AGENDA CONTROL AND RECIPROCITY IN SEQUENTIAL VOTING DECISIONS

We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs. (JEL C92, D71, D72)     

CARBON GEOGRAPHY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATION INTENDED TO MITIGATE GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCTION

Over the last 5 years, the U.S. Congress has voted on several pieces of legislation intended to sharply reduce the nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Given that climate change is a world public bad, standard economic logic would predict that the United States would “free ride” and wait for other nations to reduce their emissions. Within the Congress, there are clear patterns to who votes in favor of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This paper presents a political economy analysis of the determinants of “pro‐green” votes on such legislation. Conservatives consistently vote against such legislation. Controlling for a representative's ideology, representatives from richer districts and districts with a lower per‐capita carbon dioxide footprint are more likely to vote in favor of climate change mitigation legislation. Representatives from districts where industrial emissions represent a larger share of greenhouse gas emissions are more likely to vote no. (JEL Q54, Q58, R50)     

Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of legislatures—most important, that legislators can change their vote after seeing how their fellow legislators have voted—then the only possible equilibrium is one where all legislators ignore their policy preferences. That is, each legislator votes as if he or she is not pivotal. The result, consistent with empirical studies of Congress, suggests that legislators should tend to vote sincerely, rather than sophisticatedly. In this paper we examine how outcomes change if we change the rules for voting. Namely, instead of a simultaneous game, we consider a game where legislators vote sequentially in a pre-determined order. We show that, opposite to the simultaneous game, an alternative wins if and only if a majority of legislators’ policy preferences favor that alternative. Our results suggest that if Congress adopted this change in rules, then sophisticated voting would become frequent instead of rare.     

THE CALCULUS OF VOTING RECONSIDERED

A rational economic hypothesis of the citizen's decision tovote or not vote in U. S. presidential elections has been citedas an example of the replacement of social-psychologically oriented"empirical generalizations" by axiomatically based deductivepropositions in political science. However, close scrutiny showsthat the rational (or political) economic paradigm is no moreaccurate a theory than previously popular systems analysis orfunctional paradigms. The claimed verification of the originalhypothesis was based on an apparently imprecise, adhoc, ordinalprocedure that could not distinguish between the intimatelyrelated rational economic and social-psychological hypotheses.A more powerful technique resolves the issue in favor of thelatter model for the data used by the original authors.     

AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non-infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.     

Unions,PAC contributions,and the NAFTA vote

Political action committees (PACs), especially those controlled by organized labor and business, have been shown to affect Congressional voting. We explore how PACs influenced the House of Representatives’ vote on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA vote is analyzed because organized labor strongly opposed the treaty while business generally supported it and because of the straight-forward voting generated by its fast-track status. Probit analysis of a unique, unpublished data set containing information about PAC and non-PAC contributions to the 1992 House election campaigns demonstrates that Representatives who depended largely on labor PACs tended to oppose NAFTA, while Representatives who derived a large proportion of their campaign contributions from business PACs tended to favor its passage.     

LOGROLLING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS

Does exchange, i.e., vote trading, occur in legislatures?!f so, is it quantitatively important or optimal? How important are political parties for the organization of logrolling coalitions? To address these questions, this paper investigates a broad range of votes where logrolling has been reported among interests favoring subsidies for urban, labor, and farm interests. The findings suggest that logrolling agreements are widespread, that many Democratic congressmen changed votes because of logrolling agreements, and that the Democratic party served to facilitate logrolling between its members. Furthermore, logrolling coalitions exhibited a strong degree if stability.     

Abortion on demand in France? a five-year trial for the "time limit solution"

France's Assemblee Nationale and Senate passed a "time-limit solution" abortion law on December 20, 1974. Abortion is permitted on demand by a physician in a hospital during the 1st 10 weeks of pregnancy. The tone of the law stresses the concept of respect for life and suggests the undesirability of abortion. The developing child is recognized as a human being whose life has begun. The woman herself is responsible for her distress is sufficient to warrant abortion. Further provisions insure that the woman is as well-informed as possible concerning medical risks and possibilities of adoption and requires consultation with an information, consultation, or family counseling service, family planning center, or other social service organization. French scientists, physicians, magistrates, and religious leaders opposed the permissive law. The victory of the proabortionists was created by the political decision of the Socialists and Communists to impose party discipline and to require a unanimous vote for liberalization.     

A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions

To address the issue of when minority and nonminority candidates compete for admissions to a college, we show that an academic quality–oriented college maximizes the test score of its incoming class by adopting an admissions rule that favors the minority. Such a "handicapping" rule increases competition and induces candidates to invest more in educational attainment. These results reconcile the often-assumed conflicts between diversity and academic quality. However, we also show that the non-minority responds to the affirmative action admissions more aggressively, which tends to widen the racial test score gap. (JEL H0 , J7 )     

Preelection Polling in the 1982 Illinois Gubernatorial Contest

All the polls in advance of the 1982 Illinois gubernatorialelection proved incorrect in their prediction of a substantialvictory for James Thompson, the Republican. After examiningsome of the popular explanations for the "missed call," thispaper shows that while the voters "preferred" Thompson, therewas a very substantial increase in the number of straight partyballots cast for the Democrats, compared to 1978. This paperconcludes that in those states where straight party vote isan option, the poll takers probe for the possibility of a partyline vote. Information used in this paper to examine five hypothesesstems from a preelection poll of 1,200 Illinois voters.     

Multiple votes,ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment

Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a two-party system. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the two-party system under Approval Voting.     

REFERENDUM DYNAMICS AND THE IRISH DIVORCE AMENDMENT

Referendums are typically interpreted in terms unique to a particulartime and place; the 1986 Irish divorce referendum has been noexception. Here this vote is examined in light of referendumsin the United States and elsewhere in an attempt to identifymore pervasive patterns. It is concluded that there is a referendumdynamic capable of anticipating the diverse fluoridation votesof the 1950s, the ERA campaigns of the 1970s, and the Irishdivorce vote of 1986, all of which displayed large voter shiftsfrom an initial majority in favor to an eventual majority against.The dynamic process involved appears to be a pattern of eliteretreat brought about by community conflict, rather than theresult of confusion, ignorance, a herd instinct, or alienationin the electorate.     

The power of a cohesive subgroup within a voting body

We examine the power of a subgroup within a voting body as a function of its size and cohesiveness. The measure of cohesiveness is the probability that an arbitrary member of the subgroup will vote the same way as the leader of the subgroup. All voters are assumed to vote independently, and those not in the subgroup vote for or against with probability 1/2 in each case. The power of the subgroup is the probability that its vote differential exceeds the vote differential of the members of the body not in the subgroup. Tradeoffs between relative subgroup size and its follow-the-leader probability are considered.     

Modernisierungsverlierer,Cultural Backlash,Postdemokratie

In the debate about the causes for the rise of right-wing populism three central hypotheses can be identified: the losers of modernization hypothesis, the cultural backlash hypothesis and the post-democratization hypothesis. In his article (Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 69:209–232) Holger Lengfeld analyses if losers of the modernization process tend to vote for the party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). Lengfeld found no empirical evidence for his assumption. The empirical data basis of his study is small and he also tests no alternative explanations. In the here presented paper we overcome these shortcomings using Allbus-Data from 1996, 2006 and 2016 to test two alternative hypotheses: the cultural backlash hypothesis and the post-democratization hypothesis. In addition we analyze also the question if the middle class shows a higher predisposition than other social classes. The cultural backlash hypothesis proves to be the strongest predictor for the intention to vote for AfD, nevertheless the two other aspects show significant influence. We found no evidence for a particular radicalization of the middle class.     

Attitudes of Community Leaders in New Casino Jurisdictions Regarding Casino Gambling's Effects on Crime and Quality of Life

Interviews were conducted with 128 key individuals in seven communities that are new casino jurisdictions. The individuals interviewed are community leaders (mayors, members of the city council, leading members of the business community) or work in areas (banking, law enforcement, social services) which would provide insight into the positive and negative effects that casinos have on communities. A series of core questions were asked of all 128 respondents followed by additional questions designed to elicit specific information based on the individual's position. A content analysis was conducted comparing responses both within and between communities by leadership position. Findings indicate that a clear majority (59%) of those interviewed are in favor of the casino in the community, believe the casino enhances the quality of life in the community (65%), and believe that the casino has a positive effect on the economy (77%). Although a majority of the community leaders interviewed view the impact of casinos favorably, responses vary both by community and by position within the community. Finally, since ths group of community leaders was not selected randomly, it is possible that unintended interview bias shifted these results in a positive direction.     

Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting

This paper focuses on the mean vote procedure for choosing the quantity of a public good, a social choice rule that selects the mean of the quantities voted for. The available theoretical models of mean voting give rise to conflicting predictions about the extent of the strategic bias that might arise in the individual vote. An experiment has been run in order to assess whether the participants disclose their (induced) preferences in voting or whether they strategically manipulate their vote, and in the latter case, which variables impact upon the likelihood of strategic bias and to what extent.     

Education and Change in American Opinions on a Woman for President

Abstract During the early 1970s, the increase in willingnessof Americans to vote for a woman for president was directlyrelated to education and contrasts with the inverse relationshipbetween education and increasesin willingness to vote for ablackforpresident.The contrast indicates that on some issues, the relationshipbetween education and "enlightened" opinions is variable andcharacterizes mainly the middle stages of such issues' lifehistories.     

Die <Emphasis Type="Italic">AfD </Emphasis>und die unteren Statuslagen. Eine Forschungsnotiz zu Holger Lengfelds Studie <Emphasis Type="Italic">Die „Alternative für Deutschland“: eine Partei für Modernisierungsverlierer?</Emphasis>

In the June 2017 issue of this Journal, Holger Lengfeld showed empirically that “losers of societal modernisation” do not have a stronger intention to vote for AfD than others. His analyses are based on survey data collected by infratest dimap in November 2016. The mass media reported extensively on the results of this study, however, without mentioning that the survey used by Lengfeld has some specific features. In the present research note, I investigate the intention to vote for AfD on the basis of data of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), which were collected between April and September 2016. This survey is better suited to study the intention to vote for AfD. On the basis of this survey, I can show that “losers of societal modernisation” have a stronger intention to vote for AfD than people of higher/the high social strata.     

DEMOCRATIC INCUMBENTS AND THE 1984 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A CASE STUDY

This article examines the advantages a single Democratic incumbentutilized to win reelection in 1984 despite an overwhelming victoryby Ronald Reagan at the top of the ticket in the congressionaldistrict. The incumbent won reelection because of two typesof ticket splitting: Republican-inclined voters who voted forRepublican candidates for president and U.S. Senate and splitto vote for the Democratic incumbent for Congress, and Democraticvoters who supported Democratic candidates for U.S. Senate andCongress but split to vote for Ronald Reagan for president.Ticket splitting was found to be associated with basic politicalorientation—weak Republican and independent voters splitin favor of the Democratic incumbent and were far less likelyto vote a straight ticket for either party. Support for theDemocratic incumbent was explained in nonideological terms andwas based upon high recognition and favorability, constituentservice, voting record, and personal familiarity. For the Republicanchallenger, who never achieved a high level of recognition (despitesignificant campaign expenditure), support came almost solelyfrom the most partisan Republican members of the electorateand was based simply upon the party affiliation of the Republicanchallenger.