Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.     

CEO burnout,managerial discretion,and firm performance: The role of CEO locus of control,structural power,and organizational factors

Despite the possibility of burnout resulting from dynamics in firms' upper echelons, little if any work has focused on chief executive officer's (CEO's) burnout and firm performance. Drawing on managerial discretion theory, this article analyzes the influence of CEO burnout on firm performance and the moderating roles of the individual (CEO locus of control), structural power (CEO duality and CEO tenure), and organizational characteristics (size, age, and resource availability) related to managerial discretion. Using a sample of 156 CEOs in Swedish firms, we find a negative association between CEOs who report higher burnout and firm performance. Our results confirm that CEO duality and resource availability ameliorate and firm size exacerbates the negative association between CEO burnout and firm performance. Contrary to our expectations, CEO locus of control, CEO tenure, and firm age do not influence this relationship. We discuss the implications of our research for upper echelons theory and strategic leadership theory.     

Idiosyncratic volatility,executive compensation and corporate governance: examination of the direct and moderate effects

Entrenchment of private benefits by the CEO or dominant owners can lead corporations to avoid riskier but more private benefits resulting in greater idiosyncratic volatility and information flow trading. Using a unique database of 806 listed firms, we investigate the impact of CEO compensation and corporate governance on idiosyncratic volatility and information flow trading. We find strong and robust evidence that equity-based (fixed income) CEO compensation is negatively (positively) related to volatility and information trading. Incorporating an agent principal–principal perspective into our models of managerial discretion provides us with an accurate prediction of how the proportion of CEO compensation and the degree of entrenchment will influence risk-taking decisions as well as how equity-based compensation interacts with related-party transaction and ownership dispersion to influence stock volatility. Finally, we find that idiosyncratic volatility and information flow trading are also affected by CEO compensation and corporate governance, which act as instrumental variables, while subject to environmental variants and the jointly determined.     

The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China

This study examines how board leadership structure (CEO duality) affects the corporate governance of corporatized state-owned firms where the state shareholders use these firms to serve both profit and non-profit objectives. We propose that CEO duality will generate a positive (negative) significant impact on the firms’ corporate governance when state owners tend to monitor their CEOs on the basis of profit (non-profit) considerations. We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between CEO duality and CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies that are ultimately controlled by central or local governments. We find that CEO duality is negatively related to turnover in marginal profit-making firms where turnover would be value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality is detrimental to these firms’ corporate governance because it entrenches relatively poorly performing CEOs. Duality is also negatively related to turnover in high-profitability firms where turnover would be non-value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality might positively contribute to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non-value enhancing turnover. Overall, our study suggests that CEO duality is a double-edged sword in corporatized state-owned firms.     

TMT functional complementarity and post-IPO performance: Evidence from the U.S. biotechnology industry

Drawing insights from the resource dependence and the upper echelons theories, this study examines how top management team (TMT) IPO reconfiguration – the managerial change between immediately before and after an initial public offering (IPO), affects firm performance in the post-IPO years. We investigate this through the lens of TMT functional complementarity - the degree of differing functional knowledge held by the firm's TMT in the pre-and post-IPO stage. We argue that TMT functional complementarity positively affects firm post-IPO performance. Further, this relationship is positively moderated by executive managerial discretion, measured by CEO duality and TMT insider board membership. We test our model using a sample of 250 US biotechnology firms that went public from 1991 to 2019, and the empirical results largely support our hypotheses. This study contributes to the literature of upper echelons, technology-based ventures, and IPO firms.     

New CEO Openness to Change and Strategic Persistence: The Moderating Role of Industry Characteristics

Drawing on the upper echelons, managerial discretion and strategic contingency perspectives we examine the relationships between newly chosen CEOs' openness to change and firm strategic persistence in the post-succession phase. This study is different from prior studies on the consequences of CEO succession in that it focuses on specific characteristics of the new CEO (that reflect his/her knowledge-base and cognitive orientations) and the industry context rather than purely on the event of succession. Based on a sample of 132 successions in 118 firms in the US manufacturing sector, and after controlling for industry concentration, board power, firm size and pre-succession performance, we find a negative relationship between CEOs' openness to change and post-succession strategic persistence. Interestingly, our findings indicate that this relationship is moderated by industry characteristics in that the negative association between CEO openness to change and strategic persistence is significant in high-discretion but not in low-discretion industries. Contributions of the paper to the CEO succession and strategic change literatures along with the managerial implications of our findings are discussed in the concluding section of the paper.     

The face of wrongdoing? An expectancy violations perspective on CEO facial characteristics and media coverage of misconducting firms

We examine the extent to which CEO facial characteristics matter in media coverage of firms implicated in corporate wrongdoing. We build on literature discussing that leaders’ faces may convey subjective behavioral expectations and that outsiders often over-rely on facial cues when making social judgments. We situate these insights in the context of corporate wrongdoing, where information incompleteness may be particularly high, potentially prompting outsiders to draw on CEO facial characteristics in forming their social judgments. Drawing on Expectancy Violations Theory, we hypothesize that firms led by CEOs expected to be more trustworthy, as inferred from their lower facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), will draw greater attention and more negative opinions from the media in the wake of corporate wrongdoing. Results of an experiment (Study 1) where CEO fWHR was digitally manipulated support this counterintuitive logic, while findings based on an archival study of corporate wrongdoing of US firms from 2003 to 2016 (Study 2) partly generalize the rationale in the field setting. Our findings suggest that subjective expectations inferred from CEO faces may serve as part of a complex and underexamined source of variation in media coverage of misconducting firms. We discuss implications for theory and practice.     

CEO characteristics and firm valuation: a quantile regression analysis

This study investigates the effects of three highly-visible CEO characteristics on firm valuation. Using a sample of 2702 observations for Australian firms over the period 2001–2011, we find that CEO age is uniformly associated with lower firm valuation. CEO tenure is also associated with lower valuation, but more significantly so in the higher quantiles of firm valuation, that is for firms with high-growth opportunities. In contrast, CEO duality is found to be beneficial only for firms with high-growth opportunities. Overall, the study highlights the contingent relationship between CEO characteristics and firm valuation.     

CEO Duality,Agency Costs,and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency

This study examines the impact of CEO duality on firms’ internal capital allocation efficiency. We observe that when the CEO is also chair of the board, diversified firms make inefficient investments, as they allocate more capital to business segments with relatively low growth opportunities over segments with high growth opportunities. The adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only among firms that face high agency problems, as captured by high free cash flows, staggered board structure and low board independence. Depending on the severity of the agency problem, CEO duality is associated with a decrease in industry‐adjusted investment in high‐growth segments of 1% to 2.1% over the following year, relative to that in low‐growth segments. However, CEOs’ equity‐based compensation curbs the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency. Overall, the findings of this study offer strong support for the agency theory and postulate the internal capital allocation policy as an important channel through which CEO duality lowers firm value in diversified firms.     

Are Female Executives Over‐represented in Precarious Leadership Positions?

We use a sample of CEO appointments at US corporations over the years 1992–2004 to test the 'glass cliff' hypothesis, which posits that females are appointed to leadership positions at firms that are in a precarious financial condition. Our analysis utilizes three measures of stock-price-based financial performance and two distinct control samples of appointments of males to the CEO position. We find that corporate performance preceding CEO appointments tends to favor females, implying that females (males) are appointed to the CEO position largely at times when the firm is in relatively better (worse) financial health. Disaggregating the data by appointments in up versus down markets, at high-risk versus low-risk firms, and by calendar time yield similar conclusions. There appears to be no glass cliff facing female CEOs at US firms. Our findings suggest a need for additional research to identify where and for what types of positions this phenomenon is prevalent.     

CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions

We propose that outside CEO candidates will have greater bargaining power than insiders. As a result, outside CEO successors will likely receive greater total compensation than inside CEO successors. Outside successors, meantime, pose more risk to the hiring firm than inside successors due to higher information asymmetry. As a result, outside successor compensation packages are tilted towards more performance-related pay-at-risk, while inside successor packages have a higher percentage in salary. In addition, outside successors may want to utilize the structure of their compensation at their previous firm in their new contracts. Using a sample of 99 firms with outside successors who were not CEO in their prior firms, matched by industry and size to firms that hired inside candidates, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses.     

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater.     

Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs

Several firms prohibit their CEOs from trading in the stock of peer firms. This is puzzling since hedging by the CEO through private trading in the capital market can reduce the CEO’s exposure to systematic compensation risk. When the CEO’s incentive contract comprises relative performance evaluation, we find that the firm might want to disallow private hedging even though there are no technological interdependencies or strategic interactions to peer firms. In the analysis, we highlight two frequently observed characteristics of incentive contracts. First, the use of accounting benchmarks is widespread in compensation contracts for CEOs. Second, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful CEOs have influence on the process of designing their own compensation. We find that in the presence of a powerful CEO, the firm can benefit from disallowing private hedging. In particular, the firm’s decision to allow or to disallow private hedging depends on the characteristics of the accounting benchmarks and the characteristics of the peer firms.     

Family firms and high technology Mergers & Acquisitions

We examine whether family firms undertake value creating high technology M&A. We also examine whether level of ownership, diversification, agency issues and CEO type matter. Our sample consists of high-technology M&A undertaken by Canadian firms over the period 1997–2006. Canada offers a setting with many family firms and the use of control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares and pyramid structures. We find a positive relationship between family ownership and announcement period abnormal returns. This relationship, however, starts to decrease at higher levels of ownership but remains overall positive. We also show that the agency conflict between shareholders and professional managers has a detrimental impact on announcement period abnormal returns whereas the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders via control enhancing mechanisms does not. Finally, we document that founder CEO undertake better high tech M&A than descendant or hired CEO.     

管理决断权、高管薪酬与企业绩效的实证研究

本文从企业层面上研究了管理决断权对高管薪酬的影响及两者与企业绩效之间的权变关系。论文选取2002-2007年深沪两市上市公司作为研究样本,构建了管理决断权的多指标衡量体系,证明管理决断权对高管薪酬和企业绩效具有重要的决定作用,企业绩效好的情况下高管薪酬与管理决断权的联系更为紧密。同样,在高管理决断权情况下高管薪酬与企业绩效的挂钩更加紧密,但同时企业会面临监管难题。     

Emotionally intelligent top management and high family firm performance: Evidence from Germany

Executives in family firms are often confronted with emotionally loaded issues, in part due to the need to include the interests of the owning family. Given this context, we hypothesize how high family-firm performance is affected by the emotional intelligence (EI) of a family-based CEO and top-management team (TMT), in addition to the CEO's transformational leadership (TFL) and TMT's behavioral integration. Survey measures were taken from a random sample of 72 CEOs of German family firms and 245 members of their TMTs. We found that TMT behavioral integration mediates between CEO TFL and objective firm performance while CEO EI is significantly related to both CEO TFL and TMT EI. Implications are discussed for future research thereby suggesting an extension to upper-echelon theory.     

When Cooperation is the Norm of Appropriateness: How Does CEO Cooperative Behaviour Affect Organizational Performance?

The current study has tested the prediction that CEO cooperative behaviour has an impact upon organizational performance. This is a fundamental organizational issue that is in clear need of illumination through studies of practice. We pursued the issue through a study of leadership in organizations located in the Norwegian socio‐cultural context in which cooperation has been, and still is, a norm of appropriateness. The study provided empirical evidence of a positive relationship between CEO cooperative behaviour and organizational performance. This relationship appeared to be stronger in organizational contexts in which CEOs are perceived to have legitimacy and managerial discretion, and it appeared to be weaker in organizations in which individual performance pay is the rule. Since some organizational characteristics have the potential to enhance the impact of CEO cooperative behaviour while other characteristics might inhibit this impact, leaders have to consider carefully how to develop and maintain individual and organizational capabilities that are needed to act appropriately.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Agency conflicts,executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from Sweden

Based on a unique country set up with concentrated ownership of firms, strong representation of major shareholders on boards and one of the highest percentages of firms with dual-class shares worldwide I study CEO pay-performance sensitivity in Swedish listed firms in the years 2001–2013. Focusing on Type II agency conflict, I find that that pay-performance sensitivity in family-controlled firms with family CEOs is significantly lower than in other types of firms, and that dual-class firms have significantly lower sensitivity of pay to accounting performance than non-dual-class firms. The results suggest that in firms with type II agency conflicts compensation practices may be driven either by family ties or by the power preferences of the controlling shareholder that uses compensation to align CEO’s interest with his/her will rather than with financial performance. The study also documents that the link between CEO pay and performance disappears in the 2010–2013 period following the implementation of the European Recommendations regarding executive compensation. This finding is in contrast to the stipulated goal of the European Commission, ‘to ensure pay for performance’ (European Commission 2009).     

CEO transformational leadership and organizational outcomes: The mediating role of human–capital-enhancing human resource management

Using a field survey and company data of 170 firms in Singapore, we tested an integrated theoretical model relating CEO transformational leadership (TL), human–capital-enhancing human resource management (HRM), and organizational outcomes, including subjective assessment of organizational performance, absenteeism, and average sales. We found that human–capital-enhancing HRM fully mediates the relationship between CEO transformational leadership and subjective assessment of organizational outcomes and partially mediates the relationship between CEO transformational leadership and absenteeism. We discuss practical and theoretical implications.