Changes in fertility rates and family size in response to changes in age at marriage, the trend away from arranged marriages, and increasing urbanization

Abstract Demographers have proposed a long list of factors that help explain why population growth and fertility rates respond to rising levels of urbanization, economic growth and national development.(2) Two of the many suggested influences will be investigated in the present paper with regard to urban Hong Kong.     

Population distribution and economic development in Africa: The need for urbanization policies

Many countries in Africa are facing severe development problems because of high rates of population growth, stagnant or declining agricultural productivity, and increasing migration of the rural poor to large cities. Most demographic studies of Africa ignore problems arising from the spatial distribution of population and public allocation of investment. Strategic planning of the location of development investments in ways that will prevent or reduce excessive concentration of population and productive activities in large primary cities is becoming increasingly important for many African governments. In this article it is argued that the excessive growth of primary cities in predominantly rural countries can be detrimental to their economic recovery. Policies encouraging more widespread distribution of population in secondary cities and towns and policies promoting investment in physical infrastructure, marketing, small-scale manufacturing, and agroprocessing in secondary cities and towns can provide a stronger base for both rural and urban development in many African countries in the future.     

Africa's expanding population: old problems,new policies

Sub-Saharan Africa faces an historic challenge: to achieve economic and social progress while experiencing extraordinary population growth. With an estimated 1989 population of 512 million, the 42 countries of sub-Saharan Africa have the highest birth and death rates of any major world region. While death rates have fallen since the 1960s, persistently high birth rates yield annual growth rates above 3% in many countries. The United Nations projects that the region's population will increase 2.7 times by 2025--to 1.4 billion. Throughout the region, population has outstripped economic growth since the mid-1970s. In addition, many African countries are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). The extent and demographic impact of the epidemic still are unknown, but disturbing social and political effects are already being felt. The region's population growth will slow only when African couples begin to have fewer children. The average number of children per woman ranges from 6 to 8 for most countries. The Africans' preference for large families is deeply rooted in the culture and fed by the perceived economic benefits they receive from their children. Economic stagnation during the 1980s prompted many national governments to recognize that rapid population growth was hindering their socioeconomic development. The political climate has shifted away from pronatalist or laissez-faire attitudes toward official policies to slow population growth. The policy formation process--detailed here for 4 countries (Zambia, Nigeria, Zaire, and Liberia)--is ponderous and beset with political and bureaucratic pitfalls, However, policy shifts in more and more countries combined with evidence of increased contraceptive use and fertility downturns in a few countries give some hope that the region's extraordinary population growth may have peaked and will start a descent. Whatever the case, the decade of the 1990s will be crucial for the future of sub-Saharan Africa.     

Persistent efforts must continue to be made

Evidence has continuously suggested that population growth in a particular country is closely related to its social stability and economic development. Statistics show that the population growth in the developing countries accounts for 90% of the world's total increase, and the growth rate in those countries is the highest. Therefore, the population problem is of a more serious nature to the developing countries. Unless this problem is solved or at least alleviated, it would be extremely difficult for many developing countries to shed poverty, develop their national economies, and raise standards of living. On the other hand, the trend of growth of the world population and the high rate of population growth in the developing countries will inevitably have grave consequences affecting, directly or indirectly, the economic stability and development of developed countries. These consequences would also affect world peace. The population problem is therefore both a national and an international issue. While each country should take the problem seriously and work hard to tackle it according to its own conditions, all countries in the world should come together to address the problem and make joint efforts for its settlement or alleviation. It is inspiring that the "Day of 5 Billion" has caught global attention and is being observed throughout the world with massive support.     

试论教育投资能力与适度人口规模——一个人口质量经济学的视角

从资源环境承载力、经济增长和可持续发展等角度,人们已对人口规模的适度性问题做过不少探究。随着信息时代的到来和知识经济的发展,教育投资能力应当成为衡量人口规模适度与否的另一重要因素。     

快速人口转变后的中国长期经济增长—从预期寿命、人力资本投资角度考察

在过去三十年里,中国历经了发达国家要用一百多年才能完成的人口转变过程。生育率、死亡率快速下降,接踵而至的是日益严重的少子、老龄化过程。基于以上背景,本文扩展了Diamond（1965）的基本叠代模型,以不确定性寿命为切入点,在个人的微观行为基础上,致力于分析以下问题：中国是否需要调整当前的计划生育政策;随着人口红利的逐渐消失,中国长期的经济增长如何持续。本文的分析结果显示,预期寿命与生育率、人力资本投资、储蓄率以及经济增长的关系是非单调性的。     

An objective criterion of coordination of population growth with economic development]

Coordination of population growth with economic development is the fundamental element for the development of society. Based on China's present condition and our future goal--to be a communistic society--per capita income was suggested to be the most important criterion. Because the primary requirements of a communistic society and the goal of our socialistic production are material abundance and a highly developed civilization, per capita income is also the best criterion to measure the level of our "Four Modernizations" program and the coordination of population with the economy. The economic development based on per capita income also has international significance, for it will indicate the excellence of our system and contribute our strength to world peace in the future. In order to continue increasing per capita income the primary goal is increased production. On the other hand, a rapid population growth delays economic development. A comparatively small difference in population growth rate (a decrease from 1.5% to .5%) leads to a large difference in total population and the investment in the population after many years (e.g. 20 to 40 years). For China's present condition the slower the population growth rate the better for our economic development and the faster the per capita income will increase.     

Several problems concerning population investment]

Population investment is a major topic in the studies of population and economic relations. In this particular area, numerous theoretical and practical problems are still in need of solution. Concerning the problem of population concept, there are three different approaches: (1) to determine the definition of population investment from the relationship between the population growth and the capital from national income used for investment, including investment in the newly increased population and investment in the entire population; (2) to explain population investment from the economic viewpoint that people are producers; and (3) to explain population investment from the expense needed to change a simple labor force to a skillful labor force. The expenses include educational costs, maintanance spending, wages needed to compensate workers in labor, costs for workers to master and learn modern scientific techniques to be used for production, and the costs of keeping a young labor force in the next generation.     

Human capital,technological progress and the demographic transition*

We emphasize the importance to consider components of population growth — fertility and mortality ‐ separately, when modeling the mutual interaction between population and economic growth. Our model implies that two countries with the same population growth will not converge towards the same level of per capita income. The country with the lower level of birth and death rates will be better off in the long run. Introducing a spill over effect of average human capital on total productivity our model implies multiple equilibria as illustrated in Becker el al. (1990) and Strulik (1999). Besides the existence of a low and high level equilibrium ‐ as characterized by low and high levels of per capita output respectively ‐ we show the existence of multiple low level (Malthusian) equilibria. Initial conditions and parameters of technological progress and human capital investment determine whether an economy is capable to escape the low level equilibrium trap and to enjoy sustained economic growth.     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.     

新古典增长理论框架下的老龄化效应分析

众所周知,日益严重的老龄化进程将对一国经济和社会各个方面的产生深远影响。近年来,以OECD和亚洲国家为对象的定量研究大量涌现。着重于分析人口老龄化对中国宏观经济变量的影响,本文考察了现收现付制和取消现收现付制两种不同条件下的政策模拟。运用Ayse Imrohoroglu等人的新古典增长模型,我们的政策模拟基于两种不同的人口冲击:生育率降低、预期寿命延长。我们发现在上述政策模拟中,个体变量和汇总变量的变化各不相同。     

人口老龄化、人口增长与经济增长——来自中国省际面板数据的实证证据

利用一个包含人力资本的柯布-道格拉斯生产函数,从索洛增长理论入手,分析人口老龄化和人口增长率对经济增长的影响,理论模型的推理结果表明人口老龄化和人口增长对经济增长均产生不利影响。再根据理论模型的结果构造了人口老龄化和人口增长影响经济增长的实证模型,收集和使用中国1990～2008年的省级面板数据对理论模型的推理结果进行实证检验,证实了理论模型的推理结果。实证研究还表明:(1)初始的人均GDP对经济增长的影响为负,说明中国的区域经济发展出现了条件收敛的情形;(2)人力资本投资、储蓄率和劳动参与率对经济增长有着显著的正向促进作用。     

人口始终是我国经济持续增长中的一个重大问题

本文旨在研究控制人口增长与我国当前经济持续、快速增长之间的相互关系。文章首先确定两个事实:一是用进出口贸易的资料证实中国近年来的经济不是泡沫经济,而是实际增长;二是通过中国各种人口统计指标,特别是总和生育率(TFR)论证中国近年来生育率下降和人口增长率的下降。笔者认为当前TFR值1.8是可接受的。其次,通过减少人口投资,提高人均GDP,提高人力资本和改善人民生活等方面论证生育率和人口增长率下降是促进经济发展的重要条件,并指出人口是我国构建资源节约型和人与自然友好型社会的关键性因素。     

Pitfalls in benefit-cost analysis of birth prevention

Abstract The paper summarizes the procedure usually employed by Enke, Meier and others to estimate the benefit-cost ratio of a prevented birth. Some possible deficiencies in the formulation, the possible lack of relevance of the resulting computations, are considered. For example, since the benefit-cost ratios are exceptionally high they would imply unusually high rates of investment for family planning. The results would also apply for the birth prevention of not only high parity births, but also for first and second children. Some arguments are presented which suggest the possibility that the income distribution might be worsened as a consequence of the application of a family planning programme based on these principles - especially those which employ subsidies to induce the practice of family limitation. In addition it is also argued that the average economic quality of the population may be lower than otherwise as a consequence of such programmes, and that the consequences of such events are not taken into account in the usual formulation. Also the usual estimates of costs of such programmes are questioned since the relation between acceptances and births prevented are unknown given the lack of knowledge about the substitution between the proposed methods of family limitation and other means of population control. Finally, we present a model based on reasonable but different assumptions than the formulation popularized by Enke and others, and show that on the basis of this model it is possible to obtain results which are the exact opposite of the Enke model. Also it is argued that the model presented is much more sensitive to actual data than the usual formulation.     

人口效应及其对中国经济增长的影响

对于人口增长与经济增长的关系,理论界存在着多种争论。本文首先在现代经济增长理论基础上建立了一个简单的逻辑框架,进而得出了关于人口增长与经济增长关系的预测,然后利用大量的经验数据初步证实了上述判断;虽然受各种因素的影响,人口增长的经济效应可能依时间、地点而有明显的差异,但无论是从长期还是短期来看,人口增长对经济增长都有一定的促进作用。因此,在目前的背景下,应当适时地调整现行的人口管理政策,以维持我国经济的持续增长。     

The effects of economic and population growth on national saving and inequality

This is a progress report on ongoing research into the effects of economic and population growth on national saving rates and inequality. The theoretical basis for the investigation is the life cycle model of saving and inequality. We report evidence that is conditional on the validity of the model, as well as evidence that casts doubt on it. Using time series of cross-sectional household surveys from Taiwan, Thailand, Britain, and the United States, we show that it is possible to force a life cycle interpretation on the data on consumption, income, and saving, but that the evidence is not consistent with large rate-of-growth effects, whereby economic and population growth enhances rates of national saving. The well-established cross-country link between economic growth and saving cannot be attributed to life cycle saving, nor will changes in economic or population growth exert large effects on saving within individual countries. There is evidence in favor of the life cycle model’s prediction that within-cohort inequality of consumption and of total income—though not necessarily inequality of earnings-—should increase with the age of the cohort. Decreases in the population growth rate redistribute population toward older, more unequal, cohorts, and can increase national inequality. We provide calculations on the magnitude of these effects.     

西部地区人口红利效应与区域增长差距

本文从人口红利效应角度比较区域之间的增长差距,发现人口红利效应的发挥并非是经济增长的决定因素,经济增长还受制于其他因素的影响,人力资本投资和由知识积累及扩散获得的技术进步以及制度等其他要素从深层次上决定着区域差距的逐渐扩大。     

Some fundamental problems concerning the relationship between population growth and economic development]

The population growth rate is closely related to the quality of economic life, available funds for individual and social consumption, national income to be used for reproduction, and the labor employment situation. Since liberation, socialism has not been able to show its superiority, mainly because of China's large population figure, low economic productivity, low national income, and poor management in the relationship between consumption and accumulation. In order to solve these problems, we need to adequately control the pace of the population growth and match the rate of population growth with the pace of economic development. A way to increase national income is through saving and avoiding unnecessary waste. Social expenditures on education, culture, science, health and medical care, social welfare, and investment in the promotion of people's wisdom should all be increased. Meanwhile, the living standard of the people needs to be raised, and capital accumulation should also be managed so that funds will be available for industrial and economic enterprises. Existing inefficient production enterprises should be properly reorganized so that full employment may be achieved. In this way, the national economy will have more prosperity, and the people will benefit more from the Socialist policy.     

Population and the energy problem

When energy is scarce or expensive, people can suffer material deprivation and economic hardship. When it is obtained in ways that fail to minimize environmental and political costs, these too can threaten human wellbeing in fundamental and pervasive ways. The energy problem today combines these syndromes: much of the world's population has too little energy to meet basic human needs; the monetary costs of energy are rising nearly everywhere; the environmental impacts of energy supply are growing and already dominant contributors to local, regional, and global environmental problems (including air pollution, water pollution, ocean pollution, and climate change); and the sociopolitical risks of energy supply (above all the danger of conflict over oil and the links between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons) are growing too. This predicament has many causes, but predominant among them are the nearly 20-fold increase in world energy use since 1850 and the cumulative depletion of the most convenient oil and gas deposits that this growth has entailed, resulting in increasing resort to costlier and/or environmentally more disruptive energy sources. The growth of world population in this period was responsible for 52% of the energy growth, while growth in per capita energy use was responsible for 48% (excluding causal connections between population and energy use per capita). In the United States in the same period, population growth accounted for 66% of the 36-fold increase in energy use. In the late 1980s, population growth was still accounting for a third of energy growth both in the United States and worldwide. Coping with global energy problems will require greatly increased investment in improving the efficiency of energy enduse and in reducing the environmental impacts of contemporary energy technologies, and it will require financing a transition over the next several decades to a set of more sustainable (but probably also more expensive) energy sources. The difficulty of implementing these measures will be greatest by far in the developing countries, not least because of their high rates of population growth and the attendant extra pressures on economic and managerial resources. If efficiency improvements permit delivering the high standard of living to which the world aspires based on a per capita rate of energy use as low as 3 kilowatts—about a quarter of the current U.S. figure—then a world population stabilized at 10 billion people would be using energy at a rate of 30 terawatts, and a population of 14 billion would imply 42 terawatts (compare 13.2 terawatts in 1990). Delivering even the lower figure at tolerable monetary and environmental costs will be difficult; each additional billion people added to the world population will compound these difficulties and increase energy's costs, making everyone poorer.Presented at the Symposium on Population and Scarcity: The Forgotten Dimensions.     

Population dynamics of humans and other animals

Human population dynamics, at least until the past century, have probably been governed by homeostasis and in this resembled those of other animals. Because human population homeostasis was probably substantially weaker than among large mammals, its operation has been less obvious. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence for advanced agriculturalists is compelling. Unlike animals, the human population has tended toward equilibria that have been tending upward at an accelerating rate. The acceleration might reflect long-run positive feedback between density and technological progress, as Boserup has suggested. Because homeostasis was weak, its role in shorter run historical explantation is limited; its force was gentle and easily overwhelmed by other particular influences. Malthusian oscillation, in the sense of distinctive medium-run dynamics arising from homeostasis, probably did not occur. And because homeostasis was weak, density dependence can in principle explain only a minute proportion of the annual variation in population growth rates. Yet homeostasis plays an essential role in demographic theory. Without it, we are incapable of explaining population size and change over time except by recounting a mindless chronology of events back to the beginning of humanity--whenever that was. Without it, we cannot explain the response of population growth to economic growth. Without it, we cannot explain recovery from catastrophe or the rapid natural increase in many frontier regions. Without it, we cannot properly analyze the influence of climatic variation and other partially density-independent factors. Our basic understanding of human history requires a grasp of what homeostasis can explain and what it cannot. A homeostatic approach to population dynamics also leads to questions about the roles of reproductive norms and institutions, not just whether they encourage high or low fertility, but whether they make natural increase responsive to resource abundance. And if they do, whether they strike the balance of population and the means of subsistence at a relatively prosperous or impoverished level. Such considerations may contribute to an understanding of broad preindustrial differences among the regions of the world in densities, average levels of vital rates, and living standards--which was very much how Malthus viewed the matter. Ordinary homeostatic tendencies essentially vanish in the course of economic development, and they were probably all but gone from much of Europe by the end of the 19th century.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)