-averse taxpayers but reduces compliance for ambiguity lovers. Because experimental evidence reveals considerable heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity preferences, we conclude that fostering uncertainty about the probability of being audited may not be an effective policy for increasing taxpayer compliance. Moreover, because the tax authority can neither categorize nor screen taxpayers on the basis of their preferences for ambiguity, it is not likely to be either a useful or a desirable instrument for increasing taxpayer welfare. (JEL H26 , D81 )     

Diasporic kinship hegemonies and transnational continuities in the Hmong diaspora

ABSTRACT

Although hegemony has been understood as the property of nation-states and the ruling classes, this paper explores cultural hegemonies among diasporic peoples by examining the pervasive compliance of Hmong living in Laos and the United States with the principles of their kinship system. Since these kinship rules are inculcated through parental education from an early age and are seen as essential for maintaining the cohesion of their dispersed diasporic community in the absence of a territorial ancestral homeland, they have become culturally engrained and taken-for-granted by Hmong through their voluntary consent and no longer have to be enforced by overt power and coercive means. However, like all hegemonies, the Hmong kinship system may also confront increasing challenges and contestation as it is enacted in the different nation-states where Hmong reside, and may eventually become an ideology that needs to be actively enforced and imposed by the direct use of power.     

Procedural (in)justice,emotions, and compliance

The procedural justice model has become widely recognized as a key crime prevention and reduction strategy, spurring its adoption across police agencies throughout the United States in an effort to address mounting concerns regarding police use of force. Recent critiques, however, have called attention to the need for greater examination of potential contributing factors that are underdeveloped in investigations of the procedural justice model, including the role of emotions. This article takes stock of interdisciplinary advancements to critically examine scholarly investigations exploring associations between procedural (in)justice, emotions, and compliance behaviors within the context of police-citizen interactions. In doing so, continued gaps are identified. Lastly, this article concludes by identifying future pathways and recommendations for the scholarly advancement of our understanding of emotions and their continued relevance to the procedural justice model.     

The backfiring effect of auditing on tax compliance

Using country-level data from 2003–2014, we examine the association between auditing level (measured as number of verification actions taken by tax authorities per 100 taxpayers in each country) and tax compliance (measured as business executives’ perception of tax evasion). Our hypothesis is that compliance increases until a certain auditing level is reached, and decreases beyond that level (i.e., an elevated auditing level backfires). In line with our expectation, the results of a series of tests indicate that there is a U-shaped association between auditing and tax evasion. We discuss how a potential backfiring effect may depend on the extent to which compliance is voluntary.