2011年：宽松货币政策实施与退出的“滞胀”效应——来自2002～2010年货币存量变动研究的见解

通过对2002～2010年我国货币存量、价格波动与产出增长关系的实证研究,有两个重要的发现：一是一个高的货币存量增长率会带来物价上涨的趋势,而抑制物价上涨的根本之策是降低货币增长率;二是2009～2010年实施的宽松货币政策对产出增长的短期效应开始消褪,而价格则进入了一个上升通道,＂滞胀＂风险已经出现,因而中央银行转向降低通胀的一个明确的货币政策规则应是优选的政策目标。     

STICKY PRICE AND STICKY INFORMATION PRICE‐SETTING MODELS: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?

Using a partial equilibrium framework, Mankiw and Reis show that a sticky information model can generate a lagged and gradual inflation response after a monetary policy shock, whereas a sticky price model cannot. Our study demonstrates that the finding is sensitive to their model's parameterization. To determine a plausible parameterization, we specify a general equilibrium model with sticky information. In that model, we find that inflation peaks only one period after a monetary disturbance. A sensitivity analysis of our results reveals that the inflation peak is delayed by including real rigidities when the monetary policy instrument is money growth, whereas inflation peaks immediately when the policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. ( JEL E31, E32, E52)     

Roles of Stock Price and Exchange Rate in Slovakia's Money Demand Function and Policy Implications

The demand for real M1 in Slovakia is positively influenced by real output and the stock price and negatively associated with the deposit rate, depreciation of the koruna, the euro interest rate, and the expected inflation rate. Considering the goods and the money market simultaneously, these results suggest that a higher stock price may or may not cause real output to rise and that a depreciation of the koruna or a higher euro interest rate would help raise Slovakia's real output. The coefficients of the deposit rate and the stock price in real M2 demand are insignificant at the 10% level. The likelihood ratio test in the extended Box–Cox model shows that the double-log form cannot be rejected at the 5% level while the linear form can be rejected at the 5% level. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests show that the money demand function was relatively stable.      

THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

THE RELATION BETWEEN NARRATIVE AND MONEY MARKET INDICATORS OF MONETARY POLICY

This paper studies the relation between narrative-based indicators of monetary policy and widely used money market indicators of monetary policy. Three principal findings emerge. First, changes in monetary policy, as measured by the narrative-based policy indices, are associated with persistent changes in the levels of M2 and the monetary base. In contrast, changes in the narrative policy indicators lead to transitory changes in short-term interest rates, nonborrowed reserves, and the spread between the six-month commercial paper rate and the three-month treasury bill rate. Third, these findings are generally robust across different narrative-based policy indices.     

EFFICIENT INFORMATION PROCESSING IN OUTPUT MARKETS: TESTS AND IMPLICATIONS

If goods markets efficiently process information, much of received macro doctrine seems of little relevance. Neither unemployment nor the money stock should be leading indicators of inflation. Countercyclical monetary policy will have little effect on inflation. Restrictive monetary policy can have severe effects on real variables if the public is unconvinced the authorities are committed to reducing inflation. When proper account is taken of mean shifts in the stochastic process generating CPI inflation rates, there is little remaining autocorrelation indicative of inefficiency, and filter rule experiments similarly support the hypothesis of goods market efficiency.     

THE TIMING OF MARKETS AND MONETARY TRANSFERS IN CASH-IN-ADVANCE ECONOMIES

In cash-in-advance models, do the timing of markets and the timing of the monetary transfer affect equilibrium money demand? The timing of markets generates different individual money demands; however, under the common assumption that agents are identical, these differences do not affect the behavior of equilibrium real balances. In contrast, the timing of the monetary transfer has important implications for agent's information sets; these implications can influence the equilibrium characteristics of real balances.     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING,INDETERMINACY, AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper investigates economies of scale (ES) in financial intermediation as a source of equilibrium indeterminacy. Financial intermediation is embedded into a standard flexible‐price monetary model, and provides deposits (inside money) that substitute with currency to purchase consumption. The results indicate that equilibrium indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES in intermediation nor a large intermediation sector, but on monetary policy and the determination of nominal interest rates. Monetary policies not targeting nominal rates allow for indeterminacy to arise for any positive degree of ES, while policies targeting nominal rates eliminate indeterminacy for all degrees of ES. (JEL C62, E44, E52)     

THE INTEREST ELASTICITY OF MONEY DEMAND, LIQUIDITY AND REVERSE CAUSATION

This paper employs theoretical neoclassical and Keynesian models which have been expanded to include near monies to demonstrate that the interest elasticity of money demand is a peripheral issue to more fundamental differences between monetarists and Keynesians. The analysis indicates that the money supply is endogenously determined by income in such models, i.e. the reverse causation argument applies, and money is therefore an inappropriate instrument of monetary policy. The analysis also reveals that necessary and sufficient conditions for fiscal policy to be impotent are that the interest elasticities of money demand, money supply and all near monies must be zero.     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)     

THE REACTION OF INTEREST RATES TO UNANTICIPATED FEDERAL RESERVE ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MONEY ANNOUNCEMENT CONTROVERSY

This paper examines the reaction of long- and short-term interest rates to monetary policy surprises that influenced market expectations of the future behavior of the federal funds rate in the period after October 1979. We find that the relative reaction of long- and short-term rates to policy surprises is similar to the relative reaction of these rates to money announcements. Consequently, we conclude that the large reaction of long-term interest rates to money announcements in the period after October 1979 is consistent with the "policy anticipations hypothesis" which views this reaction as a movement in real interest rates.     

MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS,EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES

This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CASE FOR NEGATIVE NOMINAL INTEREST RATES?

This article studies optimal monetary policy in a model with credit frictions and money demand. We show that augmenting a standard New Keynesian model with money demand and financial frictions generates a mechanism that, in equilibrium, gives rise to optimal negative nominal interest rates. In addition, we find that the tighter credit markets are, the lower the optimal nominal policy interest rate and the more likely it is to be negative. Quantitatively, when credit constraints are binding, a standard calibration of the model generates an optimal nominal policy interest rate that is roughly ?4% annually. (JEL E31, E41, E43, E44, E52, E58)     

COULD STABLE MONEY HAVE AVERTED THE GREAT CONTRACTION?

We test the hypothesis that the Great Contraction would have been attenuated had the Federal Reserve not allowed the money stock to decline. We simulate a model that estimates separate relations for output and the price level and assumes that output and price dynamics are not especially sensitive to policy changes. The simulations include a strong and a weak form of Friedman's constant money growth rule. The results support the hypothesis that the Great Contraction would have been mitigated and shortened had the Federal Reserve followed a constant money growth rule.     

A CLARIFICATION OF THE EXCESS DEMAND FOR OR EXCESS SUPPLY OF MONEY

One of the most misunderstood and neglected concepts in all of economics is the notion that money may be in excess supply or excess demand. The article presents several reasons why monetary disequilibrium would indeed persist, including the fact that no "money market" exists with a single price which would clear that market. Contrary to the claims of several leading textbooks, the article explains why changes in the interest rate would not immediately eliminate an excess supply of or demand for money.     

MONETARY POLICY AND ENDOWMENT RISK IN A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL

A limited participation model is constructed to study the risk‐sharing role of monetary policy. A fraction of households exchange money for interest‐bearing government nominal bonds in the asset market and the government injects money through open market operations. In equilibrium, money is nonneutral and monetary policy redistributes consumption across households. Without idiosyncratic endowment risk, monetary policy becomes a perfect risk‐sharing tool, but with idiosyncratic endowment risk, it is not. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general. (JEL E4, E5)     

FINANCIAL MARKET VARIABLES DO NOT PREDICT REAL ACTIVITY

The past decade has seen an extensive empirical reassessment of the information content of financial market variables sensitive to monetary policy. Particularly provocative are recent papers suggesting that some interest rates and interest rate spreads contain more information about economic activity than monetary aggregates. This paper reviews important methodological pitfalls in these studies. We then show that none of the commonly employed measures of monetary policy contain incremental information useful in forecasting real economic activity. Two conclusions are possible. Either monetary policy innovations have no significant real effects, or we (collectively) have failed in our efforts to measure monetary policy. ( JEL E52)     

THE VANISHING LIQUIDITY EFFECT OF MONEY ON INTEREST: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

This paper seeks to re-examine the effects of money on interest rates. The earlier literature on this topic determined, fairly well, the pattern of response of interest rates to changes in money growth. The notable studies of Cagan (1972), Cagan and Gandolfi (1969), and Gibson (1970) served to establish the professions "stylized pattern" as presented in section I. Section II presents new evidence on the subject and finds that the old empirical generalizations no longer hold. Specifically, the results suggest that the initial liquidity effect of faster money growth is likely to be offset within the month following the monetary policy change. Sections III and IV investigate the reasons for the changing pattern of monetary effects on interest rates and discuss the policy implications of the new pattern.     

INTERNATIONAL PRICE BEHAVIOR AND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY

Oil prices, commodity prices and American monetary policy, the last operating through a variety of channels, have all figured prominently in explanations of the international inflation process in the late 1960s and early 70s. OUT major purpose in this paper is to test these various hypotheses. We do so in the context of a reduced-form rational-expectations price equation which we estimate for the United States and seven other industrial countries using quarterly data for the period 1955 through 1976.
The principal conclusion that emerges from this exercise is that movements in domestic money in these countries served as the key link in the inflation process. The factors that produced these monetary changes, however, differed among countries. Price shocks of various sorts were clearly of secondary importance.
The other important set of conclusions concerns the demand for money. In place of a traditional stock adjustment model, we used GLS with a second-order correction for autocorrelation. We believe this produced more plausible estimates of the parameters of the long-run demand function and of the adjustment process itself.     

THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY: FURTHER EVIDENCE

Simultaneous monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions are derived and estimated for the 1969:2–1984.3 period. The results suggest that the Reagan administration has abandoned fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Furthermore, although the average money growth rate declined in the Reagan administration, variation in the rate of money growth indicates that monetary policy has been used to combat unemployment. Finally, monetary and fiscal policies were not coordinated during this period. Rather, monetary and fiscal policy appear to be set by a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. In a Nash equilibrium, the policy chosen by each authority maximizes its payoff, given the policy choice of the other authority.