THE ROMANTIC ANTECEDENTS OF MEADIAN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*

Mead's life-long interest in Romanticism is the least studied aspect of his work. As summarized in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Meadian explorations in romantic philosophy and sociology provide a valuable insight into his substantive contributions. The present paper seeks to amplify this insight and explores its relevance to the interactionist tradition in sociology. Special attention is given to the Meadian claim that the modern notion of self first appears in the romantic literature. Mead's emphasis on the interplay between the social structure and the structure of the self is linked to the romantic vision of the self as the microcosm of the social macrocosm. The current controversy over Mead and Chicago sociology is given a new interpretation in light of the dialectical premises inherent in the Meadian and romantic theories of self.     

Anatomy of Fear: Mead's Theory of the Past and the Experience of the HIV/AIDS “Worried Well”

The HIV/AIDS “worried well”—persons who believe themselves infected with HIV in the absence of any objective medical proof—have been well documented in the psychological literature but not the sociological literature. Adopting a symbolic interactionist perspective, I use George Herbert Mead's theory of the past to conceptualize the HIV/AIDS worried well experience by analyzing narratives written by persons who have been worried well. Empirically, I provide sociological evidence of the existence of the HIV/AIDS worried well. Theoretically, I expand concepts derived from studies of persons with chronic illness to the worried well and speak to the influence of Mead's theory of the past to sociology.     

The Hobbesian Microcosm: On the Dialectics of the Self in Social Theory*

If Parsons is not guilty of holding an over-socialized conception of man, Wrong's critique does apply to the work of the “reality-constructionists” and “symbolic interactionists.” In underemphasizing Mead's “biologic individual” or “I,” contemporary sociological social psychology manages to evade the Hobbesian problem and, hence, amounts to a largely disembodied dialectic. By way of contrast, the compatibility of the Meadian and Freudian perspectives is stressed and the need for further development of a psychoanalytic sociology reaffirmed.     

W.E.B. DU BOIS,THE BLACK CHURCH,AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION

During his early sociological period (1896–1914), Du Bois published several empirically-based studies on the Black Church. Many topics were addressed that are relevant to the contemporary study of the Black Church and the sociology of religion. Du Bois utilized methodological triangulation to empirically ground his studies of the Black Church. Census, survey, and ethnographic data were integrated to provide a comprehensive picture of the role of the Black Church in the African American community. He addressed the social construction of African American religious identity and provided an early functional analysis of the Black Church. The association between religion and social class was recognized, and Du Bois was a pioneer in the area of congregational studies addressing such issues as church expenditures and membership patterns and generating surveys of children's religious beliefs and ministerial effectiveness. Extensive data were collected on Black Church membership in large cities and small communities. These data make it possible to reconstruct the Black Church religious economy in these areas. Du Bois' sociological work on religion provides a link to the discipline's past and a bridge to its future.     

Mead's Lost Conception of Society

The single best word to describe the impact of George Herbert Mead's ideas on the intellectual world is “ironic.” Although Mead was a philosopher, his ideas have been more influential in sociology than in philosophy. Despite Mead's belief that it is the job of sociologists to study society, it is his notion of the self rather than his notion of society that has received the most attention in this field. Mead himself is first and foremost responsible for this ironic state of affairs because his analysis of society is so obscure at points that it is hard for most sociologists to understand. However, Mead alone is not to blame. The two main expositors of his sociological thought since his death, Herbert Blumer and Hans Joas, added to the confusion by not making clear that Mead sees society as a “body of institutions.” To correct their distortions of Mead's notion of society, I provide an alternative exposition of that notion. I disclose how Mead addresses the three main problems that he believes must be resolved before society can be understood: (1) the operation of institutions in the daily lives of people; (2) the origination of early institutions, such as language, the family, the economy, religion, polity, and science; and (3) the change of these institutions after their inception.     

Social Behaviorism on Emotions: Mead and Modern Behaviorism Compared*

This paper presents George Herbert Mead's work on emotions from the perspective of social behaviorism and compares it with the modem behavioral analysis of emotions. The two positions are strikingly similar. The main difference between modern behaviorism and Mead's social behaviorism is that contemporary behaviorists have access to a larger empirical data base and more refined theoretical models than Mead had. The modern behavioral analysis of emotions confirms most of Mead's basic observations and expands upon them. Empirically oriented symbolic interactionists who identify with Mead's social behaviorism can benefit by drawing upon the extensive behavioral research and theories developed in the decades since Mead worked. In fact, there is an enormous potential for developing productive research and theory at the interface between Mead's social behaviorism and modem behaviorism in the study of emotions and most other social psychological topics.     

Mead's Theory of Emergence as a Framework for Multilevel Sociological Inquiry

This article explores Mead's theory of emergence. The essence of this theory is conditional interactionism. In this perspective, every social fact is an emergent arising out of preconditioned interaction between the acting unit and the social and nonsocial environment. Its nature is shaped by (1) the patterns, processes, and contents of the interaction, including their mediation by such factors as perception/meaning, reflective thinking, role‐taking‐based rationality, emotion, nonsymbolic power in use, and reality testing; and (2) the preexisting conditions of both the acting unit and the environment that underlie this interaction. I argue that Mead's conditional interactionism can be used as a powerful guide for sociological inquiry at all levels of research and that it has the potential to function as a metatheoretical approach to compete with both the objectivist/structuralist and the subjectivist/phenomenological traditions. Mead's theory of emergence is probably the greatest treasure we can unearth from his semineglected legacy.     

Mead's Solution to the Problem of Agency*

The question of agency is central to several important debates in contemporary sociology. Unfortunately, discussions of agency can become embroiled with issues related to free will and dterminism. George Herbert Mead developed an approach to agency that avoids unsolvable metaphysical problems about free will and determinism. This paper presents Mead's work relevant to agency, revealing both Mead's method and the details of his theory. First, it shows how Mead followed the basic methods of behavioristic psychology, which require that abstract philosophical and psychological concepts are defined in terms of the actual behaviors involved. A strict focus on behavior helps in avoiding metaphysical impasses when dealing with such complex issues as decision making and choice. Second, the paper presents an overview of Mead's specific theories about awareness, meaning, decision making, choice, creativity, and social responsibility, showing how he analyzed these concepts in terms of the central nervous system, language, inner conversation, taking the role of others, reflective intelligence, the “I” and the “me”, and related concepts.     

INTERPRETING THE SOCIOLOGICAL CLASSICS: CAN THERE BE A “TRUE” MEANING OF MEAD?

Many sociologists have tried in vain to find the “true” meaning of the classic works in the discipline. An interactionist perspective suggests that this search is not a valid one for sociologists, especially symbolic interactionists. Although there can be no “true” meaning, some authors use conventions of writing that make their work more or less clear. Using Mead's Mind, Self and Society as an example, we discuss the dimensions of clarity. We then argue that the sociological classics should be read to (I) simulate new theories and research (pragmatic analysis), (2) determine how sociologists have used that classic to support or refute particular theories or perspectives (rhetorical analysis), and (3) provide information about the sociological concerns of the author and his/her contemporaries (historical analysis).     

A (macro) sociology of fear?

A proper sociological approach to fear is of both empirical and theoretical significance in understanding late modern society. Normally fear has been explored psychologically, as one of the emotions, but recently a sociology of emotions has begun to emerge. Furthermore, there have also been attempts to examine fear macro‐scopically, arguing for the existence of a distinctive ‘culture of fear’ in contemporary societies. Furedi's argument to this effect is explored here, suggesting the need for a more systematic theorising of fear in its social contexts. Via an analysis of the elementary characteristics of fear, a model is constructed of the ‘parameters of fear’. This model serves as a guide to the classes of phenomena within which fear is constituted and negotiated. It is also used to further examine the virtues and failings of ‘culture of fear’ approaches to fearfulness in modern societies.     

THE SOCIAL PRESERVATION OF MIND: THE ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE EXPERIENCE

Data from the Alzheimer's disease (senile dementia) experience are interpreted to extend and refine George Mead's theory of mind. While Mead conceived of mind as an internal conversation, the disease experience shows that the reality-status of mind is more practical and radically dialogical in organization. Taken as collectively preserved, mind is circumscribed through agents by means of rule-guided articulations and closures. Suggestions are offered for a more fully dialogical appreciation of Mead's view.     

George Herbert Mead and Karl Marx: Exploring Consciousness and Community*

Current discussions within symbolic interaction point to a concern with (a) returning to Mead's original insights, (b) extending Meadian thought beyond the micro realm, and (c) linking Mead's ideas to constructive social action. These concerns complement an effort within contemporary Marxist literature to provide a systematic social psychology for understanding new forms of domination in capitalist society. In exploring the philosophical foundations of Mead and Marx, the authors identify fundamental similarities in their approaches to the relation between consciousness and community. The authors criticize the current attempts to synthesize Marx and Freud and call for a more thoroughly sociological approach. A Meadian reading of Marx, unlike the Marx-Freud synthesis, is consistent with sociological assumptions and points to the practical possibility of transformative social change through the interpersonal act.     

The Dialectic of Technology: Commentary on Warner and England1

Abstract Warner and England (1995) make a welcome argument for a technological science perspective for sociology based on a theory of humans as technological agents and an epistemology that includes ethical values. As with any sociological perspective, however, Warner and England's comments help to focus on and understand some aspects of social life and not others. This commentary provides a complementary focus by emphasizing the dialectical relationship between human agency and technological agency. Furthermore, I argue that a dialectical view is necessary for grounding Warner and England's theoretical argument and for acting on their ethical argument. Implications of a dialectical perspective for the meaning and politics of technology are explored. The paper concludes with a discussion of the suitability of “science” as a metaphor for sociology.     

Current State of the Sociology of Occupations

This report is a review of the recent literature (mostly since the mid 60s) of the sociology of occupations. The notion of measuring professionalism, especially as represented by the attribute approach, has failed to deal with crucial sociological issues. The sociology of occupations has been criticized for being without an overall theory, but the search for such a theory may not be a justified goal. Work in this field has produced many interesting and useful generalizations of a more limited range. Studies of this field are numerous, but they are distributed unevenly over the range of occupations and work issues. The strong point is the numerous detailed case studies of occupations. However, there are also some good examples of efforts to relate occupational behavior to a larger societal perspective.     

The Person Behind The Word: Mead's Theory Of Universals And A Shift Of Focus In Symbolic Interactionism

Careful consideration of Mead's theory of universals proves to be a corrective to a number of tendencies evident in the work of at least some influential contemporary symbolic interactionists. Mead avoids any realistic hypostatization of separate universals (“meanings,” “forms,” or “essences” while at the same time eschewing nominalistic and conventionalistic views of language. His principle of the objective reality of perspectives (1932:161-175) allows him to grant objective reality to universal characteristics of concrete objects, but entails neither hypostatization nor idealization of the universal. In addition to contravening nominalism and conventionalism, Mead's theory of universals provides a perspective from which the reality of the self, and the importance of intentional action for the development of a firmly felt sense of self and autonomy, can both be affirmed. Far from being an illusion or mer.e symbolic construct, the self is seen to be an objectively real universal within the perspective of social action.     

Sociologists of the unexpected: Edward A. Ross and Georg Sinimel on the unintended consequences of modernity

The modern increase in opportunities for social activities also brings with it unintended side effects posed by the liberating potential and the acceleration of modern life. In this paper it is argued that the views reflected in Georg Simmel’s formal approach and in American sociologist Edward A. Ross’ reformative sociology are (1) complementary and (2) offer fresh insights for our current sociological understanding of unexpected consequences in contemporary “high modernity” or knowledge societies. A long forgotten nexus between the ideas of Simmel’s and the work of Ross will be reviewed in order to point out affinities between the two authors’ takes on the unintended and sometimes tragic moments in modern culture and their relevance for sociology today. Based on these discussions a fundamental mode for framing the unexpected in modern society as a recursively-linked component to the intended is illustrated.     

Sociology as a Natural Science? The Agenda of Walter Wallace*

Walter L. Wallace has spent over twenty years outlining parameters for the discipline of sociology. He has paid special attention to what he calls the “complementarities” between the various areas of sociological specialization. From this investigation he has proposed a metalanguage to unite the discipline, with a particular emphasis on structure. Wallace's position is that sociology must, inevitably, follow the canons of the natural science model. This perspective is sketched in this article with some assessment of Wallace's contribution to contemporary sociology.     

Back to Hegel? On Gillian Rose's critique of sociological reason

Thirty‐five years ago, Gillian Rose articulated a significant critique of classical sociological reason, emphasizing its relationship to its philosophical forebears. In a series of works, but most significantly in her Hegel contra Sociology, Rose worked to specify the implications of sociology's failure, both in its critical Marxist and its ‘scientific’ forms, to move beyond Kant and to fully come to terms with the thought of Hegel. In this article, I unpack and explain the substance of her criticisms, developing the necessary Hegelian philosophical background on which she founded them. I argue that Rose's attempted recuperation of ‘speculative reason’ for social theory remains little understood, despite its continued relevance to contemporary debates concerning the nature and scope of sociological reason. As an illustration, I employ Rose to critique Chernilo's recent call for a more philosophically sophisticated sociology. From the vantage point of Rose, this particular account of a ‘philosophical sociology’ remains abstract and rooted in the neo‐Kantian contradictions that continue to characterize sociology.     

The sociologist and the state. An assessment of Pierre Bourdieu's sociology

This paper provides an assessment of Pierre Bourdieu's sociology based on a reading of his posthumously published lectures on the state in Sur l'État. It argues that the state was a foundational element in Bourdieu's rendition of the symbolic order of everyday life. As such, the state becomes equally pivotal in Bourdieu's sociology, the applicability of which rests on the existence of the state, which stabilizes the social fields and their symbolic action that constitute the object of sociology. The state, which Bourdieu considers a ‘meta'‐ordering principle in social life, ensures that sociology has a well‐ordered object of study, vis‐à‐vis which it can posit itself as ‘meta‐meta’. The state thus functions as an epistemic guarantee in Bourdieu's sociology. A critical analysis of Bourdieu's sociology of the state offers the chance of a more fundamental overall assessment of Bourdieu's conception of sociology that has relevance for any critical sociological perspective that rests on the assumption of a meta‐social entity, such as the state in Bourdieu's work, as a final ordering instance.