Und Immer Noch Einmal: Alfred Schütz, „Die Definition der Situation“ und die (Angeblichen) Grenzen von Rational Choice

The paper is a reply to the critique of Christian Etzrodt in two points, where he was discussing the model of frame-selection which I formulated following some suggestions of Alfred Schutz on the problem of bounded rationality: (1) The model does not exclude at all the processes of the “interactive” and symbolic constitution of social situations; (2) it does in no way rely on the “rationality” of the actors alone. It does, however, assume quite a different mechanism to the assumption of “calculativeness”, usually associated with subjected-expected-utility theory, despite it is based on certain formal assumptions of this theory. The core of the framing-concept is the “match” of typical properties of the situation (i.e. “symbols”) with socially shared mental models, which are part of the identity of the actors. Quite different to the assumptions of Etzrodt, the model thus systematically takes into account the “meaning” of social action and the strength of culture in defining a situation.