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1.
This article uses laboratory data from a series of first‐price (FP) and second‐price (SP) sealed bid auctions in which the number of bidders is unknown to test for possible deviations of individual behavior from theory and study the source of heterogeneity in bidding. In SP auctions we find a substantial amount of coincidence with theory. We observe systematic deviations from risk neutral bidding in FP auctions and show theoretically that these deviations are consistent with risk averse preferences. We find essentially no heterogeneity in bidding in SP auctions where risk preferences and the number of bidders do not affect the optimal bid, while in the FP auctions heterogeneity in bidding persists with experience. We find that heterogeneity in bidding in FP auctions is consistent with heterogeneity in risk preferences, the attempt to count the number of bidders in the auction, and bidder specific noise. (JEL D44, C91) 相似文献
2.
YVONNE DURHAM MATTHEW R. ROELOFS TODD A. SORENSEN STEPHEN S. STANDIFIRD 《Economic inquiry》2013,51(2):1357-1373
We present a series of laboratory experiments that examine auctions with buy prices, which are prices that allow a bidder to stop the auction and buy the item immediately. Two types of buy prices are considered, one that is available throughout the auction and one that disappears with an initial bid. Both are evaluated with and without proxy bidding. We find that the use of a buy price increases revenue, early bidding, and auction efficiency. Differences between outcomes in auctions with permanent and temporary buy prices are consistent with the observed choices in auction design made by online auction sites. (JEL C90, D44, C70, L81) 相似文献
3.
Lance Eric Brannman 《Economic inquiry》1996,34(4):730-745
Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed-bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning-bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices. 相似文献
4.
The Pareto optimality and price behavior of English and Dutch oral auctions, and First-Price and Second-Price sealedbid auctions are compared under various procedures for assigning valuations among cash motivated bidders. The Vickrey propositions with respect to the mean and variance of prices under the English, Dutch and Second-Price auctions are not falsified by the data. Individual behavior and prices in the First-Price auction deviates considerably from Vickrey's Nash postulate. Behaviorly, the English and Second-Price auctions appear to be isomorphic, but the Dutch and First-Price auctions may not be isomorphic. 相似文献
5.
We utilize laboratory experiments to study behavior in sequential procurement auctions where winning an auction round increases a bidder's future costs. The game admits competitive as well as bid‐rotation style collusive equilibria. We find that (a) bidders show some propensity to account for the opportunity cost of winning an auction, but underestimate its magnitude; (b) revealing all bids (instead of only the winning bid) after each round leads to dramatically higher procurement costs. The rise in procurement costs is accompanied by an increase in very high (extreme) bids, a fraction of which appear to be collusive in nature. (JEL C91, D44, L44) 相似文献
6.
ROBERT G. HANSEN 《Economic inquiry》1986,24(1):125-142
Data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions are used to test Vickrey's original proposition that sealed-bid and open auctions yield equal revenue. Models for the high-bid in an auction are specified and estimated using three different procedures: ordinary least squares, two stage least squares, and maximum likelihood. The second two procedures include a second equation which accounts for the Forest Service's auction choice and therefore control for selection bias. These two procedures, which unlike ordinary least squares yield consistent estimators, imply a statistically and economically insignificant difference in high-bids between sealed-bid and open auctions. 相似文献
7.
Using a large data set with 80,214 repeat sales, we find that the real return on a diversified portfolio of modern prints sold at auctions worldwide averaged a modest 1.51% during the period 1977–2004. We address several issues regarding the performance of modern prints as investments: the selection bias arising from the self-interest of auction houses; the impact of an ever-expanding universe of auction houses on investment returns; the "masterpiece" effect, or whether more expensive works of art outperform the market as a whole; and the differences in returns that arise due to random fluctuations in collector tastes. ( JEL Z11, G11, G14) 相似文献
8.
Indranil Chakraborty 《Economic inquiry》2019,57(1):648-653
Analysis of standard auction rules when bidders are risk averse is usually carried out under the assumption that the seller is able to set an optimal reserve. The role of entry fees has been generally overlooked in that analysis. We consider bidders with constant absolute risk aversion and show that reserve price is an essential tool in the second price auction while entry fee is essential in the first price auction. Furthermore, setting a reserve price and entry fee combination optimally may change some of the rankings of the standard auctions that hold under optimal reserves. (JEL D44) 相似文献
9.
We examine the theoretical properties of the auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. Two unique features of the Medicare auction are (1) winners are paid the median winning bid and (2) bids are nonbinding. We show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high‐cost firms potentially displace low‐cost firms as winners. Further, the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost. We also introduce a model of nonbinding bids that establishes the rationality of a lowball bid strategy employed by many bidders in the actual Medicare auctions and recently replicated in Caltech experiments. We contrast the median‐price auction with the standard clearing‐price auction where each firm bids true costs as a dominant strategy, resulting in competitive equilibrium prices and full efficiency. (JEL D44, I11, H57) 相似文献
10.
Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. We seek to characterize experimentally the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction to a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects can be shown to be willing to pay more to enter the ascending auction than is explainable by their risk attitudes when accounting for their expectations about the risk preferences of their opponents. (JEL C91 , D44 ) 相似文献
11.
JEFFREY A. LIVINGSTON 《Economic inquiry》2010,48(2):237-253
In Internet auctions, bidders alter their strategies as they gain market experience. While inexperienced bidders bid the same high amounts regardless of the seller’s reputation, experienced bidders bid substantially less if the seller has yet to establish a reputation and raise their bids as reports are filed that the seller has treated bidders well in the past. Experienced bidders also wait until much closer to the end of the auction to place their bids, although it takes very little experience to learn that waiting to submit one’s bid is a superior strategy. (JEL L14, L15, D83, D12) 相似文献
12.
RESERVE PRICE EFFECTS IN AUCTIONS: ESTIMATES FROM MULTIPLE REGRESSION‐DISCONTINUITY DESIGNS
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We present evidence from 260,000 online auctions of second‐hand cars to identify the impact of public reserve prices on auction outcomes. We exploit multiple discontinuities in the relationship between reserve prices and vehicle characteristics to present causal regression‐discontinuity estimates of reserve price impacts. We find an increase in reserve price decreases the number of bidders, increases the likelihood the object remains unsold, and increases expected revenue conditional on sale. We then combine these estimates to calibrate the reserve price effect on the auctioneer's ex ante expected revenue. This reveals the auctioneer's reserve price policy to be locally optimal. (JEL D44, L11, L62) 相似文献
13.
Phillip A. Beutel 《Economic inquiry》1991,29(2):389-393
In testing agents' responses to increased competition in sealed-bid first price-rice auctions, Meyer [1988] makes two erroneous assumptions: (1) that agents know ex ante the number of bidders in the auction, and (2) that firms forecast resale prices with information unavailable at the time of the auction. These two misspecifications are identified and corrected. A probit model provides a forecast of market competition, and agents' bids are modeled as a function of expected competition and factors affecting the value of each rice lot. The bias toward zero in Meyer's estimated coefficient on market competition is reduced. 相似文献
14.
BIDDING BEHAVIOR AND DECISION COSTS IN FIELD EXPERIMENTS 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Whether rationality of economic behavior increases with expected payoffs and decreases with the cognitive cost it takes to formulate an optimal strategy remains an open question. We explore these issues with field data, using individual bids from sealed-bid auctions in which we sold nearly $10,000 worth of sports cards. Our results indicate that stakes do indeed matter, as high-priced ($70) cards produced more of the theoretically predicted strategic behavior than did lower-priced ($3) cards. We find additional evidence consistent with the importance of cognitive costs, as subjects more experienced with sports card auctions exhibited a greater tendency to behave strategically than did less experienced bidders. 相似文献
15.
Bidding above the risk‐neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets. We find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding. (JEL D44, C91) 相似文献
16.
THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS TECHNIQUES: ANALYSIS OF DEMAND BEHAVIOR 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper examines the parallelism which exists between demand behavior determined from the sale of a private good in an actual "real world" field setting and in a laboratory auction setting. The demand behavior observed in the two settings is significantly the same leading to the corroboration of the thesis that there is often correspondence between laboratory and real world behavior. 相似文献
17.
LADISLAV WINTR 《Economic inquiry》2008,46(3):369-379
Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end‐time. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002) . There is no indication that late bidding could lead to collusive gains for bidders. Late bidding is a strategic response to the presence of bidders placing multiple bids. Experts protecting their private information are typically the last to bid, while collectors are often the first. As bidders gain familiarity with eBay rules, they tend to bid slightly earlier. (JEL D44) 相似文献
18.
IN SEARCH OF THE WINNER'S CURSE 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Earlier papers on the winner's curse have provided theoretical arguments that winning bidders in an auction will incur ex post losses even when all bidders use reasonable ex ante bidding strategies. This paper demonstrates that these arguments are erroneous: optimal ex ante bidders will never suffer from a winner's curse in an auction where only the winning bid is announced; furthermore, such bidders will on the average not suffer from a winner's curse in an auction where all bids are announced. Thus if a winner's curse is a behavioral reality then bidders are not generally using ex ante optimal strategies. 相似文献
19.
YARON RAVIV 《Economic inquiry》2008,46(3):325-341
This paper uses data collected from a series of public auctions of used cars in New Jersey to examine how strategic bidding affects price determination in open‐outcry English auctions. “Jumps” in the bidding, which occur when a new offer exceeds the old offer by more than the minimum bid increment, are highly pervasive and consistently related to the item’s presale estimated price. The size of the jumps is not affected by the selling order, however. This jump bidding pattern suggests that open‐outcry auctions are more appropriately interpreted with models that assume common‐item valuations rather than models assuming private valuations. (JEL D44) 相似文献
20.
This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal buy‐price in the second price is higher than are those in the first‐price all‐pay auction, both formats maintain the same expected profit. With an endogenous entry process, all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted‐price selling mechanism. (JEL D44, L11, L81) 相似文献