A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions

A necessary and sufficient condition is established in terms of restrictions on individual preferences for a class of democratic systems to be Nash-stable: that there is no one in the society who can profitably misrepresent his preferences. It is shown that only a very strong similarity of preferences can eliminate the incentive for individuals to misreveal their preferences. Since individual preferences in actual practice are not likely to be so similar, the result in this paper shows that strategic misrevelation of preferences by individuals remains a disturbing possibility under this class of democratic rules.We are grateful to Professor Prasanta K. Pattanaik for many helpful suggestions.     

Is more health always better for society? Exploring public preferences that violate monotonicity

There has recently been some literature on the properties of a Health-Related Social Welfare Function (HRSWF). The aim of this article is to contribute to the analysis of the different properties of a HRSWF, paying particular attention to the monotonicity principle. For monotonicity to be fulfilled, any increase in individual health—other things equal—should result in an increase in social welfare. We elicit public preferences concerning trade-offs between the total level of health (concern for efficiency) and its distribution (concern for equality), under different hypothetical scenarios through face-to-face interviews. Of key interests are: the distinction between non-monotonic preferences and Rawlsian preferences; symmetry of HRSWF; and the extent of inequality neutral preferences. The results indicate strong support for non-monotonic preferences, over Rawlsian preferences. Furthermore, the majority of those surveyed had preferences that were consistent with a symmetric and inequality averse HRSWF.     

The Independence Postulate,Hypothetical and Called-off Acts: a further reply to Rabinowicz

The Independence postulate links current preferences between called-off acts with current preferences between constant acts. Under the assumption that the chance-events used in compound von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries are value-neutral, current preferences between these constant acts are linked to current preferences between hypothetical acts, conditioned by those chance events. Under an assumption of stability of preferences over time, current preferences between these hypothetical acts are linked to future preferences between what are then and there constant acts. Here, I show that a failure of Independence with respect to current preferences leads to an inconsistency in sequential decisions. Two called-off acts are constructed such that each is admissible in the same sequential decision and yet one is strictly preferred to the other. This responds to a question regarding admissibility posed by Rabinowicz ([2000] Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: A rejoinder to Seidenfeld, Theory and Decision 48: 311–318 [this issue]).     

Interpersonal dependency of preferences

Standard decision theoretic models disregard the phenomenon of interpersonal dependency of preferences. In this paper it is argued that interpersonal dependency of preferences is a serious challenge for standard utility theory. First we sketch the more philosophical aspects of the problem and then, using a simple, formal model for the two-person case, we show that interpersonal dependency of preferences generally results in indeterminacy of preferences (resp. of subjective utility).     

Common genetic effects on risk-taking preferences and choices

Although prior research has shown that risk-taking preferences and choices are correlated across many domains, there is a dearth of research investigating whether these correlations are primarily the result of genetic or environmental factors. We examine the extent to which common genetic factors account for the association between general risk-taking preferences and domain-specific risk-taking preferences, and between general risk-taking preferences and risk taking choices in financial investments, stock market participation and business formation. Using data from 1898 monozygotic (MZ) and 1344 same-sex dizygotic (DZ) twins, we find that general risk-taking shares a common genetic component with domain-specific risk-taking preferences and risk-taking choices.

     

Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games

Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. For 2 × 2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable.Jel Codes: C72, A13     

Welfare analysis under uncertainty

This article extends Bergsonian welfare analysis to an environment of uncertainty where preferences are not expected utility and may even be state-inconsistent. Given state-inconsistent preferences, the familiar notion of ex ante efficiency is also state-inconsistent. Other efficiency and welfare concepts achieve state consistency by ignoring entirely the prospective preferences of consumers. The framework developed in this article allows welfare judgments to be state-consistent while respecting prospective and conditional preferences. The theory is called inclusive welfare. An application to optimum insurance subsidies illustrates the practical use of the concept.     

Does nurture matter: Theory and experimental investigation on the effect of working environment on risk and time preferences

Building upon the reference dependent preferences model, we develop a theoretical framework to examine the relationship between environment and preferences. To verify the model’s prediction, we use a combined artefactual field experiment and household survey data in Vietnam to investigate whether involvement is risky and has long-run targeted benefits, thereby causing fishermen to exhibit different risk and time preferences than workers in other occupations. Using a structural model approach, we integrate prospect theory and hyperbolic time discounting into a single framework, to simultaneously estimate and correlate the parameters of both risk and time preferences with other demographic variables. The key finding that fishermen are found to be less risk-averse and more patient than others asserts the theoretical prediction about the influence of the working environment on preferences.     

Democracy and interdependent preferences

In a democracy, the views and wishes of the citizens are to count. The problem here is how this dictum is to be understood. I suggest that a proper analysis requires that each person's preferences be seen in the context of his beliefs concerning the preferences of the others and of the preferences he would have if he held different beliefs. Preferences founded on erroneous beliefs call for special consideration. So also do certain reluctantly held preferences. I propose a decision-policy involving the identification of social equilibria of preference.     

An axiomatic system for multidimensional preferences

An axiomatic system TP is developed which allows the amalgamation of linear preferences (preferences in respect to different criteria) according to the weights of those criteria. Section 1 deals with linear preferences. In Section 2 an axiomatic system for the ordering of classes of criteria is formulated. Section 3 explains the development of system TP. Two TP-systems are distinguished, based on two different linear preference systems. The preference relation of TP is shown to be nontransitive, while the linear preference relation is transitive. In 3.7 an alternative-system TP′ is given. Section 3.8 deals with formulas concerning the disjunction of alternatives, which are not valid in TP, even though they are valid in a linear preference system. In Section 4 types of preference relations and types of alternatives are distinguished to get the opportunity to express preferences between preferences.     

Social organizations and matching theory

We generalize the Gale-Shapley matching theory to the formation of social units consisting of more than two individuals and each individual having more than one role.We show how social preferences and social structure could conflict with freedom. In the absence of such a conflict, we define stability and show that this could conflict with social preferences and social structure. Next, we define Rawlsian justice in case of stability and show how social preferences and social structure can conflict with justice. Thus, it is the social preferences and social-structure which decide whether our concepts of freedom, stability, and justice are achievable or not.     

Giving in the face of risk

Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries’ final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals’ risk preferences are predictive for giving in both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple non-linear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk is on the beneficiaries’ side but less so when risk is on the givers’ side. Our results point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences that also incorporate risk preferences.     

A genuine foundation for prospect theory

In most models of (cumulative) prospect theory, reference dependence of preferences is imposed beforehand and the location of the reference point is determined exogenously. This paper presents principles that provide critical tests and foundations for prospect theory preferences without assuming reference-dependent preferences a priori. Instead, reference dependence is derived from behavior and the reference point arises endogenously.     

Learning-by-doing in an ambiguous environment

How well do revealed ambiguity preferences predict how people choose to seek new information about uncertain events? In an economics experiment, we apply a new instrument to measure ambiguity preferences, and in a later session observe to what extent the measure predicts the choice to receive costly information in a learning-by-doing game. Ambiguity averse subjects are more willing to pay to receive information, while risk averse subjects are not. Holding ambiguity preferences constant, risk averse subjects tend to perform worse than risk loving subjects. The returns to experimentation, especially for ambiguity averse subjects, suggest a not-well studied but important role that ambiguity preferences play in decision-making under uncertainty.     

Heterogeneous and Correlated Risk Preferences in Commercial Fishermen: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Perfect Storm</Emphasis> Dilemma

Commercial fishing involves both physical and financial risks. This combination questions whether fishermen are inherently risk-loving, whether physical and financial risk preferences are correlated, and how much preferences vary across fishermen. This paper addresses these questions with a panel data set of daily participation decisions in the California sea urchin dive fishery. Weather buoy data and the prevalence of great white sharks at a particular fishing site proxy for physical risk. Overall, urchin fishermen are not risk-loving on average, risk preferences are heterogeneous, and there is some evidence that risk preferences are positively correlated across physical and financial domains.JEL Classification: Q22, D81     

Subjective probabilities and utility with event-dependent preferences

This article generalizes Savage's theory to include event-dependent preferences. The state space is partitioned into finitely many events. The induced preferences over consequences are assumed independent of the underlying states within, but not across, these events. This results in an additively separable representation of preferences over acts. The dependence of the preference relation over consequences on the events is represented by event-dependent mappings of the set of consequences onto itself. Given these mappings, the preferences on acts are represented by the expectation of event-dependent utilities on the consequences with respect to unique subjective probabilities on the states.Helpful discussions with David Schmeidler are gratefully acknowledged.     

The individual rationality of maintaining a sense of justice

Let us say that an individual possesses aprincipled preference if she prefers satisfying her preferences without violating the principles of justice governing her community to satisfying her preferences by violating these principles. Although living among possessors of principled preferences benefits individuals, maintaining such a preference is individually costly. Further, individuals can benefit from others possessing principled preferences without themselves possessing one. In this paper, I argue that occupying a choice situation which mirrors key aspects of our own situation, maximizing rationality requires individuals to develop and maintain principled preferences.To establish that maintaining a principled preference is individually rational for the occupants of such a choice situation, I define a range of individual strategies for them, model their choice of individual strategies as a game, and argue that this game involves an equilibrium in which all of its participants would choose to develop and maintain a principled preference.     

Measuring ambiguity preferences: A new ambiguity preference survey module

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - Ambiguity preferences are important to explain human decision-making in many areas in economics and finance. To measure individual ambiguity preferences, the...