The Future Composition of the Canadian Labor Force: A Microsimulation Projection

This article charts the future transformations of the Canadian labor force population using a microsimulation projection model. The model takes into account differentials in demographic behavior and labor force participation of individuals according to their ethnocultural and educational characteristics. As a result of a rapid fall in fertility, the Canadian population is expected to age rapidly as baby boomers start to retire from the labor market in large numbers. In response to declining fertility, Canada raised its immigration intake at the end of the 1980s, and immigration is now the main driver of Canadian population growth. At the same time, immigrants to Canada are becoming more culturally diversified. Over the last half century, the main source regions have shifted from Europe to Asia. Results of the microsimulation show that Canada's labor force population will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than in the recent past. By 2031, almost one third of the country's total labor force could be foreign‐born, and almost all its future increase is expected to be among university graduates, while the less‐educated labor force is projected to decline.     

Immigration to the U.S.: the unfinished story

Annual totals of new immigrants and refugees in the US may now be up to the record highs of over a million immigrants counted in 6 years between 1905 and 1914. Since 1979, legal immigrants have averaged 566,000 a year (570,009 in 1985), newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000, and the "settled" illegal immigrant population is growing by up to 1/2 million a year, according to some estimates. 1/2 of illegal immigrants are persons who entered the US legally but then overstayed the terms of temporary visas. Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehensions of illegal aliens, projected at a record 1.8 million for fiscal year 1986, indicate a sharp increase in illegal border crossers, driven by Mexico's and Central America's mounting population and economic pressures and lured by the prospect of jobs with employers who through a loophole in US immigration law can hire illegal aliens without penalty. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration now accounts for 28% of US population growth and will account for all growth by the 2030's if fertility stays at the current low 1.8 births per woman. Public opinion strongly favors crubs on illegal immigration and legalization of illegal aliens long resident in the US, and in 1986 Congress enacted legislation to reduce illegal immigration to the US. Asians and Latin Americans now make up over 80% of legal immigrants and Latin Americans comprised 77% of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census. Asians far outstrip Latin American immigrants in education, occupational status, and income and might be expected to assimilate in the same manner as earlier immigrant group did. Hispanic immigrants so far appear to favor cultural pluralism, maintaining their own culture and the Spanish language. Research in California indicates that recent Hispanic immigrants (legal and illegal) have helped preserve low-wage industries and agriculture. Illegal immigrants appear to draw more on public health and education services than they pay back in taxes. With or without immigration reform, population and economic pressures in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin ensure that the numbers of people seeking to enter the US are only likely to increase.     

On Integrating Immigrants in Germany

Immigration to Germany in the decades following World War II made the Federal Republic the host of the largest number of immigrants in Europe. The size of the population with an immigration background is on the order of 15 million, nearly one‐fifth of the total population. (Many of these are ethnic German returnees.) Although restrictive policies and a less dynamic economy in recent years slowed the annual number of immigrants and asylum seekers, the interrelated demographic influences of very low fertility, negative natural population increase, and population aging make continuing future immigration likely and, judged by influential domestic interests, desirable. Anxieties about inadequate integration of immigrants in German society are, however, apparently strongly felt by large segments of the native population. The “Grand Coalition” government that took office in November 2005 considers the formation of an effective policy of integration a high priority. On 14 July 2006 an “Integration Summit” was convened in the Chancellery with the active participation of representatives of immigrant groups. Chancellor Angela Merkel called the Summit “an almost historical event.” Reproduced below in full is a non‐official English translation of a government statement (entitled “Good coexistence—Clear rules”) presented to the participants at the opening of the meeting. Intended as a “start of the development of a national integration plan,” the statement highlights existing deficiencies of integration, especially problems with second‐ and third‐generation immigrants: lack of mastery of the German language, weaknesses in education and training, high unemployment, lack of acceptance of the basic rules of coexistence, and violation of the law. The importance of these issues is underlined by a demographic fact noted in the statement: by 2010 it is expected that in Germany's large cities 50 percent of the population under age 40 will have an immigrant background. The statement recognizes the government's responsibility to help immigrants learn German and become better informed about the country's laws, culture, history, and political system. In turn, it demands reciprocal efforts from migrants living permanently and lawfully in Germany. The original German text of the statement is available at the Bundeskanzleramt home page: « http://www.bundesregierung.d »     

Efficacy of screening and treatment of latent tuberculosis infection

ABSTRACT

Sixty-three percent of the total active tuberculosis cases in Canada were diagnosed among foreign-born individuals, representing 20% of the total population. The majority of these cases occur from the reactivation of tuberculosis infections acquired prior to immigration. A preventive policy consisting of screening and treating new immigrants for latent tuberculosis infection is evaluated on its efficacy for reducing the total number of tuberculosis cases, using tuberculosis incidence data between 1986 and 1995 from the Canadian tuberculosis reporting system. The most effective intervention is to screen for and treat latent tuberculosis infection among arriving immigrants from countries of birth with a tuberculosis incidence rate greater than 15 cases per 100,000.     

Immigration and males' earnings inequality in the regions of the United States

In this paper I investigate the impact of recent immigration on males' earnings distributions in the major regions of the United States. I use six counterfactual scenarios to describe alternative regional skill distributions and wage structures for the population of natives and long-term immigrants in the absence of recent immigration. I find that immigration over the last three decades can account for a substantial portion of the variation in inequality across the regions. Recent immigration has contributed moderately to national growth in males' earnings inequality, primarily by changing the composition of the population.     

Immigration and the stable population model

This paper reports on work aimed at extending stable population theory to include immigration. Its central finding is that, as long as fertility is below replacement, a constant number and age distribution of immigrants (with fixed fertility and mortality schedules) lead to a stationary population. Neither the level of the net reproduction rate nor the size of the annual immigration affects this conclusion; a stationary population eventually emerges. How this stationary population is created is studied, as is the generational distribution of the constant annual stream of births and of the total population. It is also shown that immigrants and their early descendants may have fertility well above replacement (as long as later generations adopt and maintain fertility below replacement), and the outcome will still be a long-run stationary population.     

Unintended consequences of US immigration policy: explaining the post-1965 surge from Latin America

Immigration reforms in the United States initiated in the 1960s are widely thought to have opened the door to mass immigration from Asia and Latin America by eliminating past discriminatory policies. While this may be true for Asians, it is not the case for Latin Americans, who faced more restrictions to legal migration after 1965 than before. The boom in Latin American migration occurred in spite of rather than because of changes in US immigration law. In this article we describe how restrictions placed on the legal entry of Latin Americans, and especially Mexicans, set off a chain of events that in the ensuing decades had the paradoxical effect of producing more rather than fewer Latino immigrants. We offer an explanation for how and why Latinos in the United States, in just 40 years, increased from 9.6 million people and 5 percent of the population to 51 million people and 16 percent of the population, and why so many are now present without authorization.     

Canada's population: growth and dualism

In Canada the current 1.3% population growth rate is causing some concern. Those concerned argue that such a rate of growth in combination with high levels of consumption could jeopardize the country's resource base and its comfortable style of living. Many Canadians are questioning high levels of immigration, for now that the fertility level is below replacement level, net immigration contributes substantially to population growth (over 1/3 in 1976). The growing proportion of non-Europeans among recent immigrants is causing resentment, and, in a tight job market, immigrants are regarded as threats to the World War 2 baby boom cohort who are now at working ages. The baby boom generation also puts stress on housing and health services, and it will increase the need for pension checks as it ages. Although French fertility is no longer high and immigration is no longer dominated by the British, the French group's 200-year struggle to preserve its identity continues on in the current effort of the Quebec government to enforce the use of French language by law within that province. Geography and climate dictate another demographic fact that divides the country and pervades its history. In addition to intense regionalism, uneven population distribution is responsible for 2 other concerns: the rapid growth of several already large cities and depopulation of many small communities. Focus in this discussion is on Canada's population growth in the past and as projected for the future, historical and current fertility, mortality and immigration trends, the search for a new immigration policy, the impact of the baby boom generation on the population's age structure and the problems this creates, and recent shifts in population distribution and in the country's ethnic and linguistic makeup. The population policy proposals evolved thus far involve to a great extent the use of immigration as a lever for achieving given population objectives.     

Aging population scenarios: an Australian experience

During the past decade, there has been wide public discussion about the effects of population and immigration policies. There is some consensus that an older population imposes economic costs but uncontrolled population growth imposes congestion and environmental burdens. While many realize that policies which restrict population tend to exacerbate aging, the inevitable trade-off is not widely acknowledged. Fewer still appreciate that there is a sustainable age distribution that is largely imposed on us by nature that cannot be defeated in the long term. In this paper, we look at the ‘aging issue’ for Australia by looking at the total population and age distribution as a joint outcome. For ease of interpretation, the age distribution is converted into a required retirement age (RRA) to maintain dependency ratios at 2010 levels. We examine the effects of alternative policy scenarios on total population and RRAs, benchmarked against a hypothetical population in zero population growth equilibrium. We account for differing demographic groups of immigrants and emigrants as well as trends in mortality. Policy scenarios can be well summarized by plotting the trajectory of the two outcomes, total population and RRA, with the equilibrium values as axes.     

An alternative approach to immigration policy: Rationing by skill

Current U.S. immigration policy places a heavy emphasis on kinship ties with a U.S. citizen or resident alien in rationing immigration visas. An alternative policy is to focus on the skills of visa applicants. Immigrants with higher levels of schooling and with skills that are more readily transferable to the U.S. labor market are more productive, as measured by their earnings. A larger proportion of skilled workers in a cohort of immigrants tends to narrow the differences in earnings among skill groups in the native-born population. This reduces income inequality and reduces the use of income transfers by the low-skilled native-born population. More highly-skilled immigrants also make less use of income-contingent transfers. A point-system would be necessary to combine the multidimensional aspects of skill. The adoption of skill-based rationing with a point system in Canada led to an increase in the skill level of the immigrants.     

Son Preference and the Persistence of Culture: Evidence from South and East Asian Immigrants to Canada

Preference for sons over daughters, evident in China's and South Asia's male sex ratios, is commonly rationalized by poverty and the need for old‐age support. In this article we study South and East Asian immigrants to Canada, a group for whom the economic imperative to select sons is largely absent. Analyzing the 2001 and 2006 censuses, 20 percent samples, we find clear evidence of extensive sex selection in favor of boys at higher parities among South and East Asian immigrants unless they are Christian or Muslim. The latter finding accords with the explicit prohibition against (female) infanticide—traditionally the main sex‐selection method—in these religions. Our findings point to a strong cultural component to both the preference for sons and the willingness to resort to induced abortion based on sex.     

Immigration, ethnicity and voluntary association membership in Canada: Individual and contextual effects

Using multilevel models fitted to data collected by Statistics Canada and the Canadian Census, this paper assesses the individual and contextual influences of immigration and ethnicity on voluntary association membership. Our analysis is unique in two ways: (1) we explore the effects of both immigrant status and ethnicity at the individual level, and (2) we assess the role of both the immigrant population and the visible minority population at the community level. Our results demonstrate that the probability of holding an association membership increases as the time since immigration passes. We also find ethnic differences in the probability of membership, though these differences have little to do with visible minority group status. On the other hand, the contextual effects of immigration and visible minorities stand in contrast to these individual-level effects. More specifically, the probability of membership tends to be largest in communities with many immigrants but smallest in communities with many visible minorities. Consistent with Putnam's constrict thesis, these contextual effects operate in a similar manner for immigrants and native born citizens. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of these findings.     

文化的同化对加拿大老年人居住方式的影响

本文基于加拿大 1996年移民数据 ,利用单因素和多因素Logit模型分析方法 ,试图研究文化因素对老年人居住方式的影响。主要结论如下 :文化因素对老年人居住方式的选择有重要影响 ;文化的同化对移民居住方式的选择有显著作用 ,表现为移民时间越早的移民老年人独立居住的倾向越强 ;文化同化速度的快慢对不同种族来源的移民来说是不同的。该文认为 ,在未来相当长的时间内 ,与子女合住仍然是中国老年人居住方式的主流     

跨国移民与学缘网络——以日本D大学中国人研究者为个案

国际移民的研究中一直以关注移民的文化适应、移民与移入地居民的互动、移民网络的建构及移民社区的形成为主流,但是当今世界的国际移民群体已经发生了分化．不仅存在低人力资本的国际移民,同样存在着高人力资本的移民,他们的受教育程度、社会经济地位普遍高于移人地居民,本研究通过70个样本的个案研究发现,在他们的国际移民实践中,对血缘和地缘网络的依赖程度十分有限,他们更热衷于构建跨越区域空间的学缘网络、这不仅成为他们孤独的移民生活的情感寄托,也成为他们职业发展的需要。     

Immigration, integration and fiscal sustainability

Economic theory points out that immigration of even low-skilled immigrants may improve public finances in Western welfare states, and it is sometimes suggested that fiscal sustainability problems in Western countries caused by ageing populations could be solved by increasing immigration. We examine consequences of various immigration scenarios using the large-scale computable general equilibrium model Danish rational economic agents model describing the Danish economy. It turns out that increased immigration will generally worsen the Danish fiscal sustainability problem. Improved economic integration of immigrants and their descendants, however, may alleviate the problems of the public sector considerably. Responsible editor: Klaus F. Zimmermann     

Strengths and Weaknesses of Canadian Express Entry System: Experts’ Perceptions

This article offers an analysis of the first four years of functioning of Express Entry, a new on-line application management system to select skilled entrants for Canada's key economic immigration programs leading to permanent residence. Based on interviews with 20 experts on Canadian immigration policies, we identified a number of strengths and weaknesses of the Canadian Express Entry system related to four areas: immigration policy making, processing of applications, selection of immigrants, and retention of immigrants. Since these areas are integral parts of immigration policies in all countries and Canada is a long-term leader in the design of points-based systems for selection of skilled immigrants, we also specify several lessons from the Canadian experience with the Express Entry system for other countries seeking to attract skilled immigrants.     

Emigration from Canada in the 1960s

Summary Emigration from Canada can be assessed only by indirect means. Here, survival ratios have been applied to the total population enumerated in the 1961 Census and to particular segments of it, so that a comparison of the calculated numbers in 1971 with the population actually enumerated indicates the volume of emigration during the decade, both in the whole population and in certain groups. Amounting to two-thirds of the number of immigrants during the same period, the estimate for the ten years is exactly double the volume of emigration reported to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on immigration policy of 1975. Since 1971, the level of emigration has probably fallen. Of the 960,000 emigrants during the decade, 42 per cent were Canadian-born. Their favourite destination was the United States; immigrants, on the other hand, tended to return home. Many immigrants now stay in Canada for only a few years. Fewer Canadians emigrate to the United States. These two factors have contributed to a new pattern of emigration, up-to-date details of which will not be ascertained before the Census of 1981.     

Immigration and the dependency ratio of a host population

This paper examines the long-term impact of constant immigration on the dependency ratio in an SI population (a stationary population through constant immigration) in the context of the stable population model. Our analysis has three main findings. First, in SI populations, a younger population (a lower aging ratio) does not necessarily have a lower dependency ratio. An SI population has a lower dependency ratio than a closed stationary population, provided immigration is concentrated around the youngest working age in the host population. Second, under the same condition, selecting high-fertility immigrants increases the dependency ratio. Third, also under the same condition, substituting working-age immigrants with young (dependent) immigrants increases the dependency ratio. Using the United Nations model age structures of immigrants, our empirical illustration confirms these analytical results.     

The fertility contribution of Mexican immigration to the United States

Crucial to the long-term contribution of immigration to a receiving country's population is the extent to which the immigrants reproduce themselves in subsequent, native-born generations. Using conventional projection methodologies, this fertility contribution may be poorly estimated primarily because of problems in projecting the number of immigrants who are at risk of childbearing. We propose an alternative method that obviates the need to project the number of immigrants by using the full sending-country birth cohort as the risk group to project their receiving-country childbearing. This "sending-country birth cohort" method is found to perform dramatically better than conventional methods when projecting to 1999 from base years both before and after the large increase in inflows of Mexican immigrants to the United States in the late 1980s. Projecting forward from 1999, we estimate a cumulative contribution of Mexican immigrant fertility from the 1980s to 2040 of 36 million births, including 25% to 50% more births after 1995 than are projected using conventional methods.     

Immigration and Natives’ Attitudes towards the Welfare State: Evidence from the European Social Survey

Does immigration reduce natives’ support for the welfare state? Evidence from the European Social Survey (2002/2003) suggests a more qualified relation. For Europe as a whole, there is only weak evidence of a negative association between the perceived presence of immigrants and natives’ support for the welfare state. However, this weak average relationship masks considerable heterogeneity across countries. We distinguish two channels through which immigration could affect natives’ support for the welfare state: a pure dislike of immigrants and concerns about the economic consequences of immigration. We find that natives who hold both negative views react much more negatively to a given perceived share of immigrants than natives who hold neither view. However, there is no clear pattern concerning the relative importance of the two channels. Finally, we find that natives who hold either of these negative views of immigrants tend to be less supportive of the welfare state independently of the perceived presence of immigrants.