Cultures of care? Animals and science in Britain

It is becoming increasingly common to hear life scientists say that high quality life science research relies upon high quality laboratory animal care. However, the idea that animal care is a crucial part of scientific knowledge production is at odds with previous social science and historical scholarship regarding laboratory animals. How are we to understand this discrepancy? To begin to address this question, this paper seeks to disentangle the values of scientists in identifying animal care as important to the production of high quality scientific research. To do this, we conducted a survey of scientists working in the United Kingdom who use animals in their research. The survey found that being British is associated with thinking that animal care is a crucial part of conducting high quality science. To understand this finding, we draw upon the concept of ‘civic epistemologies’ (Jasanoff 2005; Prainsack 2006) and argue that ‘animals’ and ‘care’ in Britain may converge in taken‐for‐granted assumptions about what constitutes good scientific knowledge. These ideas travel through things like state regulations or the editorial policies of science journals, but do not necessarily carry the embodied civic epistemology of ‘animals’ and ‘science’ from which such modes of regulating laboratory animal welfare comes.     

The merton thesis: Oetinger and German Pietism,a significant negative case

The Merton thesis identifies two movements — English Puritanism and German Pietism — as causally significant in the development of the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries. It attributes this connection to a strong compatibility between the values of ascetic Protestantism and those associated with modern science. This article questions Merton's conclusion regarding one of these movements, German Pietism, by arguing that the Pietist ethos stood in sharp conflict with what Merton has called the normative structure of science. One manifestation of this conflict involves Friedrich Oetinger's articulation of a contending religious-mystical conception of science, which assigned a central place to feeling, intuition, the role of the divine, and a qualitative approach to nature. This conception of science, it is argued, provides the clearest indication of the conceptual and valuative distance that tended to separate Pietists from the new science of the 17th and 18th centuries.An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1990 meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, in Virginia Beach.     

Methodological troubles as problems and phenomena: ethnomethodology and the question of ‘method’ in the social sciences

Across the disciplinary frontiers of the social sciences, studies by social scientists treating their own investigative practices as sites of empirical inquiry have proliferated. Most of these studies have been retrospective, historical, after‐the‐fact reconstructions of social scientific studies mixing interview data with the (predominantly textual) traces that investigations leave behind. Observational studies of in situ work in social science research are, however, relatively scarce. Ethnomethodology was an early and prominent attempt to treat social science methodology as a topic for sociological investigations and, in this paper, we draw out what we see as its distinctive contribution: namely, a focus on troubles as features of the in situ, practical accomplishment of method, in particular, the way that research outcomes are shaped by the local practices of investigators in response to the troubles they encounter along the way. Based on two case studies, we distinguish methodological troubles as problems and methodological troubles as phenomena to be studied, and suggest the latter orientation provides an alternate starting point for addressing social scientists' investigative practices.     

Three faces of cruelty: Towards a comparative sociology of violence

Conclusion In our contemporary society, ferocious cruelty is no longer structurally induced; it is no longer part of the dominant ceremonial order, although we still find individual cases. In this sense, modern society appears more humane. But at the same time, the dangers of callousness increase; and the technological efficiency of modern instruments of destruction makes its consequencess all the more appalling while it hides them from view. Between these opposing trends, ascetic cruelty has had its ups and downs, cresting during periods of mobilized conflict.There is no evolutionary trend towards kindness and happiness. Ferociousness once increased, then declined; callousness and asceticism now oppose each other as defenders and challengers of the status quo. And the institutionalized asceticism of a victorious revolutionary movement easily amalgamates with the callousness of an established bureaucratic regime.The demons can be exorcised, but only by seeing them for what they are. Those who claim that the demons can be exorcised only by action in the world, not by theorizing about them, seem to be possessed by demons of their own, especially the demon of asceticism; one senses here the communal hostility of the ascetic to the individual luxury of intellectual contemplation. And here is the danger. Those who deny everything for the self deny it as well for others; our altruism, taken too exclusively, is an infinite regress, passing a bucket from hand to hand that never reaches the fire. When we act, we call out the demons to meet us. Be careful: they are ourselves.     

The Enduring Social Psychology of Robert K. Merton: Motivating Sentiments,Reference Groups and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies

Robert K. Merton (1910–2003) gained renown as a distinguished sociologist, especially in connection with the paradigm of “structural-functionalism” and he publicly self-identified as a “structuralist.” This paper calls attention to an emphasis in Merton’s work that sociologists have often overlooked, namely, his social psychology. I argue that, throughout his long career, Merton consistently pursued social psychological issues, including how non-logical action, appeals to shared sentiments and collective definitions of situations affect life in organized groups. I shall characterize his earlier analyses as “Harvard style,” and his later social psychological works as “Chicago style,” as a heuristic means of calling attention to interesting variations in framing. Merton’s formulations have impacted numerous subfields of sociology, and some (e.g., “self-fulfilling prophecies,” “the Matthew Effect”) remain influential even today. Examining Merton’s social psychology will contribute both to a fuller appreciation of his career and also to a more complete history of social science in the United States.     

Films and videos (evening screenings)

Photography and science have a symbiotic relationship; they always have. It was in the context of science that photography was first announced to the public by François Arago in 1839. And it was the rhetoric of observation and objectivity that was so beloved of scientists in the mid-nineteenth century that photography very soon acquired. It was, in fact, photography's close ties to science that hindered its bid to claim fine-art status. It is photography's close and continued ties to science that have also been utilised by artists through the decades, artists who played with the concepts of objectivity, truth, documentary and surveying. The author discusses the unique place that photography has taken up in the art of science and the science of art, dwelling on moments when the two appear to be one and the same, and moments where they appear to diverge. Rather than writing a sort of survey, the paper will dip in at various points in history, looking at the debates from various historical perspectives so as to consider the paradigm ‘art science’ as it has variously been applied to photography. The paper will take up the conflicting rhetorics of passivity and control, mechanical and creative, showing how each is used in its place, but always emphasising the back-and-forth, the give-and-take between science and art. It will be argued that photography's dual nature is exactly what makes it interesting to artists, and what makes it valuable to the sciences.     

Development, Diversity, and Conflict in the Sociology of Science *

The sociology of science has undergone considerable growth and diversification in recent years. Early sociology of science was developed within philosophical debates regarding the nature of science and the social bases of knowledge in general. Karl Mannheim and Max Scheler in the 1920s gave these discussions a specifically sociological bent. In the 1930s, the theme was made into an explicit sociology of science both by Marxists and by the functionalist Robert Merton, and both approaches were followed up during the next 30 years. The takeoff of the sociology of science into a flourishing research area occurred in the early 1960s, with the publication of works by Derek Price and by Thomas Kuhn, as well as important studies by Joseph Ben-David and by Warren Hagstrom. In the 1970s, sociology of science burgeoned into a variety of approaches: citation and network studies, conflict theory, social constructivism, ethnomethologically-influenced studies of laboratory life, and others. The idealized functionalist image of science has largely given way to more critical, relativist, and highly empirical approaches to science.     

Social Transformation in the Age of Globalization. A Challenge to Reduce Anomie and to Increase Social Capital

Anomie is one of few social scientific terms with a wide claim to explain aspects of social change, in different cultures at different stages of modernization not to say globalization. In the early 1990s the Scientific Board of the Swiss Academy of Development commenced a research project which is still continuing with most of the same researchers but under the name of The International Network for the Assessment of Social Transformation (INAST), based in the Institute of Sociology, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. The work was importantly influenced by Robert K. Merton, an honorary member of the group.     

Stratification in American Science*

Although differential ranking in science is not readily visible to lay observers, American science is, in fact, sharply graded. Rewards and facilities for research are concentrated among relatively few investigators and organizations. This distinctive pattern of stratification, at odds with the egalitarian ethos of science, is not solely attributable to the distribution of talent in the scientific community. There is however a high correlation between assessed contributions to science and investigators' scientific standing. The present pattern of stratification is the outcome of processes of allocation of men and resources among various sectors of science which include selective recruitment and socialization of young investigators, differential access to publication and research facilities, and differential recognition of scientists' contributions through citations to their work and honorific awards. In a time when the legitimacy of reward systems in many social institutions is routinely challenged, scientists are apt to accept their own as just and correct.     

Beyond Presentism and Historicism: Understanding the History of Social Science

The revival of interest in the social scientific past has stimulated a growing literature on the methodology of the history of social science. Existing "presentist" type histories have been criticized for their "Whiggish" assumptions about scientific progress. The critique of presentism is the product of a new school of historians of social science who advocate a "historicist" historiography. My paper is addressed to this discussion and falls into three parts. First, I review the principles of presentist and historicist historiographies, relating their methodological positions to their theories of science. Second, I take up the argument of the "new historicism" in more detail, criticizing its theory of textual interpretation and its theory of social scientific development. I conclude by offering an alternative historiographic model of social scientific development based upon a theory of science that I outline.     

Science, Power, Bodies: The Mobilization of Nature as State Formation

Abstract This paper brings together recently developed perspectives in science studies and the historical sociology of state formation. It focuses on how scientific and government practices together construct the relationalities, identities, natures, and material environments of the bodies that constitute the modern state. The paper argues that the modern state is an effect of these practices, a techno-scientific political formation in which political government and scientific practice are woven together in a heterogeneous yet definitive network.     

Yoshida Theory: Its Structure,Criticism and Advancement

Tamito Yoshida, a giant of theoretical sociology, passed away in 2009. Here, I give a concise review of his theoretical achievements, called “Yoshida Theory”, and foresee the future. The main features of Yoshida Theory are the following: information controls resources; there was evolution from the stage of only materials to that of materials controlled by generic information and also to that of materials controlled by symbolic information; the process of information procedures is divided into “to cognize,”“to evaluate” and “to order,” which are distinguished from one another, and from the theoretical standpoint called the “Information Processing Resources Paradigm”; i nformation is maintained as long as it is useful, and when it becomes useless it is selected or expected to be changed. There was much criticism against the theory. The most unrelenting opposition was that it was not a system of explanation in the conventional sense of scientific methodology. It was claimed not to be positive scientific theory because of the logical inconsistency. Yoshida's counter‐criticism was, contrary to his opposites' expectations, that sociological theory ought not to fulfill the criteria to be science. It seemed to support his evolutionalist assertion that the synchronically inconsistent theory will be corrected diachronically and achieve some consistency. The criteria of science themselves should be re‐constructed to thematize the fact that information or program‐controlling society has evolution, he thought. He called it “New Science”; however, the attempt was never completed. It is still our task to clarify whether sociological theory can remain in science or not.     

AZT kill or cure? The social essences of scientific authority

This paper examines differing institutional responses to and interpretation of the same scientific and medical data, and looks at the way in which policies, ostensibly based upon these interpretations, are presented to public audiences. The case study concerns the use of AZT as a prophylactic for injured health care workers. Data was collected from personal in depth interviews in two health authorities and telephone interviews with a further 35 health authorities. Observations include the fact that widely different interpretations of scientific data by scientific and medical experts is likely to be presented to the lay audience in terms of scientific certainty, based on an institutional need for certainty and consensus. Contrary to conventional perspectives which would suggest that scientific knowledge was completed in its expert arena, then applied in different settings, this analysis suggests that the scientific knowledge is socially ‘completed’ or ‘closed’ in each of the different situations in which it is interpreted into practice. Ideal models of both the science and of organisational working practice, appear to have been used as the basis of these different constructions.     

Merton’s Sociology 215-216 Course

For many years, Robert K. Merton taught a famous, year-long graduate course at Columbia called The Analysis of Social Structures. His lectures have been recalled for their dazzling intellectual effects by those who took the course, but none of these former students has described what Merton actually said in specific lectures. I do this now, using my extensive lecture notes from 1952–53 when I took it for credit, and from later years when I sat in on the course. The core of the course at that time was Merton’s Paradigm for Functional Analysis in Sociology. Each concept in the paradigm—subjective dispositions, objective consequences, functional requirements, structural constraints, etc.—was elaborated in its relationship to a wide variety of sociological problems in the published theoretical and empirical literature. I also recount how Merton’s relationship to Talcott Parsons appeared to us in the course.     

Science and its Others: examining the discourse about scientific misconduct through a postcolonial lens

This article investigates the current discourse about scientific misconduct from a postcolonial perspective. It traces the development of a causal story about scientific misconduct, blaming misconduct on so-called foreign scientific cultures said to be most prevalent among developing countries. The paper attempts to show how the discourse on misconduct is structured by themes and logics of coloniality as well as diverges from them, exhibiting shifting categorisations and images of the Other, which oscillate between the Other as a backwards savage and the Other as an advanced machine. Such contradictory categorisations will be argued to be both interpretable as movements to abandon prevailing ideologies of efficiency and progress within science and to make science more inclusive as well as means to uphold and re-establish existing patterns of coloniality in the face of historical changes both within and outside of academic research.     

Unfeeling knowledge: Emotion and objectivity in the history of sociology

The theoretical concern of this paper is with the relationship of gender, personal life, and emotion to the social construction of sicentific knowledge. I examine this question through biographical research into the life and work of William Fielding Ogburn (1886–1959), a major figure in the history of American sociology. Ogburn believed that emotion was inimical to science and that statistics could help control what he considered to be its distorting effects. My analysis suggests that there was a personal component, reflecting Ogburn's search for masculinity, to the development of his ideas about how scientific sociology should be defined and practiced. I also suggest that Ogburn's ideas were favorably received by his mostly male audience because they spoke to broad cultural and historical currents. My analysis shows the need for a view of scientific knowledge that takes into account the effects of gender relations and emotion on intellectual activity.     

Reason, Politics, and the Politics of Truth: How Science Is Both Autonomous and Dependent

The concept of "science" usually includes commitments to reason, objectivity, and disinterest in the search for truth about the nature of the world. In this view, politics, in the sense of maneuvering to gain power, corrupts both the process and the product of science. However, we show that science is political through and through—in the process of constructing scientific knowledge, in maintaining disciplines, and in being responsive to partisan sponsorship. Nevertheless, the practitioners of both science and politics maintain the boundary between the two fields; in fact, the disciplines most dependent upon government support tend also to be the most autonomous. This situation becomes understandable when both fields are considered as discursive practices. Then, scientific debates can be seen as productive precisely because they derive from an objective agreement about science as an autonomous intellectual enterprise, and science itself can be seen as a politics of truth .     

Government Influence on the Social Science Paradigm*

A scientific paradigm includes a set of widely shared understandings that specify a discipline's research methodologies and substantive priorities. The impact of government sponsorship of academic social research on the paradigms of four social science disciplines is evaluated using a probability sample of 1,079 faculty members in the fields of anthropology, economics, political science, and psychology. The results indicate that federal government funding is allocated according to topical and methodological priorities that are distinct from the disciplines' self-defined priorities. It is also found that: (1) federal support of academic research has a significant impact on the substantive and methodological plans of social scientists; (2) social scientists who are financially dependent on government assistance are particularly responsive to government influence; (3) the condition of financial dependency on government funding is in part a product of prior federal investment in social research. An “externalist” thesis holds that the scientific paradigm is not autonomous and is significantly shaped by such outside factors as the political system, and these findings provide support for this thesis.     

Max Weber, Interpretive Sociology, and the Sense of Historical Science: a Positivistic Conception of Verstehen

Weber's advocacy of understanding and an interpretive sociology is shown to be a consequence of the anthropological premises of his theory of concept formation in history. These premises, which are implied in his Rickertian conception of value-relevance as the foundation of historical knowledge, are that men are interested in understandable historical developments because of their practical involvement in society—they rely on historical knowledge in their efforts to make sense out of the present. While acknowledging this indispensable function of history Weber insists, however, that historical knowledge can strictly justify neither the meaning given to the present nor man's conduct in practical affairs. This is why, in opposition to the mainstream of the Verstehen tradition, he argues against a valuing historical and social science. Yet this separation of values and facts does not entail an option for an irrational decisionism in value matters. On the contrary, it provides the very basis for their rational discussion. Those who impute to Weber the position that empirical knowledge has nothing to contribute to a social praxis but instrumental recommendations do not realize that this makes nonsense of his justification of historical knowledge.